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Abstract
The Experience and Perception of Duration in Three Contemporary
Performances
James Richard Layton
I argue in this thesis that qualitative duration (viewed in opposition to
the construct of quantitative clock-time) can be experienced through
performance encounters that challenge smooth consumption. In a
socially accelerated culture, where to do more in less time is the
measure of a productive life, one’s connection with the ‘real’ time of
duration is diminished. To challenge this premise, I have used an
autoethnographic  approach  to  explore  an  experience  of  duration
conceived via the work of French philosopher Henri Bergson, who
posits  that  “pure  duration  [is  that  which]  excludes  all  idea  of
juxtaposition,  reciprocal  externality,  and  extension”  (Bergson,
1903/1999,  p.  26).  In  other  words,  Bergson asserts  that  duration
defies  quantitative  measurement.  I  argue  that  the  Bergsonian
experience of duration offers a pause from social acceleration and
effects  a  transformation  for  the  spectator  in  the  form  of  peak-
experience, flow, and communitas. 
Of three case studies presented, the first examines the phenomenon
of involuntary memory uncovered during a performance of Zecora
Ura’s  Hotel  Medea (Edinburgh,  2011)  and  illuminates  Maslow’s
concept  of  the  peak-experience.  The  second  case  study  uses
Einstein on the Beach (Barbican, 2012), a performance employing a
deliberately slow aesthetic, to demonstrate how Csikszentmihalyi’s
concept  of  ‘flow’  transforms the  participant.  The  final  case  study
explores  Robert  Wilson’s  participatory  performance  Walking
(Holkham,  2012),  which  invoked  Turner’s  notion  of  communitas.
These respective lenses consolidate understanding of Bergsonian
duration and suggest why contemporary audiences might be drawn
to durationally challenging performance.   
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An introductory note on terminology & Bergson and Performance
Throughout this thesis I refer to ‘time’ and ‘duration’ – terms that can
be understood and defined differently  according to  their  contexts.
Without denying these terms their complexities and nuances, I offer
these working definitions to  facilitate  clear  navigation through the
thesis. 
Time – a quantitative (clock-measured) and thus objective construct
that enables the measurement of productivity and/or negation.1
Duration –  a  qualitative  and  thus  subjective  phenomenon  that
defies  accurate  measurement  of  productivity  and/or  negation.
Despite  Bergson  scholar  F.C.T.  Moore’s  argument  for  the
appropriateness  of  durance,  I  have  found  his  usage  to  be  an
exception across the broader range of Bergson scholars and  have
therefore adhered to duration throughout this thesis. Bergson always
used the descriptor ‘durée’ and, in translating this to ‘duration’, there
is a risk (noted by Moore) that the English term might be read to
“refer  to  a  measurable  period  of  time  during  which  something
happens”  (1996,  p.  58).  While  Moore  has  preferred  the  English
‘durance’ I have followed the broader range of Bergson scholars in
adhering  to  ‘duration’  and  in  trusting  to  the  reader’s  grasp  of
context.2 Therefore,  unless  stated  as  something  else,  the  use of
‘duration’ as a term in this thesis refers specifically to Bergsonian
duration,  described  as  that  which  “excludes  all  juxtaposition,
reciprocal externality, and extension”  (Bergson, 1903/1999, p. 26).
In  contrast,  the  term  ‘durational’  refers  to  performance  lasting
beyond smooth consumption. 
1
 I  acknowledge  that  the  ‘problem’  of  time  has  been  debated  by  many
philosophers and therefore to ‘define’ time is not possible within this thesis. Thus, I
regard  time  in  terms  of  it  being  a  clock-measured  entity  that  supports  social
acceleration. 
2
 The  authorized  translation  of  Matter  and  Memory (which  I  refer  to
throughout this thesis) is noted by Moore as having “the great advantage of being
revised in proof by the author” (Moore, 1996, p. 58).
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Transformation – I use this term to explain the phenomenon of a
change  in  mental  or  physical  state.  More  specifically,  I  refer  to
individual transformation in terms of both peak-experience (drawing
on Maslow) and optimal experience (drawing on Csikszentmihalyi).
Finally, I  refer to  collective transformation in terms of communitas
(drawing on Turner). I suggest transformation is always embodied by
an individual  and is therefore subjective.  Although communitas is
traditionally regarded as social, collective, structural or symbolic, I
also regard the interplay of communitas and flow as providing an
individual transformation. 
This  thesis  suggests  that  performances  which  last  beyond
comfortably consumed lengths challenge smooth consumption. This
term is explained fully in Chapter Two but a brief definition at this
point will help steer the reader through the methodology in Chapter
One.  I  define  smooth  consumption as  a  means  of
compartmentalizing  live  performance  into  manageable  chunks  of
experience,  allowing  for  easy consumption  in  a  time-compressed
culture;  smooth  consumption  is  both  a  symptom and a cause of
social acceleration. 
Hartmut  Rosa  (2005/2013)  defines social  acceleration  as:  “an
increase in quantity per unit of time (or, logically equivalent, as a
reduction of the amount of time per fixed quantity)” (p. 65). Social
acceleration  leads  to  an  overwhelming  multiplicity  of  available
options,  making  their  fulfilment  an  impossibility  and  thereby
perpetuating a sense of underachievement.   As with other terms,
social  acceleration  is  explored in  a  later  chapter  (Three);  Rosa’s
helpful definition is intended to guide the reader in the early stages
of this thesis. 
The final term in this glossary is memory – a familiar concept with
variable definitions. For example, science might regard memory as
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being  a  function  of  the  brain  (O’Shea,  2005);  that  it  is  ‘held’
somewhere in the physical body, a catalogue of easily retrievable
facts, whereas Bergson (1896/1910) regards memory as ‘habit’  or
‘pure’. The former term refers to the memory we use to carry out
actions  such  as  recalling  lines  of  text  or  operating  a  machine,
whereas pure memory is involuntary and unable to be summoned at
will. This view is one that is increasingly supported by science, that
“memories are not possessions … [t]hey are mental constructions,
created in the present moment,  according to the demands of the
present” (Fernyhough, 2013, p. 6).  Both habit and pure memory are
explored in Chapter Four. 
Bergson & Performance 
The original contribution to knowledge provided by my thesis is the
combination of Bergson’s work on duration and the notions of self-
actualization, flow, and communitas, examined through the lens of
three performances that are not explicitly concerned with duration. I
hope that, through my analyses, I contribute to the burgeoning field
of  work in  relation to  Bergson and performance and offer  a  new
perspective to the debate – that of the transformative potential  of
work lasting beyond smooth consumption. 
Despite Bergson’s significance as a philosopher in the early part of
the  20th century  his  ideas  fell  out  of  favour  and  it  is  only  since
Deleuze’s  Bergsonism (1966)  that  Bergson’s  writing  returned  to
wider circulation. This absence of Bergson’s thought is reflected in
the field of performance, with the exception of Laughter (1900), often
discussed in  relation  to  comedy.  Despite  this,  the  last  few years
have  seen  discussions  emerging  around  Bergson’s  theory  of
duration and its implications for performance. In a themed issue of
Performance Research,  Edward Scheer (2012) notes the “idea of
duration  has  always  been  essential  to  the  experience  of
performance”  (p.  1)  and cites  Bergson as  a central  figure  in  the
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discussion  of  real  duration,  “with  its  emphasis  on  the  constant
change or flow of time … a definition that suggests an approach to
time  that  is  defiantly  non-linear  and  non-chronological  [an]  …
approach to time, and to perception, [that] is not static but fluid and
mobile” (p. 2). Scheer’s privileging of Bergson as a major influence
on  philosophies  of  time  positions  him  as  significant  in  current
thinking  around  duration  and  performance.  Despite  this,  the
application of Bergson to analyses of performance is relatively rare,
often neglected in favour of Deleuze. In fact, at a cross-disciplinary
arts  conference  titled  ‘Time’  at  the  University  of  Gothenburg  in
November  2015,  there  was  an  almost  complete  absence  of
reference  to  Bergson’s  philosophy  on  duration.  Similarly,  at  an
earlier conference – ‘On Duration’ – at Newcastle University in 2012,
I was the only speaker to make reference to Bergson’s concept of
duration  and,  at  the  2015  Theatre  and  Performance  Research
Association  (TAPRA)  conference,  there  was  only  a  single
presentation  using  Bergson’s  theoretical  stance  on  duration  in
relation to performance. 
At  the  Performance  Studies  International  (PSI)  19  conference  in
2013, several references to Bergson were made in papers, including
Saini Manninen, Nik Wakefield, and Katherine Fry.  Manninen used
Einstein  on  the  Beach to  suggest  something  anti-Bergsonian
occurred  in  the  production’s  use  of  space.  Wakefield’s  paper  –
Freeing Duration from the Durational – examined how works defined
as durational may not be so in Bergsonian terms, as Bergson saw
duration as a passage of living or becoming. Fry’s paper -  It’s About
Time:  Duree,  Duration  and  Durational  Performance  – explored
whether there exists a singular temporal logic to durational work in
relation to the work of Tehching Hsieh. Despite the title of the PSI
conference being ‘Now Then: Performance and Temporality’, with a
focus on the temporality of performance, the references to Bergson
were relatively scant. None of these references to Bergson and / in
performance employ his ideas in the same way as in my analysis of
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duration  in  relation  to  transformation.  Furthermore,  these  papers
were  concerned  solely  with  Bergson,  in  contrast  to  my  use  of
Bergson in conjunction with Maslow, Csikszentmihalyi, and Turner
as  a  means  of  further  illuminating  the  concept  of  Bergsonian
duration.  
Amelia Jones (2011) notes Bergson’s significance to performance 
art: 
[T]he profound paradox of live events … is that they are
only accessible through human perception; even in the
live ‘instant’ (if we can imagine such a thing), we perceive
and make sense of performance through bodily memory,
itself impossible to pin down or retrieve in any full state.
(p. 34)
The  relevance  of  Bergsonian  duration  may  be  in  its  ability  to
interrogate liveness and what it means to be present. In realizing a
sense of being present, the (loosening of) parameters are found in
durational work rather than smoothly consumed performance. This
liveness  is  evident  in  Katia  Arfara’s  (2014)  discussion  of  Kris
Verdonck’s  performative  installation  End,  in  which  the  visual
aesthetic and use of slowness is Wilsonesque and places us “inside
Bergson’s time abyss and his concept of simultaneous, coexisting
temporalities (p. 52). 
 
For Patrick Robinson (2012), the significance of Bergson’s  Matter
and Memory is that liveness as a source of power is “action and
indetermination … in the living body …. [and] the same question …
floats in the wings of nearly every performance” (p. 147). Robinson
concludes  that  encounters  between  Bergson’s  philosophy  and
performance  might  be  multiple  rather  than  singular,  raising
questions  of  “presence  (stage  presence,  the  present  moment,
liveness), memory (in rehearsal, in the unconscious) and attention
(memory, focus, intention) in terms of time, rather than space” (p.
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147). My thesis gathers some of these themes (memory, liveness,
the  present  moment)  and,  in  some  way,  ‘tests’  Robinson’s
hypothesis  that  “we are  ready to  exercise  the  power  Matter  and
Memory urges for us” (p. 147).  
Mark  Fleishman  (2012)  uses  Bergson’s  notion  of  duration  in
discussing  how  performance  as  research  exists  as  embodied
repetitions  in  time.  He  argues  that  “through  Bergson  and  then
Deleuze we can begin to understand the difference of performance
as a mode of research, its refusal of binaries … its radical openness,
its  multiplicities,  its  unrepresentability,  its  destabilization  of  all
pretensions to fixity and determination” (p. 32). Whilst this is clearly
related to practice as research, its implications for my thesis in using
Bergson  through  to  which  to  view and  analyze  performance  are
clear: Bergson offers a way of understanding performance’s lack of
fixity,  its  ephemerality  being  contingent  on  a  fluid  sense  of  time
passing. 
Austrian collective AO&’s four-hour performance, Old Acquaintance
Should Be Forgot takes the form of a meal,  where fifteen guests
share  fifteen  courses,  exploring  the  “temporality  of  these
participatory  and  ephemeral  events”  (Roberdeau,  2012,  p.  130).
Roberdeau suggests that AO&’s slowed down rhythms of the shared
meal  illustrates  “their  intensely  durational  praxis  of  living  and
cooking  [that]  successfully  renegotiates  everyday  aesthetic
awareness” (p. 134). Drawing on Bergson’s notion that perceptions
are impossible  to  isolate as they consist  of  many millions of  tiny
vibrations,  Roberdeau  argues  that  the  isolation  of  tastes  in  Old
Acquaintance might  actually  facilitate  the  distinction  between  the
essence  of  things  and  the  unity  of  experience  that  holds  them
together. 
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Lara Shalson (2012) uses the parameters of a performance normally
lasting  around  ninety  minutes  rather  my  suggested  two  hours  to
define durational work. For Shalson, durational performance offers
the “opportunity to concentrate ona single, often very simple, idea or
activity  for  an  extended  period  of  time,  in  the  belief  that  such
engagement yields certain rewards” (p. 103). In her article, which
argues that durational performance can offer a sense of something
different from the homogenized late capitalist culture, Shalson cites
Bergson  as  being  centrally  important  as  an  alternative  way  of
viewing  and  experiencing  time  in  performance.  Using  works  by
Marina  Abramović,  Jamie  Isenstein,  and  Yingmei  Duan,  Shalson
examines how experiences of these works might proffer a different
way of viewing time. 
Following theorists such as Hassan (2007) who argue we are now in
the  age  of  networked  time  –  an  advancement  on  the  changes
brought  about  during  the  industrial  revolution  –  Shalson  (2012)
suggests,  “[t]he problem with networked time is not that  we view
time as external and homogenous, nor is it that we fail to experience
the multiplicity  of  duration”  (p.  103)  but  that  our  attention  is  less
focused,  as  we  are  constantly  directed  to  multiple  diversions
simultaneously,  resonating  with  Rosa’s  hypothesis  of  social
acceleration. Shalson regards durational performance as being able
to counter this, an argument I put forward in my thesis. In discussing
her participation in  Marina Abramović Presents (Whitworth Gallery,
2009),  Shalson notes  that  “by focusing on the time spent,  rather
than  on  what  transpired  during  it,  the  four-hour  period  …  is
transformed intoa quantified representation of precisely that which
escapes such measurement” (p. 105).  
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Introduction: (Re)Ma(r)king Time
Making time, marking time, remarking (on) time, remaking time. The
parentheses in the above title imply time is a constructed concept in
that it is man-made and marked by clocks and calendars, usually
quantitatively. The title also suggests time is something that can be
remade,  reformed,  and  reconstituted  as  something  other  than  a
quantitative entity. Time is embodied and felt and can therefore be
experienced as duration; a qualitative alternative to the concept of
clock-time that supports a socially accelerated culture, in which to do
more  in  less  time  is  the  measure  of  a  ‘productive’  life  (Rosa,
2005/2013; Rosa & Scheuerman, 2008/2009). As a construct, clock-
time facilitates smooth consumption of cultural encounters such as
live performance, thereby supporting a socially accelerated culture.
In such a culture, an increased number of experiences are possible
and  I  argue  this  reduces  our  natural  sense  of  duration.  These
paradigms support each other: smooth consumption increases the
number of possible experiences in a socially accelerated culture and
therefore condensing many lifetimes into one  seems manageable.
Thus, to challenge this, my search has been for an experience of
duration  in  performances  lasting  beyond  smooth  consumption.
Whilst smooth consumption is ubiquitous, the trend in contemporary
performance  for  durational  works  –  those  that  last  beyond
comfortably consumed lengths, offers an oppositional stance to an
accelerated  culture.  Thus,  this  thesis  demonstrates  how
performance  can  be  used  as  a  way  of  remarking  on  the
phenomenon  of  social  acceleration  and  remark time  through  an
exploration  of  three  contemporary  performances  seen  between
August, 2011 and August, 2012. I suggest that Bergson’s notion of
‘pure’  duration  can  be  experienced  when  one  is  -  through
performance  -   taken  outside  of  the  conditions  of  a  socially
accelerated culture; that “pure duration [which] excludes all idea of
juxtaposition,  reciprocal  externality,  and  extension”  (Bergson,
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1903/1999,  p.  26)  can  be  a  product  of  conditions  created  when
performance exceeds comfortable consumption (Skjoldager-Nielsen,
2009). Using an autoethnographic approach, Bergson’s philosophy
of duration is explored in relation to concepts of  self-actualization
(Maslow,  1943;  1954;  1970;  1971),  optimal  experience  or  ‘flow’
(Csikszentmihalyi,  2008;  2013;  2014),  and  communitas  (Turner,
1969; 1982; 1988), exemplifying how transformation can occur. The
potential  for  self-actualization,  flow,  and  communitas3 to  offer
transformative  experiences  makes  them  natural  choices  for
explicating Bergson’s thinking on duration.   
Chapters One and Two offer an explication of smooth consumption
and how it can be challenged through autoethnographic readings of
performance, whilst the next chapter examines the phenomenon of
social acceleration. Memory cannot be divorced from an exploration
of duration in performance and so Chapter Four outlines Bergson’s
views on perception and involuntary recall.   Chapters Five to Ten
contextualize  Maslow,  Csikszentmihalyi,  and  Turner  alongside
Bergson  and  demonstrate  how  their  respective  theories  can  be
understood through my experiences of  duration as a spectator in
Hotel Medea (Edinburgh, 2011), Einstein on the Beach (2012), and
Walking (Norfolk,  2012).   In  using Maslow, Csikszentmihalyi,  and
Turner I hope to illuminate what I perceive to be Bergson’s meaning
of  duration and posit  it  as an antidote  to  the relentlessness of  a
socially accelerated culture, in which an innate sense of duration is
lost to clock-time. There are now few moments when we are able to
lose  a  sense  of  time  and  experience  duration,  such  as  that
described by Bergson, something that may be necessary in limiting
the often stressful effects of social acceleration. 
3
 The  first  two  of  these  concepts  have  their  provenance  in  the  field  of  positive
psychology; communitas, although originating in anthropology, follows a similarly positive
model that focuses on intrinsically positive aspects of humankind.  
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Chapter  One:  Challenging  smooth  consumption  -  an
autoethnographic   approach 
My  assertion  that  smooth  consumption  can  be  challenged  by
durational  performance  has  been  investigated  through  an
autoethnographic lens, a qualitative research methodology allowing
me to convey embodied experience and analyze concepts evading
concrete  description  or  measurement  in  my  encounters  with
performance. In exploring Bergson’s duration, that which “excludes
all  idea  of  juxtaposition,  reciprocal  externality,  and  extension”
(1903/1999, p. 26),4 the use of qualitative autoethnographic methods
can go some way towards addressing this problem. Whilst the use of
autoethnography is  not  a  wholesale  solution,5 it  has  assisted  my
qualitative, phenomenological enquiry. 
Informing my approach is  authority  on  autoethnography,  Heewon
Chang (2007;  2015).  She cites  Reed-Danahay’s  (1997)  assertion
that  autoethnography  consists  of  three  varieties:  native
anthropology,  ethnic  autobiography,  and  autobiographical
ethnography  (Chang,  2015).  The  first  category  refers  to
anthropologists studying a people to which they belong after being
studied  by  outsiders,  arguably  with  a  greater  understanding;6 the
second refers to studies written by minority ethnic groups, and the
third to anthropologists placing their own personal experience into
ethnographic writing. My own approach sits in the final category; my
personal  experience is  foregrounded whilst  also  observing  others
undergoing the same experience. For example, others’ experience
4
 This  view  of  duration  derives  from  Bergson’s  assertion  that  time  is
represented by  number and therefore  quantitative  and spatialized.  In  contrast,
duration  cannot  be  equated  with  anything  else  and  is  qualitative  and  wholly
subjective. 
5
 All  methodologies  have  their  limitations  and  the  question  of  conveying
embodied experience has not been fully addressed by any approach. 
6
 Arguably,  the  ‘outsider’  might  have  a  more  objective  and  therefore
increased understanding of the group being studied; conversely, the ‘insider’ may
have  a  more  nuanced perspective.  In  both  respects,  the  researcher  may find
different kinds of knowledge and understanding from their unique positions. 
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of the same performance may differ from my own, particularly when
one accounts for the manifold ways in which performance can be
read. In fact, the chosen performances could have been viewed as
being concerned with carnival (Hotel Medea), operatic performance
(Einstein on the Beach), and site-specificity (Walking).  A clear focus
on embodied experience and communicating  the  memory  of  that
experience through written text is coupled with an emphasis on my
experience and understanding, privileged above that of others. The
representation of others through autoethnographic research cannot,
however, be ignored, as the cultural context is significant.   
A tripartite of autoethnography 
Chang’s assertion that “autoethnography should be ethnographical
in  its  methodological  orientation,  cultural  in  its  interpretative
orientation, and autobiographical in its content orientation” (2015, p.
208) suggests  a triadic  balance of  ethnographic analysis,  cultural
interpretation,  and  self-narratives.  My  approach  has attempted  to
maintain this balance throughout my readings and analysis of the
three  performances.  The  subjectivity  of  my  phenomenological
experience  is  a  fundamental  ingredient  in  the  descriptions  and
analyses of each performance and is thus a central component of
my  narrative  writing,  contextualized  by  a  wider  cultural  and
philosophical  framework.  The  analysis  of  each  performance
experience is examined from the perspective of being a member of
a socially accelerated culture, whilst the triad is completed by my
spectatorship  of  the  performances,  thus  being  oriented  in
ethnography.  
Cultural context 
The first case study in this thesis illustrates how the ‘past me’ and
‘present me’ intermingle in a kind of cross-cultural encounter. As a
connection of the personal with the cultural - how one is reacting to
the world in which one exists, autoethnography proved important in
my  research.  Judith  Okely  exemplifies  this  point  in  discussing
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anthropology  and  autobiography:  “[t]he  autobiography  of  the
fieldworker  anthropologist  is  neither  in  a  cultural  vacuum,  nor
confined  to  the  anthropologist’s  own  culture,  but  …  placed  in  a
cross-cultural  encounter”  (Okely,  1992,  p.  2).  Chang  (2007)
suggests autoethnography is “ethnographical and autobiographical
at  the same time [and is]  concerned with  the cultural  connection
between  self  and  others  representing  the  society”  (p.  2).
Autoethnographic  research,  however,  is  not  the  same  as  other
narrative forms of writing such as memoir or journal as the authorial
voice responds to embodied experience and cultural context; for me,
it is against the backdrop of smoothly consumed live performance,
supported by a socially accelerated culture. 
Cultural  context  becomes  transitory  when  explored  in  relation  to
embodied experience. Just as Tami Spry (whose work is discussed
later in this chapter)  suggests identity  and culture can be viewed
from  a  different  angle  through  autoethnographic  performance  or
writing, the embodied experience of the autoethnographer allows for
shifts  in  cultural  understanding  to  occur  whilst  in  the  field.  This
makes  the  process  ‘cross-cultural’  in  two  senses.  Firstly,  the
researcher is able to make direct comparisons between cultures and
secondly, it can allow for the researcher to see how opposing ideas
might  become  hybridized.  Thus,  a  moment  in  performance  can
become  significant  at  that  point  in  time;  the  writing  up  being  a
reflection  on  that  insight.  My  account  of  Hotel  Medea draws  on
moments from my past into the present, hybridizing ‘past me’ with
‘present me’ cultures.  
Autoethnography  insists  the  culture  in  which  research  is  situated
should  not  be  ignored;  people  and  culture  have  a  “symbiotic
relationship” (de Munck, 2000, as cited in Chang, 2015, p. 216). The
“notion  of  culture predisposes  the  co-presence  of  others  [and
autoethnography  should]  reflect  the  interconnectivity  of  self  and
others” (Chang, 2015, p. 216). Thus, an autoethnographer failing to
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recognize  the  importance  of  culture  is  “likely  to  produce  a  self-
exposing  story  but  not  autoethnography”  (2015,  p.  216).  My
exploration  of  an  alternative  experience  of  time  uses
autoethnography to ‘expose’ duration; it is the cultural backdrop of
social acceleration that guards against it becoming a self-exposing
story, despite a strong emphasis on narrative.  
An autoethnographic reading of  performance situates  it  in  a  new
context.  Whilst  the  artists,  performers  and  directors  had  clear
intentions about the purpose of their works, I am unconcerned with
this  and,  to  an  extent  I  am bracketing  their  cultural context.7 My
readings,  however  remain  situated  in  cultural  and  philosophical
contexts,  primarily against the backdrop of an accelerated culture
but also as a consumer of comfortably consumed performances. As
a  member  of  a  socially  accelerated  culture,  I  acknowledge  my
conditioning to certain temporal expectations; it is my intention that
the accounts of performance offer an alternative perspective to this
culture whilst also being situated within it. Although some obvious
factors  might  differentiate  me  from  others  in  a  particular  culture
(ethnicity,  gender,  age,  socio-economic  background,  education),  I
state  my  position  as  a  mainstream  example  of  someone  totally
integrated into a socially accelerated culture. Any level of ‘expertise’
that might  contribute to my readings of the chosen performances
arises  from the research process and is not therefore an ‘expert’
reading. 
As an autoethnographer with a specific focus and agenda, I have
filtered and processed my most important perceptions both during
and after each performance. The focus of this thesis – a challenge
to  smooth  consumption  and  social  acceleration  has  affected  my
reading of each performance. I suggest they offer a challenge to the
7
 Not  ‘bracketing’  in  the  phenomenological  sense  but  placing  less
significance  on  artistic  intentions  of  the  performance  creators.  I  am,  however
mindful of the ethnography of each performance and have an understanding of the
artistic contexts. 
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hegemony  of  clock-time  and,  although  examined  in  relation  to
specific  theoretical  ideas,  the  transformative  potential  of  going
beyond  smooth  consumption  is  a  universal  possibility.  Prior
contextual knowledge of durational performance works has made a
contribution to my understanding but I suggest this is no different to
any individual’s prior knowledge or experience. In other words, each
participant  /  spectator  will  have  an  agenda  although  I  argue  my
agenda  has  a  greater objectivity  (despite  the  subjectivity  of
autoethnographic writing) because I have a clearer appreciation and
understanding of  the cultural  framework in  which I  am operating.
Furthermore, by explicitly stating my position, the reader is able to
successfully navigate through any subjectivity. In making the reader
aware  of  my  viewpoint,  my  intentions  and  reflections  are
transparent,  thus  maintaining  an  autoethnographical  rather  than
autobiographical focus.  Despite autoethnography exemplifying and
celebrating an innately personal response, it is the focus on lived
experience  that  presents  a  problem  for  some  in  terms  of  its
authenticity. However, as John Freeman (2010) suggests, there is
“no  such  thing  as  an  objective,  innocent,  primary  document…[a]
methodology based on autoethnography is ultimately no greater a
guarantee of the truth of experience than any other” (p. 183). It is the
relational quality of autoethnography that for me, validates it as a
useful research methodology, it being firmly situated in the context
of a wider culture.
Immediate feedback and the hyperreflexive ‘I’
Autoethnography  has  the  potential  to  offer  immediate  feedback
before  any  ‘data’  is  analyzed.  Furthermore,  a  reflective  process
using  notes,  memory  and  others’  recollections8 help  the  reader
create a vivid picture of the experience being described, thus better
understanding the encounter. My written accounts of performance
8
 I have not interviewed anyone who was present at each performance, as I
wanted to focus completely on my own experience. I have, however drawn on
accounts of academics or critics from either the same or previous productions.  
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aim to guide the reader towards an appreciation of, what I suggest
were  transformative  experiences.  The  transformations  discussed,
however are accounts of my transformation rather than attempting to
transform the reader.  Equally, the accounts are not ‘prescriptions’
for  a  similar  experience  although  I  suggest  challenging  smooth
consumption  can  be  transformative  for  anyone.   The  immersive
aspect  of  the  related  methodology  of  performance  ethnography,
offering “sensuous retellings and ongoing re-creations, in words and
body” (Pollock, 2006, p. 325) is a characteristic of  my descriptive
accounts; I have not attempted to hide the “I”, which in ethnography
is static and objective. The hyperreflexive ‘I’ of autoethnography is
stabilized  by  maintaining  a  triadic  balance  between  self,  (auto)
culture  (ethno),  and  descriptive  research  (-graphy).  Okely  (1992)
suggests  the  ‘I’  that  is  so  important  in  autobiographical  and
autoethnographical  research  is  only  inserted  at  “key  junctures  in
ethnographic monographs in order … to give authority to the text …
otherwise  they produced accounts  from which  the  self  has  been
sanitized” (p. 5). The presence of the ‘I’ is an important justification
for using autoethnography in my research, affirming the validity of
phenomenological  experience.  From  the  perspective  of
anthropology  (from  which  autoethnography  is  ultimately  derived),
autobiography or  reflexivity  can be viewed as  “threatening  to  the
canons  of  the  discipline  [as  the]  reflexive  I  of  the  ethnographer
subverts the idea of the observer as impersonal machine” (Okely,
1992, p. 24). Ultimately, autoethnography has allowed me to give
the  ‘I’  precedence  in  the  omnipresent  context  of  culture,  whilst
maintaining  the  necessary  triadic  balance  of  self,  culture,  and
descriptive research. 
Mind/Body
How to report on this embodied knowledge and practice, rooted in
the  senses  rather  than  the  mind  is  also  one  of  the  perceived
problems of  ethnography,  as  it  is  “an intensely sensuous way of
knowing” (Conquergood, 1991, p. 180). Embodiment of experience
20
and  its  recollection  through  memory  are  key  factors  in  exploring
each  performance;  I  aim  to  convey  the  embodied  experience
through text in a way that gives the authorial voice prominence. The
emancipatory potential of autoethnography is apparent through this
process and - at its most potent - knowledge comes through ‘being’
and privileges  my reading of a performance over the performance
intentions.  For  example,  none of  the chosen pieces are primarily
concerned  with  time  or  duration  –  it  may  be  coincidence  they
exceeded  cultural  norms;  for  me,  the  length  of  time  ‘in’  the
performance  was  a  dominating  factor.  Marina  Abramović  (2013)
suggests  these  ‘cultural  norms’  are  contravened  when  a
performance  exceeds  six  hours  and,  for  her  this  is  the  defining
quality of a durational performance. She also asserts that the 
performer’s use of time is a crucial element of this genre.
By  slowing  down,  lengthening,  or  repeating  actions
normally unexamined, a long durational work encourages
both  its  performers  and  audience  to  step  outside  of
traditional  conceptions  of  time  and  examine  what  this
experience  means  to  them.  (“What  are  long  durational
works?”, para. 2)  
Thus, it is not just the length of time a performance lasts but the
pace at which it unfolds. This quality of slowness was apparent in all
three performances and defined them as cultural encounters beyond
smooth consumption. Stepping outside of ‘traditional conceptions of
time’  is  the  mainstay  of  this  thesis,  in  the  hope  of  facilitating  a
challenge to smooth consumption and social acceleration.9
9
 Although  Abramović  is  specific  in  stating  that  performance  becomes
durational when it exceeds six hours, the performances examined in this thesis
are  approximately  between  four-and-a-half  and  six  hours.  I  am  not  using
Abramović’s definition as a benchmark but an indication of how ‘durational’ might
be defined; her definition may, in part, stem from the specific six-hour duration of
her  early  performance  Rhythm 0 (1974).  Since  then,  Abramović  has  regularly
worked with durations stretching into days, weeks and months. 
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Blurring  boundaries,  the  communication  of  embodied
knowledge, and the role of memory 
It is impossible to accurately communicate lived experience through
language  or  other  means,  as  the  ephemerality  of  a  moment
becomes a representation when recalled. Recollections of embodied
experiences  draw  upon  the  senses,  leaving  traces  on  memory.
Recalling a memory recollects visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory
and tactile  experiences,  attempting to  make cognitive sense of  a
corporeal  experience.  My intention  is  to  offer  written  accounts  of
performances  translating  sensory  experience  to  ordered  thought,
whilst  also  acknowledging  the  difficulty  in  accurately  capturing
embodied  experience.  In  using  aspects  of  autoethnography  I
attempt  to  offer  an  ‘embodied  perspective’  of  performative
encounters without using performance to convey the experience; it
is achieved through the evocative nature of the writing and the focus
on  my experience.  Whilst  it  would  be possible  to  include others’
accounts of the performances, I have chosen to exclude these, as I
privilege  the  role  of  my memory  in  recollections  and  analysis.
Despite the inadequacy of language to convey embodied experience
(something  Bergson  agrees  is  also  true  of  duration),  the
foregrounding  of  my  own  experience  can  only  be  adequately
articulated through my own language to support phenomenological
experience.  As  with  ethnographers  who  recognize  the  nature  of
discourse reaching beyond words in “dance, music, gesture, food,
ritual artifact, symbolic action” (Conquergood, 1991, p. 189), I have
considered my use of language and words that evoke a sense of
immersion rather than participation.10 
10
 Although I  have described myself  as participant-spectator in two of the
performances, my point here is that I was placed in the performance environment
primarily as audience member rather than performer. 
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Chang (2015)  suggests,  “[m]emory  is  both  a friend and a foe  of
autoethnographers;  whereas  it  allows  researchers  to  tap  into  the
wealth of data to which no one else has access, memory selects,
shapes, limits, and distorts” (p. 210).  As with Bergson’s notion of
pure  memory  (see  Chapter  Four),  which  is  incapable  of
compartmentalization and voluntary recall,  memories are distorted
and  appear  only  when  prompted  by  particular  perceptions.  The
composition of field texts makes researchers aware of the “limiting
nature of memory” (Chang, 2015, p.  210),  but is nevertheless an
essential  tool  in  conveying  embodied  experience.  The
autoethnographer  uses memory to  recall  the senses experienced
whilst in the field and is less concerned with accuracy of memories
than with the feelings evoked.11  Whilst I acknowledge the limiting
nature  of  memory,  it  has  the  potential  for  a  richer  evocation  of
embodied experience on the page. Drawing on the experience of
others can be helpful in recollecting specific moments, but it does
nothing  to  guard  against  the  vagaries  of  memory  in  others.
Therefore, the role of memory in my qualitative, phenomenological
enquiry is significant in conveying the experience to the reader. 
Written style
Autoethnographic writing style can depart from accepted academic
conventions.  Chang  (2007)  draws  on  Van  Maanen’s  (1988)
classification  of  ethnographic  writings,  noting  autoethnographic
writing  falls  between  realist  description,  impressionist  caricature,
analytical description, and confessional self-exposure. My writing is
between realist and analytical description as I attempt to evoke a
sense  of  my  actual  experience  from  an  analytical  perspective.
Chang  (2015)  also  asserts,  “[w]hichever  style  autoethnographers
decide  to  employ,  [they]  are  advised  not  to  lose  sight  of  the
quintessential identity of autoethnography as a cultural study of self
and  others”  (p.  213).  It  is  this  emphasis  on  culture  to  which
11
 Thus  in  the  performance  accounts,  events  may  be  inaccurate,  out  of
chronological order and embellished by ‘false’ recollections. 
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autoethnography constantly returns, whilst also placing importance
on individual experience.  
The choice of writing style impacts on a reader’s perceptions and
experience; autoethnography has two distinct types - evocative and
analytic. The former uses imaginative writing to create a vivid picture
for  the  reader,  extending  “ethnography  to  include  the  heart,  the
autobiographical  and  the  artistic  text”  (Ellis,  1999,  as  cited  in
Muncey, 2011, p. 35), whilst the latter refers to ethnographic work,
in  which  the  researcher  is  (1)  a  full  member  in  the
research group or setting, (2) visible as such a member in
the researcher’s published texts, and (3) committed to an
analytic  research  agenda  focused  on  improving
theoretical understandings of broader social phenomena
(Anderson, 2006, as cited in Muncey, 2011, p. 36).
An  analytic  approach  requires  a  more  detached  researcher  than
those engaged in an evocative approach; fewer of their own feelings
are presented. Evocative autoethnography may be concerned with
telling a life story and is therefore preoccupied with giving life to a
particular  moment  as  part  of  a  wider  narrative.  My  writing  falls
between these two areas and uses “relational language to create
purposeful dialogue between the reader and author” (Spry, 2001, p.
713). The discussions of each performance support  the reader in
engaging  with  the  text  meaningfully,  creating  their  picture  of  the
performance experiences being described;12 they must be “moved
emotionally and critically”,  [as a] “felt-text”  (Spry, 2001,  p.  714) –
possible  through  my  descriptions  which  relate  to  a  fundamental
human  experience  of  encountering  time.  Thus,  autoethnographic
writing “is able to present an individual perspective [but] also one
that  makes  connections  to  a  more  collective  understanding”
12
 Despite this assertion, I acknowledge that the structure of the narratives
(particularly Hotel Medea) distorts the linear picture of the performance, as I use
the device of repetition and description of moments non-sequentially. This device
allows the reader to engage with a sense of my memories being distorted in and
by the performance, thus creating a purposeful dialogue.
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(Freeman,  2010,  p.  184).  It  is  the  recognition  of  an  individual
perspective having resonance amongst a wider group of people that
draws a  distinction  between  autobiography  and  autoethnography.
Whilst  this  thesis  is  certainly  more  autoethnographic  than
autobiographical, the notion of  auto is a strength of the work and
one that offers an original perspective.  
The emancipatory potential of autoethnography  
Freeman (2010) suggests the term autoethnography is “contested,
even maligned” in the field of performance studies (p. 184), whilst
Spry  (2001)  argues  that  using  autoethnography  to  create
performance “concentrate[s] on the body as the site from which the
story  is  generated”  (p.  708).  Concerned  with  creating
autobiographical performances and the way we ‘I-Witness’ our own
reality  constructions,  Spry  sees  the  emancipatory  potential  of
autoethnography, whose defining feature interprets culture “through
the  self-reflections  and  cultural  refractions  of  identity”  (p.  706).
Similarly, my aim has been to self-reflect on the nature of duration in
order  to  demonstrate  that  it  can  be  viewed  from  a  different
perspective, changing the way it is viewed culturally. The notion of
Bergsonian duration is also emancipatory; it offers freedom from the
rigour of clock-measured time in a socially accelerated culture.   
An  autoethnographic  approach:  A  challenge  to  smooth
consumption? 
Autoethnography  focuses  on  the  experiential,  investigating  “the
feeling of  what  happens,  rather  than  having  a  focus  on  what13
13
 Whilst I offer detailed descriptions of each performance, the facts of what
happened may not be completely accurate as I have written from memory and
with a focus on feeling. 
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happened”  (emphasis  added)  (Freeman,  2010,  p.  182).  In  my
autoethnographic writing, I relate my feelings to the context of the
culture in which they arise; my exploration of duration comes from
the perspective of an individual embedded in a socially accelerated
culture, dominated by clock-measured time. 
The notion of cultural accounting having parity with critical reasoning
is another significant aspect of using an autoethnographic approach;
it allows for an assessment of aspects of a particular culture to be
explored. For me, the need for an alternative to social acceleration
and  societal  structures  of  time  are  assessed  through  my  own
experience whilst simultaneously analyzing them through the lenses
of Bergson, Maslow, Csikszentmihalyi, and Turner. 
This thesis is the result of  using aspects of an autoethnographic,
qualitative approach, drawing on my phenomenological14 experience
of performance to find the  essence of duration and explore peak-
experience,  flow,  and  communitas.  The  evocative  nature  of
autoethnographic writing supports my communication of embodied
experience,  as  part  of  a  hybrid  approach  to  reflect  the  esoteric
nature of Bergsonian duration.  
 
14
 Merleau-Ponty describes phenomenology as the “study of essences; and
according to it, all problems amount to finding definitions of essences: the essence
of perception, or the essence of consciousness” (1945/2007, p. vii). 
26
Chapter  Two:  Performance  and  the  challenge  to  smooth
consumption
In his discussion of Taiwanese artist Tehching Hsieh’s lifeworks, 
Adrian Heathfield (2009) examines other durational works of the 
1970s and 1980s and concludes:
[D]uration nearly always involves the collapse of objective
measure.  Whether  it  is  short  or long in ‘clock-time,’  its
passage will  be  marked by  a  sense of  the  warping  of
time,  an  opening  of  regularity  to  other  phenomena  or
inchoate orders. Duration will  often be accompanied by
spatial sense of expansion, suspension or collapse or by
reverential, chaotic or cosmic phenomena, as notions of
temporal distinction are undone. (p. 22) 
This  thesis  is  an  exploration  of  live  performance’s  ability  to
investigate this ‘collapse of objective measure’ and ‘warping’ of time.
In  doing  so  I  explore  how ‘other  phenomena or  inchoate  orders’
‘undo’ temporal distinctions. Exploring performance through the lens
of  Bergson  demonstrates  how  duration  can  be  understood  as
distinct  from  clock-time;  I  investigate  Maslow’s  peak-experience,
Csikszentmihalyi’s  ‘flow’,  and  Turner’s  communitas  as  inchoate
orders arising from this analysis and serve to elucidate how time can
be freed from the “connective imperative” (Heathfield, 2009, p. 21)
that supports a socially accelerated world (Rosa, 2005/2013; Rosa &
Scheuerman, 2008/2009).15 
 
Durational performance potentially creates a situation in which the
“overtaxed  recipient  experiences  [performance]  as  a  seemingly
unending, unsynthesizable, uncontrolled and uncontrollable course
of  events  … [in]  a  negative postdramatic  version of  the sublime”
15
 Peak-experience,  flow,  and  communitas  are  all  examples  of  inchoate
orders as, in my analysis, they emerge from time reforming as duration. 
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(Lehmann,  1999/2009,  pp.  156-7).  Despite  Lehmann’s  negative
reaction to the durational in postdramatic theatre, the “stretches of
time that often necessitate significant endurance in both performers
and participants”  (Hoffman,  2012,  p.  47)  can offer  an  efficacious
experience.  Echoing my assertion  that  a  grasp of  ‘real’  time has
been diminished by social acceleration16 and smooth consumption,
British performance artist Alistair MacLennan (as cited in Hoffman,
2012) comments:
Our culture is not very good at ‘being’ with time. There is
a tendency to ‘kill’  time, or not to be aware of time – a
sense that  it’s  oppressive.  We are  also  fearful  of  time
passing, of the ageing process. Of import is attending to
what  we’re  going  through,  rather  than  hiding  from  it,
escaping it, or seeking diversion from it. (p. 51) 
This thesis is an account of my exploration of an alternative to the
diversion of social acceleration; in experiencing performances that
challenge  smooth  consumption,  I  suggest  duration  becomes
apparent as the ‘objective measure’ of clock-time collapses. 
The notion that performance lasting beyond an average of two hours
offers  a  challenge  to  smooth  consumption  and  thus  a  culturally
healthy pause was suggested in an unpublished paper given by Kim
Skjoldager-Nielsen,  at  the  Performance  Studies  International
conference,  Zagreb  in  2009.    In  discussing  British-Danish
performance  artist  Stuart  Lynch’s  24-Hour  Performance  (2000),
Skjoldager-Nielsen  (2009)  posed  questions  about  the  schism
between such a performance offering the experience of Bergsonian
duration and the compartmentalized time of an audience who can
come  and  go  at  will,  something  that,  in  Lynch’s  performance,
produced “a deliberate clash of time and duration” (n.p.). The author
attempts  to  define  some  of  the  components  of  durational
performance using an example of “fitting into the category of easy
16
 The concept of social acceleration is explored fully in Chapter Three. 
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accessible  and  consumptive  cultural  products”  (2009,  n.p.).  He
suggests  the  US TV series  24,  in  which each of  the  twenty-four
episodes corresponds to one hour of real time, demonstrates that a
compartmentalization of the series allows for smooth consumption.
Although  Skjoldager-Nielsen  acknowledges  the  series  can  be
viewed in one sitting on DVD, this is unlike endurance felt in live
performance. The element of corporeal endurance provides the “one
constituent  of  the  subversively  viable  durational  performance  …
equally  in  the  sense that  the  event’s  time endures,  and that  we
endure it by perceiving and living it” (Skjoldager-Nielsen, 2009, n.p.).
This endurance is only possible with the co-presence of performer
and spectator: “this co-presence of mutually dependent participants
… makes the performance an emerging event … the unfolding of a
complex  interplay  of  all  of  its  constituents”  (2009,  n.p.).  This  co-
presence is emphasized by the excessive length of a performance,
as  each  spectator  who  chooses  to  stay  endures  the  labour  and
presence of the performer in its entirety. The challenge to smooth
consumption  offered  by  durational  performance  sits  against  the
backdrop  of  an  accelerated  world,  where  to  endure  means  to
condense  too  many  different  experiences  into  our  lives.  An
alternative  kind  of  endurance  (an  enduring)  is  offered  by  the
prospect of experiencing time as lived and real, an assertion argued
by Bergson (1889/1913).  
Thus the backdrop to this thesis is a socially accelerated world, in
which  experience  is  compartmentalized  to  allow  for  smooth
consumption. In turn, this has led to an accounting and rationing of
time  continuing  at  a  rapid  pace  and,  as  “fast  capitalism meshes
poorly with the fundamental rhythms of human existence, [it] thereby
engender[s]  intense  stress  and  unease  in  everyday  life”  (Rosa,
2008/2009, p. 25). The prospect, therefore, of an alternative to time
as  duration,  is  an  appealing  possibility.   I  argue  that  by
conceptualizing  time  as  duration,  a  personal  transformation  can
occur.  Approaching three performances from an autoethnographic
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perspective, a number of theoretical frameworks are connected to
aspects of  Bergson’s  theory  of  duration.   In  the first  case study,
Zecora Ura’s Hotel Medea is examined in relation to Maslow’s peak-
experience; the second examines Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of flow
in  relation  to  Robert  Wilson’s  Einstein  on  the  Beach,  and  finally
Turner’s notions of communitas and the liminoid are explored in the
context  of  Wilson’s  Walking.  Uniting  these  performances  is
Bergsonian duration, which I argue offers an alternative to the clock-
time of a socially accelerated world, thus enabling a transformation
understood  through  the  lenses  of  peak-experience,17 flow,  and
communitas.  All  three  performances  are  beyond  comfortably
consumed  durations,  are  slow,  and  thus  challenge  social
acceleration.  The  rationale  for  using  these three  theorists  is  that
each one can be read as positing a form of transformation through a
focused  effort;  there  is  a  goal  setting  associated  with  peak-
experience  and  flow.  Spontaneous  communitas,  discussed  in
relation to Walking is an exception to this rule and may not, at first
glance, appear to be the same focused effort. It is, however, from
approaching Hotel Medea and Einstein  through the focused lenses
of  achieving  peak-experience  and  flow18 that  resulted  in  my
understanding  of  spontaneous  communitas  in  Walking.  Thus,  my
focus  of  investigating  transformative  experience  in  the  first  two
performances facilitated my natural journey to and through Walking.
My  autoethnographic  research  journey  –  like  any  journey  –  had
unexpected paths opened to me and it was therefore apt that the
final case study was freer in form than the earlier pre-defined goals
in Medea and Einstein.  
17
 Maslow  suggests  peak-experiences  are  a  result  of  becoming  self-
actualized. 
18
 In Chapter Eight, I suggest that I did not watch Einstein to purposely seek a
flow  experience  but  that  the  experience  was  realized  through  subsequent
recollection and analysis of the performance. Despite this fact, my experience of
flow was though a focused effort. 
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These autoethnographic accounts are personal reflections and, as
such  relive  the  experiences  through  memory.  In  writing  these
accounts  from  my  memories  of  the  performances,  I  have  not
attempted  to  explore  entire concepts  but  rather  where  I  see  the
ideas  of  Maslow,  Csikszentmihalyi,  and  Turner  converging  with
Bergson. Thus my reading of Medea as a route to peak-experience
explores only some of Maslow’s B-Values;19 my analysis of Einstein
is limited to specific aspects of optimal experience, and my account
of Walking does not offer a comprehensive inquiry into all aspects of
Turner’s communitas. Neither is it the purpose of this thesis to offer
a complete disentangling of Bergson’s writing on duration, or is it
within  its  scope;  instead  I  explore  key  passages  of  Bergson’s
thought in which he considers duration as an absence of reciprocal
externality,  as  psychological  process,  intuition,  becoming  and
creative  evolution,  and  memory.  My  application  of  Bergsonian
duration to autoethnographic readings of contemporary performance
and  their  applicability  to  other  20th century  theorists  privileges  a
personal  response  to  performance;  I  thus  demonstrate  how
Bergson’s contribution to the philosophy of time can be understood
in an embodied sense.  
19
 According to Maslow, Being-values are present in self-actualizers. 
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Chapter Three:  Against the backdrop of a socially accelerated
world
Compiling  a  comprehensive  historical  overview  of  time  is  a  task
beyond  the  remit  or  possibilities  of  this  thesis.  Therefore,  the
inclusion  of  specific  histories  of  time  derive  from  my
autoethnographic approach. The insertion of details relating to the
railways,  monasteries,  and  industry  reflect  my  experience  of  the
world  since  birth,  in  which  travel  is  dictated  by  strict  timetables,
institutions such as schools are run by the bell (directly influenced by
early  monasteries);  schools  and  other  educational  institutions
adopting systems of preparing children for an industrious adult work
life. 
Sociologist Barbara Adam (1990) suggests that the measure of time
as an economic force is a man-made construct and, as such, can
only be understood in terms of power relations. She writes:
Humans  are  time  binding,  time  transcending  and  time
controlling beings. Whilst the control of the time-infused
conditions  of  existence  is  a  universal  human
characteristic  the  control  of  time  per  se is  not.  It  is  a
recent  historical  phenomenon  and  needs  to  be
associated  with  the  conjuncture  of  industrialisation  and
the development  of  calendars and clocks.  We need to
differentiate  the  control  of  time  as  such  from  the
generalised  control  over  the  time  aspects  of  our
existence. (p. 110) 
This transcendence of clock-time can be viewed through a number
of different lenses. As a time-infused being my temporal experience
is felt  corporeally and phenomenologically and thus it  follows that
there is the possibility of transcending rather than controlling time, a
position argued in this thesis. 
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According to Adam (2006): 
[Time]  has  suffused  knowledge  since  the  dawn  of
humanity.  It  has  occupied  such  a  central  place  in  the
history  of  ideas  and  cultural  practice  because  the
temporality  of  being  confronts  us  with  the  immemorial,
existential issues of life and death, origin and destiny.20
(p. 3)
As  such,  pursuing  an  understanding  of  time  has  concerned
philosophers  and  scientists  for  many  centuries;  as  if  by
understanding time, it can be controlled. In a seminal essay on time,
historian Lewis Mumford (1956) suggested that the control of time
was founded, not in the factories of the industrial revolution, but in
the monasteries of the 13th century:
 … one is not straining the facts when one suggests that
the monasteries … helped to give human enterprise the
regular collective beat and rhythm of the machine; for the
clock is not merely a means of keeping track of the hours,
but of synchronizing the actions of men….Time-keeping
passed into time-serving and time-accounting and time-
rationing. As this took place, Eternity ceased gradually to
serve as the measure and focus of human actions. (pp. 4-
5)
Adam (1990)  suggests,  “[l]ike the monastery  bell,  the school  bell
secures conformity to a regular collective beat. Unlike the monastery
bell, however, the school bell structures secular time, a time that no
longer  belongs  to  God but  to  a  human collective”  (p.  106).  This
machine time pervades every aspect of modern life, as “[c]hildren
are educated in accordance with its mechanistic beat. Public life is
regulated to its invariable rhythm.… All times are equal under the
clock.…  The  ultimate  transcendent  and  recalcitrant  became
malleable and manageable” (Adam, 2006, p.  116).  It  is  since the
rapid  advances  of  industrialization  were  made  possible  by
20
 It  is  human  nature  that  we  try  to  understand  our  existence  through
rationalizing structures such as time; time is used to mark births, deaths and other
important rites of passage. But, as a socially constructed concept, time does not
align itself with individual, innate senses of duration. 
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innovations  in  timekeeping  technology  between  the  17 th and  18th
centuries,  that  people  have  become  “like  clocks,  acting  with  a
repetitive regulatory which ha[s] no resemblance to the rhythmic life
of a natural being” (Woodcock, 2013, p. 66).
The domination of the clock began long before the invention of the
railways  whose  timetables  are  commonly  held  to  have  imposed
‘time’ upon us. The railways and technological advances, however,
enforced  a  stricter  sense  of  time,  also  shifting  pre-capitalist
ideologies of agrarian workers to the regime of the factory. Even in
pre-modern  cultures,  means  existed  of  calculating  time,  although
these were “usually imprecise and variable.  No one could tell  the
time  of  day  without  reference  to  other  socio-spatial  markers”
(Giddens, 2010, p. 17): [the] “[m]eans of reliably subdividing space
have always been more readily available than means of producing
uniform measures of time” (p. 19).  Thus the notions of ‘when’ had
become linked with ‘where’ - the invention of the mechanical clock
changed this, as it “expressed a uniform dimension of ‘empty’ time”
(Giddens, 2010, p. 17). Barnett (1999) speculates that clocks (or the
idea of a clock) had been in existence since 1271 as lecture notes
(prepared  for  either  the  University  of  Paris  or  the  University  of
Montpellier)  discuss  the  subject.  Records  of  mechanical  clocks
appear from the early 14th century with the “first known public clock
… erected in the tower of the Church of St. Eustorgio in Milan by
1309” (Barnett, 1999, p. 68). 
Adam  (2006)  suggests,  “machine-based,  rationalized  24-hour
system[s] measured a time whose subdivisions were based purely
on  convention  … operat[ing]  independently  of  the  variations  that
were  the  mark  of  planetary  cycles”  (p.  112).   The  increased
regularity of time began to shape people’s lives in a tangible way
and,  as Nigel  Thrift  suggests,  “[t]he  old  habit  of  leaving off  work
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when  enough  money  had  been  earned  for  the  week  had  to  be
eradicated now that machinery was involved” (1990, p. 115).  
The first large-scale factory in England resulted from an increased
ability to organize time. Ambrose Crowley’s ironworks in Winlaton,
near Newcastle was an operation that grew from a workforce of 197
in 1702 to over 1000 in the second half of the century. Crowley’s
central  innovation of  using a warden as timekeeper controlled all
workers’ activities: 
The warden was to deduct from a worker’s pay time that
was  ‘wasted’  in  drinking,  smoking  or  conversation.  A
greater offence was to alter time. Severe penalties were
laid down for tampering with the master clock. Informing
against others who sinned against the clock (as well as
informing against  loiterers in  general)  was encouraged.
(Frank, 2011, p. 90). 
Thus, Crowley’s control of the clock also controlled his workers and
therefore production and profit. Despite his unrelenting drive for time
efficiency,  Crowley  (a  Quaker)  was  philanthropic  and  aimed  to
create  a  “kind  of  utopia  in  which  reason,  when  applied  to  the
organization of society, would bring a better life to all” (Frank, 2011,
p.  91).  This  utopian  vision  was  short  lived,  as  the  industrial
revolution made the clock a weapon of ruthless factory owners and
industrialists. Today, this pressure of clock watching has, according
to Harvey (2000) reached such a level that: 
[M]ost  work schedules are extremely tightly  ordered …
favour[ing]  capital  rather  than  labour.   Telephone
operators working for AT&T are expected to deal with one
call  every 28  seconds as  a  condition  of  contract,  lorry
drivers push themselves to extremes of endurance and
court  death  by  taking  pills  to  keep  awake,  air  traffic
controllers  suffer  extremes  of  stress,  assembly  line
workers take to drugs and alcohol, all part and parcel of a
daily  work  rhythm  fixed  by  profit  making  rather  than
construction of humane work schedules. (p. 231)
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Harvey demonstrates a seismic shift  in the way time has gripped
people’s lives since Crowley’s use of the clock to advance a utopia.
In  the  short  period  since  Harvey’s  words  were  first  published  in
1990, the advance of the Internet and mobile technologies makes
his argument even more prescient. 
 
Taming time: From railway time to GMT
Writing in 1982, Walter Ong suggests that:
Time  is  seemingly  tamed  if  we  treat  it  spatially  on  a
calendar or the face of a clock, where we can make it
appear as divided into separate units next to each other.
But this also falsifies time.  Real time has no divisions at
all, but is interruptedly continuous: at midnight yesterday
did not click over into today.  No one can find the exact
point  of  midnight,  and if  it  is  not  exact,  how can it  be
midnight? (as cited in Rantanen, 2004, p.  48). 
Ong acknowledges two different types of time; the clock-measured
kind and what is experienced in reality - duration.  Time itself was
manipulated with the advent of the mechanical clock although it was
the adoption of GMT in 1880 that made time a force to be reckoned
with. In the early-industrialized factories of the nineteenth century,
workers were controlled by a concept of time possessing no realistic
value or correlation to the actual passing of time and, as “people
synchronized to the clock-time rhythm [they came] to be treated as
appendages to the machine” (Adam, 2006, p. 116). 
A stricter sense of time discipline became an enforced way of life
from the mid-1840s.  With the increased popularity of railway travel,
time accuracy became paramount, although the synchronization of
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time  was  not  a  smooth  transition.   Thrift  (1990)  illustrates  the
confusion felt by early railway passengers:
London time is  kept  at  all  the  Stations on the railway,
which  is  about  4  minutes  earlier  than Reading time;  5
minutes  before  Cirencester  time;  8  minutes  before
Chippenham time;  and  14  minutes  before  Bridgewater
time (Great Western Railway, 1841) (p. 122)
In fact, many railway passengers used specially adapted watches
with dual clock faces, showing local time and London time used by
railway  companies  (Hassard,  1990);  only  in  1847  did  railway
companies  adopt  Greenwich  Mean  Time  instead  of  local  time
zones.21  This was not the case in a number of  towns and cities
across Britain  who still  operated on  local  time.  As  late  as  1852,
public clocks in cities including Bristol, Oxford, Cambridge, Harwich
and  Portsmouth  showed  local  time,  suggesting  advanced
industrialization did not make events in a wider geographical area
significant  to  daily  life (Thrift,  1990).   Only  in  1880,  when  the
Statutes (Definition of Time) Bill  was given the Royal Assent that
time was standardized to GMT, seemingly taming time. In discussing
this parliamentary bill, James Gleick (n.d.) notes, “[r]emoving doubts
about the meaning of time is an ambitious goal. Alas, it turns out that
the question answered by this legislation is not  What is time? but
a related  and simpler  question,  What  is  the  time?”  (‘Her  Majesty
Defines Time’, para 4). 
Thus,  the  different  time  zones  of  the  early  railways  offered  an
alternative  to  the  ‘fixed’  times  of  the  seasons  pertinent  to  most
people.  The  clock  had  less  effect  on  people’s  lives  than  natural
rhythms of night and day, spring and winter; people could transcend
clock-time by retaining a greater  connection to  the seasons.  The
21
 It was not until 1855 that most public clocks in the United Kingdom were
set to GMT. Prior to this towns and cities across the UK operated according to
their own local time. 
37
standardization  of  time  with  GMT  was  a  fundamental  shift  in
understanding time; people became less able to discern clock-time
from natural time, a phenomenon that continues relentlessly. 
April 14, 1912
Around the time that  Bergson’s fame reached its  peak (his  1913
lecture  in  New  York  caused  a  traffic  jam  on  Broadway),  a
monumental event took place that was to change the way in which
time is viewed; it was to be the beginning of ‘global time’, making the
world more unified and synchronized as the pace of economic and
technological advances accelerated. An example of this global time
appeared on April  14,  1912,  when RMS Titanic,  a  ship that  took
three years to build, sank in just under three hours.  The time that it
took for the news of this tragedy to reach across the world marked
the start  of  global  time,  as  the  telegraph carried  bulletins  almost
instantaneously.   It  was only thirty-two years earlier  in 1880,  that
Greenwich  Mean  Time  was  adopted  as  the  accepted  meridian
(despite its introduction in 1675), yet it was the loss of the Titanic, a
vessel trying to beat its own schedule, which heralded the start of an
instant  culture.   Since  that  moment  the  pace  of  life  in  travel,
communication,  and the expectations these innovations bring has
increasingly accelerated and, whilst we can certainly ‘waste’ time,
the marking of time is difficult to escape from. 
Social time
Today,  the  clock’s  domination  positions  quantitative  measures  of
time  as  superior  to  qualitative  measures.   Sorokin  and  Merton
(1937)  challenged  this  idea,  asking  whether  “periods  of  years,
months,  weeks,  days  are  the  only,  or  even  the  most  readily
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applicable, temporal measures in a system of social dynamics” (p.
615).  In fact, I suggest the significance of social time is far greater.
Existing outside of time structures and not participating in society
does not preclude being bound by its temporal structures. As Adam
(1990) suggests:
People at home are influenced in their timing by their own
habits  and  those  of  the  people  around  them.…  They
cannot  extricate  themselves  from  the  institutional
timetables imposed on other members of their family.…
Whether we are affected in a primary or secondary way,
we  cannot  escape  the  clock-time  that  structures  and
times our daily lives.… As long as we remain part of a
society  that  is  structured  to  the  time  of  clocks  and
calendars our  activities  and interaction with  others  can
only escape its pervasive hold to a very limited extent. (p.
107) 
When one says that something happens at a particular time, the fact
that  something happens places more importance on it.   Although
systems of time vary within different social structures, time is equal
and  quantitative  whereas  social  time  is  qualitative,  arising  from
common  beliefs  and  customs22 (Sorokin  &  Merton,  1937).   The
symbolism associated with social time, with weekly structures often
arising from market days, means that set times have been shaped
by astronomical  time23 (Sorokin & Merton,  1937).  Ultimately,  time
systems can be reduced to the need to coordinate and synchronize
groups of people, usually for economic efficiency.  Sorokin & Merton
assert  social  time  should  be  an  auxiliary  to,  rather  than  a
replacement for  astronomical  time.   The prevalence of a singular
22
 On August 15, 2015, North Korea changed their time by thirty minutes to
‘Pyongyang Standard Time’, as a way of marking seventy years since the end of
Japanese imperial rule. Whilst this has practical implications (particularly for South
Koreans working north of the border), the symbolic importance of this decision is
perhaps more significant.  Abrahamian (2015) suggests it  is  “one more way for
Pyongyang to say to its own citizens and some constituencies down  south that
South  Korea is symbolically  and  practically  in  step with  the imperialists,  while
North Korea has always tried to carve its own path” (para. 6).  
23
 Astronomical time takes into account the movements of the sun, moon and
other planets. 
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time  reckoning  system  seeks  to  ignore  its  social  origins;  small
communities or groups, once united by a sense of collective rhythm
have  been  sacrificed  for  economic  effectiveness,  marking  an
unblinking awareness of time in terms of productivity. 
A  by-product  of  closer  time-coordination  and  therefore
instantaneous communication is increased exposure to a multiplicity
of stimuli, reducing the likelihood of completing tasks that may not
offer immediate results. Author and advocate of the slow movement,
Carl Honore (2007) comments (paraphrasing actress Carrie Fisher),
“these days, even instant gratification takes too long” (TED, 2007).
Equally, the many available choices of how to spend time has led to
a  ‘zapping culture’,  in  which it  is  common to  “surf  hundreds and
thousands of [web] sites [and] … miss hundreds” of TV programmes
(Rosa, 2008/2009, p. 91). It seems that “multitasking has been our
destiny all  along – not  killing time,  not  doing time,  but mastering
time” (Gleick, 1999, p. 279).  Prior to the dominance of clock-time,
the lack of instant communication acted as a kind of screen which
has  now  vanished:  “the  remote  is  as  close  as  the  near:  the
ephemeral is as emphatic as the durable” (Rantanen, 2004, p.51).24  
Space, time and globalization 
Chris Shilling (2004) suggests, “the disciplining of workers’ bodies
was not accomplished on the basis of overt physical coercion, but
relied heavily upon an associated reorganisation of space and time”
(p. 79). Sylviane Agacincski (2000/2003) notes, “[g]lobalization is the
unification of the world’s rhythms, all adjusted to the Western clock,
that  is,  to  contemporary  chronotechnology”  (p.  5).  An  effect  of
24
 There are other ways of understanding time such as deep geological time
or the physics of time; it is not, however, possible within the constraints of this
thesis to consider these perspectives.
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globalization,  according  to  Harvey  (2000)  and  Anthony  Giddens
(2010)  is  that  the  world  is  getting  smaller  due  to  technological
advances  enabling  trans-global  interactions  (in  Rantanen,  2004).
Giddens notes, “the liberation of time and space is a prerequisite for
globalization  as  a  direct  consequence  of  modernity”  (as  cited  in
Rantanen, 2004, p. 47), whilst Harvey argues,
the objectification and universalization of the concepts of
time and space allowed time to annihilate space … time-
space compression involves a shortening of time and a
shrinking  of  space:  the  time  taken  to  do  things  is
progressively  reduced,  and  this  in  turn  reduces  the
experiential  distance between different  points  in space”
(as cited in Rantanen, 2004, p. 47). 
As my perception of  the world shrinks,  tasks are completed at a
much faster pace; whilst this can make time seem more productive,
there is a greater emphasis on being productive at all times.  
My assertion that time is regarded as valuable and not to be wasted
in  either  work  or  leisure  activities  is  supported  by  an  economic
structure dependent on time regarded as money, where ‘making the
most of’  time is encouraged. I suggest Western society is geared
towards a general view that money must be spent in order to spend
our  time  wisely,  productively,  and  as  a  way  of  making  leisure
activities more profitable. Time, however is not like money; “[w]hilst
time passes outside  our  control,  money can be consumed at  an
intentional  pace or  it  can be left  to  accumulate”  (Adam, 1990, p.
113).  However,  since  time  has  become  widely  regulated  by  the
clock, its value as a commodity - defined in 1867 by Karl Marx as,
“an object outside us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human
wants of some sort or another” (1867/2008, p. 13) - has increased.
The employer wants to maximize the time he is paying his workers
for, whilst the workers  want to gain the best return for the sale of
their  only  commodity  -  time.   Telling  time  is  necessary  for
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participation in its exchange as a commodity; whilst time tells on the
worker who sells his most valuable commodity – his labour power
traded in units of time. This commoditization of time has continued
apace, fuelled by the phenomenon of globalization. 
The  globalization  of  clock-time  was,  according  to  Adam  (2006)
completed in  1913 when the transmission of  the  first  time signal
“travelling at the speed of light displaced local times and established
one time for all: 1913 is the beginning of world time” (p. 119).25 The
commoditization  of  time intensified  by  globalization,  presents  two
conflicting  views  of  its  consequences:  “either  global  relationships
become stretched as a result  of  time-space distanciation, or they
become  more  intense  and  robust  as  a  result  of  time-space
compression” (Rantanen, 2004, p. 47).  Whilst faster communication
and transport enables immediate contact with others and expedient
travel,  anecdotal  evidence  suggests  less  actual  physical  contact
takes  place,  as  digital  and  online  identities  become  increasingly
prevalent.  In this sense, relationships are being reduced or diluted.
It is true, therefore that both arguments give an accurate picture of
the consequences of globalization; a paradoxical situation that sees
relationships stretched and intensified.  Likewise, the conception of
time  has  undergone  a  similar  transformation  as  opportunities  to
instantaneously engage with  others anywhere on earth  make the
apparent  mastery  of  time  more  achievable.   The  pace  of  these
global  relationships  actually  reduces  the  control  of  time  as
individuals  forced  to  become  aware  of  time  differences  pay  less
attention to inner, natural rhythms. Whilst this is not universally true,
my  own  experience  and  my  observations  of  others  suggests  a
picture of a world in which an increasing number of opportunities
exacerbates a feeling of being ‘time-pressed’. Thus there is a move
25
 I  suggested earlier that  the sinking of  the Titanic in 1912 heralded the
beginning of global time. Adam is making the same point,  as the news of the
Titanic disaster was communicated via telegraph. 
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away from an inner sense of duration and towards an experience
ever more strictly regulated by the clock. 
The “specialness of place and time” was, according to Meyrowitz,
eroded  by  the  invention  of  the  telegraph  (as  cited  in  Rantanen,
2004, p. 50), making time something to be obeyed rather than exist
within.  Rantanen suggests the telegraph changed the relationship
between news and time, supporting this with Giddens’ definition of
globalization  as  “the  intensification  of  worldwide  social  relations
which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are
shaped  by  events  occurring  many  miles  away  and  vice  versa”
(Rantanen, 2004, p. 50).  This highlights time as a concept, in which
2pm in London means nothing to someone in New York, where it is
9am. Events happen at the same time, but at different times; yet the
news  of  these  events  reaches  an  audience  instantaneously,  a
paradox  illustrating  the  irrelevance  of  clock-measured  time.
Attaching  significance  to  the  event  itself  rather  than  the  time  it
occurred, positions time as little more than a compartmentalized and
quantitative way of making sense of the world.  
Despite having an ordered, time-managed experience of the world,
there  can  be  a  loss  of  the  ‘specialness’  of  time  described  by
Meyrowitz.  In societies operating around the clock, little time has
been left untouched in which it is possible to pause. As Rantanen
suggests,  the  radio,  television  and  Internet  have  created  a  “new
concept  of  time  that  hastened  the  pace  of  life  by  constantly
reminding people that something was happening – if not here, then
somewhere else”  (2004,  p.  50).  This  need for  activity  is  a  direct
product  of  how  industrialized  and  technologized  society  has
commoditized  time,  its  purpose  extrinsic  rather  than  intrinsic:
“[m]ediated globalization has resulted in an increased sense of time”
(Rantanen,  2004,  p.  66).  The  term  ‘sense’  has  a  number  of
connotations.  I can consider it in terms of possessing a physical or
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mental awareness of something, or as a way of guiding us (as do
our physical senses).  I regard ‘sense’ as meaning a way of ordering
the world and my experience of it. When I examine what Rantanen
means by ‘sense’, it is an ordering or logical rationality of the world
essential to the smooth operation of a global economy. What do we
mean when we talk about having a ‘sense of time’?  Do we truly
know what the time really is?  We structure our days, weeks, months
and years around a notion that there is a time for everything.  The
week is  marked (most  commonly)  by a structured pattern of  five
days’ work followed by two days where we do as we please (or at
least we like to think we do as we please).  We ‘sense time’ in that
we are aware of its passing, marked by the precision and regularity
of the clock.  We ‘sense’ the changing seasons as we feel the heat,
cold, wind and rain on our bodies.  We see the changing seasons
and hear the sounds of four quarters of a year.  Today, I awoke and
as the  day progressed through becoming light  outside  then dark
again, I knew that time had passed – I had a sense of time. 
The mastery of time: From a singular  sense of clock-time to
multiple senses of time 
In The Spectrum of Social Time (1964), Georges Gurvitch draws on
Paul  Fraisse’s  1957 discussion of  the mastery of  time:26 “Fraisse
places the ‘estimation, conceptualization and quantification of time’
under the rubric of the mastery of time. We have some reservations
about  this,  since  we  believe  that  time  can  be  estimated,
conceptualized, and known without always being mastered” (p. 15).
Whilst  Gurvitch  (1964)  does  not  define  the  mastery  of  time,  he
suggests,  “generally  speaking,  …  since  the  movements  which
produce time also take place in time, by this fact they are partially
produced by time” (p. 15). The notion of ‘mastering’ time makes little
26
 Fraisse (1957) suggested that research on time is concerned with either
the conditioning of time, the perception of time, or the mastery of time (in Gurvitch,
1964). 
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sense  when  removed  from  an  economic  or  social  context,  but
Gurvitch’s  belief  in  the  “multiple  manifestations  of  time”  (p.  15)
suggests  time  has  no  singular  universal  meaning,  as  might  be
argued from a late capitalist perspective.27 
Heathfield  (2009)  argues  that  by  the  late  1970s,  “the  allied
organizing kinetic logics of capitalized temporality – regulation and
acceleration  –  were  firmly  embedded  in  the  Western  social  and
cultural  milieu” (p. 20), something continuing at a rapid pace in a
socially accelerated age (Rosa,  2005/2013; Rosa & Scheuerman,
2008/2009).   The  Western  world  is  dominated  by  corporatism,
dividing  people  into  groups  sharing  common interests;  Gurvitch’s
perspective  on  social  time  emphasizes  many  types  of  time
experienced  by  different  groups.  In  clock  dominated  societies  or
groups, the concept of time and an appropriate time for completing
tasks varies according to  collective values and priorities;  different
groups experience time in different ways and develop in response to
changing circumstances and priorities. The concept of time itself is
repeatedly challenged amongst different social groups, highlighting
the  decreasing  significance  of  clock-time.  Gurvitch’s  (1964)
discussion  of  social  time  refers  to  the  concept  of  time  “as
convergent  and  divergent  movements  which  persist  in  a
discontinuous  succession  and  change  in  a  continuity  of
heterogeneous  moments”  (p.  18),  “[s]ocial  time is  the  time  of
convergence  and  divergency  of  movements  of  total  social
phenomena, whether the  total social phenomena are global, group
or microsocial and whether or not they are expressed in the social
structure” (p. 27).  Thus, despite the move towards a singular sense
of clock-time, multiple senses of time exist  for different groups of
people.  
27
 Currently defined as Neoliberal. 
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The mastery of  time,  so elusive in  post-industrial  societies would
have  been  easily  obtained  in  pre-modern  times  as,  “everything,
including time and space, was in one’s place, because one had no
knowledge  of  anything  beyond  one’s  own immediate  experience”
(Rantanen,  2004,  p.  51).  For  the  pre-industrial  revolution  cottage
industry worker, labour was done only when necessary, often ending
the working week when sufficient goods were produced.  Historian
E.P.  Thompson  (1990)  suggests,  since  capitalism’s  rise  the
commoditization  of  time  has  affected  all  aspects  of  life,  neatly
compartmentalizing  work  and  leisure.  He  argues  a  changing
consciousness of time is possible with:
… a new synthesis of elements of the old and of the new,
finding an imagery based neither upon the seasons nor
upon  the  market  but  upon  human  occasions  …
unpurposive passing of time would be behaviour which
the culture approved. (as cited in Hassard, 1990, p. 129).
A failure to recognize the innate human sense of time, historically
marked  by  agrarian  workers  according  to  seasons  and  nature,
eludes the mastery of time.  It is a paradox that the time accuracy of
a digital age makes this mastery of time problematic; the plethora of
choice overwhelms individuals, an argument I espouse in relation to
social acceleration. The division of time into work and leisure would
have been familiar to the workers of pre-GMT society, but there is
now diminished choice about when work time ends and leisure time
begins. Furthermore, the number of options of how to spend that
time far exceeds the actual time available.  
A socially accelerated culture
46
The  “intense  stress  and  unease  [created  by]  fast  capitalism
mesh[ing] poorly with the fundamental rhythms of human existence”
(Rosa, 2008/2009, p. 25), makes the prospect of duration appealing.
Gleick  (1999)  claims  we  have  “reached  the  epoch  of  the
nanosecond. This is the heyday of speed” (p. 6) and, “[i]nstantaneity
rules in the network and in our emotional lives; instant coffee, instant
intimacy,  instant  replay,  and  instant  gratification  … If  we  do  not
understand time,  we  become  its  victims”  (p.  13).  In  this  sense,
Gleick’s reference to ‘understanding’ time is the same as ‘mastering’
time, for to understand it, is to be aware of the potential and limits of
time that, in essence, is mastery. Anyone unable to understand or
master time may become one of its victims - left behind, falling ever
further down a slipping slope. 
The emphasis placed on speed is exemplified in Paul Virilio’s work
on  Dromology  –  the  “study  and  analysis  of  the  impact  of  the
increasing  speed  of  transport  and  communications”  (Redhead,
2004, p. 23); that speed will come to dominate the slow, although it
also  “increases  the  potential  for  gridlock”  (Adam,  2006,  p.  131).
These artificial rhythms “replace natural ones: to be speeded up at
will  and paced to  the  dictates  of  the prosthetic  machine”  (Adam,
2006, p. 133). John Urry (2009) also illustrates the pervasiveness of
clock-time in social life:
It has meant the general replacement of kairological time
… that  now is the time to do something irrespective of
what  any  clock  indicates.  Kairological  time  [uses]  the
experience of the past … to develop the sense of when a
particular event  should take place in the future,  of  just
when it is the right time for something to occur. (p. 184)
This  kairological  sense  of  time  is  closer  to  Bergsonian  duration;
kairological time suggests actions based on past experience – “the
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invisible  progress of  the  past  gnawing into  the  future.”  (Bergson,
1896/1910, p. 194).   Although the spread of clock-time permeates
all  aspects  of  people’s  lives  today,  Urry  (2009)  also  proffers
instantaneous time. The ubiquity and speed of technology, such as
computers  performing  tasks  in  a  billionth  of  a  second  makes
“inconceivably  brief  instants,  which  are  wholly  beyond  human
consciousness  … replac[ing]  the  linear  logic  of  clock-time”  (Urry,
2009, p. 189). Thus we find comfort in clock-time; it is ‘manageable’
when sixty seconds make a minute and sixty minutes an hour, units
neither too large nor too small.   In resistance to instantaneous time,
which  exemplifies  the  “final  abstraction  of  time  and  its  complete
separation from human experience and rhythms of nature” (p. 189),
Urry  (2009)  sees  the  ‘slow’  movement  encouraging  us  to
consciously decelerate. This ‘glacial’ time28 is often advocated as an
antidote to the rapidity of contemporary living, evident in the slow
movement (Griffiths, 2000; Honore, 2010, 2014).29 
Hartmut Rosa (2005/2013) argues slowing down is more important
than simply  reacting to  the  acceleration of  our  experience of  the
world, that “selective social deceleration for the purpose of hindering
an erosion of institutions necessary for the continued existence of
society may be, from both a cultural; and structural perspective, a
28
 Glacial time is a term used by John Urry (2009) who suggests it is the
opposite to a speeded up social life:
Glacial  time resists  instantaneous time and seeks to  slow
down time down to  ‘nature’s  speed’.  This metaphor of  the glacier
indicates a number of characteristics. First, glacial time is extremely
slow-moving  and  ponderous,  desynchronized  from  clock  and
instantaneous  times.  Change  therefore  occurs  over  many
generations, and indeed can only be observed intergenerationally.”
(p. 194)
29
 The slow movement is  a worldwide phenomenon that  began in Italy in
1986 with the concept of slow food as a reaction to the spread of fast food outlets.
Since then there has been a slow ‘revolution’ that has witnessed many slow ways
of living including slow design, slow education, slow gardening, slow parenting,
and slow cities. 
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functional requirement of the contemporary acceleration society” (p.
89).  According  to  Rosa,  acceleration  is  notable  in  three  areas:
technological, social change, and the pace of life. He argues that if
technological innovation increases the speed at which we can live
and work, time should be in abundance. Paradoxically, individuals
have less time resulting from the profusion of choices presented and
may  feel  compelled  to  compress  activities  by  doing  them
simultaneously or for shorter periods of time. Rosa (2005/2013) calls
this phenomenon social acceleration, which is:
an  increase  in  quantity  per  unit  of  time (or,  logically
equivalent, as a reduction of the amount of time per fixed
quantity).  Various  things  may  serve  as  the  quantity
measured:  distance  travelled,  total  number  of
communicated  messages,  amount  of  goods  produced
(category 1) or the number of jobs per working lifetime or
change  in  intimate  partners  per  year  (category  2)  or
action episodes per unit of time (category 3).  (p. 65)
Thus an experience of social acceleration is “defined by an increase
in  the  decay  rates  of  the  reliability  of  the  experiences  and
expectations and by the contraction of the time spans definable as
the  ‘present’”  (Rosa,  2008/2009,  pp.  83-4).  Therefore,  we  feel
compelled to experience as many opportunities as are presented to
us, changing our relationship with time:  
The  rate of growth (of options) undeniably exceeds the
rate  of  acceleration  …  [the]  premodern  peasant,  who
does not live in a linear, progressive time with an open
future but in a cyclical time with reiterated rhythms of day
and night, summer and winter, youth and age, and thus
dies ‘old  and sated with life’,  the (late)  modern person
never reaches this point, never manages to reconcile the
time of life with the time of the world, because everything
through which he has lived has long been overtaken by
escalating  possibilities  with  respect  to  life,  events,  and
experience. (Rosa, 2005/2013, pp. 184-5) 
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It is through “the quantitative heightening of the objective pace of life
[that] … a qualitative transformation of the subjective experience of
time” occurs (Rosa, 2005/2013, p. 131). In other words, the amount
of options presented compels us to attempt more than is possible,
leaving us short of available time in which to do them.  
Of course, there are examples of people who choose to opt out of a
socially accelerated world and I do not suggest everyone is part of it.
There is, however, a clear reason why to opt out might not be an
option. Rosa (2008/2009; 2005/2013) explains this as being on a
‘slipping slope’; the feeling that one does not want to fall behind and
“feel pressed to keep up with the speed of change … experience[d]
in [the] social and technological world in order to avoid the loss of
potentially valuable options and connections” (Rosa, 2008/2009, p.
88).  Even when stepping outside of  normal  routines,  such as on
holiday, the world continues to accelerate and one falls further down
the slipping slope. On re-joining the socially accelerated world, an
individual  may find  the  “feeling  of  rapidly  changing elapsing  time
[that]  emerges in  a  highly  dynamic society,  generat[ing]  pressure
even in periods free of work” (Rosa, 2005/2013, p. 134).  
Acceleration(ism) and Network Time
Although Rosa’s argument is used as the central point of reference
to  social  acceleration  in  this  thesis,  there are  a number of  other
relevant sources that support my argument that Bergsonian duration
offers respite from a culture in which the prevalence of clock-time
keeps  us  to  strict  timetables  and  schedules.  In  recent  years,
arguments  have been presented alongside  Rosa’s  view of  social
acceleration that suggest we have moved beyond the time of the
clock  to  ‘networked  time’,  “a  process  that  emerges  out  of  the
dynamics of the network society” (Hassan, 2012, p. 65), in which we
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are always connected and therefore able to work more effectively in
faster and more efficient ways. This “open-ended form of speed …
means that the rate at which humans communicate and the rates of
increase in  productivity  and efficiency can never be fast  enough”
(Hassan, 2009, p. 17); therefore, the feeling of being time pressured
is intensified.   In some respects, this presents an argument that we
are ‘free’ from the constraints of clock-time as we can work at our
convenience, no longer constrained by work places and schedules.
However,  as  Benjamin  Noys  (2014)  suggests,  networked  time
actually creates other ‘shackles’ – one that we carry around with us
in the form of mobile technologies: “No longer, as in Marx’s day, are
we  chained  to  factory  machines,  but  now  some  of  us  carry  our
chains around with us, in the form of laptops and phones” (p. 11).
Robert  Hassan  (2007)  concurs  with  this,  suggesting  that  “the
network  society  is  a  society  that  does  not  distinguish  between
previously  discrete  realms  of  life  such  as  work,  leisure,  home,
private  and  public”  (p.  89).  In  Noys’  book  Malign  Velocities:
Accelerationism  and  Capitalism,  the  author  traces  a  history  of
accelerationism beginning with the Futurists through to Cyperpunk
Phuturism. He suggests that, as members of societies affected by
accelerationism, we experience a kind of jouissance – whereby we
take both pain and pleasure from the demands and constraints of
work  and  an  accelerated  existence.  Whilst  I  argue  that  an
experience of Bergsonian duration offers an opportunity to counter
the experience of acceleration, Noys suggests that “a way out of the
impasse  …  [is  not  just]  a  desire  to  slow  down”  (p.  xi)  but  “a
restoration of the sense of friction that interrupts and disrupts the
fundamental accelerationist fantasy of smooth integration” (p. 103).
For Noys, accelerationism is a “postgraduate disorder” (p. 93), an
analogy with the individual who has stayed in education longer than
others and therefore enters the workplace later, causing them to be
‘behind’  both  professionally  and  financially.  The  solution  to  this,
Noys  argues,  is  found  in  “[a]ccelerationism  [as  it]  …  turn[s]  the
horror of work into the jouissance of machinic immersion” (p. 93). In
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other words, the postgraduate entering the workplace must do more
to  catch  up  and,  in  doing  so,  embrace  both  the  painful  and
pleasurable experiences associated with it. 
Embracing acceleration is also proposed by Judy Wajcman (2015),
who suggests that technology should not be blamed for our sense of
feeling harried but that it  can be a source of “creative tension …
provid[ing] an unparalleled opportunity for realizing a more human
and just society, only we need to keep in mind that busyness is not a
function  of  gadgetry  but  of  the  priorities  and  parameters  we
ourselves  set”  (p.  184).  Wajcman  argues  that  advances  in
technology and associated technological  devices do not  make us
time-pressed.  Rather,  it  is  because we set  ourselves parameters
about our schedules that makes our lives so busy; she questions
whether  “acceleration is an adequate trope for understanding our
emerging relationship with time” (p. 183). On a similar note, Robert
Colville (2016) proposes that, whilst there are dangers associated
with  acceleration,  it  should  be  embraced  rather  than  resisted.
Whereas Hassan (2007; 2009; 2012), Castells (2000), Warf (2008),
and Noys (2014) have argued for a new type of ‘networked’ time,
Wajcman believes that “industrial  regimes still  set the contours of
our lives … traditional timescapes and domains of activity have been
subsumed within networked 24/7 digital temporalities” (p. 183). 
Manuel  Castells  (2000)  illustrates  how  the  ‘timeless  time’  of  a
networked society is still the time of the clock, working against innate
human  rhythms  despite  the  apparent  ‘freedom’  it  offers.   He
describes  network  time  as  “timeless  time …  [which  is]  …  the
emerging, dominant form of social time in the network society, as the
space of flows does not negate the existence of places” (p. 465).
This ‘timeless time’ may help the flow of capital but in the networked
society,  “the  power  of  flows  takes  precedence  over  the  flows  of
power” (p. 500). For Castells, giving precedence to the networked
society is detrimental to human existence, as “the network society is
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characterized  by  the  breaking  down  of  the  rhythms,  whether
biological  or  social,  associated  with  the  notion of  a  life-cycle”  (p.
476). It is this
neoliberalized  network  society,  [with  its]  ‘time-saving’
devices …  [that]  become the digital  shackles that  are
‘always on’. The Microsoft slogan ‘Where do you want to
go today?’ would become heavy with irony if only one had
the time to  stop and think  about  it  and enjoy  the  joke
(Hassan, 2007, p. 89). 
The process of acceleration, as illustrated in my brief history of the
rise  of  clock-time in  this  chapter,  is  a  phenomenon observed for
hundreds of years but it  was in the 20 th century that acceleration
became a more quotidian experience. Martin Heidegger – writing in
1936 – attributed a loss of a sense of being to the accelerating pace
of life. He hypothesizes that technology hides the abandonment of
being, that it  is “cloaked in the increasing authority of  calculation,
speed,  and  the  claim  of  the  massive.  The  obstinately  distorted
essence of the abandonment by being is hidden away under this
cloak,  and  it  makes  the  abandonment  unassailable”  (Heidegger,
1989/2012, p. 95). Of these three ways in which abandonment of
being is masked, speed is responsible for:
 
[P]rompt forgetting and losing oneself in what comes next
… blindness  to  the  truly  momentary,  which  is  not  the
transient, but is what opens up eternity. With respect to
speed … the eternal is the mere endurance of the same,
the  empty  … the genuine unrest  of  the battle  remains
concealed, and in its place has stepped the restlessness
of constantly more ingenious activity, … pushed forward
by the dread of becoming bored with oneself (p. 96). 
In Heidegger’s hypothesis, being swept away by the excitement of
technology and acceleration hides something far more serious than
being unable to keep up with the world; it is actually detrimental to
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one’s  existence  and  engagement  with  being.  Kevin  Aho  (2007)
acknowledges  this  in  examining  the  relevance  of  Heidegger’s
discussion  of  acceleration  to  modern  psychology.  The  author
concludes  that  Heidegger’s  identification  of  the  “interconnected
‘symptoms’  of  modernity  in  …  ‘calculation’,  ‘acceleration’,  and
‘massiveness’ … reveals how the frenzied pace of technological life
embodies a ‘hidden distress’ in the inconspicuous cultural mood of
boredom” (p. 38). 
Barney  Warf’s  (2008)  book  Time-Space  Compression provides  a
detailed account of how the Western world has accelerated across
three  historical  ‘periods’  –  early-modern,  late-modern,  and
postmodern. Warf concludes that:
[T]here  is  not  and never  has been a single,  ‘objective’
time  or  space,  no  one  ‘correct’  way  to  organize  or
experience them, only a vast array of very different ones.
Hence, there are no stable meanings that we can assign
to  time and space,  only  temporary  and arbitrary  ones,
because  human  life  itself  is  variegated  spatially  and
temporally. (p. 213) 
Warf’s  argument  presents  time  as  socially  constructed,  as
“repeatedly  folded,  distorted,  remade,  reconstituted,  and
reinterpreted, that there is no single ‘objective’ form in which spatio-
temporal  reality  presents  itself”  (p.  218).  Recognizing  time  as
socially constructed is significant for Warf because, in doing so, he
suggests that “discovery of ourselves will  have made a significant
step forward” (p. 218). Warf’s argument is apposite for my thesis, as
my  suggestion  that  experiencing  Bergsonian  duration  as  an
alternative  to  clock-time  is  predicated  on  time  being  socially
constructed,  and  that  to  recognize  this  is  an  important  step  in
gaining respite from a socially accelerated world.  
Hassan (2009) suggests “two temporal empires have ruled over the
inhabitants of  our  modern (and now postmodern) economies and
societies: one based upon the clock and the other upon a ubiquitous
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information network that comprises the ‘network society’ and what I
have elsewhere called ‘network time’”(p. 2). In his argument, Hassan
sees the “time of the clock [as] predictable and manageable in ways
the time of acceleration and speed of the network society are not”
(p. 37). Thus, networked time is even less ‘manageable’ than clock-
time and further exacerbates the feeling of being time-pressed in a
socially  accelerated culture.  Unlike the spread of  clock-time as a
means of standardizing the railways and factories of the 19 th century,
network time advances quickly and, as new digital technologies are
superseded,  the  pressure  to  do  more,  faster,  bears  heavily  in  a
socially accelerated culture. This ‘persistent connection’ referred to
by
[s]ome … [as]  ‘real  time’… is  in  fact  a  misnomer.   Its
connotations  lend  it  to  the  construction  of  a  general
consciousness  that  tends  to  obscure  the  actual
temporality of the network. A much more interesting and
potential-laden time is ‘network time’. (Hassan, 2009, p.
88)
For Hassan, network time exists alongside clock-time in a “double-
structure  of  technological  time  ….  [that]  grows  unplanned,
unorganized and chaotically due to its subordination to speed and to
the irrational principles of neoliberal competition” (2009, p. 94). The
speed at which network time grows and implants itself  into every
aspect  of  life  is  all  the  more  reason  to  seek  an  alternative
experience  of  Bergsonian  duration.  Network  time,  like  the
manageable  units  of  clock-time,  renders  “the  physical  world  as
malleable and conquerable” (Hassan, 2009, p. 106); network time,
like its analogue predecessor, extends the allure of the clock as a
means  of  management  and  control.  However,  like  clock-time,
network time has an effect of time-pressing rather than easing. 
In a similar sentiment to Heidegger, Hassan (2009) notes that the
experience of social acceleration associated with network time acts
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as a pathology, … drives us to thinking in an abbreviated
fashion, and causes us to view the wider world in that
way.  The  deeply  insidious  aspect  of  this  process,
however, is that such thinking functions in a vicious cycle.
It is like senile dementia: the worse it gets, the less we
are aware of it. (p. 122) 
Thus  there  is  a  sense  of  a  loss  of  self,  a  masking  of  the
abandonment  of  being  that  Heidegger  believed  was  caused  by
“machination  attain[ing]  ultimate  dominance  …   the  hex  cast  by
technology and  by  its  constantly  self-surpassing  progress  is  only
one sign of this bewitchery that directs everything toward calculation,
utility, breeding, manageability, and regulation” (1989/2012, p. 98).
This progress has, for Jonathan Crary (2013), created a 24/7 society
in which the demands of capitalism work against human rhythms,
ultimately starving us of sleep.   For Hassan, our view of time and
temporality shapes our understanding and perception of society as
well as our being, concurring with my hypothesis about a need for
an  alternative  to  time  found  in  Bergsonian  duration.  Hassan
concludes:
The  most  important  idea  …  is  that  we  must  look  at
temporality in a new way. With the rise of the networked
society  and  neoliberal  globalization  it  is  socially  and
politically  necessary  to  move  beyond  seeing  time  as
something  expressed  by  the  clock,  something  abstract
and uncontrollable that we must synchronize with. (2009,
p. 232)
Like other  theorists  discussed above,  Rosa regards technological
acceleration  as  a  “crucial  feature  of  modern  society’s  relation  to
nature  [and]  the  acceleration  of  the  pace  of  life  is  of  overriding
importance  for  the  late  modern  personality”  (2008/2009,  p.108).
Hassan’s assertion that we must move beyond the abstract nature of
the  clock  resonates  with  Rosa’s  (2005/2013)  assertion  that,  in  a
socially accelerated culture, it is unhealthy to constantly remain on
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the ‘slipping slope’ and that to seek occasional respite from it may, in
fact, offers the means by which we prevent “the individual’s reaction
to social acceleration in late modernity … [as being] characterized
by a strong sense of directionless, frantic motion that is in fact a form
of inertia” (Rosa, 2008/2009, p.101). 
Since  realizing  the  commodity  value  of  time  humans  have  been
driven exponentially  towards ‘mastering’  or  controlling  time.  Early
time reckoning devices used by the monasteries of the 13 th century
started  a  human  obsession  with  time:  a  measure  of  efficiency,
productivity,  and social  control.  Mumford (1956) suggests,  “during
the first seven centuries of [the clock’s] existence the categories of
time and space underwent an extraordinary change, and no aspect
of  life  was  left  untouched  by  this  transformation”  (p.  3).  This
progress, from monastery timekeeping and town square clocks to
the  digital  age  has  been  unrelenting.  Despite  other  significant
advances  in  the  modern  world  (air  travel,  Internet,  mobile
technologies)  reaching  a  plateau,  the  simple  notion  of  using
quantitative units to measure something as ephemeral as passing
time continues to grow. This phenomenon of social acceleration, of
fitting  more  into  less  creates  a  Pandora’s  box;  the  innocent
intentions with which the monasteries formalized time made it  an
inescapable reality, for which an antidote might be an ability to open
the box, step outside of time and into duration. 
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Chapter Four: Bergson, Perception and Memory
Duration  and  memory  are  inextricably  linked  and,  as
autoethnography relies on memory, I outline Bergson’s conception
of memory and by association, perception.  In  Matter and Memory
(1896/1910),  Bergson  presents  a  diagrammatic  representation  of
perception: 
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Figure  1: Bergson’s diagrammatic representation of perception. (From Bergson,
1896/1910, p. 128)
Point  O  represents  the  object  perceived  (the  present  moment),
whilst A, B C, and D represent memories moving further away from
the present  moment.  At  point  D, memories are deeper and more
complex the further removed from point O (object perceived in the
present moment). The further away from point O in time, the details
become richer and conform less to the perception image, or what we
actually see. In this model of perception, one must always return to
point O, as “each time one must return to the present to be able to
leap once again into the medium of the past” (Grosz, 2004, p. 174).
Points B’, C’ and D’ represent virtual images from the past, that is
images that we recall as representations of the past.   
Elena Fell (2012) explains Bergsonian perception as the “conductor
of  new  content  being  incorporated  into  our  conscious  life,  and
memory is the previously acquired content which gives meaning to
what  is  new”  (p.  55).  Thus,  perception  and  memory  cannot  be
separated in this cyclical process, which I represent in the following
diagram:
Perception  
Memory 
Recognition
Process 
information 
Volition 
Action 
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Figure 2: The cycle of perception and memory. 
The growth of duration via perception is enriched by memory. These
stages “present a continuity of the inextensive past flowing into the
material present and looking into the future” (Fell, 2012, p. 55).  This
cycle, according to Bergson explains how we process images and
draw understanding from our perceptions. In perceiving an object,
we use memory to recognize it and take action accordingly. As Fell
(2012) notes,  “[p]erception is the conductor of  new content  being
incorporated into our conscious life, and memory is the previously
acquired content which gives meaning to what is new” (p. 55). The
role of perception then, is to act as a way accessing memory in a
useful way that makes new experiences. 
Bergson illustrates memory using an upside down cone:
 
Figure 3: Bergson’s cone of memory. (From Bergson, 1896/1910, p. 211)
In  Bergson’s  diagram,  the  square  P  represents  the  plane  of
existence  (i.e.  where  we  happen  to  be)  and  S  the  present  (or
sensori-motor  mechanisms  that  we  experience  in  the  present
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moment), S being the point at which memory is closest to action.
The cone grows at each successive moment but the present always
remains the same. Because the cone is upside down, we see point
AB  (joined  by  a  curved  line)  “in  the  measure  that  we  detach
ourselves from our  sensory  and motor  state  to  live  in  the  life  of
dreams” (Bergson, 1896/1910, p. 211). Points A’’B’’ and A’B’ (both
joined by a curved line) represent memory gaining depth as it moves
from the plane of existence. Point AB is the furthest point from S and
is thus richer in memories as we carry a heavier and heavier load
with us; it is, as Rudolf Bernet (2005) notes, “the evanescence of the
present is ballasted by the weight of the past that not only saves the
present  from  foundering  in  nothingness  but  that  also  gives  it  a
dimension of depth” (p. 70). Point AB, being the richest in memory,
is also the most “dilated level thus represent[ing] a dream-plane, the
most languid and expansive of all memories, where memories can
elaborate  themselves  for  their  own  sake  instead  of  being
subordinated to a current interest” (Grosz, 2004, p. 181). 
For Bergson, memory was either habit memory or memory proper.
Habit memory is action-oriented and future seeking, appearing as
action rather than representation, as a combination of sensation and
idea. Memory proper,  or pure memory represents and recalls the
past,  just  as  perception  reconstructs  the  material  image;
spontaneous, it is concentrated in the past. This kind of memory is
similar to what happens when we dream. When pure memory and
action found in habit memory are at their closest point, the process
of  recognition  occurs  and  pure  memory  is  displaced  by  habit
memory. Habit memory “appears through conscious effort, through
repeated learning; [pure memory] occurs spontaneously and often
unbeckoned” (Grosz, 2004, p. 171).
Michel  De  Certeau  (1984)  describes  memory  as  “a  sort  of  anti-
museum:  it  is  not  localizable”  (p.  108);  this  is  Bergson’s  pure
memory – unlike an orderly filing system, it cannot be methodically
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located. Ann Game (1991) notes an important distinction between
these two types of memory:
The present is sensori-motor, the materiality of existence,
and is unique for each moment of duration. As memory
materialises in the body, in movement,  it  ceases to  be
pure memory; it is lived in the present. It has moved from
virtual,  in  the depths of  the past,  to  actual,  capable of
provoking movements. (p. 97) 
The recounting of each performance experience uses pure memory,
as  I  draw  on  the  involuntary  recollections  of  the  past.  In  my
explication  of  these  performances  it  is  not  necessary  to  repeat
actions, nor for them to unroll in the time it took to experience them –
something  reflected  in  the  non-linear  account  of  Hotel  Medea in
Chapter  Six.  The  performances  cannot  be  repeated;  each  new
memory or recollection of a moment is a new event. As Fell (2012)
notes, “[t]he two types of memory do not function in isolation but
constantly  interact:  pure  memory  records  memory  images  of  all
events of our life” (p. 45). 
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  Chapter Five: Contextualizing Theories 1 – Maslow and Bergson 
Self-actualization and the peak-experience 
My  decision  to  explore  the  connections  between  the  ideas  of
Maslow and Bergson has been informed by the nature of both men’s
work. Maslow, writing in the scientific field of psychology, has been
criticized for producing ideas that are less than scientific. Similarly,
Bergson’s  work  on  duration  defies  objective  definition.  The
convergences between Maslovian self-actualization and Bergsonian
duration actually illuminate concepts that, individually, might appear
to be obfuscated by their unquantifiability. Therefore, my intention in
bringing  these  ideas  together  is  to  illustrate  how  Maslow’s
suggestion  that  peak-experience  (as  a  form of  transformation)  is
possible through experiencing Bergsonian duration. 
 
Maslow  regarded  self-actualization  (manifested  in  peak-
experiences) as often being lived “out-of-time and out-of-the-world
(atemporal and aspatial) even though mostly they  must  live in the
outer  world”30 (Maslow,  2010,  p.  198),  a  notion  that  has  clear
resonance with the performances explored in this thesis. Introducing
the concept of self-actualization in a 1943 paper, Maslow offers a
definition  as,  “[w]hat  a  man  can be,  he  must be”  (p.  382)  and
comments that “we do not know much about self-actualization, either
experimentally  or  clinically.  It  remains  a  challenging  problem  for
research” (p. 383). The term ‘peak-experience’ is not mentioned in
this  paper:  peak-experiences  developed  in  Maslow’s  later  work,
describing them as “transient  moments of  self-actualization.  They
are  moments  of  ecstasy  which  cannot  be  bought,  cannot  be
30
 I  believe Maslow is  making reference to the notion that,  although self-
actualizing people often transcend the world, they must still  live within it in the
same way as other, non-self-actualizing people. 
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guaranteed, cannot even be sought” (Maslow, 1971, p. 46), and, as
such, can only be measured against each individual’s experience.
Maslow’s studies on self-actualization and peak-experiences were
developed throughout his life, although the fundamental argument
remained  constant.  The  term  self-actualization,  as  Maslow
acknowledges, is attributed to Kurt Goldstein, a German psychiatrist
who was concerned with individuals reaching their latent potential
and becoming a whole  person (Colman,  2008).  The term  ‘whole
person’  is,  of  course,  highly  contentious.  From  a  spiritual
perspective a sense of wholeness might be ‘oneness’  with a God,
psychologically,  this  may  refer  to  a  mentally  balanced  individual,
physically it could mean someone who has a balanced and healthy
body. I suggest that a ‘whole’ person is a subjective state in which
an  individual  reaches  a  sense  of  satisfaction  with  their  being
(although ‘being’ might be more accurately described as ‘becoming’
to  suggest  an  ongoing  development  of  the  whole  person).
Following the publication of these initial  theories in 1943, Maslow
continued to explore theories of motivation. Many of his ideas were,
as one would expect, published incrementally as journal articles and
I am using his most formulated ideas as laid out in  Motivation and
Personality (1954),  Toward a Psychology of Being (2010; originally
published in 1962), Religions, Values and Peak Experiences (1970;
originally published in 1964), and  The Farther Reaches of Human
Nature (1971).  Green & Burke (2007) suggest that Maslow moved
from his  initial  ideas  in  1943,  in  which  self-actualization  was the
highest  point  of  satisfaction  to  a level  they  term as  beyond self-
actualization. Maslow developed an argument that once the deficit
needs  (D-Cognition)  have  been  satisfied,  one  is  no  longer
concerned  with  them;  thus  a  move  beyond  self-actualization  is
focused on the being needs (B-Cognition). Maslow (1971) asserts
that  Being  cognition  “always  comes  when  one  has  a  peak-
experience, but it may come without a peak-experience, and it may
come even from a tragic experience” (p. 242).   In his later writing
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Maslow  advocates  a  move  beyond  the  self  –  a  selfless-
actualization,31 “indicating  human development  beyond the  self  in
self-actualization” (Green & Burke, 2007, p.  119).  Green & Burke
(2007) use the notion of selfless-actualization in a social  context;
where people beyond self-actualization are “authentic, genuine and
bring the future to the present i.e. what ought to be is!” (p. 121). 
Maslow, self-actualization and performance 
Maslow  (1943)  proposed  that  the  “integrated  wholeness  of  the
organism  must  be  one  of  the  foundation  stones”  of  human
motivation theory (p. 370). The basic model is often summarized as
a pyramid in  education and psychology textbooks (Curzon,  2004;
Atkinson, Atkinson, Smith, & Bem,1993; Woods, Taylor & Woods,
2005), although Maslow himself never used this format to represent
his hierarchy, which for John Rowan (1998) represents “one of the
worst things that has happened to the theory” (p. 82). Rowan argues
that  using  a  triangle  or  pyramid  to  represent  Maslow’s  theory
“suggests that there is an end point to personal growth [and] that
this end point is not far away” (p. 88). In fact, as I will explain later,
my  concern  is  beyond self-actualization  –  the  ongoing  personal
growth that Rowan advocates.  However, despite the limitations of
the pyramid diagram, Maslow’s writings do suggest that in order for
human beings to reach a level  of self-actualization – that is,  “the
desire  for  self-fulfilment,  namely,  the  tendency  …  to  become
actualized in what he is potentially” (Maslow, 1943, p. 382) – they
must  first  of  all  satisfy  a number of  other  needs.  He categorized
these as:  physiological  needs,  safety  needs,  love  needs,  esteem
needs, and finally, self-actualization – a state manifested in peak-
experiences. 
31
 Not to be confused with being selfless in the sense of putting others first
although Green & Burke do imply that selfless self-actualizers are a force for good
in society. 
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Maslow’s suggestion that basic needs should be fulfilled before one
can reach higher levels of satisfaction is rational and straightforward
when related to situations such as formal learning environments. In
fact,  the  theory  of  self-actualization  is  most  commonly  cited  by
educationalists  and  has  become  an  important  part  of  teacher
training  in  the  developed  world  (Gershon,  2013).  Maslow’s  first
suggestion that physiological needs must be met does not, however,
universally  apply.  Maslow  (1943)  himself  suggested  that  the
“generality [of this argument] … can be denied” and that it is often
appetite rather than hunger that is normally experienced when one
feels hungry (p. 374). Thus, meeting the need of hunger might only
be meeting the need of appetite. Even when hunger needs are met,
Maslow  suggests  the  fact  that  they  have been  met  can  still  be
confused for appetite. The many feats of endurance achieved in the
face of adversity and a denial of basic needs (whether imposed by
choice or not) may have been denying, not a need, but a desire.
Thus it  is  through this denial  of  a desire rather than a need that
allows self-actualization as a form of transformation to occur. 
Self-actualization can also be regarded as a freeing of the individual;
freeing oneself  from what an individual may  believe to be hunger
permits the freedom to view the world and the self in a different way.
In the work of performance artists Marina Abramović and Tehching
Hsieh,  the denial  of  basic  needs such as food (Abramović’s  The
House with the Ocean View), shelter (Hsieh’s  Outdoor Piece), and
adequate sleep (Time Clock Piece) are prominent features of their
performances. In each case, the artists had a self-imposed regime
that denied their basic needs. For both Abramović and Hsieh, this
was an essential part of the process and, without these restrictions
the impact on artists and spectators may have been diminished. For
Hsieh, the restrictions he placed on himself were actually liberating
in “transforming and theatricalizing … a routine moment” (Heathfield,
2009, p. 30); similarly, Abramović’s preparation and performances
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operate  on  a  positive  level  of  denial  to  elevate  consciousness  –
using the energy from her spectators (see Richards, 2010, pp.107-
108;  Biesenbach,  2009,  p.  211;  Birringer,  2003,  p.  68;  Westcott,
2010, pp.166-69 & pp. 283-85). 
Andrew Neher (1991) also finds a contradiction to the necessity of
satiating  physiological  needs  in  reaching  self-actualization.
Suggesting that humans purposefully self-deprive lower order needs
in  order  to  undergo  a  meaningful  experience  such  as  camping,
undermines  “Maslow’s  …  path  to  self-actualization  and  peak-
experience” (Neher, 1991, p. 108).  He summarizes that:
[t]he problem here is not that the level of self-actualization
is not worth attaining.  The problems are that, first, there
is  a  serious  question  whether  its  attainment  is  a
consequence  of  the  process  Maslow  advocated  [and]
there is a good reason to believe that lower motivations
are not always burdensome.  In fact, they can make their
own unique and significant contribution to our lives (pp.
108-9).  
Neher’s assertion certainly supports examples of performance artists
working durationally who deprive themselves of basic physiological
needs. In addition to the examples cited earlier of Abramović and
Hsieh, artists such as Joseph Beuys, Mike Parr, and Terence Koh
have all self-denied their basic needs in the process of performance.
Beijing born Canadian artist Terence Koh has worked durationally to
explore corporeal and mental endurance, a strategy exemplified in
Nothingtoodoo (2011), in which Koh circled a pile of rock salt on his
knees for eight hours a day, five days a week over a period of five
weeks. For Roberta Smith (2011),  Nothingtoodoo suggests a “kind
of  abject  penance  that  is  hard  to  dismiss  …  [i]t  involves  a  fair
amount of physical discomfort, if not downright suffering, and in its
own way it too is hard to look at” (‘Crawling for Peace in a Not-Quite
Salt  Mine’,  para.  4).  Echoing  the  endurance  works  of  Hsieh,
Abramović  and  Chris  Burden,  Koh  presented  a  simple  act  in  a
straightforward  durational  context.  This  simplicity  was  further
67
epitomized through Koh’s use of white pyjamas and white setting – a
blank canvas through which duration was traversed.  Like Hsieh’s
yearlong  works,  Koh’s  performance  was  filling  time  whilst
contributing nothing productive or tangible. 
In opposition to Maslow’s assertion that our basic needs must be
satisfied before anything else, Neher (1991) argues that “a certain
degree  of  hardship  in  meeting  basic  needs  can  bring  people
together and give them a sense of purpose as they cooperate to
overcome adversity” (p. 97).  In relation to collective experiences of
performance stretching beyond comfortable consumption, a shared
‘hardship’  may  become  something  that  offers  a  more  valuable
experience. As already stated, deficiency of a lower order need can
facilitate the successful acquisition of a higher order need. In many
of Abramović’s durational works, the necessity of enduring hardship
to  reach  her  goal  is  paramount.   Similarly,  Hsieh’s  self-imposed
constraints are the very factors that provide a route to enlightenment
(Heathfield, 2009). Ansuman Biswas’s Cat (1997) and many of Chris
Burden’s performances also have these self-imposed hardships. In
Cat, Biswas stayed in a lightproof and soundproof box for ten days,
attempting to maintain his sensory awareness. He used the principle
of Schrödinger’s Cat – a theoretical concept in physics that argues
that  a  cat  is  potentially  both  alive  and dead until  it  is  observed.
Burden’s Five Day Locker Piece (1971) and White Light White Heat
(1975) tested the artist’s endurance to extremes: in the first, Burden
was confined to a book locker with only water for sustenance; in the
second piece Burden stayed on a small ledge in a gallery for three
weeks.  In these examples, a conscious choice to be deprived of
basic needs was in operation.  Whilst ‘enlightenment’ may not be a
specific  goal  or  claim  by  Hsieh,  there  was  certainly  something
transformative about  the outcome of  his  lifeworks,  leading us,  as
Heathfield (2009) argues, to “have faith that the act was conducted
with integrity…. operat[ing] as a test of belief” (p. 56). 
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Neher  (1991)  notes  Maslow’s  open  rejection  of  the  traditional
behaviourist  position  of  overcoming  deprivation  needs,  instead
favouring an approach that suggests higher needs are gratified by
inquisitiveness  and  stimulation.  Arguing  that  the  most  defensible
position  is  somewhere  between  “extreme  need  deprivation  [and]
extreme ease of need gratification” (Neher, 1991, p. 102),  it is “the
purposeful choosing of challenges, and thus deprivations, which can
provide almost limitless motivation and satisfaction (p. 104). Thus,
the  choice  of  challenges  is  significant  when  exploring  Maslow’s
psychology of self-actualization; individual agency being a factor that
critics rebuking Maslow with  accusations of  elitism have failed to
recognize. The effect of cultural context on agency is used by Neher
(1991) in arguing against Maslow’s assertion that higher needs are
innate,  instead  suggesting  they  are  “largely  shaped  by  cultural
experience” (Neher, 1991, p. 92). Neher also notes Maslow’s “theory
implies that the imposition of cultural norms is unnecessary at best,
and, at worst, destructive of our unique potential as individuals” (p.
94).  
Performance artist Alistair MacLennan creates durational work, often
lasting 12 hours in length although his 1981 piece, Days and Nights,
which  lasted  for  144  hours  represents  an  extreme  example.
MacLennan  (as  cited  in  Hoffman,  2012)  describes  his  durational
performance works as ‘actuations’, stemming “from the idea that the
work ‘actuates’ a process in the life of those people who see and
experience it”  (p.  50).  These actuations are  agents  of  change in
transforming a spectator through their experience of the work. The
notion of actuation or becoming actuated - to “cause [a person] to
act”  (Thompson,  1996,  p.  11)  -  resonates strongly with  Maslow’s
theory  of  self-actualization  wherein  an  individual  is  motivated
towards a particular goal.  In  The White Hybrid (Fading) (1996), a
performance  lasting  seventy-two  hours,  Australian  performance
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artist Mike Parr took himself and the audience beyond the theatrical,
creating a “kind of autonomy that produces a delay, a floating away
of the corridor of time” (Parr as cited in Scheer, 2008, p. 199). Thus,
the length of Parr’s performance produced a similar actuating effect
in anyone who experienced it. 
Artists  working  durationally  are  not  always  driven  by  this  ascetic
need; instead they may be concerned with a living autobiography,
such as the work of Berlin based plan b (Daniel Belasco-Rogers and
Sophia New), currently engaged on a project that began in 2001.
Belasco-Rogers  started  recording  his  everyday  movements  using
GPS equipment as a way of learning the geography of Berlin, the
city where he had just moved. Joined in this task in 2003 by his
partner, Sophia New, plan b began to create visual maps of their
journeys,  the  “marks  attest[ing]  to  unique  and  often  memorable
journeys to new territories in a now familiar city or to the charting of
new  territory  in  the  terra  incognita  of  their  personal  atlases”
(Belasco-Rogers & New, 2010, p. 23). This work could be described
as  being  driven  by  an  autobiographical  desire  rather  than  any
ascetic  purpose  and,  unlike  Hsieh,  who  was  also  making
autobiographical ‘lifeworks,’ plan b are not ascetic in their approach;
they  are  concerned  with  recording  their  lives  as  one  continuous
performance.  Conversely,  Hsieh’s  ascetically  driven  yearlong
performances  were  distinct  from his  quotidian  existence.  Despite
this, in 2009 Hsieh stated, “[t]he only thing I’m sure about is that I’m
still  in  the process of  passing time,  as I  always am” (as cited in
Heathfield  & Jones,  2012,  p.  467),  thus suggesting his  art  is  life
itself. Hsieh has suggested his whole life can be regarded as a piece
of  art.  In  his  final  lifework,  Hsieh  began  with  a  statement  that
promised “NOT TO DO ART, NOT TALK ART, NOT READ ART,
NOT TO GO TO ART GALLERY AND ART MUSEUM FOR ONE
YEAR. I JUST GO IN LIFE” (Heathfield, 2009, p. 296). He followed
this with a thirteen-year performance in which he made art but did
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not show it publically. On emerging from his self-imposed abstinence
on December 31, 1999,  Hsieh stated “I  KEPT MYSELF ALIVE. I
PASSED THE DEC 31, 1999” (as cited in Heathfield, 2009, p. 58).
Thus, Hsieh’s view of his life is as a piece of art or performance. 
Equally, the works of Robert Wilson (Ka Mountain, 1972;  The Life
and  Times  of  Joseph  Stalin,  1973)  required  discipline  from
performers and spectators although not in denying the basic needs
of either party. In all of these examples the physiological needs of
the artists concerned had been met. In the cases of Abramović and
Hsieh, their physiological needs were, paradoxically, met by denying
these needs;  Abramović’s  abstention  from food and Hsieh’s  self-
imposed regime of interrupted sleep or ‘shelterless’ living were the
physical  means  through  which  they  were  able  to  achieve  their
performance aims. For Belasco-Rogers and New, the GPS mapping
of their daily movements did not necessitate the denial of food and
water  although a  strict  adherence to  ensuring  consistency of  the
GPS mapping may have interfered with an immediate gratification of
hunger and thirst. Likewise, Hsieh’s  Time Clock Piece (1981-2) did
not deny the artist food and shelter, although his hourly clocking on
restricted  other  physiological  needs  by  the  “very  temporal  (and
spatial) constraints that govern the institutions of capitalized labor”
(Heathfield, 2009, p. 32); he was denied uninterrupted sleep as well
as being restricted in his movements. In some respects, Belasco-
Rogers  and  New  go  further  than  Hsieh  in  being  tracked  every
second of the day rather than a commitment to ‘clocking on’ at set
times. In Time Clock Piece, every “clocking-on [was] linked to being
clocked  by  the  camera”  (Heathfield,  2009,  p.  36);  plan  b’s  GPS
project increases the frequency of ‘being clocked’ by a further fifty-
nine minutes in each hour.  
For  each  of  the  artists  cited  above  it  may  be  in  the  process  of
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preparation  for  performance  that  the  physiological  needs  are
satisfied.  Abramović  is  well  known  for  instigating  a  process  of
‘cleaning the house’ (‘house’ being a metaphor for the body) in her
own work and in workshops with small groups of people over several
days. This process includes fasting, meditating, long walks in the
heat or cold, walking backwards with a mirror, standing naked and
blindfolded in a forest, and sitting silently (Westcott, 2010). It is this
kind of preparation that satisfies Abramović’s physiological needs,
almost like an animal preparing for long winter hibernation. Whilst
Hsieh  has  not  disclosed  his  process of  physical  preparation,  the
written  statements  published  at  the  beginning  of  each  year  long
performance might  be viewed as statements  of  commitment  to  a
process  that  adequately  prepared  him  physiologically.  These
preparatory  processes are  also,  of  course  psychological  but  it  is
through the physiological – the corporeally felt – that the artists are
transformed. 
Once these physiological needs are gratified, Maslow suggests that
safety needs become an essential  step in  the path towards self-
actualization. Again, there are a number of situations in which safety
seems less than important in achieving a particular outcome. For
Maslow, the need for safety refers to the need for a “predictable,
orderly world” (Maslow, 1943, p. 377), which is something we learn
as children and carry into  our  adult  lives.  This  need for  order  is
exemplified in the way we use time to structure most aspects of our
lives, even structuring ‘unstructured’ leisure or ludic activities. 
The  need  for  love  and  belongingness  follows  safety  needs  in
Maslow’s hierarchy. This sense of belongingness has significance in
my analysis of the chosen performances, as will be shown later –
particularly in relation to Hotel Medea, where an overnight durational
experience  brought  a  group  of  strangers  together.  Similarly,  the
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communitas  that  emerged  in  Walking forged  a  sense  of
belongingness. Preceding the final level of self-actualization is the
need for esteem. Although I  do not  directly explore the notion of
esteem in relation to performance, a transformation through peak-
experience suggests that esteem can be a by-product. 
In explaining the concept of self-actualization Maslow draws on a
number  of  case  studies,  citing  individuals  who  he  believes  are
examples of self-actualizing people. A criticism of Maslow has been
that his case studies support the idea that self-actualization is an
elitist concept. He suggests that few people genuinely self-actualize
and “[t]hough, in principle,  self-actualization is easy,  in practice it
rarely happens (by my criteria, certainly in less than 1% of the adult
population)” (Maslow, 2010, p. 62).  It is the ‘criteria’ used by Maslow
that are perhaps the factor in limiting the number of people he sees
as self-actualizing. According to Michael Daniels (1988), this elitism
is a “distasteful and unsound” aspect of Maslow’s theory (p. 22), as
he uses examples of  presidents,  artists  and poets to  support  his
argument. Daniel’s argument is, however, incomplete as Maslow’s
choice  of  exemplar  in  self-actualizers  demonstrates  the  ultimate
positive outcomes, and to use less well-known examples would be
less effective in illustrating the argument to his readership.32 
The subjectivity of self-actualization
A  key  element  of  Maslow’s  theory  is  the  achievement  of  self-
actualization itself and, in terms of parts of this thesis it is the most
significant. For Maslow, the notion of self-actualization is about how
each individual can achieve their particular goal. The goals need not
necessarily be planned far into the future; it is that an individual must
32
 It would, in principle be just as effective to use an example from someone
who is not famous. Maslow’s examples were chosen, however, because he was
able to study them from afar rather than carry out systematic one-to-one case
studies.  
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do  what  “he  is  fitted  for”  (Maslow,  1943,  p.  382).  For  example,
anyone with a desire to  make music or write poetry must do so.
Often,  pursuing  goals  that  require  diligence  and  determination
means neglecting our basic physiological needs and relationships
with others. He suggests, “[i]t  then becomes possible, and indeed
does actually  happen,  that  they may,  for  the  sake of  this  higher
need, put themselves into the position of being deprived in a more
basic need” (Maslow, 1943, p. 387). It is to this end that I suggest
self-actualization  (through  peak-experience)  is  something
achievable  in  the  context  of  a  performance  lasting  beyond
comfortable consumption.  As I have intimated with the examples of
Abramović and Hsieh, the road to self-actualization does not always
rely  on firstly  satisfying basic  needs.  Maslow recognized that  the
hierarchy is not fixed and those individuals in search of higher needs
may neglect a more basic need. Similarly, Daniels (1988) recognizes
that the route to self-actualization is possible as a heuristic process;
we do not  need to  “wait  for  circumstances to  improve before we
begin such as the satisfaction of lower needs and gratifications” (p.
24).  
It  is  difficult  to  identify  directly  what  might  be  meant  by  self-
actualization beyond Maslow’s broad definition and, as such, it  is
open to interpretation. Maslow’s work has been widely referenced
but in some areas there has been a focus on the spiritual nature of
his work – particularly in counselling practice (Chandler, Holden, &
Kolander,  1992;  Gold,  2013),  where  self-actualization  has  been
referred  to  as  “spiritual  awakening”  (Benjamin  & Looby,  1998,  p.
102). Maslow’s writing can be viewed as spiritual in tone; his 1964
book  Religions,  Values and Peak Experiences exemplifies this  in
many ways, but it is by his own admission, not “a transcendence of
all human problems. Conflict, anxiety, frustration, sadness, hurt, and
guilt can all  be found in healthy human beings” (Maslow, 2010 p.
196). To this end, I am exploring the notion of self-actualization as
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some degree of felt change rather than a total transformation of self;
more  specifically,  as  a way of  understanding duration  as  distinct
from time in a clock-measured socially accelerated culture. 
A major criticism of Maslow’s work on self-actualization has been
that  it  is  too  closely  allied  with  philosophy  rather  than  science
(Daniels,  1988)  and  that  it  is  “subtle,  elusive,  and  challenging”
(Daniels, 1988, p. 10).  It is certainly true that the subjective nature
of the concept of self-actualization renders it challenging to measure
in  a  scientific,  objective  sense,  although  using  Maslow’s
recognizable features of self-actualizing individuals might be a way
of  identifying  positive  change.   The  non-subjective  elements  that
Daniels deems inappropriate are reflected in the physiological needs
that Maslow outlines in his hierarchy; no matter who you are, these
basic  needs must  be  fulfilled.   Other  needs,  such as  safety  and
belongingness  will  vary  enormously  between  individuals.   By
suggesting that Maslow’s research has a scientific context, Daniels
asserts that there is a failure to apply his theory scientifically.  The
potential  difficulty  in  the  measurement  of  self-actualization  raises
questions about what self-actualization actually is.  In a sense, it is a
spiritual  concept,  one that  cannot  be recognized in  a  physical  or
scientific way.  For Daniels, the theory is simply there to, “provide
guidance and support for those seeking fulfilment” (1988, p. 12) and
should therefore not be regarded as a rigid framework that offers
incontrovertible  proof  of  anything.  As  “a  symbolic  language  that
enables people to make sense of their existence” (Daniels, 1988, p.
13), self-actualization begins to make connections with philosophical
thought  in  the  broadest  sense  and,  more  specifically  with
Bergsonian  thought  on  duration;  it  is  living  with  the  thought  of
something being possible that gives it potential and potency. 
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Self-actualization  as  akin  to  religious  belief  is  “living  as  if self-
actualization were possible [and] may itself be a necessary condition
for achieving it” (Daniels, 1988, p. 17). Thus, despite his criticisms of
self-actualization, Daniels concedes it has worth and usefulness and
because  it  cannot  be  measured  scientifically,  it  also  cannot  be
disproved – much like belief or faith in a God or deity, which are
essentially abstract concepts. For Daniels, it is erroneous that such
an  “abstract  psychological  framework  would  necessarily  provide
concrete practical support and guidance” (p. 35). He asserts the way
forward for self-actualization theory is “to recognise that human life
may become a mythical quest, and that all such quests take place
within  a  particular  social,  cultural  and  historical  context”  (p.  35).
Thus, using Maslow as part of an autoethnographic enquiry draws
upon such cultural contexts and validates the subjective emphasis
Maslow places on realizing self-actualization. The notion of life as a
mythical quest suggests that self-actualization, like an experience of
Bergsonian  duration  is  something  that  may  never  be  achieved.
However,  the  process  of  seeking  self-actualization  may  itself
become a self-actualizing experience. 
Maslow and Bergson: Self-actualization and peak-experiences
As Maslow’s ideas developed, so did his justification for the value of
peak-experiences. In Religions, Value and Peak-Experiences (1970)
he begins to question the validity of knowledge gained during peak-
experiences, asserting that “it appears quite clear that the kind of
(putative)  knowledge  gained  in  peak-experiences  can  also  be
obtained from desolation experiences” (p. 74) – something to which I
earlier alluded. For Maslow (1970), peak-experiences were akin to
mystic experiences revealing “great insights and revelations” (p. 75).
Peak-experiences can be validating insights into “the experience of
being a real identity … of feeling what it is like to really feel oneself,
[it is] the revelation of a truth” (p. 75). The truth, according to Maslow
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(1970), is a kind of “attention-change” where reality is viewed and
valued in  a  different  way (p.  77-8);  it  is  what  he describes as a
“freshening of experience and the breaking up of rubricizing” (p. 78).
If we take ‘rubricizing’ to mean the unitizing or defining of something
into specific parts, then dismantling the rubric of clock-time was a
kind  of  attention-change  that  I  underwent  in  my  experience  of
Bergsonian duration (see Chapters Six, Eight, and Ten).   
In connecting Maslow’s ideas with Bergson’s work it  is  significant
that  a  common  thread  is  the  sense  of  spirituality  and  mysticism
present in both men’s writing. It has been suggested that many of
Bergson’s  ideas  would  not  be  out  of  place  in  some  Eastern
philosophies (Foley, 2013) and that his discussions of intuition over
intellect, and duration over clock-measured time draw clear parallels
with  the  Buddhist  practice  of  meditation.  However,  according  to
Lesek Kolakowski  (2001),  Bergson “never pretended to  have this
kind  of  [mystic]  experience;  nor  did  he  suggest  that  it  might  be
universally  accessible”  (p.  28).  In  all  of  Bergson’s  writings,  as
extensive as they are,  he does not  specifically  address how  one
might experience duration. Similarly, Maslow’s use of case studies
makes observations about those he considers self-actualizers and
cites examples of individual peak-experiences, although the specific
practical advice on achieving this state is neglected. Maslow, writing
in  the  scientific  field  of  psychology  has  been  criticized  most
frequently for the lack of clear evidence to support his assertions;
Bergson’s positioning in philosophical enquiry has mitigated for this
to some extent, although his work has not evaded criticism for lack
of  clarity.33  The  apparent  opacity  of  Bergson’s  thought  perhaps
arises from a misconception that, like earlier philosophers, Bergson
was attempting to answer the question ‘what is time’? Gilbert-Walsh
(2010) suggests rather that Bergson found the nature of time: “[t]he
33
 Bergson’s  metaphysical  approach  to  philosophy  counters  this  to  some
degree. 
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key issue for … Bergson … is not really ‘time’ as a specific topic of
inquiry  but  rather  how  philosophical  discourse  can  best
acknowledge the elusive backdrop that situates and determines it”
(p. 175). In my process of attempting to discover the experience and
perception of an alternative to  time (i.e.  duration),  I  concede that
finding an absolute truth is impossible; it is, however, possible that
the act of doing so is itself the truth about time. Gilbert-Walsh (2010)
concurs  with  this,  noting  the  “perplexity  concerning  time’s  very
conceptualization,  is  not  an  obstacle  preventing  us  from  gaining
access to the truth about time; rather, this perplexity, taken up in the
right manner, is itself the truth about time” (p. 182). 
B-Cognition and D-Cognition
At  the  centre  of  Maslow’s  theory  of  self-actualization  and  peak-
experiences is humanist psychology. He developed the notions of B-
cognition  and  D-cognition  –  that  is,  Being  and  Deficiencies.  B-
cognition may arise when one is completely focused in a particular
moment, “as if it [the experience] were all there was in the universe”
(Maslow, 2010, p. 70). This state is a kind of concrete perception
that  can lead to peak-experiences “felt  as …  self-validating,  self-
justifying moment[s] which [carry their] own intrinsic value” (Maslow,
2010, p. 74). Highly pertinent to this thesis, Maslow (2010) identifies
a pattern of “a very characteristic disorientation in time and space”
(p.  76)  in  his  analysis  of  peak-experiences,  where  “[i]t  would  be
accurate to say that in these moments the person is outside of time
and  space  subjectively”  (p.  76).  Other  participants  in  Maslow’s
experiments  noted  a  paradoxical  experience  of  time,  where  the
moments passed by very quickly whilst simultaneously seeming to
stand  still,  thus  suggesting  an  awareness  of  time  that  might  be
closer  to  qualitative  duration,  in  which  clock-time  loses  its
significance. 
B-Values
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Following  on  from  Green  &  Burke  (2007),  who  propose  that
Maslow’s  ideas  on  self-actualization  move  to  beyond self-
actualization,  I  will  use  his  categories  of  Being-values  (B-values)
(Maslow,  1971;  2010)  in  making  connections  to  Bergson’s
discussion of duration.  Maslow proposed fourteen categories of B-
values  (Maslow,  1971;  Maslow,  2010).  From  these  categories,  I
have  selected  specific  B-values  because  of  their  resonance  to
Bergson’s  writing  on  duration  and  my  experience  of  the  first
performance  discussed  in  this  thesis.  As  I  stated  earlier,  my
autoethnographic  approach  has  privileged  an  embodied,
phenomenological  response  to  the  selection  of  Maslow’s  ideas.
Furthermore,  it  would  be  impossible  to  apply  all of  Maslow’s  B-
Values  to  an  analysis  of  any  experience;  as  Maslow  (1971)
suggests,  “[s]elf-actualization  is  a  matter  of  degree,  or  little
accessions accumulated one by one” (p. 49); the peak-experience is
one that can happen as a result  of  a number of different values,
different  at  different  times.   Maslow  does  not  offer  a  detailed
explanation  of  each  of  these  values;  he  does,  however,  provide
some general  notes on the characteristics of  Being-Cognition (B-
Cognition)  and Deficiency-Cognition  (D-Cognition).  The Maslovian
principle that the physiological needs of an individual must be met
before self-actualization can occur deals only with D-Cognition; B-
Cognition really only begins once an individual goes  beyond  self-
actualization. This is not to say that the artists discussed earlier who
are  concerned  with  the  ascetic,  such  as  Abramović  and  Hsieh,
cannot go beyond self-actualization but that their non-satisfaction of
deficiency  needs  actually  facilitates  B-Cognition.  The  B  and  D
realms are, as Maslow (1971) reminds us, not “two separate realms
in actual physical space or actual physical time …[but]… about two
kinds of perception, two kinds of cognition, two attitudes towards the
one world” (p. 248). 
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In  the  posthumously  published  The  Farther  Reaches  of  Human
Nature (1971), Maslow’s widow Bertha offers34 “Improved … Further
Notes on Cognition” (p. 249), first published in 1962 in  Towards a
Psychology of  Being.  In  the preface to  the 1971 publication,  she
notes that she was “faced with a choice between substantial editing
of AHM’s idiosyncratic style or the publication of the original articles
as a collection of papers” (p. xi). As the 1971 ‘improved’ edition is
regarded as definitive, I will refer to this throughout the next section
in  explaining  B  and  D-Cognition  characteristics.35 Maslow’s
characteristics are listed as nineteen points, which I have tabulated
in summary form below:
B-Cognition D-Cognition
1. Whole,  complete,
self-sufficient,  unitary,
unity  of  the  world  or
object perceived
1. Part,  incomplete,
not  self-sufficient,
dependent  on  other
things
2. Absorption,
fascination,  total
attention,  richness  of
detail, all aspects equally
important
2. Rubricized,
selective  inattention  to
some aspects, seen only
from some point of view
3. No  comparing,  not
in  competition  with
anything else
3. Comparing, judging,
placing on a continuum
4. Human-irrelevant 4. Relevant  to  human
concerns, what it is good
for
5. Made  richer  by
repeated  experiencing.
More  and  more
perceived 
5. Repeated
experiencing
impoverishes,
familiarization  leads  to
34
 Bertha Maslow is unclear exactly how the notes have been ‘improved’; they
are not new ideas but rather re-publication and collation of earlier ideas, although
this  final  version  of  his  works  is  regarded  as  definitive  because  she  states,
“[e]diting  has  been limited  to  the  necessary  technical  corrections,  deletions  of
occasional repetitive statements, and the combination of two articles” (1971, p. xi).
Thus, the text is safely assumed to be Maslow’s original work. 
35
 Maslow (1971) makes no clear and definitive distinction between B-Values
and B-Cognition: I understand the former as being principles or beliefs held in
relation to the latter way of thinking.  He does, however, state that “characteristics
of Being are perceived as values of Being” (p. 251). 
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boredom
6. Perceived  as
having  no  reference  to
needs  of  perceiver,
independent
6. Object  seen  as
need-gratifier,  useful  or
not useful
7. Ego-transcending,
self  disappears  as  so
absorbed in experience
7. Ego is centre point,
ego  projected  into
percept, perception not of
object  alone  but  of  the
object mixed with self  of
the perceiver
8. Object  permitted  to
be  itself,  humble,  non-
interference  with  object
or percept
8. Active  shaping,
organizing,  trying,  effort,
control
9. Seen  as  end  in
itself,  has intrinsic value,
self-validating
9. A  means,  not
having  self-contained
worth
10. Outside of time and
space, eternal, universal,
percept  not  related  to
surroundings
10. In time and space
11. Characteristics  of
Being  are  perceived  as
values of Being
11. D-Values  are
means  values,  suitability
for a purpose
12. Absolute  (because
spaceless and timeless)
12. Relative  to  history,
felt to be passing
13. Resolution  of
dichotomies,
inconsistences  exist
simultaneously and seem
sensible and necessary
13. Aristotelian  logic,
separate  things  seen  as
dissected  and  different
from each other, mutually
exclusive
14. Concretely  and
abstractly  perceived,
ineffable  to  ordinary
language,  aesthetic
experience
14. Abstract,
categorized, rubricized
15. Ideographic  object,
classification impossible
15. Nomothetic36,
general
16. Increased 16. Decreased
36
 The use of the term ‘nomothetic’ here supports the criticism of Maslow that
he was not scientifically rigourous. 
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isomorphism,  as
essential  Being  of  the
world  is  perceived  by
person,  so  he  comes
closer to own Being
isomorphism
17. Object perceived as
sacred,  holy,  calls  for
awe, wonder
17. Object  normal,
everyday, ordinary
18. World and self often
seen as amusing but also
poignant,  fusion  of
comic-tragic dichotomy
18. Serious  and  comic
separate
19. Non-
interchangeable,  not
replaceable
19. Interchangeable,
replaceable
Figure 4: Characteristics of B and D Cognition (Adapted from Maslow, 1971, pp.
249-253)
These characteristics of B-Cognition all have something in common
– that they are not predicated on a logical way of seeing the world,
whereas the D-Cognition characteristics are presented as rational
and situated in the objective world. In the Hotel Medea case study
(Chapter Six), I deal with specific B-Values37 in relation to Bergson,
although  it  is  my  initial  intention  to  discuss  some  of  the
characteristics of B-Cognition; a way of thinking that allows B-Values
to emerge.
The  description  of  B-Cognition  as  being  ‘whole,  complete,  ego-
transcending,  having  intrinsic  value,  being  outside  of  time  and
space, and absolute’ (points 1, 7, 9, 10, and 12 in the above table)
alludes to  the qualities that  I  assert  are part  of  an experience of
Bergsonian duration. These descriptions suggest a transcendence
of the ‘real’ world, a notion that Maslow was preoccupied with.  In a
chapter on the various meanings of transcendence in  The Farther
37
 Maslow  discusses  B-Values  in  relation  to  the  B  and  D  Cognition
characteristics; these are explored further on in this chapter.  
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Reaches  of  Human  Nature (1971),  Maslow  describes  thirty-five
different  ways  of  interpreting  transcendence.  The  range  of
definitions and interpretations makes Maslow’s study applicable to a
diverse and far-reaching number of instances, as well as the many
tangible links to Csikszentmihalyi’s theory of optimal experience or
flow  (I  discuss  flow  in  Chapter  Seven  and  pick  up  on  these
connections to Csikszentmihalyi’s work). Maslow admits that, as with
the B-Values / D-Values and B-Cognition / D-Cognition, there is a
good deal of overlap in his categories of transcendence; a nebulous
approach to psychology that has earned Maslow his fair share of
critics. My discussion of transcendence is in relation to the notion of
transformation,  whereas  Maslow’s  term  suggests  something
stronger,  of  going  beyond  a  physical  plane  of  existence;
transformation, however, is more subjective and may only mean a
small change in mental or physical state. 
Maslow’s definition of transcendence
At the end of his chapter on the various meanings of transcendence,
Maslow (1971) offers a “condensed statement”: 
Transcendence  refers  to  the  very  highest  and  most
inclusive  or  holistic  levels  of  human  consciousness,
behaving  and  relating,  as  ends  rather  than  means,  to
oneself, to significant others, to human beings in general,
to other species, to nature, and to the cosmos. (p. 269)
 
Maslow’s view of transcendence as an ability to move to a higher
level of consciousness connects with my definition of transformation
stated at the outset of this thesis; the change in mental or physical
state that I suggest is transformation implies an effect on the highest
levels of human consciousness, although it may only be manifested
as a small change. 
83
Transcendence of time
In his 1971 book  The Farther Reaches of Human Nature, Maslow
uses the example of being “bored in an academic procession and
feeling slightly ridiculous in cap and gown” (p. 259) to exemplify his
different  experience  of  time.  His  description  of  imagining  himself
amongst  great  thinkers  and  academics,  as  representing  the
“Platonic essence of the teacher” (p.  260),  is not so much about
diminishing clock-time but about feeling “friendly, in a very personal
and affectionate way, with [great thinkers] as if they still lived. Which
is to say that in specific ways they do still live” (p. 260). He also sees
the transcendence of time as being manifest in “working hard for not
yet born great-grandchildren or other successors … plant[ing] trees
for future generations” (p. 260). Maslow’s transcendence of time is
rooted in imagination and in using that imagination to lift oneself out
of  the  present  moment.  The  potential  of  performance  to  ignite
imagination  has  obvious  resonance  with  Maslow’s  notion  of
transcendence in  this  example,  although his  example arises from
being bored instead of having one’s imagination stimulated.  
Transcendence of culture
I began Chapter Three with an exposition of the move towards the
control  and  mastery  of  time,  beginning  with  time  keeping  in  the
monasteries of the 13th century. In our age of social  acceleration,
whereby one might be constantly aware of remaining on a slipping
slope  (Rosa,  2005/2013;  Rosa  &  Scheuerman,  2008/2009),  the
possibility  of  transcending  this  culture  is  the  concern  of  ‘slow’
movements  and  similar  counter-cultural  activities.   For  Maslow
(1971), the “transcendent self-actualizing man, is the universal man
[rising] above that culture … to be independent of it in various ways”
(p. 260). The ability of the self-actualizing individual to move outside
of his or her culture is significant to my enquiry, the role of culture
84
being an essential feature of autoethnography (see Chapter One).
The  transcended  self-actualized  individual  possesses  an  attitude
towards their culture that has been “consciously accepted [and] is
quite different from the unthinking and blind, unaware unconscious
total  identification  with  one’s  culture  in  a  non-discriminating  way”
(Maslow,  1971,  p.  260).  The  intentional  and  focused  use  of
Bergson’s thought on duration in exploring the chosen performances
is an example of how one might consciously accept a culture but
then use specific means in order to experience it differently. Maslow
(1971) also discusses how one’s own past can be transcended; in
doing  so  he  describes  how,  by  “forgiving  one’s  self  because  of
understanding one’s self … means the transcendence of remorse,
regret, guilt, shame, embarrassment, and the like” (p. 261). In some
ways this concurs with Bergson’s notion of memory as becoming
richer and more detailed the further away from the original  event
(see  Chapter  Four,  pp.  64-66  for  Bergson’s  explanation  of  pure
memory as an upside down cone). In my account of  Hotel Medea,
memories  from  my  past  infiltrate  my  present  and  augment  my
experience of specific moments (see p. 112, p. 116, p. 118, and p.
173). Arguably, a feeling of shame or regret that has been enhanced
by  pure  memory  might  make  transcendence  less likely;  I  see  a
depth of  memory,  however,  as being a way of  gaining  a deeper
understanding and therefore facilitating transcendence.   
Transcendence to living in the realm of Being 
Most boldly, Maslow (1971) claims that one can “live in the realm of
Being, speaking the language of Being, B-cognizing, plateau-living”
(p. 265). He suggests that once one has a great mystic experience,
the novelty disappears and “one gets used to good things or even
great things, live casually in heaven, and be on easy terms with the
eternal  and  the  infinite”  (p.  265).  He  admits  that  whilst  peak-
experiences are transient, the effects of the experience stay with the
individual permanently: “He cannot ‘un-see’. He can’t become blind
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again” (p. 265). Fundamentally, Maslow is proposing that the peak-
experience leads to a kind of lasting change, much in the same way
that I assert a Bergsonian view of duration provides an alternative
view and experience of time in a socially accelerated culture – an
experience that can be sought repeatedly. In a separate meaning of
transcendence,  Maslow (1971)  suggests  “a  special  and  separate
statement  ought  to  be  made  of  transcendence  in  the  particular
meaning of introjection of and identification with B-Values” (p. 267);
he  asserts  that  a  transcendental  experience  leaves  an  individual
with “the state of being primarily motivated by them hereafter” (p.
267).  Thus  the  peak-experience,  whilst  transitory,  teaches  the
subject the worth and efficacy of a B-Value way of viewing the world.
Both Maslow and Bergson offer a challenge to the status quo of a
socially  accelerated  culture.  In  self-actualizing,  an  individual  may
have their view of the world changed and, whilst they must still live
within  this  world,  their  ability  to  self-actualize  allows  them  to
transcend it. Similarly, an experience of Bergsonian duration might
offer respite from a culture driven by clock-time and the motivation to
stay within that culture. In this sense, occasionally stepping away
from  a  socially  accelerated  culture  actually  ensures  its  survival,
something I argue in the conclusions of this thesis. 
The spiritual value of B and D Cognition 
As I  have already suggested, Maslow’s work on self-actualization
and peak-experiences is often regarded as spiritual in nature; the
title of his book Religions, Values and Peak-Experiences indicating a
direct concern with spirituality.  In the preface, he describes peak-
experiences as “often meaningfully … called a ‘little death’, and a
rebirth  in  various  senses”  (1970,  p.  xv).  Koltko-Rivera  (2006)
observes that  the “conventional  description of  Abraham Maslow’s
(1943, 1954) hierarchy of needs is inaccurate as a description of
Maslow’s later thought … [as he] … amended his model, placing
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self-transcendence as a motivational step beyond self-actualization”
(p. 302). Later on in his 196438 publication, Maslow discusses the
core-religious  or  transcendent  experience  as  the  basis  on  which
“every known high religion … has been the private, lonely, personal
illumination, revelation or ecstasy of some acutely sensitive prophet
or seer” being of utmost significance (Maslow, 1970, p. 19). 
Maslow (1971)  suggests that  the self-actualized state is  one that
stands outside of D-cognition whilst still being aware of it. He asserts
that knowledge cannot be undone and, along with perception, they
are irreversible states:
You can’t  long for some mythological  Garden of Eden,
and  if  you  are  an  adult  you  can’t  long  for  childhood
because you just can’t get it. The only possible alternative
for  the human being is to understand the possibility  of
going on ahead,  growing older,  going on ahead to the
second  naiveté,  to  the  sophisticated  innocence,  to  the
unitive consciousness, to an understanding of B-cognition
so that it is possible in the midst of the D-world. Only in
this  way can the D-world be transcended,  only  by real
knowledge  and  only  by  growth,  only  by  the  fullest
adulthood. (p. 247)
This  unitive  consciousness  is  a  fusion  of  the  eternal  with  the
temporal,  in  many religions,  the  former  being  privileged over  the
latter. In Christianity the notion of everlasting life mirrors the beliefs
of other religions such as eternal life in Hinduism and salvation in
Islam. Whilst Maslow’s writing suggests a strong interest in religion,
he  wanted  to  “demonstrate  that  spiritual  values  have  naturalistic
meaning, that they are not the exclusive possession of organized
churches  …  they  are  the  general  responsibility  of  all mankind”
(Maslow, 1970, p. 4). He asserts that the model of peak-experience
may appear to be the result of “religious illumination or conversion”
38
 Religion, Value and Peak-Experiences was first published in
1964. The edition referred to here is from 1970. 
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but  we  are  able  to  investigate  them  and  understand  the
“illuminations on which high religions were founded” (1970, p. 27). In
this  sense,  Maslow  was  bridging  what  he  regarded  as  a  gap
between  religion  and  the  secular  spiritual;  the  B  and  D  states
represent “two attitudes towards the one world” (Maslow, 1971, p.
248). Thus, the self-actualized state is not something outside of the
real world but a state that exists within the real world, much like the
existence of duration within a clock-measured culture. 
B-Values and Bergson 
In  defining  the  characteristics  of  B-Cognition  and  D-Cognition,
Maslow identified fourteen B-Values. Although these B-Values were
not  fully  explicated  by  Maslow,  there  are  some  interesting  and
pertinent connections that can be made to Bergson’s thoughts on
duration.  Maslow  explicitly  states  that,  in  his  study  of  peak-
experiences, “[n]o one subject reported the full syndrome” (2010, p.
67) and, as such, I focus on the most relevant B-Values to the first
case study of Hotel Medea in Chapter Six. I will, however, list the B-
Values in their  entirety  for  the sake of  thoroughness and context
before I begin making connections between Maslow and Bergson.
Maslow  (2010)  lists  the  B-Values  as:  wholeness,  perfection,
completion,  justice,  aliveness,  richness,  simplicity,  beauty,
goodness, uniqueness, effortlessness, playfulness, truth,  and self-
sufficiency. 
Wholeness suggests a sense of order, unity and integration – of
being connected to others as well as a feeling of entirety of the self.
Bergson (1896/1910) explores this notion of the whole in relation to
perception,  which,  he  asserts,  only  takes  account  of  what  is  of
interest to the perceiver. As John Mullarkey (2000) suggests in his
analysis of Bergsonian thought, “[p]erception is an action, a deletion
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of what is of no interest to our body in the world, not a mysterious
appendage of something entirely different from that world” (p. 48). I
suggest that a sense of wholeness can be gained through a deletion
of what is irrelevant to our particular needs at particular moments; it
is  transitory  (like  all  peak-experiences)  and,  like  Bergson’s  pure
memory, it cannot be summoned at will.  
The  notion  of  process  over  end  product  is  another  area  where
connections can be made between Bergson and Maslow. Maslow’s
end  state  of  self-actualization  is  given  prominence  in  his  theory
although much of the discussion relates to the ways in which the
steps towards peak-experiences can be beneficial in their own right.
For Maslow, it  is small steps that enable an individual to achieve
self-actualization and “[e]ach time one takes responsibility there is
an actualizing of the self” (Maslow, 1971, p. 45).  This heightened
awareness of the self is something that also resonates with Bergson,
who posited that perception is defined as “limited, since it should be
the image of the whole, and is in fact reduced to the image of that
which interests you” (Bergson, 1896/1910, p. 34).39
Aliveness. The spontaneity  and self-regulation suggested by this
category makes a connection with the heterogeneity of duration. In
Time  and  Free  Will,  Bergson  makes  a  case  for  duration  being
heterogeneous  as  it  is  distinct  from  space,  which  he  views  as
homogeneous.  Bergson also  argued that  we have fallen  into  the
habit  of  counting  in  time  rather  than  in  space  (see  Bergson,
1889/1913, p. 78).  He suggests that when we imagine the number
‘50’, we repeat numbers until we reach 50 in the belief that we have
built  up  to  that  number  in  duration  only.   In  essence,  we  have
39
 See Chapter Six (pp. 96-105) for a discussion of perception in relation to
Hotel Medea. 
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counted moments in duration rather than moments in space.  The
question here for Bergson is whether we have counted the moments
of  duration  by  means  of  points  in  space.  In  his  questioning  of
whether duration has anything to do with space he argues, “[p]ure
duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states
assumes  when  our  ego  lets  itself  live,  when  it  refrains  from
separating  its  present  state  from  its  former  states”  (Bergson,
1889/1913,  p.  100).   So,  if  time  (as  distinct  from duration)  is  a
medium in which our conscious states form a discrete series to be
counted,  and our  conception  of  number  is  the  spreading  out  in
space of everything that can be directly counted, therefore time as a
medium where we can make distinctions and count is nothing but
space. 
The  conclusion  reached  by  Bergson  is  that  duration  must  be
something  different.  Bergson’s  notion  of  duration  -  that  of  a
synthesis  of  a  unity  and a multiplicity  of  states of  consciousness
means there can only be a single duration - duration is succession
without distinction. Bergson observed there are two multiplicities
with regards to duration - homogeneous duration and conscious life:
Below  homogenous  duration,  which  is  the  extensive
symbol  of  true duration,  a  close psychological  analysis
distinguishes a duration whose heterogeneous moments
permeate one another; below the numerical multiplicity of
conscious states, a qualitative multiplicity; below the self
with well defined states, a self in which succeeding each
other means  melting  into  one  another and  forming  an
organic whole. (Bergson, 1889/1913, p. 128) 
Bergson suggests it is because an individual may have a desire to fit
into a social structure that we replace reality with symbols and, by
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doing  so  we  replace  our  fundamental  self.  To  regain  this
fundamental self would mean an experience of the “confused, ever
changing, and inexpressible self [above the] clear and precise, but
impersonal  self” (Bergson, 1903/1999, p.  129).  For Bergson, time
expressed as a homogenous medium is a spurious concept as it is
“nothing  but  the  ghost  of  space  haunting  the  reflective
consciousness”  (Bergson, 1889/1913, p. 99). Bergson’s allusion to
the ‘reflective consciousness’ may be making reference to the way in
which time is viewed in relation to other things or events.  Fell (2012)
disagrees  with  Bergson  and  believes  that  duration  cannot  be
divorced from space: “Spatial markers … define and locate duration,
and duration itself is embodied time, events, not pure time and pure
motion” (pp. 11-12). She argues that duration cannot be separate
from space, otherwise there would be no temporal relations:
We locate psychological duration when we speak of the
whereabouts of a person because all his or her thoughts
and feelings take place wherever he or she is. We locate
the  duration  of  an  action  and  of  any  other  process
because  we  locate  the  trajectory  of  the  moving  body,
which  has  definite  spatial  parameters.  Thus,  time  is
spatially located, in this sense. (Fell, 2012, p. 128)
These relational aspects of duration are, for me, less significant in
my application of Bergson’s theory as I am not concerned with the
quality of duration in relation to past and future. Despite my frequent
and detailed references to the role of memory in my experience of
Hotel Medea, I am concerned with memory as voluntarily entering
the present rather than as a marker of past, present, and future. The
notions of earlier and later are only important if used in establishing
a  set  of  facts  such  as  the  validity  of  a  witness’s  statement  in  a
testimony (Fell, 2012), wherein the timing of events has significance.
Whilst  the  assertion  that  time  is  spatialized,  with  space  being
important  in establishing temporal  relations,  Fell  (2012)  concedes
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that  in  perceiving  duration  as  a  temporal  quality,  “sometimes
relational facts do not seem to matter to the qualities involved, such
as linking the fact of dissolving sugar with the timing of the news
programme” (p.  129).40 Thus,  there is a clear  distinction between
duration in relation to before and after, and duration in relation to my
individual subjective experience, which is the focus of my enquiry. 
For Bergson (1903/1999), the notion of life force or aliveness (to use
Maslow’s term) was both concerned with lived experience and the
inner life. Bergson saw this inner life as the “unrolling of a coil” (p.
25) as well a “continual rolling up”, our past following us and swelling
“incessantly  with  the  present  that  it  picks  up  on  its  way;  and
consciousness  means  memory”  (p.  26).  Thus,  the  notion  of
aliveness carries the “heavier and still heavier load we drag behind
us as we grow older” (p. 40). 
One of Bergson’s most famous statements concerns what he terms
“élan  vital”  or  vital  impulse. It  was,  according  to  Paul  Douglass
(2014), because of the “difficulty of understanding and explaining the
truth  of  the  elan  vital [that]  caused  Bergson  to  originate  other
concepts  in  his  philosophy,  like  those  of  the  self,  memory,
philosophical  intuition  …  and  duration”  (p.  304).   In  Creative
Evolution, he argues that life occurs, not as Darwin argued through
natural selection, but through this vital impulse.  It is duration, says
Bergson, that is “the continuous progress of the past which gnaws
into the future and which swells as it  advances. And as the past
grows without ceasing, so also there is no limit to its preservation”
(1907/2008,  p.  4).  Writing  in  1940,  Walter  Benjamin  uses  Paul
Klee’s painting ‘Angelus Novus’ to illustrate how history is viewed.
Like  Bergson’s  progress  of  the  past  gnawing  into  the  future,
40
 In  Creative Evolution,  Bergson (1907/2008) uses the example of  sugar
dissolving in water to illustrate his concept of duration (see p. 96).  
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Benjamin’s angel of history “perceive[s] a chain of events … sees
one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage
… [he is] irresistibly propel[led] into the future … while the pile of
debris before him grows skyward” (Benjamin, 1940/1999, p. 249).
Bergson’s past gnawing into the future is, however, a collection of
events  in  history  that  does  not  grow  skywards  but  rather  stays
hidden until it is involuntarily recalled. 
Uniqueness. Here,  Maslow  uses  the  words  “idiosyncrasy”;
“individuality”;  non-comparability”;  and  “novelty”  to  describe  this
category. Bergson’s writing also discusses the notion of novelty in
Creative Evolution and, according to Mullarkey (2000), in Bergson’s
“time-philosophy  the  emphasis  has  always  been  on  the
unforeseeable and indeterminate creation of novelty” (p. 63). This
notion of novelty is something I also resume in Chapter Eight in my
discussion of the possible and the real (see pp. 326-332).  
Effortlessness.41 The  ability  to  be  effortless  that  according  to
Maslow,  is  present  in  self-actualizers  is  something  that  Bergson
implies in his discussion of duration. His rejection of time measured
as space and a view of duration as being like the notes of a tune
melting into each other, paints a picture of duration as a merging of
one (mental) state with another, akin to the effortless described by
Maslow.  Bergson  raises  the  topic  of  effort  in  his  discussion  of
intuition, which Fell (2012) sees as a “three-fold process, beginning
with  primary  (pre-conceptual)  intuition –  conscious  but  pre-verbal
41
 There  are  also  other  areas  of  Maslow’s  thought  that  crossover  with
Bergson. I have limited these to a footnote in this instance simply to highlight the
possible connections rather than to offer a full analysis. Bergson’s search for the
inner life implies a search for truth, whilst Maslow’s description of self-sufficiency
as self-determining, separate, and “living by its own laws” (Maslow, 2010, p. 78)
echoes  the  kind  of  individuality  suggested  by  Bergson’s  writing  on  the
heterogeneous nature of pure duration as opposed to the homogeneity of clock-
measured time. 
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grasp of sensory data – continuing with intellectual processing of it,
and  possibly  finishing  with  secondary  (post-conceptual)  intuition
which synthesizes what intellect has provided” (p. 12). For Bergson,
intuition requires effort to experience duration. In An Introduction to
Metaphysics (1903,  first  English  translation  1912)  he  writes  that
through “an effort of intuition, I immediately perceive how it is unity,
multiplicity,  and many other  things besides … [i]n  this  sense,  an
inner,  absolute  knowledge  of  the  self  by  the  self  is  possible”
(1903/1999, p. 31). Whilst duration is a qualitative experience that
cannot  be measured and therefore consistently sought like clock-
time, Bergson believes that intuition – which must be worked at - is
one way in which duration can be experienced. Despite the effort
associated with intuition, the resulting effortlessness of duration is
like Maslow’s notion of effortlessness because, as I show in the next
chapter (see p. 166), achieving effortlessness requires effort. 
As with process philosophy, the privileging of intuition above intellect
is echoed in the Humanist thinking of Maslow: “[t]here is a self, and
what  I  have  sometimes  referred  to  as  “listening  to  the  impulse
voices” means letting the self emerge” (Maslow, 1971, p. 44). Being
a scientist, one would expect Maslow to offer more specific details of
these  “impulse  voices”  and  how  they  lead  to  self-actualization.
Despite his scientific background, he offers little more detail of the
meaning  and  process  of  self-actualization  other  than  it  does  not
“mean doing some far out thing necessarily, but it may mean going
through an arduous and demanding period of preparation in order to
realise one’s possibilities” (1971, p. 46). 
Similarly,  Bergson’s  assertion  that  intuition  is  something  to  be
worked at makes mental  demands of  the individual.  For  Bergson
(1903/1999), being placed in duration is only possible through an
“effort of intuition” (p. 31), unlike a dream, which is “the entire mental
life, minus the effort of concentration” (Bergson, 1920, p. 127).
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Playfulness. Maslow regards playfulness as a one of the “higher
subjective  experiences  [that  has]  a  cosmic  or  a  godlike,  good-
humored  quality,  certainly  transcending  hostility  of  any  kind”
(Maslow, 1970, p. 106). On this subject, Maslow (1970) admits – like
Bergson’s discussion of duration – that “[i]t is very hard to describe
B-playfulness since the English language falls far  short”  (p.  106).
Despite  this,  my  account  of  the  playful  nature  of  Hotel  Medea
attempts  to  use  language  to  describe  how  this  B-Value  was
embodied  (see  Chapter  Six,  p.  159).  The  next  chapter,  which
discusses Hotel Medea, there was a definite sense of play apparent
at many moments. The playfulness in parts of  Hotel Medea arose
from  a  sense  of  camaraderie  at  times,  but  also  a  sense  of
spontaneity  that  resonated  with  my  general  experience  of
involuntary memory infiltrating the present. The space or freedom to
‘play with’  duration in  Hotel  Medea had emancipatory potential;  it
facilitated my ‘freedom’ from the clock. Thus, playfulness became a
way  in  which  I  was  able  to  transcend  clock-time  and,  as  I
demonstrate in a discussion of playfulness towards the end of the
next chapter, it is an innocence or naiveté accompanying this, that
Maslow suggests can lead to self-actualization.    
The connections I  have made between Maslow and Bergson are
explored further in the next chapter, in which I provide an account of
Hotel Medea. It is hoped that the preceding explication of Maslow’s
theory of B-Values will offer the reader an opportunity to understand
how  these  values  might  become  manifest  through  performance
lasting beyond comfortable consumption. By way of illustrating these
points,  I  also  explore  Hotel  Medea as  a piece of  immersive  and
participatory performance and the ways in which this contributed to
a  durational  experience  that  facilitated  the  possibility  of  peak-
experience. 
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Chapter  Six: Hotel  Medea –  Memory,  Duration  and  Peak-
Experience in an Accelerated Culture
If I want to mix a glass of sugar and water, I must, willy
nilly, wait until the sugar melts. This little fact is big with
meaning.  For  here  the  time  I  have  to  wait  is  not  that
mathematical time which would apply equally well to the
entire history of  the material  world,  even if  that  history
were  spread out  instantaneously  in  space.  It  coincides
with my impatience, that is to say with a certain portion of
my own duration, which I cannot protract or contract as I
like.  It  is  no  longer  something  thought,  it  is  something
lived. It is no longer a relation, it is an absolute. (Bergson,
1907/2008, pp. 10-11)
August 13, 2011
After 
Bergson’s  discussion  of  sugar  dissolving  in  water  offers  a  tangible  example  of  how  duration  is
subjective  and unquantifiable,  and  it  is  through such a lived moment  that  duration  becomes  truly
absolute. Brazilian performance collective Zecora Ura42 exemplified this experience of waiting for sugar
to dissolve in their production of Hotel Medea. This chapter is an exploration of how Bergson’s concept
of duration can be understood through Hotel Medea, and how Hotel Medea can be understood through
Bergsonian  duration.  The  chapter  aims  to  provide  the  reader  with  an  account  of  a  performance
experience  that  shifts  backwards  and  forwards,  deliberately  working  against  chronological  time;
memories being evoked  during and  after the performance, as well as memories of  before. As such,
some of the descriptions and narratives are at the threshold of the performance, which I suggest began
when I first became aware of Hotel Medea. In writing this reflection on the performance, I have made
connections to the distant past as a way of making sense of the ethereal nature of duration; and as I
suggest in the closing statements of this chapter, Hotel Medea unlocked a different experience of time
and revealed an understanding and appreciation of Bergsonian duration. The centrality of memory to
this  account  means  that  the  narrative  is  occasionally  deliberately  fragmented;  the  repetitions  are
intentional and are representative of the power of pure memory (see Chapter Four) to enhance the
present  at  particular  moments.   This account  also argues that  aspects  of  Maslow’s theory  of self-
actualization (see Chapter Five) were illuminated for me during Hotel Medea, manifested as moments
of  transformation  in  the  form  of  peak-experiences.  Both  Bergson’s  duration  and  Maslow’s  self-
actualization are, I suggest, revealed in Hotel Medea because it challenged smooth consumption in a
socially accelerated culture. 
Welcome to Hotel Medea: We hope you enjoy your stay
42
 Renamed in 2014 as ZU-UK. 
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Most hotels provide their guests with a directory of services: restaurant and bar menus, laundry, and
reception contact details amongst other amenities. My stay at  Hotel Medea was unconventional; the
company did not offer any of the above and the stay was not restful. The content of a directory found at
Hotel Medea may read something like my following description:
Dear Guest,
Welcome to Hotel Medea. We take great pride in the well being of our guests and we would like to take
this opportunity to inform you of a few things you may find useful during your stay: 
Zero Hour Market – “a maze of blood, food, dance and a frenzied battle for the Golden Fleece with a
live DJ” (Zecora Ura, 2012). Your night will begin with a visit to the local bustling market – a great
opportunity  to meet  other  guests  and get  into the party  spirit!  You will  then be invited to a frantic
wrangling for  the much-desired Golden Fleece,  followed by a lively and frenetic celebration of the
marriage of Jason and Medea. 
Drylands –  “a  post-modern  wasteland.  Live  documentary,  hot  chocolate  and  CCTV  add  a  fresh
perspective to Jason’s betrayal” (Zecora Ura, 2012). As the night continues, you will be given the once-
in-a-lifetime opportunity to meet Jason on his campaign trail – there may even be a photo opportunity,
a worthy souvenir of your meeting with the great leader! We, at  Hotel Medea, take great pleasure in
listening to our guests and their opinions; as part of our commitment to guest satisfaction, we ask that
you participate in a focus group. As a thank you, we will provide you with a complimentary mug of hot
chocolate, fresh pyjamas, and a bedtime story. 
Feast of Dawn – “harrowing paparazzi chases, burning brides and twisted games of hide and seek”
(Zecora Ura, 2012). We hope that by now you will be feeling in the mood for some relaxing, soulful
music and performance art as we invite you to ‘Club Exile’ – sorry, gentleman, this is a ladies only club!
(Men may be admitted in exceptional circumstances, terms and conditions apply). As your night at
Hotel Medea draws to an end, we hope that you will join us for the most illuminating part of your stay,
followed by an early breakfast.
Wishing you a pleasant and memorable stay.
The Hotel Medea Management.
After
This performance, like the others in this thesis, is discussed against the backdrop of an accelerated
culture, one in which the multitude of technologies presents us with so many potential experiences,
that we are unable fulfil them satisfactorily. Thus the lack of time begets the need for an alternative –
duration, offering the potential for transformation – defined as the phenomenon of a change in mental
or  physical  state  -  to  occur.  This  chapter  aims  to  illustrate  this  by  making  connections  between
Bergson’s  philosophy  of  duration  and  Maslow’s  theory  of  self-actualization,  manifested  as  peak-
experiences. 
Before
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Figure 5: Image from email dated July 6, 2011.
On July 6, 2011 an email appeared in my inbox, ‘inviting’ me to stay at Hotel Medea. I found the explicit
reference to endurance appealing, as if  I was somehow being personally challenged to participate.
This was the beginning of my journey, as four days later on July 10 I received email confirmation of my
ticket purchase. The official start time stated 23.45 on August 13, although my passage to and through
the performance had, in retrospect, begun on July 6. 
On my journey from email ‘invitation’ to performance, I accrued certain expectations. Firstly, I viewed
Hotel Medea – as the initial case study – with some knowledge of Bergson and Maslow, and this had a
bearing on my ‘reading’ of the performance. Other factors with a bearing on my experience were that I
had  some  awareness  of  the  company,  it  was  part  of  the  Edinburgh  Fringe,  it  had  elements  of
participation,  and  I  attended  as  a  researcher.  Despite  this,  I  suggest  that  it  was  the  unexpected
elements of Medea that contributed to my (then) nascent understanding of Bergson. As the case study
demonstrates,  the  role of  involuntary  memory and the  subsequent  reflections  on the  performance
provided the most significant insights. 
From audience to audience-participant to participant-spectator
As my audience I hope that you will get a sense of my experience of
Hotel Medea.  I  pause at this moment to offer a suggestion as to
exactly what  my role  was in this  production,  as well  as to clarify
some terms of reference. The immersive and participatory nature of
Hotel Medea,  along with many other contemporary performances,
strongly suggests the conventional audience member or spectator is
a  redundant  concept.  Almost  as  soon  as  Stanislavski  had
successfully made a clear distinction between audience and actors,
many  20th century  theatre  makers  (Artaud  and  Boal  being  two
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obvious examples, but for different reasons), blurred the boundaries
between spectator and actor. Grotowski’s poor theatre distorted the
edges  of  ‘playing’  and  ‘watching’  space  in  many  of  his  works
(Kordian, 1962;  Dr  Faustus, 1963),  extending  this  in  his  para-
theatre,  beginning  in  1968  in  “experiments  …  allowing  …  the
possibility  of  ‘meeting’  in  an  atmosphere  that  had  been  carefully
structured for such encounters” (Findlay, 2001, p. 174). The practice
of disrupting conventional theatre formats has been utilized by many
others, from Schechner’s environmental theatre to performance art
and  the  move  from  theatre  to  gallery  spaces.  As  an  audience
member in Hotel Medea, my role was similarly blurred, exemplified
in  following  instructions  given  by  the  performers,  the  promenade
staging, and participation.  
All  theatre  is  participatory,  given  that  spectators  participate  in
watching performers and, as Gareth White (2013) notes:
Without participation performance would be nothing but
action  happening  in  the  presence  of  other  people.
Audiences  laugh,  clap,  cry,  fidget,  and  occasionally
heckle; they pay for tickets, they turn up at the theatre,
they stay to the end of the performance or they walk out.
They are affected emotionally, cognitively and physically
by the action they witness. (p. 3)
The  degree  of  participation,  however,  is  important:  “audience
participation … is the participation of an audience, or an audience
member, in the action of a performance” (White, 2013, p. 4). Thus,
an  audience  who  affect  the  action  of  a  performance  are  truly
participating. In immersive performance, artists and companies have
used a range of nomenclature to explain the role of their audience:
‘comrades’ (Punchdrunk),  ‘audience-participant’  (Howells),  ‘visitors’
(Lundhahl  &  Seitl),  ‘co-creators’ (Nimble  Fish),  ‘guest-performers’
(Silvia  Mercuriali),  ‘playing-audience’  (Coney),  and  ‘attendant
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audience’  (Louise  Ann  Wilson)  (Machon,  2013).  Kate  Bond  and
Morgan Lloyd’s  immersive  performance  You Me Bum Bum Train
(YMBBT),  describes  its  audience  members  as  ‘passengers’.  In
YMBBT, each passenger becomes the main character as they travel
through a series of bizarre, yet remarkably lifelike experiences.  In
describing  my  experience  of  Hotel  Medea,  I  use  the  term
‘participant-spectator’,  thus placing emphasis on the haptic  rather
than  optic  nature  of  the  performance.43 The  presence  of  the
participant-spectator  (or  similar)  has  become  a  familiar  notion
beyond theatre and performance and can be applicable to works of
visual art. For art critic and curator Nicholas Bourriaud (2006), “[t]he
basis of today’s experience of art is the  co-presence of spectators
before the artwork”  (p.  167) with art  being “a state of encounter”
(p.162).  The  immersive  nature  of  Hotel  Medea made  it  a
performance  that  resonated  closely  with  Bourriaud’s  view  of
encounters with visual art; without the presence of the participant-
spectators, the work would be incomplete, much like a hotel without
guests. 
At the threshold of the performance: Present day Manchester and the ghosts of Edinburgh past
I  departed  Manchester  Chorlton  Street  coach  station  at  11:00  on  August  12,  2011,  heading  to
Edinburgh  via  an  almost  seven-hour  coach  journey.  I  had  not  booked  any  accommodation  in
Edinburgh, reasoning that I would spend a few hours absorbing the street theatre and other sights of
the city before I moved towards the performance. Arriving at Elder Street bus station at 17:45 I stepped
off the coach and walked towards the centre of Edinburgh. My last visit to the capital of Scotland had
been seventeen years  earlier  in 1994,  as an undergraduate performing at  the fringe festival.  As I
walked towards what I remembered to be the centre of the city (although perhaps not the city centre), I
recalled faintly familiar sights  such as the castle - my memory involuntarily throwing up images of
people  from my past,  fragments  of  conversations  and faces fixed with expressions that  made me
reflect on the passage of time, expressions that might now seem different after time’s work on the face.
As I walked (purposefully at first and then later more casually), I started to get a sense of a long night
laying itself out in front of me; the forthcoming performance promising exciting possibilities whilst the
natural rhythms of the day seemingly challenging these prospects as day turned to evening and then
43
 There are obvious similarities here with Boal’s notion of the spect-actor
although I exclude this definition as Boal’s approach is overtly concerned with the
political and thus the role of participation has a different function. 
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towards night. During this festival month, Edinburgh was alive with possibility but the rapidly reducing
intensity of daylight countered this and, around this time, my tiredness began to take its toll on me. 
I walked. I walked a good deal around the streets of Edinburgh, as if to feel a part of the city. I was lost
but I did not want to appear lost, as if this was something to be ashamed of – of having no fixity or
stability in a place. I remembered being in some of the places I traversed many years before, although
I really knew that these weren’t the same places. As I negotiated the streets in an attempt to navigate
and make sense of the pavements, back streets and traffic lined roads, I began to absorb the rhythms
of the city. With around two hours to go before the start time, I found a pop-up bar next to the BBC
comedy marquee and stood with a drink, observing others around me. Occasionally, a group of actors,
comedians or  other  performers appeared and gave impromptu highlights  of  their  ‘must-see’  show.
Being at  the  fringes  of  the  Edinburgh Fringe was beginning  to  wear  me down a little  and so the
prospect of staying at a hotel, even a hotel where I knew I would be awake all night seemed appealing.
As I headed towards the venue – Summerhall - I felt a clearer sense of purpose than when I had been
wandering the streets of Edinburgh; this was what I had travelled all this way for and the beginning had
almost arrived.  
As I walked confidently towards Summerhall I soon realized I was
lost and my last few hours of assimilation with the city meant very
little,  as  I  looked  for  signs  and  maps  to  guide  me  in  the  right
direction.  Perhaps  the  venue  had  been  chosen  because  of  its
location away from the centre of Edinburgh; perhaps getting lost on
my way there was an important part of the audience experience. Of
course, this cannot be true – the choice of venue was most probably
based on availability, economics, and suitability for the performance
amongst many other factors.  For me, however,  finding the venue
and  getting  lost  in  doing  so  added  to  my  overall  experience  of
duration on my way to and throughout my stay at Hotel Medea.  
This shift from one space to another is not something new in theatre
experience.  Since  the  theatre  of  Dionysus,  the  transition  from
quotidian space to theatre space has been important in demarcating
everyday  life  to  something  more  profound.  As  Aronson  (2013)
suggests, “the short pilgrimage to the theatre served as a transition
from their [the theatre goers of Dionysus] daily urban and domestic
milieu to a liminal space and thus from quotidian time to festive time”
(p. 89). Machon (2013) also suggests that travelling to and finding
the performance event can be significant:  “Specific timings for an
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entrance to  and immersion in  the event  –  which can include the
journey  to  and  discovery  of  the  given  location  …  is  often  a
fascinating facet of the wider experience” (p. 96). Similarly, in her
discussion of Punchdrunk’s 2006/7 production of Faust, Jen Harvie
(2013) suggests the location for this site-specific performance added
to the overall experience:
Even before entering the building, the audience began to be immersed in the show’s
ambience by being disoriented: the venue was far from any of London’s main theatre
districts … the building’s  adapted use was only  minimally sign-posted;  and getting
from the gated entrance to the site on Wapping Lane to the building’s actual entrance
required circumnavigation of almost the whole of the building’s perimeter. (p. 31)
In this instance and in much of Punchdrunk’s work, the location and venue was carefully chosen. In
Hotel Medea, the production occupied Summerhall only temporarily, in the same way the piece had
been previously performed in London’s docklands.44 Nevertheless, my disorientation from getting lost
in attempting to find the venue is not to be underestimated in my overall reading of the performance.
For me, the disordered journey to Summerhall was the threshold of the performance and, as such, was
very much part of the overall experience. 
The past before Edinburgh past and the story of Medea
My 1994 visit to Edinburgh began with the story of Medea. In the autumn of 1992, as a first year Drama
undergraduate I was introduced to Euripides’ tragedy when my peers and I devised and presented our
response to the play. My memory of this production is fragmented and unreliable and, at this present
moment, I cannot recall my role or any specific moments beyond a few capricious images from our
collective attempt to tell the story. When I resumed this journey in July 2011, the story of Medea was
familiar  to  me but  was  equally  fragmented and  variable;  throughout  the  night  at  Summerhall,  the
forgotten moments and characters constantly surprised me. In this autoethnographic account of my
experience, I shall provide my own unreliable knowledge of the story from before the performance in
August 2011. It may be that December 1992 was the real start of my Medea story:  
Fragments of a 19-year old Medea story 
After being ‘conquered’ by Jason and his Argonauts, Medea and Jason marry and have two children.
Jason, having been offered Creon’s daughter, spurns Medea, ultimately leading to her taking revenge
on Jason by murdering their two children. This straightforward and brief  summary of the plot  is as
much as I remembered before seeing Hotel Medea, although I recalled the role of the Nursemaid as
being important – something that Zecora Ura used, particularly in directly addressing the audience. As
the reader,  you may know the  story  of  Medea in great  depth  and its complexity  is  belied  by my
economical summary. In Hotel Medea, however, it was not the detail that was important, but the length
of time over which it was told. 
In attempting to recall the story, a moment from 1992 is unlocked from memory and pours into my
consciousness. I remembered a dress rehearsal for a student production of Medea, where an accident
44
 The original production of Hotel Medea, co-produced with Para Active, was
conceived in 2006. 
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led to a broken tooth.  This moment illustrated Bergson’s notion of involuntary,  pure memory – that
which invades the present in a moment of perception:
(Re)Ma(r)king memory 
Because  of  the  ephemeral  nature  of  Bergson’s  “mysterious
operation which takes place in darkness” (Bergson, 1903/1999, p.
46), our individual durations may be understood as habits, ingrained
into our unconscious. In  Matter and Memory (1896/1910), Bergson
offers a detailed discussion of types of memory, the first of which
being  habit  or  motor-memory.45 He  suggests  that  the  practical
function of memory is:
[T]he  utilizing  of  past  experience  for  present  action,  -
recognition … [s]ometimes … lies in the action itself … at
other times it implies an effort of the mind which seeks …
those representations which are best able to enter into
the present situation. (1896/1910, p. 87)
In a long discussion of memory, Bergson explains memory as either
habit,  image or pure, all  of which are indistinguishable in practice
and  must  all  work  together.  To  illustrate  habit  memory,  Bergson
uses  an  example  of  learning  a  lesson  (presumably  a  written
passage)  by  heart,  demonstrating  that,  through  repetition  he  will
eventually have learned the lesson. He suggests that each attempt
at learning is “distinguished from those which preceded or followed it
by the place which it occupied in time … a definite event in history”
(1896/1910,  p.  89).  For  Bergson  (1896/1910),  this  kind  of
remembering is like a habit because it is acquired through repetition.
In  repeating  the  learned  lesson,  the  subject  uses  a  bodily
“mechanism which is set in motion as a whole by an initial impulse,
in a closed system of automatic movements which succeed each
other and, together, take the same length of time” (p. 89). 
45
 See Chapter Four (pp.48-52) for discussion of Bergsonian memory. 
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The memory of each reading (i.e. the learning of the lesson) is not,
Bergson asserts, like habit. Instead, he argues that each successive
reading is a unique event in life and therefore can only add to its
original  nature.  Even  though  the  initial  image becomes easier  to
recall  at  each  repetition,  “the  image,  regarded  in  itself,  was
necessarily at the outset what it always will be” (1896/1910, p. 90).
Bergson  goes  further  in  stating,  “consciousness  reveals  to  us  a
profound difference, a difference in kind, between the two sorts of
recollection” (1896/1910, p. 91). The memory of a specific reading is
only  a  representation  that  can  be  shortened  or  lengthened  in
duration;  the  memory  of  the  lesson  requires  a  specific  duration
because it is an action rather than a representation – it is “part of my
present, exactly like my habit of walking or writing; it is lived and
acted, rather than represented” (1896/1910, p. 91). 
For  Bergson (1896/1910),  memory-images  record  all  of  our  daily
lives as they happen and, through intelligence, we can recognize
what  we  have  already  perceived.  Every  perception,  however,  is
“prolonged into a nascent action; and while the images are taking
their place and order in this memory, the movements which continue
them modify the organism, and create in the body new dispositions
towards  action”  (p.  92).  The  body,  therefore,  holds  a  series  of
mechanisms that are ready to react to a variety of external stimuli.
Although we are conscious of  these mechanisms, the memory is
different from the memory-image as the motor-mechanism is always
in the present and looking to the future: “… it no longer represents
our past to us, it acts it; and if it still deserves the name of memory, it
is not because it conserves bygone images, but because it prolongs
their useful effect into the present moment” (p. 93). 
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Bergson suggests that the memory image imagines whilst the motor
memory repeats, with the second sometimes being mistaken for the
first. He uses the example of a dog seeing his master and suggests
it is the familiar relations between animal and master at work rather
than memory image. He writes,
[t]o call up the past in the form of an image, we must be
able  to  withdraw  ourselves  from  the  action  of  the
moment, we must have the power to value the useless,
we must have the will to dream” (1896/1910, p. 94).
  
Voluntary memories acquired “by repetition are rare and exceptional
… the recording, by memory, of facts and images unique in their
kind takes place at every moment of duration” (Bergson, 1896/1910,
p. 94). Bergson notes habit memory is foregrounded as it appears
most useful. In contrast, 
[s]pontaneous  recollection  is  perfect  …  time  can  add
nothing  to  its  image  without  disfiguring  it;  it  retains  in
memory  its  place  and  date.  On  the  contrary,  a  learnt
recollection passes out of  time in the measure that the
lesson  is  better  known;  it  becomes  more  and  more
impersonal, more foreign to our past life. (1896/1910, p.
95)
In other words, Bergson believes that habit memories are replaced
with updated and improved habit memories thus taking the original
learnt  memory  further  away  from pure  memory.  In  favouring  the
memory image, Bergson argues the bodily habit could not even be
called a memory if one could not remember acquiring it or learning a
lesson. Memory image, then, is “memory par excellence [whilst habit
memory] is  habit interpreted by memory  rather than memory itself”
(Bergson, 1896/1910, p. 95). Seeing habit memory as biologically
inferior to image memory, Bergson asserts that habit memory would
be sufficient to us as living beings, as it allows us to adapt, which “is
the general aim of life” (p. 96). This would be fine, however, if all we
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did was to live; it is the role of memory image to “distort the practical
character of life” (1896/1910, p. 96). Habit memory will  constantly
inhibit image memory, only seeing the latter as useful when they can
throw light on the former. 
We are, however, able to retain the memory image independently of
the motor  (or  habit)  memory.  Bergson (1896/1910)  aims to  show
how “the two memories run side by side and lend to each other a
mutual support” (p. 96). Complex lessons and series of facts can be
learnt and repeated without error, something that Bergson observes
is  still  true in  cases of  dementia  and aphasia.  He argues that  in
learning a lesson, which may be recalled through habit memory, we
are evoking the use of image memory. This memory, however, is
unreliable and it “disappears at the least movement of the voluntary
memory” (Bergson, 1896/1910, p. 101). Image memory is erratic: “…
it remains capricious in its manifestations; and as the recollections
which it brings us are akin to dreams, its more regular intrusions into
the life of the mind may seriously disturb intellectual equilibrium” (p.
102).  
In summary, the past is stored up either as habit memory or memory
image: 
… the first follows the direction of nature; the second, left
to  itself,  would  rather  go  the  contrary  way.  The  first,
conquered by effort, remains dependent upon our will; the
second,  entirely  spontaneous,  is  as  capricious  in
reproducing  as  it  is  faithful  in  preserving.  (Bergson,
1896/1910, p. 102)46 
46
 Although I am looking at Bergson without the filter of Deleuze it is worth
noting that Deleuze’s notion of involuntary memory has its origins in this area of
Bergson’s philosophy. 
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Although Bergson sees these two types of memory as pure states,
they  are  unable  to  be  separated  in  reality.  In  discussing  how
movements pass to memories, Bergson (1896/1910) sees an object
perceived  as  “an  interlocutor  whose  ideas  develop  within  his
consciousness  into  auditory  representations  which  are  then
materialized  into  uttered  words”  (p.  145).  Following  a  lengthy
discussion, in which Bergson draws on psychologists’ views of how
we understand speech, he asserts “[i]t is vain … to treat memory-
images and ideas as ready-made things, and then assign them an
abiding place in problematical centres” (p. 159), concluding that, in
this  respect,  it  is  not  useful  to draw on anatomy and physiology.
Thus, despite Bergson drawing on science to explain memory, he
rejects its claims in favour of a more philosophical position, arguing
that pure memory, although superior to habit memory, relies on a
perception through which pure memory can be realized: 
[T]he memory-image itself,  if  it  remained pure memory,
would  be ineffectual.  Virtual,  this  memory  can become
actual  by  means  of  the  perception  which  attracts  it.
Powerless, it borrows life and strength from the present
situation in which it is materialized. (Bergson, 1896/1910,
p. 163)
Bergson claims pure memory, memory-image, and perception are
three  separate  processes  but  all  act  together.  Perception  is
permeated  with  memory-image  -  the  memory-image  uses  pure
memory,  which  is  materialized  as  perception,  and  becomes  a
nascent perception. Bergson illustrates this in the diagram below,
showing how these three states are separate but, in practical terms,
cannot  be  uncoupled.  Thus,  despite  Bergson’s  belief  in  the
superiority of pure memory, he admits that it “manifests itself as a
rule  only  in  the  coloured  and  living  image  which  reveals  it”
(1896/1910, p. 170) – in other words, through a perceived object.
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I  have  explored  how  Bergson  understands  perception  as  being
enriched by  memory  the  further  away from the  object  perceived.
Bergson’s  use  of  an  upside  down  cone  (see  Chapter  Four)
elaborates  on  this  further,  as  he  argues  that  memories  become
richer  as  we  move  further  away  from  the  event.   The  singular
embodied experience that Bergson believes is the true operation of
memory is reconstructed as a spatialized process in  the diagram
below (see Figure 6). Bergson’s argument recognizes that memory
is a process but he also asserts that the same process is not precise
in actuality. His argument is convincing because it accounts for the
role  played by the  conscious recovery of  memory  in  the form of
associationism.47 Although  he  suggests  that  associationism
interrupts  the flow from perception to  pure memory,  he does not
dismiss conscious thought as completely superfluous.
Figure  6:   Perception, memory image and pure memory. (From Bergson, 1896/
1910, p. 170).
47
 A school of thought in psychology that suggests memory operates as a
chain of associations; words, ideas and images evoke associated concepts. For
example, the image of someone’s face will recall a name. 
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Bergson’s diagram above shows pure memory, memory-image, and
perception in  different  segments  although “it  is  impossible  to  say
precisely  where  one  of  the  terms  ends  and  another  begins”
(Bergson,  1896/1910,  p.  171).  These  processes,  possible  to
separate on a diagram, cannot be separated in reality; the line AD
thus represents a single process. The vertical axis MOP (memory,
object, perception) represents how the conscious recall of memory
distorts pure memory, slicing in two the process AD.   According to
Bergson, in recovering a recollection our minds act like a camera
that  is  focusing  and  readjusting  –  “our  recollection  still  remains
virtual;  we simply prepare ourselves to receive it  by adopting the
appropriate attitude” (1896/1910, p. 171): 
In a moment following Medea’s humiliating apology to camera, there
is a brief sequence of apparent tenderness between her and Jason.
As Medea lifts her left arm towards Jason’s face in a smooth and
natural  motion,  the live video image suggests a more stilted and
distorted movement.  
We consciously attempt to recover a memory by placing ourselves in
the past; as the image passes into the actual it imitates perception. It
is, however, “attached to the past by its deepest roots, and if, when
once realized, it did not retain something of its original virtuality, if,
being a present state, it were not also something which stands out
distinct from the present, we should never know it for a memory”
(Bergson,  1896/1910,  p.  171).  MOP  represents  the  process  that
associationism - the conscious recovering of memory that Bergson
believes is inferior to pure memory – plays in expelling it from the
uninterrupted  process  of  AD.   This  disruption  is  a  “rivalry  which
associationism … sets up between the stable and the unstable [in
which]  perception  is  bound  to  expel  the  memory-image,  and  the
10
memory-image to expel pure memory” (1896/1910, p. 172). Bergson
regards  the  line  MO  as  dissecting  the  line  AD,  consequently
reducing pure memory in the part AO “to the realized image which
pure  memory  attains  as  it  expands”  (1896/1910,  p.  172).  Thus
Bergson sees associationism as erroneous:
[P]laced in the actual, it exhausts itself in vain attempts to
discover in a realized and present state the mark of its
past origin, to distinguish memory from perception, and to
erect into a difference in kind that which it condemned in
advance to be but a difference of magnitude. (Bergson,
1896/1910, p. 172) 
For Bergson, pure memory travels down the upside down cone (see
Figure 7) to the present moment of experience, where the memory is
closest  to  action;  the  widest  point  of  the  cone  represents
detachment “from our sensory and motor state to live in the life of
dreams” (1896/1910, p. 211).
Figure 7: Bergson’s cone of memory. (From Bergson, 1896/1910, p. 211)
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Pure memory does not exist materially. In explaining this, Suzanne
Guerlac (2006) offers some practical advice:
The past actualizes itself. Memory does not proceed from
the present back into the past. It proceeds from the past
into  the  present,  by  actualizing  itself.  If  this  is  hard  to
imagine, it is because one is thinking statically, instead of
dynamically. Try again, thinking in time. (p. 140):  
As the wedding party  began to  dissipate,  Medea,  Jason and the
fleece were prevented from leaving as the assembled participant-
spectators once again moved into a circle of dancing and chanting.
The repetition of the chanting and the dancing immersed me further
into the piece as it segued smoothly into the intense rhythmic beats
of a club filled with ecstatic dancers, reminiscent of my Edinburgh
past – the quality of my time now being infiltrated by a memory of
my  past,  as  I  recalled  hedonistic  nights  in  Edinburgh  pubs  and
clubs. 
The force of time
Claire Colebrook (2002), writing on Deleuze, notes time cannot be
repeated mechanically in external repetition, that true repetition is
something else and it is only this that discloses time:
You do not get a sense of time by mechanically repeating
what  you  did  as  a  child.  Time  is  truly  sensed  when
memories rather than habits are repeated; for a habit is
pretty much the same from moment to moment, while a
memory recalls the specificity of a distinct moment of the
past. When a singular and involuntary memory invades
the present,  then what is repeated is the force of time
itself,  for  time  is  nothing  other  than  this  radical  and
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singular  difference.  Habit  and  generalisations  are  the
reduction of time; in seeing events as generally the same
we fail to embrace the real repetition of time. (p. 178) 
If our most common experience of memory is habit memory, we are
not truly experiencing time or, to put it more accurately, we are not
experiencing  duration.  Our  own  internal  rhythms,  resulting  from
these ingrained habits are perhaps the most tangible measurement
of duration available to us.  The duration, which is the result of the
synthesis of multiplicities of states of consciousness and a sense of
unity  described  by  Bergson,48 is  the  closest  term  we  have  for
describing  the  passing  of  time  in  consciousness.  The  dynamic
understanding of duration is one in which we think in time (Guerlac,
2006): 
Fast forward - During: Drylands 
In the second part of the trilogy – Drylands, we began by lining up in
a dimly lit  corridor  and were informed that  we would be meeting
Jason for the honour of shaking hands with him. By this point we
had  endured  a  frantic  experience  of  dancing,  chanting  and
carnivalesque celebration, and so I welcomed this more meditative
stage as we ventured into the early hours of the morning. At this
moment I  considered the significance of  time and whether  I  was
experiencing something akin to Bergson’s conception of duration. As
we  were  moulded  into  various  poses  with  Jason  and  our
photographs  taken,  I  considered  how  our  socially  accelerated
culture  moulds  our  understanding  of  time  into  an  image  like  a
photograph whose absolute reality can never be accurately captured
48
 See Chapter Seven (pp. 178-9) for a discussion of duration as a synthesis
of a multiplicity of successive states and a unity (in relation to Csikszentmihalyi
and flow). 
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or relived beyond memory; a photo may ‘capture’ a moment but it
does so falsely. Much was made of this photo session with Jason; its
success  measured  by  the  number  of  people  photographed  –  an
activity  that  was  easily  quantified,  unlike  my  evolving  sense  of
duration. 
We were taken to a ‘campaign room’ just off the corridor and invited
to sit in rows; in front of us was a large TV screen, surrounded by
banks of smaller screens, standing before us like the night ahead.
Before we took our seats we lifted wireless headphones and placed
them  attentively  to  our  ears,  consigning  each  one  of  us  to  an
individual  aural  world.  The bank of  screens showed images of  a
smartly dressed and smiling Jason; we were told to ‘allow a face to
emerge  before  our  faces,  a  man’s  face…”.  Shown  fragments  of
footage from Jason’s political canvassing, we simultaneously heard
a  conversation  between  two  of  Jason’s  political  aides  about  the
progress  of  his  campaign.  As  we  were  given  clipboards  with  a
questionnaire  attached,  it  immediately  became  apparent  that  we
were part of a ‘focus group’ as we were guided through a series of
questions requiring a written response. My memory of the content of
these questions is unreliable and erratic; my overriding recollection
of this moment being the remoteness of the human voices and the
blurred images displayed on the screen. I  recall that some of the
questions asked about values, posing moral questions – beyond this
my memory is hazy. The images appear more readily in mind: Jason
and his happy family, Jason meeting voters, interviews to camera,
and direct appeals to us as the electorate. The use of remote audio
and obfuscated mediated images added to the slow telling of the
story  and  planted  thoughts  in  my  mind  about  a  distortion  of  the
digital virtual images that undermined its precision. This part of Hotel
Medea teased its guests by playing with the tools that could deliver
the story instantly, yet chose not to. 
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After 
For me this moment was an attempt to disrupt the seamless flow of
pure memory, memory image, and perception illustrated by Bergson
1896/1910) in  Matter and Memory (see Figure 7).  I  was recalling
memories from earlier in the performance - of being introduced to
Jason  and  being  photographed  with  him.  The  fragmented  films
shown to  us  were  propagandist  and  jostled  with  my  very  recent
recollections of  Jason,  thus interrupting my pure memory.   “Pure
Memory”  [writes  Guerlac,  2006],  “has no material  existence.  It  is
pure idea or intention, pure virtuality.  It  only actualizes itself  as it
comes into contact with perception (which serves action) through the
intermediary of the motor schematism” (p. 139). Thus this type of
memory is only brought into existence when prompted by perception
of something. Whilst other moments in Hotel Medea had galvanized
the  movement  of  pure  memory  from  my  past  to  appear  in  the
present  moment,  this  use  of  mediated  images  prompted  false
memories  to  materialize,  as  the  virtual  images  I  was  seeing
influenced my understanding of the characters in the performance,
who I was also experiencing first hand in the present.  My earlier
experience  of  pure  memory  from  Edinburgh  past  brought  into
Edinburgh present was a unique moment that, for me, equalled what
Bergson meant by duration. Conversely, this confrontation with the
virtual confused my duration as the true past was entangled with a
fictional past and an embodied present.  
The length of  Hotel Medea and its slow storytelling allowed for the
expanding depths of memory to offer a different quality of duration.
Thus it was the rupture of habit memory and its replacement with
pure memory that distinguished the quality of my duration in  Hotel
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Medea,  a  performance  that  started  outside  venue  number  26:
Summerhall in Edinburgh on August 12, 2011. 
Further fragments of a 19-year old Medea story 
The repetition of the chanting and the dancing immersed me further
into the piece as it segued smoothly into the intense rhythmic beats
of a club filled with ecstatic dancers, reminiscent of my Liverpool
past – the quality of my time now being infiltrated by a memory of
my past, as I recalled hedonistic nights in Liverpool pubs and clubs:
We  devised  our  production  of  Medea  between  October  and
December  1992.  The  opening  scene  was  a  rhythmic  action,
repeated many times and with the unity of an ensemble. I remember
concentrating hard to hold back the cough I had developed over the
autumn  term,  brought  on  by  late  nights,  bad  diet,  too  many
cigarettes, and the freedom of living away from home for the first
time. Time was truly sensed as this memory was repeated. Time
was truly sensed as this memory was repeated.
Edinburgh before
Summerhall  is  a former part  of  Edinburgh University’s school  of  veterinary medicine,  the traces of
which can still  be found in the ubiquitous references to animals found throughout the building;  the
skeletons, anatomical charts and stuffed creatures paying homage to its former use.  I arrived at the
venue around forty-five minutes before the start time and went into an adjoining building (or perhaps
the same building but it seemed distinctly different), and walked through a crowded bar of Saturday
night revellers. Having purchased a drink, I wandered to the back of the bar and waited. A young man
addressed the bar from a mezzanine and passionately explained why he had made the short film he
was about to screen; I do not recall the contents of the film although I remember it having the quality of
something dark and uncharted, with a slow, ambient soundtrack.  
Edinburgh after: The carnivalesque and kaleidoscopic turn
Hotel  Medea is  described  as  an  immersive,  participatory  performance  which  uses  technology  to
reinterpret our relationship with myth (Zecora Ura, 2012). Although the collective is active in developing
new works, Hotel Medea has been their principle achievement in realizing a performance. Whilst not
concerned with duration in their works, in staging  Hotel Medea, artistic director Jorge Lopes Ramos
wanted to “defy London’s convenient after-work theatre culture”, somewhat alluding to the disruption of
temporal norms (Lopes Ramos, 2008). Zecora Ura are frequently referenced in relation to immersive
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and participatory theatre (Machon, 2013; White, 2013), except there is no other reading of their work in
relation to duration. Although Hotel Medea was not created as a means of testing audience endurance
with its length, it has the features of a performance in which duration may be important:
‘Durational’ implies time is treated as an organic and important experiential element of
the  event.  Duration  is  not  simply  ‘how  long  it  lasts’,  the  running  time  of  the
performance  from start  to  finish,  but  holds  a  greater  significance  in  regard  to  the
interactive relationship established between the audience-participants and the event
within the timescales set. (Machon, 2013, p. 96)
In  Hotel Medea, the fact that it stretched from midnight until dawn
and that many of its elements simulated a ‘clubbing’ experience or
party  atmosphere  supports  Machon’s  (2013)  suggestion  that  a
“carnivalesque and kaleidoscopic turn  … accentuates the visceral
quality of the [durational] event and can serve to elongate, contract
or coil time into a helix; temporality itself becomes experiential”  (p.
96). Machon’s suggestion of helical time intimates that time wraps
itself around the participants, elongating or contracting as it shapes
itself  to  physical  forms.  The  image  of  time  as  a  helix  may  also
suggest that the subject is being manipulated and constrained by
time, as its wraps itself  around. For mathematician Ben Goertzel,
time as a helix “does not grow around the emergent axis of time like
a vine around a pole” (n.d., “The Helical Model of Time”, para. 4),
but moves unequally forwards and backwards through time across
space.  He  represents  it  pictorially  as  time  changing  direction  in
unequal  measure, where the black line represents space and the
red line represents the experience of time, wrapping around the line
of space, “collapsed onto a single … axis for illustrative purposes”
(n.d.,  “A  graphical  depiction  of  the  forwards  and  backwards
movement of time”): 
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Figure 8: Goertzel’s (n.d.) representation of helical time. 
In  Goertzel’s  diagram,  the  red  line  representing  helical  time
illustrates how time wraps itself around space and although there is
a start and end point to the line, it is assumed that this is also for
illustrative purposes. Here, helical time, like Bergson’s duration is an
indistinguishable unbroken flow. 
Machon’s view of time being experiential in immersive performance
is  more  accurately  explained  using  Goertzel’s  diagrammatic
representation  of  helical  time  than  the  usual  image  of  a  helix
spiraling in equal measure.  The above image fits more readily with
Machon’s reference to time as a kaleidoscope of colours, spreading
out like waves, and making new patterns. The kaleidoscopic nature
of immersive theatre evokes images of time as colours spreading
out  across  a  plane  of  existence.  In  Bergson’s  diagrammatic
representation  of  memory  (see  Figure  3),  the  upside  down cone
allows pure memory to travel to the present moment although; as in
Goertzel’s helix, time (or the memory of a time) travels unevenly:
The repetition of the chanting and the dancing immersed me further
into the piece as it segued smoothly into the intense rhythmic beats
of a club filled with ecstatic dancers, reminiscent of my Edinburgh
past – the quality of my time now being infiltrated by a memory of
my  past,  as  I  recalled  hedonistic  nights  in  Edinburgh  pubs  and
clubs. 
Challenging assumption and challenging smooth consumption 
By challenging audience expectations, perceptions and the ’after-work theatre culture’,  Hotel Medea
also challenged meaning making by its extended length and nocturnal form. Citing Frank Coppieters’
work on theatre audience perceptions, Susan Bennett  (2005) notes, “[p]erceptual  processes in the
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theatre are, among other things, a form of social interaction” (p. 91).  His data was gathered from two
performances in 1976 where the usual frameworks of theatre were broken.  Significantly, he also noted
that  audiences  “generally  felt  frustration  because they  were denied the usual  channels  of  making
meaning” (2005, p. 91).49  Thus, whilst there are many examples of plays, musicals, operas and other
cultural forms that do indeed exceed two hours, they challenge our comfortable levels of consumption,
even when taking into account differing levels of enculturation in individuals.  
There can also be an expectation that a performance falling short of a particular length somehow offers
less value to the consumer. This suggests another paradox of a socially accelerated culture; because
we are offered so many choices, we attempt to condense them into as short a time as possible to
maximize the value of everything, but when offered something that is beyond comfortable consumption
(and logically therefore of greater value) it can seem less appealing. 
A significant aspect of  Hotel Medea was that it was not  primarily concerned with duration but, as its
length was beyond comfortable levels of consumption,  I understood it as having duration at its core.
Many durational works (that is, work with duration as a core element) allow audiences to drop in and
out of the action. Forced Entertainment’s Quizoola (1996), and And on the Thousandth Night (2000);
plan b’s Bed Full of Songs (2003) and How do you keep talking even when you’ve said everything you
thought possible? (2003) are all examples of durational work that allow audiences to make their own
decisions regarding length of stay. Whilst I regarded Hotel Medea as being concerned with duration, it
did not share this feature of audience choice commonly found in ‘durational’ performances. 
Heathfield defines duration in aesthetic terms as “a sense passage in which corporeal  attention is
drawn to (a) time reforming” (2009, p. 22). His parenthesis of ‘a’ implies different times; the ‘time’ that
we measure in clocks, and its alternative – duration. It is the experience of time being (re)evaluated
and (re)formed as duration that is central to my analysis of Hotel Medea, thus offering a transformative
experience akin to Maslow’s concept of peak-experiences – something I explore later in this chapter. 
The body at the centre of action 
In An Introduction to Metaphysics Bergson (1903/1999) writes, “it is
clear  that  fixed  concepts  may  be  extracted  by  our  thought  from
mobile reality; but there are no means of constructing the mobility of
the real with fixed concepts” (p. 51).  Bergson asserted there was no
adequate method of quantifying time and, like the notes of a tune,
moments  melt  into  one  another.  Of  course,  there  are  many
philosophies of time and I am not suggesting that Bergson offers the
most complete or credible interpretation. Gaston Bachelard strongly
rejected  Bergson’s  philosophy  of  duration  as  lacking  credibility
49
 There  are,  of  course,  many  ways  in  which  meaning  making  can  be
challenged, duration being only one of them. 
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because of Bergson’s dismissal of spatialized time as number, thus
viewing time unscientifically. Ultimately, this led to Bachelard’s total
refutation  of  Bergsonian  duration  (Bachelard,  1936/2000).
Bergson’s abstract philosophy of duration does, however, offer an
alternative  to  the  homogenous time that  presides over  a  socially
accelerated culture. 
In  Hotel Medea Zecora Ura communicated something fundamental
about  the  nature  of  time  and  of  the  possibility  of  transformation
through  participation  in  a  six-hour  performance  that  was  beyond
comfortable levels of consumption.  For me, participation was not
only a challenge to the after-dinner theatre culture, but to the wider
culture of which this is a part, where experiences are compressed
and multiplied. Thus  Hotel Medea was an opportunity to reflect on
how slow storytelling might be an antidote to being on the slipping
slope of a socially accelerated culture (Rosa, 2005/2013; Rosa &
Scheuerman, 2008/2009). 
Whilst Zecora Ura may have wanted to transform the conventions of
after-dinner theatre,  Hotel Medea went far beyond this in the scale
of the performance and, as an immersive piece of theatre, it had the
potential  “for  felt,  transformative  behaviour  within,  and  as  a
consequence  of,  the  work”  (Machon,  2013,  p.  26).  These
transformative qualities are,  according to  Machon (2013),  able  to
reveal,  “the  democratic  practice  of  shared,  sensory  experience,
[and] demonstrates the profound potential  of  this artistic form” (p.
144.) It is through these shared experiences, she argues, “feelings
of  community  and  conviviality”  are  accentuated  (p.  144).  The
participation  of  each  audience  member,  or  participant-spectator,
enables the performance to have a powerful effect. Thus:
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[b]y  emphasising  contact,  tactility  and  immediacy,
immersive  theatres  re-envisage  the  relations  between
people,  space  and  time  and  mark  the  event  within  a
participant’s embodied space or interior architecture. This
interplay  of  spatialities  thus  sites/cites  the  activity  of
being together during and following an immersive event.
(Machon, 2013, p. 144)
The notion of marking an event in a “participant’s embodied space”
has interesting resonances with Bergson’s analysis of the present
moment, in which the body, being situated at the centre of action,
“represents the actual state of my becoming, that part of my duration
which  is  in  process  of  growth”  (Bergson,  1896/1910,  p.  178).
Bergson  argues  that  the  body  determines  duration,  “because
sensations  and  movements  occupy  space  and  because  there
cannot  be  in  the  same  place  several  things  at  the  same  time”
(p.178).  For  Bergson,  the  immediate  past  is  sensation  and  the
immediate  future  is  action  or  movement.  Thus,  the  present  is
sensation and movement, volition towards future action; the sensory
is privileged over the cognitive. Our present is “the very materiality of
our  existence,  …  a  system  of  sensations  and  movements,  and
nothing else” (Bergson, 1896/1910, p. 178); thus Bergson’s thinking
here is apt in exploring my sensory experience of  Hotel Medea as
an immersive performance. 
Before: Bergson, space and time
As I waited in anticipation for a performance that I was aware lasted
six hours and would require me to stay awake until dawn, I reflected
on Bergson’s notion that the only way to understand duration is to
experience  it  without  ‘juxtaposition’.  This  juxtaposition  concerns
Bergson’s discussion of the spatial expression of time. In Time and
Free Will, he writes, “[w]ould not time, thus understood, be to the
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multiplicity of our psychic states what intensity is to certain of them, -
a sign, a symbol, absolutely distinct from true duration?” (1889/1913,
p. 90). In an essay from 1903 (An Introduction to Metaphysics) he
used  the  example  of  a  spectrum  of  colours  where  each  one  is
placed next to another and, arguing that the colours occupy space,
he asserted, “pure duration …[is different because it]… excludes all
idea  of  juxtaposition,  reciprocal  externality,  and  extension”
(1903/1999, p. 26).   Bergson was not only referring to time being
measured against clocks, but against space.  Using an example of
an “infinitely small elastic body.… in a constantly lengthening line”
(1903/1999,  p.  26)  he  attempts  to  express  the  pure  mobility  of
ourselves in duration.  Whilst we are able to mark points along this
lengthening  line,  noting  how  much  time  has  passed,  we  cannot
accurately measure the intervals between these points.50  Despite
his attempts, Bergson concludes that he is unable to express the
sense of inner duration adequately through metaphors such as his
‘elastic body’ as the differing qualities of duration would be sacrificed
in the process (Bergson, 1903/1999). This inadequacy of language
to  express  phenomenological  experience  may  be  levelled  as  a
criticism against Bergson, except he is open in his acceptance of the
failings of words to offer a satisfactory account of duration. In fact,
Bergson (1903/1999) states, “[m]etaphysics … is the science which
claims  to  dispense  with  symbols”  (p.  24),  suggesting  his  use  of
metaphors may only be partially useful in accomplishing a definition
of duration.  
After
Throughout  Hotel Medea I became aware of how time was being
altered through playing with duration as the story slowly unfolded,
excluding the reciprocal externality of clock time.  The company’s
50
 See Chapter Five (pp. 79-82) for a full explanation of spatialized time.  
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decision  to  perform  the  piece  throughout  the  night  gradually
distorted my perception of the ‘normal’ passing of time.  Imposing
itself on my usually unutilized and inactive hours of the night, I (as
participant-spectator) was encouraged to participate in the wedding
ceremony of Medea and Jason, get dressed up51 in pyjamas and
listen  to  a bedtime story,  even ‘infiltrate’  a  ‘secret’  women’s  only
nightclub  whilst  wearing  an  ill-fitting  wig  and  carelessly  applied
make-up.   Throughout  Hotel  Medea,  the  passage  of  clock  time
became increasingly lost as I awaited the next part of the story or
the role I would have to play in its realization.  Reflecting on this
now,  it  was  not  only  the  experience  of  being  unable  to  mark
effectively the passing of time on the ‘increasingly lengthening line’
described by Bergson, but that these points in the mobility of my
duration lost their significance.  The need to count directly in number
and therefore in  space was replaced by something different;  that
which Bergson defines as  pure duration. This Bergsonian duration
was, I suggest, something that occurred during Hotel Medea, when
pure memory enriched moments, making them unique. 
(En)During: Feast of Dawn 
The  scene  reached  a  crescendo,  as  a  distraught  Medea  lay
sprawled across her marital bed as we began to be led out of the
room, unable to assist the distressed protagonist. The final image of
the rapidly reproducing question marks continued to spread out in
space across the screen.
forgive me Jason how stupid of me I forgot that loves comes and
goes.  where  do  i  go  now?  disappear  into  my  own
wasteland??????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??
51
 I use the term ‘dressed up’ deliberately, as there was a definite sense of
theatricality in this moment. By dressing in pyjamas, we were assuming a role,
and thus tacitly acknowledging our willingness to participate.  
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 Despite the intensity of this sequence, my eyelids were heavy as I
began  my  journey  into  the  final  part  of  the  performance.  This
moment was enriched and made unique as the layers of present
images,  both  live  and  mediatized,  intermingled  with  flashes  of
images from earlier in the evening and pure, involuntary memories
of an Edinburgh past.    
During: Acts of participation, moments of immersion  
What struck me at first was the contrast in which the time taken to
perform  Hotel  Medea stood  in  relation  to  a  socially  accelerated
culture and its values.  This experience was not for the impatient; I
had  to  allow  the  story  to  unfold  at  its  own  pace,  dwelling  on
moments that could have been explained succinctly. For example,
the  first  section  Zero  Hour  Market,  concentrated  solely  on  the
meeting  and  marriage  of  Jason  and  Medea.   As  participant-
spectator  I  was  engulfed  in  the  initial  sparring  and  the  resulting
celebrations, chanting, dancing and taking a full and active part in
the  proceedings.   As  I  looked  around  at  the  other  participant-
spectators  I  sensed  some  impatience  and  even  unwillingness  to
submit to the experience.  In particular, I noticed one man standing
with his arms folded and back to the action.   In contrast, a moment
at the end of the performance six hours later fully engaged us all as
we placed flowers and toys on the bodies of the children. At this
point, the participatory deed was fluidly and ritualistically executed
as  the  act  of  laying  flowers  and  toys  continued  for  some  time,
actions  repeated  with  solemnity.  Perhaps  a  transformation  had
occurred, or perhaps I had given in to my complete participation in
the process. As with duration, it was difficult to stand outside of the
action. 
12
Participatory  performance  experiences  are  “fundamentally  time-
based (and time-pressured) state[s] of being” (White, 2013, p. 165);
I did not, however, sense the pressure of time during Hotel Medea,
but  more  of  a  time  easing.  It  is  likely  that,  for  each  individual,
experience was unique, one of the products of participation being
“an evolving, individual understanding of the possibilities offered by
an  invitation”  (White,  2013,  p.  165).  For  me,  I  understood  the
possibilities  as  being  concerned  with  an  understanding  of
Bergsonian duration and respite from a socially accelerated culture.
As a participatory and immersive experience, Hotel Medea invited its
audience  to  form  their  own  narrative,  although  not  to  the  same
degree as the experiential journey format favoured by Punchdrunk
and  others.  In  categorizing  and  defining  immersive  performance
works such as Hotel Medea, Machon (2013) suggests:
Where  total  immersion  occurs,  there  is  always  the
experience  of  formalistic  transformation  in  that  the
audience-participant is able to ‘fashion’ her own narrative
and  journey.  Certain  events  may  enable  emotional  or
existential transformation to occur due to the ideas and
practice shared. (p. 63)
Whilst Hotel Medea was much more controlled than some immersive
performance, the extent to which one participates was an important
element in the realization of transformation, existential or otherwise.
It  was  the  “continuing,  immediate  and  interactive  exchange  of
energy  and  experience  between  the  work  and  the  audience”
(Machon,  2013,  p.  44)  that  encouraged  the  spectator  to  move
towards becoming participant-spectator. 
As Hotel Medea progressed, the transformation from a sense of time
into a sense of duration occurred; partly through being part of an
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immersive  and  participatory  experience,  and  partly  through  the
physical  effort  required  to  stay  awake as night  passed into  early
morning.   As  the  performance  moved  on,  my  awareness  of  a
different sense of time - that of duration, one that was being drawn
out and played with was, once again, heightened. As with Bergson’s
(1903/1999) notion of duration as an “infinitely small elastic body.…
in a constantly lengthening line” (p. 26),  Hotel Medea played with
both individual and collective senses of time. I am not suggesting
that this amplified awareness of duration was as a result of boredom
or lack of engagement with the piece, but that I had transgressed a
rational,  measured  sense  of  time,  having  lost  the  ‘reciprocal
externality’  that Bergson saw as being equivalent to  standardized
measures of time. In the rooms of Summerhall, I had no sense of
how much time had passed;  even when looking at  a  wristwatch,
mobile phone52 or clock, it did not seem to register that what I was
seeing was the ‘true’ time.  It was this experience of duration that
possessed  a  quality  of  uniqueness  that  I  felt  was  unusual  and
transformative, a state where Maslow’s theory of self-actualization
through peak-experience may become possible.
Self-actualization and peak-experience at Hotel Medea 
In his 1943 paper A Theory of Human Motivation Maslow suggested
that  individuals are able to  reach self-actualization once all  other
needs have been satisfied.  He believed that everyone has an ability
to self-actualize as long as physiological, safety, esteem, cognitive
and  aesthetic  needs  have  been  fulfilled.   By  self-actualization,
Maslow  was  referring  to  the  possibility  of  undergoing  peak-
experiences, which he likened to mystic encounters.  In  Motivation
and Personality, he writes that peak-experiences produce:  
52
 At ‘check-in’ we had been instructed to keep mobile phones with us and
switched on; the reason became apparent later in the performance. 
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feelings  of  limitless  horizons  opening  up  …  of  great
ecstasy, wonder and awe, the loss of placing in time and
space  with  … the  conviction  that  something  extremely
important and valuable has happened, so that the subject
is to some extent transformed and strengthened even in
daily life by such experiences (Maslow, 1954, p. 164). 
Maslow (1954) identified a particular quality in likely self-actualizers
as  being  resistant  to  enculturation,  in  that  more  autonomous
individuals are “ruled by the laws of their own character rather than
by the rules of society” (p. 174); human potential becomes “lost or
buried or inhibited as the person gets enculturated” (Maslow, 2010,
p. 130).   I suggest it is a resistance to enculturation that aligns with
Bergson’s  view of  duration  experienced  as  more  ‘real’  than  time
measured by the clock. Furthermore,  Maslow’s assertion that  the
ability and desire to self-actualize is innate53 resonates strongly with
Bergson’s  notion  of  wholly  qualitative  duration;  both  self-
actualization  and  Bergsonian  duration  are  not  amenable  to
measurement.  When  Bergson  (1889/1913)  writes  that  duration
“might  well  be  nothing  but  a  succession  of  qualitative  changes,
which melt  into  one another,  without  any tendency to  externalize
themselves”  (p.  104)  he  concurs  with  Maslow’s  view  that  peak-
experiences are transient and ephemeral. In  The Farther Reaches
of Human Nature (1971), Maslow comments, “peak experiences …
are moments of ecstasy which cannot be … guaranteed” (p. 46),
also arguing that “self-actualization can only be achieved in small
steps; there is not a significant moment when one becomes self-
actualized” (p. 49).  Like duration, self-actualization somewhat defies
quantification,  and  Maslow’s  notion  of  self-actualization  could,  in
fact, be aligned with other philosophical positions besides Bergson’s
view of duration. However, Bergson and Maslow use science as a
way  of  contextualizing  their  theories  and  although  both  men
acknowledge  the  importance  of  scientific  enquiry,  they  ultimately
53
 See discussion of Maslow in Chapter Five (p.59).  
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reject  its  objectivity  in  favour  of  a  more  subjective  approach.54
Experiencing a Bergsonian notion of duration, one that is pure and
unified  is,  I  suggest  a  factor  in  leading  towards  a  state  of  self-
actualization or peak-experience. Bergson’s argument for privileging
duration over time is not  simply a matter  of  rejecting quantitative
time over qualitative duration. He does not present duration as more
positive  than time,  and indeed he was not  writing  in  a  markedly
socially  accelerated  culture.55 In  using  Bergson’s  philosophical
discussion of duration, I suggest it can be positively applied to the
realization of a Maslovian peak experience.56   
After: Uniqueness and novelty
Bergson’s privileging of the intuitive over the analytical suggests that
individual views of the world are idiosyncratic and thus unique.  This
sense of uniqueness, which Maslow (2010) identifies as one of his
B-cognition values, leading towards a peak-experience is analogous
with Bergson’s view of life as ever-changing with an ever-present
sense of novelty. This is also true in his view of and approach to
philosophy. As Mullarkey (2000) notes, Bergson advocated “thinking
in durée [to] commend … the use of fluid concepts and permanently
mutating  philosophical  schemes”  (p.  184).  For  Maslow,  the
54
 Hence  the  foundation  of  Bachelard’s  criticism  of  Bergson’s  concept  of
duration. 
55
 The  notion  of  social  acceleration  is,  arguably,  subjective.  In  Bergson’s
lifetime,  there  was  a  rapid  pace  of  industrial  and  technological  advancement
although  this  was  not  accompanied  by  the  same  sense  of  time  compression
experienced today. 
56
 There  are,  of  course,  many  other  ways  in  which  one  might  seek  an
experience of Bergsonian duration. Arguably, becoming immersed in any activity
for  which  clock-time  loses  meaning  and  structure  might  facilitate  Bergsonian
duration and induce a Maslovian peak-experience. Maslow’s self-actualization is
structured although he admits that the peak-experience cannot be directly sought
at  will  and,  as  such,  it  is  perhaps most  likely  to  be found in  more structured
activities such as performance. In contrast,  an experience such as clubbing, in
which  participants  may  lose  a  sense  of  time  and  achieve  a  ‘high’  are  less
structured and more widely  accessible  as it  deals  with  an innate response  to
rhythm and the movement of a crowd. 
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uniqueness of a peak-experience has this sense of novelty.57 Hotel
Medea exposed me to an experience that was, in numerous ways
unique and supported Bergson’s notion of a universe “being made
continually” (as cited in Mullarkey, 2000, p.184) and “in the evolution
of  things  a  continual  invention  of  forms  ever  new”  (Bergson,
1907/2008, p. 344). That Hotel Medea was a catalyst for an intensity
of  involuntary  memories  and  uniqueness  illustrates  the  ‘new’  or
novelty flowing forth.58 The continuous making of each moment was
preceded and therefore influenced by my “heavier and still heaver
load”  of  memories  flowing  through me  and  accumulating  in the
universe (Bergson, 1903/1999, p. 40).
It  may seem peculiar to regard memories as passing through me
rather  than  being  drawn  from me  but,  as  Bergson  suggests,
memories are not embodied although they need a body for them to
be realized (Bergson, 1896/1910). Conversely, the accumulation of
memories in the universe is possible as, if they are not embodied,
they must be somewhere. Bergson states in Creative Evolution that:
[O]ur duration is irreversible. We could not live over again
a single moment, for we should have to begin by effacing
the memory of all that had followed. Even could we erase
this memory from our intellect, we could not from our will.
(1907/ 2008, p. 6). 
57
 In Creative Evolution, Bergson uses an example of a painting to illustrate 
the concept of novelty. He writes: 
The  painter  is  before  his  canvas,  the  colors  are  on  the
palette, the model is sitting—all this we see, and also we know the
painter's style: do we foresee what will appear on the canvas? We
possess the elements of the problem; we know in an abstract way,
how it will be solved, for the portrait will surely resemble the model
and  will  surely  resemble also  the artist;  but  the concrete  solution
brings with it that unforeseeable nothing which is everything in a work
of art. And it is this nothing that takes time. (1907/2008, p. 341)
58
 Although each moment is part of the novelty of the universe, it consists of
moments from the past and so is never entirely new. 
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The implication here is that the consequences of a lived moment will
be recorded somewhere. From a scientific perspective (Bergson’s
Creative  Evolution  was  a  response  to  Darwin’s  Origin  of  the
Species),  “[w]herever anything lives, there is, open somewhere, a
register in which time is being inscribed” (Bergson, 1907/2008, p.
16). For Bergson (1907/2008), this also applied to memory, which is
the “basis of our conscious existence … the prolongation of the past
into the present, or, in a word,  duration, acting and irreversible” (p.
17). Thus our pure memory exists somewhere, waiting to occupy a
particular  moment  in  the  present;  a  moment  of  “uniqueness;
(idiosyncrasy;  individuality;  non-comparability;  novelty)”  (Maslow,
2010, p. 78).  
During: Performance ritual 
Anthropologist  Victor  Turner  (1982)  believed  that  “ceremony
indicates,  ritual  transforms”  (p.  80).  In  Hotel  Medea there  were
elements of both ceremony and ritual to undergo before the story
could begin. At an early stage in the performance, I already felt a
disrupted  sense  of  time  that  led  to  a  sense  of  duration,  having
travelled  from  Manchester  and  spent  a  few  hours  exploring  the
streets of Edinburgh. In the bustling streets of Edinburgh during the
festival, locating Summerhall seemed a protracted and, at times a
near impossible task in the almost labyrinthine59 geography of the
Scottish capital city. 
Before: Zero Hour Market - Checking in
On arrival, guests were individually asked to check in their baggage,
by placing it  in  a bucket  and having it  hoisted above our heads,
further  adding  to  the  belief  that  I  was  being  prepared  for  an
59
 I refer to labyrinths here because I had a clear sense of there being a
navigable path to follow rather than a maze like geographical structure in which I
was deliberately being misled.  
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experience that was slow, deliberate and exact,  yet  paradoxically
might liberate me from clock-time.  This pre-performance introduced
us to the notion of ritual  action,  something that would be utilized
repeatedly  as  the  performance progressed.  This  also  acted as  a
“contract of participation” (Machon, 2013, p. 99) between spectator
and performer, something that prepared me for full engagement in
the  experience  as  a  participant-spectator.  As  I  gathered  my
belongings together and committed them to the safekeeping of the
performers on the mezzanine above,  I  was reminded (along with
others)  to  keep  my  mobile  phone  with  me  and  for  it  to  remain
switched  on.  At  this  moment  I  admit  I  felt  a  slight  sense  of
despondency that this may not be the durational experience I was
seeking. It did, however, remind me of the ubiquity of time and that
this could still be an opportunity to stand apart from the clock. The
process of checking into Hotel Medea seemed deliberately designed
to  step  away  from  the  conventions  of  the  convenient  after-work
theatre culture (Lopes-Ramos, 2008) whilst  still  using some of its
conventions.  The  checking  in  of  belongings  reminded  me of  the
traditional  theatre  cloakroom  with  its  raffle  tickets  as  identifiers,
something the company also used here.  Similarly,  the ‘after-work
theatre’  practice  of  a  printed  programme  was  exploited  as  a
rudimentarily produced flyer was given to each participant. 
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 Figure 9: Information for participant-spectators checking in at Hotel Medea, 
Summerhall, Edinburgh, August 12, 2011.
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Welcoming us to the ‘National Day of the Golden Fleece’, the flyer
was a further method of enculturation into the experience, as it listed
the ‘rules’ we must follow. I  do not recall what the fleece actually
looked like, nor am I  certain of  its actual  physical existence. The
fleece must, however, have existed because when I look now at the
flyer  the  rules  warn  against  loitering  close  to  the  fleece  or  of
photographing it.  The focus of my attention at that moment must
have been elsewhere, perhaps I  was focused on other people or
that my perception was enriched with pure involuntary memories. In
this  early  part  of  the  performance I  recall  a  persistent  feeling  of
tiredness, prompting me to think about my journey to Hotel Medea.
The rules outlined in the flyer suggested to me that the piece might
follow a strict order and, by doing so, implement a rigid awareness of
time.  This  orderliness,  however,  was  juxtaposed  with  disorder  at
other moments, but particularly so at this stage. Despite the clear
sense  of  purposeful  activity  in  the  ‘checking  in’  of  guests  and
distribution of rules, there was a good deal  of  waiting around for
what I perceived to be the real start.60 This was a contradiction to the
idea  of  organized  time  and,  what  I  understood  as  a  tacit
acknowledgement  of  the  Bergsonian  sense  of  duration  to  be
experienced  subsequently.  For  me,  this  was  an  opportunity  to
consider  the  kind  of  durational  experience  most  prescient  in  my
thoughts as my already long day began to stretch and merge into a
night that I would consume in a waking state.   
After: Making-sense / Sense-making
The  company’s  decision  to  perform  Hotel  Medea throughout  the
night was significant; they wanted to create a piece of theatre that,
according  to  their  literature,  stretched  “beyond  the  boundaries  of
ordinary time and place,  insisting on radical  audience interaction,
60
 As I have already suggested, the performance began with my travelling to
Edinburgh and locating the venue. 
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participation and immersion” (Zecora Ura, 2012).   This immersion
was important in the overall experience of Hotel Medea, prioritizing
“embodied  knowledge  and  the  making-sense  /  sense-making
processes of human perception and interpretation” (Machon, 2013,
p.  142).  Throughout  the  performance,  by  being  immersed  in  the
‘hotel’, I not only made sense of the story being told – adding to my
unreliable memory of the narrative, but the experience was sensory
in that it was  making  senses. As well as shaping my experience,
these  senses  were  part  of  the  making  of  a  sense  of  spirit  of
community  or  togetherness  that  was  nurtured  and  encouraged.
Machon  (2013)  suggests  that  immersive  theatre’s  “transformative
qualities … [are] brought about by the democratic practice of shared,
sensory experience, demonstrat[ing] the profound potential  of this
artistic form” (p. 144), thus offering a “rehumanised and resensitised
… individual experience” (p. 143). Despite the shared encounters in
Hotel Medea, it was my unique, individual experience that had the
most powerful and profound effect on my senses. It was the way in
which Hotel Medea made senses that contributed to a move away
from time and towards duration. 
For Catherine Bell (1997), it is the sensory elements of performance
that  draw  similarities  with  ritual:  the  “ritual-like  nature  …  [of
performance] appear[s] to lie in the multifaceted sensory experience
… and in  the  ability  to  shape people’s  experience and  cognitive
ordering  of  the  world.  (p.  161)  Hotel  Medea exemplified  Bell’s
argument that:
[P]erformances communicate on multiple sensory levels,
usually involving highly visual imagery, dramatic sounds,
and  sometimes  even  tactile,  olfactory,  and  gustatory
stimulation … the power of performance lies in great part
in the effect of the heightened multisensory experience it
affords:  one  is  not  being  told  or  shown  something  so
much as one is led to experience something” (p. 160)
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In  my  exploration  of  Bergsonian  duration,  the  total  immersion
allowed me to infiltrate the interior of the performance, in the way
that White (2012) suggests is true of all  immersive theatre: “[i]t  is
likely  to  be  multi-sensory,  making  use  of  exploratory  space  and
relationships  with  performers,  but  sometimes also addressing the
senses of touch and smell” (p. 222). Senses such as smell “affect
our  involuntary  and  primitive  receptors  [and  can  be]  a  potent
expressive  tool  … to  trigger  an  involuntary  reaction  and  thereby
guide the visceral experience of an event” (Banes & Lepecki, 2007,
p. 125).  The most intense sense I experienced during  Zero Hero
Market was  the  combined  heat  of  the  theatre  lighting,  bodies  in
close contact and the frantic moving around the space. The middle
section  –  Drylands –  was  a  more  visual  experience,  as  I
encountered  banks  of  TV  monitors,  whilst  in  Feast  of  Dawn,  I
listened to melancholic sounds in Club Exile. At other moments, I
perspired as I ran around the building in a game of hide and seek,
holding  hands  with  others;  at  other  times  I  tasted  the  sickly
sweetness of hot chocolate and listened to the whispered voice of
Medea’s nursemaid telling me a story. In one of the final moments of
the performance, I placed toy bears and flowers on the bodies of
Medea’s children. The engagement of my senses reminded me I am
“distinct from the world … [and our senses] define and patrol  our
physical  perimeter  by  registering  the  effects  of  the  world  on
ourselves”  (Hurley,  2010,  p.  33).  In  a  similar  vein,  Bergson
(1896/1910) states, 
… the body [is] an ever advancing boundary between the
future and the past … which our past is continually driving
forward  into  our  future.  Whereas  my body,  taken  at  a
single  moment,  is  but  a  conductor  interposed between
the objects which influence it and those on which it acts, it
is, on the other hand, when replaced in the flux of time,
always situated at the very point where my past expires in
a deed. (p. 88) 
13
For  Bergson,  the  body  as  a  conductor  was  central  to  how  we
experience duration. It  is  our sensory engagement with the world
that allows us to be aware of duration, the deep and rich memories
travelling  down the  cone towards the  present  moment.  Thus,  for
Bergson  (1903/1999)  memory  is  activated  through  the  body
although the body does not store memory in a way that makes it
instantly retrievable, despite the “heavier and still  heavier load we
drag behind us as we grow older” (p. 40). It  is only once we are
reminded of this ‘load’ that we can truly experience duration. 
This  depth  of  duration  is  found  in  the  nature  of  an  immersive
performance, meaning that it has “a special capacity to create …[a]
kind of deep involvement” (White, 2012, p. 225). For me, the efficacy
of Hotel Medea was in a kind of involvement that was sensory. The
performance did not just occur around me, but within me; immersive
theatre such as this “ultimately becomes part of us at the moment of
performance” (White, 2012, p. 228). One markedly sensory moment,
which  I  will  also  touch  upon  later,  was  in  the  middle  section,
Drylands. Having been taken, in groups of five or six into the care of
Medea’s nursemaids, I was invited to dress in blue and white cotton
striped pyjamas. I remember the smell of fresh material, as if they
had just been laundered; this was a calm, reassuring homely aroma,
invading my senses again as I climbed between the bed sheets. The
smell of freshly washed cotton and the comfort of the beds made
this moment one in which my making sense of the performance was
through my bodily senses, rather than a cerebral process. 
In terms of Bergsonian duration, sensing being part of something –
of  the  present  moment  itself  augmented by  pure  memory  –  was
characterized  in  the  making  sense  and  sense  making  of  Hotel
Medea.  (Machon,  2013).  In  a  (syn)aesthetic  sense,  where
“sensation itself …[is]… transmitted to the audience via a corporeal
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memory … [t]his fusing of sense (semantic ‘meaning making’) with
sense (feeling, both sensation and emotion) establishes a double-
edged rendering of making-sense/sense-making” (Machon, 2011, p.
14). In  Hotel Medea, I was making sense of duration because the
performance made senses that enabled me to do so. As I lay in the
bed, with the reassuring smell of fresh pyjamas and bed sheets, I
was  given  a  mug  of  hot  chocolate  to  drink.  The  drink  left  an
uncomfortable aftertaste in my mouth of warm milk and chocolate; in
contrast,  the  soothing  tone  of  the  nursemaid’s  story  provided  a
calming auditory experience. This bedtime story was a one-to-one
encounter; I lay in the bed only inches away from the nursemaid’s
face, her eyes engaging with mine with only an occasional glance at
the book she was reading from. Intermittently, she showed me hand-
drawn illustrations in the book, the faint  pastel  coloured drawings
explaining the story of Medea and Jason’s betrayal.  
When: Self-Agency and Self-Ownership
White (2013) interprets this particular sequence as being about self-
agency (SA) and self-ownership (SO); SA being the pre-reflective
experience that I am causing an action or thought, and SO being the
pre-reflective awareness that I am  undergoing the experience. He
writes:
When … I put on pyjamas and get into a bunk bed, drink
hot chocolate and cuddle the toy that has been given to
me, I have a sense of self-agency; I experience myself
causing these new events. I also have self-ownership, as
these  things  happen  to  me,  even  as  I  play  a  part  in
causing them to happen. When, in the same sequence, a
performer tucks the bedclothes more tightly around me,
or  later  in  the performance I  am pulled into  motion by
another participant to run away from Medea, I have only a
sense  of  self-ownership;  these  things  happen  to  me
without, in this moment, having initiated them. (2013, p.
184)
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 In  respect  of  these  two  states  of  being,  the  senses  played  an
important  role  in  both,  as  embodied and instinctive  responses to
events.  White  suggests  that  these  modes  of  experience  in
participatory  performance  and  in  Hotel  Medea in  particular,  “are
intentional, we are directed towards them” (2013, p. 184). For me,
the  experience  was  predominantly  sensory,  acknowledging  the
Bergsonian notion of the body as a conductor for memories. This,
and many other moments in Hotel Medea gave me an awareness of
“palpable immediacy … reawaken[ing] embodied consciousness …
remind[ing] [me] that this sentience is a primordial underpinning in
our evolved cerebral interpretative faculties” (Shaughnessy, 2013, p.
209).  There  was  a  sense  of  self-ownership  in  experiencing
Bergsonian pure memory in  Hotel  Medea;  memories  invaded my
present  without me willing them to appear. The moments where I
attempted to summon memories at will may have given me some
sense of self-agency but this was superseded by the self-ownership
of involuntary memory. 
During: Zero Hour Market 
After ‘checking in’ to Hotel Medea, I was invited to wait with the other
guests for the performance to begin. We were ushered into a dimly
lit space, expansive with high ceilings and soon to be transformed
into  a  bustling  Brazilian  market  place.  The  music  began  with  a
simultaneous eruption of colour and vibrancy as we were invited into
the  various  ‘stalls’  populating  Zero  Hour  Market.  Each  stall  was
constructed from a  hoop supported  by  high  poles  resting  on the
shoulders  of  the  performer;  multi-coloured  ribbons  dangled  down
and as we moved inside the circle, I became entrenched within the
walls of another world. Each market stallholder had something to
either tell or sell to their audience; to me, they seemed to be asking
for my time – to stay awake beyond the usual routines of my life.
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Accepting  each  stallholder’s  offer,  I  moved  between  circles,
embracing the disorientating effect of  the twirling ribbons and the
patter  of  the  stallholders.  Their  offers  were  sometimes  questions
such as ‘What’s the most foolish thing you’ve ever done?’ and, at
other moments, statements - the content of which I do not recall. At
this  early  point  in  the  performance  I  was  acutely  aware  of  the
duration  stretching  out  ahead  of  me,  of  the  potential  for  making
unique moments from remaking memories. As a visitor to the market
interacting with the stallholders, I felt as if I was part of the scene, of
the  storytelling  that  was  done  so  slowly.  The  pounding  music
(provided  throughout  the  night  by  a  DJ,  added  to  the  club
atmosphere)  and aligned uncomfortably  with  the  slowness of  the
story. Likewise, the feverish intensity of the market failed to establish
a sense of a carefully measured pace. Abruptly, the market ended
as a siren sounded and a man dressed in white trousers, white shirt,
and Panama hat welcomed us to the hotel and began explaining the
structure of the night ahead. 
Split  into  several  groups numbering approximately  twelve people,
we were given instructions and some basic training in various dance
moves  and  tribal  sounding  chants.  Their  importance  was
emphasized to us, and that participation was essential  during our
stay  at  Hotel  Medea.  The  sense  of  going  beyond  the  ordinary
became apparent in these preparations; what this also did was to
append a sense of ritual to the whole experience, part of the “sense
of condensed totality’ (Bell, 1997, p. 161) of the performance. 
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After
Perhaps  this  appending  of  ritual  was  necessary  to  allow  us,  as
participant-spectators to come together. As a group of strangers, we
did not arrive as “a crowd with a history … with a common purpose
and expectation” and so were lacking the common identity of ready-
made institutional  audiences (White,  2013,  p.  137).  Audiences in
conventional  theatre  buildings  often  naturally  conform  to  the
institutional ‘expectations’ of the building, adapting and responding
to the architecture or history of a space.61 In Summerhall,  a non-
performance venue, these conventions were absent and thus it was
only when we could “begin to share responses that approve[d] of a
performance [that we were] more likely to give similar approval to
invitations to participate” (White, 2013, p. 137). 
During: Zero Hour Market
Moving  into  a  different  space,  a  bare  room  with  traces  of
Summerhall’s  former purpose as a veterinary school  occasionally
flashing before me, we were invaded by a band of topless female
Argonauts,  moving  rhythmically  and  aggressively  in  their  combat
style  trousers  and black  motorcycle  helmets.  Enthusiastically,  yet
with an apparent sense of reverence, the man in a Panama hat – a
kind  of  master  of  ceremonies  –  explained  we  were  to  become
guests at the wedding of Medea and Jason. As we were introduced
to  the  eponymous  Medea,  a  confrontation  began  involving  much
dancing and, whereas in a conventional production of Medea where
some careful elucidation might be employed, the narrative detail was
61
 Specific theatre spaces might have an impact on audience behaviour and
expectations. For example, Theatre Royal, Drury Lane has largely accommodated
performances with a traditional performance/audience relationship; in contrast, the
Wooster Group’s Performing Garage counters this usual dynamic. 
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presented alternatively as embodied exposition; the fiery relationship
between Medea and Jason being expressed through movement and
dance. After several verbal exchanges in Portuguese, the master of
ceremonies gave us  further  information and snippets  of  narrative
using  his  megaphone,  heightening  the  sense  of  this  being  an
important event. 
As the ‘magical’  figure of Medea’s brother appeared,  replete with
war paint, a game of football began and the dancing continued as
the  ball,  attached  to  a  pole  was  kicked  about.  Separating  the
audience  into  two  sides,  we  were  given  cardboard  masks  of
Medea’s  face,  which  were  randomly  distributed  around  the
participant-spectators. As members of the company jostled the false
Medeas from side to side, Jason’s Argonauts searched frantically for
the real  Medea. So far,  this was the most  frenetic part  although,
paradoxically, time seemed to be moving at – if not a slower pace,
then a pace demarcated from the action. The Argonauts searched
and examined the masked audience members in pursuit of the real
Medea. As the real Medea was uncovered, there was some more
dancing  and  chanting,  which  we  had  been  taught  earlier  in  the
evening. This was the beginning of a kind of mating or hunting ritual.
As the ritual action continued, calls from members of the company
for more music from the DJ led the beat and rhythm to change the
atmosphere into something more highly charged and aggressive as
a human bullfight  began. It seemed to me that this tauromachia in
the  form of  a  dance,  represented  the  battle  between  Jason  and
Medea.  As the fight  progressed, the dance moves we had learnt
earlier were employed as we moved enthusiastically, swaying even
the most reluctant of dancers. At the end of the battle, Medea was
‘won’  and  we  were  shepherded  into  a  large  circle  around  the
perimeter of the room from where we continued the dancing. At this
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early  stage in  the performance there had been a glut  of  activity,
perhaps distorting the amount of time that had passed. The action
once  again  became  frenetic  and,  in  a  sudden  halting  of  the
proceedings,  Jason  asked  Medea  for  her  forgiveness  before  the
wedding preparations continued. 
The men and women of the audience were separated and the room
divided by a large curtain into two parts.  On my side,  we began
preparing  Jason for  his  marriage to  Medea.  On the other  side,  I
assume, similar preparations were being carried out. In this process,
a few members of the audience were invited to wash Jason, before
dressing him and presenting him as cleansed for his marriage. As
Medea’s Nursemaid dressed her mistress, Medea and Jason were
blindfolded  and  left  in  a  state  of  apparent  anticipation  of  the
forthcoming marriage.  The repetition of  the chanting and dancing
added to my temporal confusion and the marring of time. As Jason
and Medea searched for each other amongst us in the crowd, the
noise and frenzied activity  continued until  they finally  succeeded.
Touching faces, Jason and Medea kissed as confetti  was thrown
around the room. 
The participatory nature of Hotel Medea was taken further here than
merely using the spectators as crowds and supernumery characters
to  become participant-spectators.  We were  invited  to  perform an
impromptu  poem in  praise  of  the  happy couple.  Standing  before
Jason  and  Medea,  several  audience  members  individually
presented their lyrical gifts, occasionally offering some insight into
the story being told.  
‘Money, women and power are your only aim.’
After each one, there was a short dance led by the poet as they
moved rhythmically towards the couple, dictated to by the intense
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Latin rhythms played by the DJ. This procession of celebration was
repeated  several  times,  during  which  time  the  exposition  of  the
Medea story  was  temporarily  suspended,  like  my  grasp  on  a
tangible sense of duration. 
As the wedding party  began to  dissipate,  Medea,  Jason and the
fleece were prevented from leaving as the assembled participant-
spectators once again moved into a circle of dancing and chanting.
The repetition of the chanting and the dancing immersed me further
into the piece as it segued smoothly into the intense rhythmic beats
of a club filled with ecstatic dancers, reminiscent of my Edinburgh
past – the quality of my time now being infiltrated by a memory of my
past, as I recalled hedonistic nights in Edinburgh pubs and clubs.
After: The heavier and heavier load 
The power of this part of  Hotel Medea, like many other moments,
was  to  evoke  memories  from long  ago  and  bring  them into  the
present,  thus bringing duration to the fore of my experience. The
true sense of time – Bergsonian duration - was felt when my past
was  involuntarily  transported  to  my  present,  offering  a  depth  of
memories that had been unconsciously built upon, layer upon layer
since my last  visit  to  Edinburgh.  In  a  single moment,  a  practical
realization of the Bergsonian concept of inner duration was revealed
to me:
Inner duration is the continuous life of a memory which
prolongs  the  past  into  the  present,  the  present  either
containing  within  it  in  a  distinct  form  the  ceaselessly
growing image of the past, or, more probably, showing by
its continual change of quality the heavier and still heavier
load we drag behind us as we grow older.  Without this
survival of  the past into the present there would be no
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duration, but only instantaneity. (Bergson, 1903/1999, p.
40)
For Bergson, the role of memory was integral to a sense of inner
duration.  His assertion that we drag a ‘heavier and still heavier load’
behind  us  reminds  us  that  the  quality  of  our  duration  is  ever
changing and is thus heterogeneous.  Bergson’s contention that we
use our memories in judging and sensing duration is an attempt to
place  measurement  against  the  immeasurable;  it  is  memory  that
gives  a  context  to  an  innate  sense  of  duration,  -  not  quite  the
reciprocal  externality  with  which  we equate  time to  numbers,  but
perhaps the closest we will reach.  Duration, like involuntary memory
is  capricious but  it  reveals the inner  life  that  Maslow might  have
regarded as aliveness. 
After: Aliveness
In  An Introduction  to  Metaphysics (1903/1999),  Bergson  explains
how  duration  is  distinct  from  clock-time,62 which  is  an  important
principle  in  appreciating  duration  as  a  life  force.  This  notion  of
duration  as  a  vital  impulse  or  live-giving  force  can  only  be
understood once one accepts that spatialized time is not duration. It
is this processual nature of duration that is recognized as aliveness
by Maslow; a “process; non-deadness; spontaneity; self-regulation;
full-functioning” (1970, p. 78). Although Maslow does not dwell on
the notion of aliveness in any detail, simply listing it as a B-Value
(see  Chapter  Five,  p.  79),  he  does  however,  discuss  the
characteristics of the B-cognizer in peak-experiences. It is from this I
extrapolate  a  connection  with  Bergsonian  duration  and  my
experience  in  Hotel  Medea.  More  specifically,  Maslow  (2010)
62
 See Chapter Five (pp. 80-82) for a full discussion of this concept. 
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speculates upon the characteristics of B-cognizers in his exploration
of  acute  identity  experiences:  in  peak-experiences,  identity  “has
various  real,  sensible,  and  useful  meanings  …  people  in  peak
experiences are most their identities, closest to their real selves” (p.
97). Identity, the notion of being, of who we are, and its associated
aliveness  is  inextricably  connected  with  our  past  and  thus  our
memories.  Just  as  Bergson  regards  the  memory  as  becoming
deeper and richer in content the further away from the event, the
person  undergoing  the  Maslovian  peak-experience  “feels  more
integrated  (unified,  whole,  all-of-a-piece,  than  at  other  times”
(Maslow,  2010,  p.  98).  The  moments  in  performance  where  a
“singular and involuntary memory invades the present” (Colebrook,
2002, p. 178), is the moment when depth of memory creates a more
integrated,  whole  sense  of  being.  Maslow  asserts  that  once  the
subject  undergoes  a  peak-experience,  their  identity  actually
becomes  a  “transcending  of  itself,  a  going  beyond  and  above
selfhood … becom[ing] relatively egoless” (2010, p. 99). This notion
of transcendence, of reaching the “very highest and most inclusive
or holistic levels of human consciousness” (Maslow, 1971, p. 269), is
a  powerful  claim.  Bergson’s  theory  of  memories  involuntarily
travelling down the cone to enrich the present moment is a similar
moment of  transcendence, of  reaching a different  level  of  human
consciousness.  In  this  process there  is  an  increased self-agency
(SA)  (White,  2013),  as  the  person  in  a  peak-experience  “feels
himself … to be responsible, active, [the] the creating center of his
activities and of his perceptions” (Maslow, 2010, p. 100). 
The Bergsonian experience of duration through a wealth of memory
is challenged by Maslow’s (2010) suggestion that the individual in
the peak-experience is “most here-now, most free of the past and of
the future” (p. 102). Maslow’s assertion does, however, suggest that
the ‘here-nowness’ is a result of a rich, deep and clear experience,
which I argue happens because of the involuntary infiltration of the
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past  upon  the  present.  Later,  Maslow  comments  that  peak-
experiences “may be fruitfully understood as completions-of-the-act
…  total  discharge,  catharsis,  culmination,  climax,  consummation,
emptying or finishing” (p. 104). These words certainly support the
importance of a depth of experience that  total  liberation from the
past and future cannot accommodate. What makes Maslow’s ‘here-
nowness’  seemingly  distinct  from  Bergson’s  involuntary  pure
memory  is  the  means  by  which  one  might  achieve  a  peak-
experience.  Maslow’s  quasi-scientific  approach  offers  an  almost
tangible guide to self-actualization whereas Bergson offers only an
abstract  philosophy,  despite  his  writing  having  foundations  in
science  (evolution  and  neuroscience).  However,  whilst  Maslow
explains a peak-experience as “total discharge, catharsis” (p. 104),
this  implies  a  content  of  past  to  be  removed  and,  as  the  past’s
content is what makes duration for Bergson, Maslow’s “completions-
of-the-act” (p. 104) must therefore be understood as encompassing
a depth of duration in the form of memory.  
During: Feast of Dawn 
In the midst of  the flurry of dancing and celebration, Medea took
possession of the Golden Fleece along with the regality and power it
represented.  As  the  room  plunged  into  blackness,  a  haphazard
crossing of torchlight beams partially illuminated Jason and Medea
leaving the space. As the body of Medea’s brother was placed in a
chest and taken away, this first part of the performance ended with a
sombre tone. 
(En)During: Drylands 
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In the second part of the trilogy – ‘Drylands’, we began by lining up
in a dimly lit corridor and were informed that we would be meeting
Jason for the honour of shaking hands with him …. At this moment I
considered the significance of time and whether I was experiencing
something akin to Bergson’s conception of duration …. 
…. taken to a ‘campaign room’ just off the corridor and invited to sit
in rows; in front of us was a large TV screen, surrounded by banks
of smaller screens, standing before us like the night ahead. Before
we took our seats we lifted wireless headphones and placed them
attentively to our ears, consigning each one of us to an individual
aural  world.  The  bank  of  screens  showed  images  of  a  smartly
dressed and smiling Jason; we were told to ‘allow a face to emerge
before our faces, a man’s face…” 
…. fragments of footage from Jason’s political  canvassing …. we
were given clipboards with a questionnaire attached, it immediately
became  apparent  that  we  were  part  of  a  ‘focus  group’  ….  my
overriding recollection of this moment being the remoteness of the
human voices and the blurred images displayed on the screen …. 
During: Drylands
Later, half of the participant-spectators were led to bunk beds where
we were dressed in pajamas, given hot chocolate and a bedtime
story.  We  were  told  to  sleep,  whilst  the  remaining  participant-
spectators watched the story unfold further.  What followed was a
reversal  of  roles;  pyjamas  and  beds  exchanged,  we  were  then
allowed to see the action we had missed. As we were led, hand in
hand with a nursemaid, I considered the paradoxical nature of the
earlier use of technology alongside the simplicity of the dormitory,
with  its  bunk  beds  and  calm  atmosphere  enhanced  by  soothing
music to send us to sleep. Having dressed in pajamas and given a
hot,  milky  drink,  the  nursemaids  told  us  a  story  using  a  simple
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children’s picture book. The story was of Medea and her children; of
how she takes revenge on her unscrupulous husband. Whilst  the
simple  and familiar  narrative  was whispered,  I  was aware  of  the
sounds  of  the  same  story  being  told  to  the  remainder  of  the
audience in the same room. Lying in bed, I was told to close my
eyes but, not wanting to miss any of the action, I was recalcitrant
with an occasional peek at the other action, afraid that drifting into
sleep might  have negated my search for  an alternative  sense of
duration.  After a lullaby was sung to smooth my passage to ‘sleep’,
the roles were reversed and I became part of that other audience,
with the story narrated by Medea’s Nurse. 
We sat on benches, configured as a thrust audience; Medea sat with
her back towards us, looking at the large projected clock, its hands
moving anti-clockwise in double time. Gentle organ music played, as
if offering a lullaby; we waited for the participant-spectators to take
our  earlier  positions  in  the  bunk  beds  and  we  were  offered  the
benevolent smile of Medea’s Nurse, as she walked from side to side.
Finally,  she invited the audience to share the ‘worst  thing you’ve
ever done’ and asked ‘have you ever had your heart broken?’:
(En)During: Zero Hour Market  
Accepting each stallholder’s offer, I moved between circles, enjoying
the disorientating effect of the twirling ribbons and the patter of the
stallholders. Their offers were sometimes questions such as ‘What’s
the most foolish thing you’ve ever done?’ and, at other moments,
statements - the content of which I do not recall:
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During: Drylands 
Despite  the  clearest  exposition  of  narrative  so  far,  the  story
continued to unfold slowly. Time, like the scene, repeated itself but
without fidelity to exactitude, as reciprocal externality disappeared.
My  eyes  were  heavy  with  tiredness  as  my  consciousness
surrendered  to  a  sense  of  duration  that  was  succession  without
distinction.  The centrepiece of the room was Medea and Jason’s
marital bed; behind that was a large projected analogue clock-face,
which the hours moved swiftly  around before fading to nothing.  I
attached some significance to this as I  considered the erosion of
time  in  favour  of  something  else;  the  intermingling  of  these  two
scenes, played out simultaneously yet separately as time continued
on its journey towards duration. The repetition of this scene once
more  played  with  my  experience  of  time  as  I  heard  dialogue  I
recalled from only a few moments earlier, reminding me of the bed,
pyjamas and story.  The time I had thought lost from the story was
reclaimed,  shifting  backwards  and  confusing  my  temporal
experience, something seldom possible in a modern culture where a
multiplicity  of  instantaneous  and  compressed  experiences
dominates.63 At this stage, there remained a sense of the duration to
be explored as it opened up before me. The words ‘from midnight
until dawn’ flew in my thoughts as I pondered whether it was closer
to the former or the latter.  
63
 This refers to the notion of social  acceleration whereby there are many
opportunities presented to us at any moment and the only way to take advantage
of them is to do them all, but very quickly and as soon they appear. Thus there is
little time to actually reflect on what has been done before the next opportunity
presents itself. 
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After: Challenging smooth consumption 
The quality of duration in  Hotel Medea had specialness64 – distinct
from  clock-time,  underlined  by  witnessing  the  performance
throughout the night and, in this way, the performance defied my
cultural norms and expectations.  Throughout the performance I felt
a  sense  of  time  being  reclaimed by  the  subversive  act  of  being
awake when normally, I should not be. Hotel Medea’s stark contrast
to  the  pace  of  modern  life  was  apparent;  not  only  through  its
nocturnal  performance,  but  also  in  that  it  allowed  its  participant-
spectators  to  defy  normal  performance  conventions.  Given  a
conventional understanding of the narrative structure of Euripides’
original  work,  Hotel  Medea stood  at  odds  to  expectation.   In  a
conventional production of Medea, the narrative may unfold over two
hours, driven forwards by the text itself.  In Hotel Medea, text gave
way to experience, the cerebral  to experiential;  the story became
part of a greater whole designed to immerse its audience in a series
of encounters.  It was this sensory rather than cerebral experience
that drew comparison with Bergson’s ideas on duration.  If we can
imagine  text  as  representative  of  time  and  experience  as
representative  of  duration,  we  have  our  starting  point.   When
presented with  linear,  narrative  text  in  performance we are  often
able to expressly quantify our understanding, through recounting the
story or the features of a character for  instance. A more sensory
experience, however, cannot be satisfactorily quantified in the same
way; qualitative experience will produce manifold meanings that may
only be understood in an embodied sense. As a consumer of theatre
and  performance,  I  have  become  conditioned  to  knowing  when
something feels too long. Conversely, there is a certain expectation
that when something is too long it is somehow boring; consciously or
not,  I  make  these  judgments  regarding  the  value  of  something
64
 Meyrowitz (in Rantanan, 2004) suggests that the ‘specialness’ of place and
time has been eroded by modern forms of communication (see Chapter Three, pp.
39-40). 
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based on its length.  The play that lasts beyond an expectation of
around  two  hours,  the  song  that  exceeds  four  minutes,  or  other
cultural events that show little promise of a speedy conclusion, all go
against the perceived norms of cultural conditioning. 
There are, of course, cultural differences found in audiences at the
Ramlila of Ramnagar in India65, or Tony Harrison’s Mysteries at the
National  Theatre  (1977),  where  spectators  sought  an  extended
durational experience.66  In the context of the comfortably consumed
products in  a Western socially  accelerated culture,  value is  more
often based on speed, efficiency and thus shorter lengths of time.67
There is a value associated with the duration of a product, in the
same respect that we associate time with money in our late-capitalist
culture. In a world of instant communication, high-speed travel, and
time-space compression leading to a shortening of and omnipresent
awareness  of  time,  my experience  of  Hotel  Medea stood  in
opposition to the need for immediate temporal gratification (Harvey,
2000;  Gleick,  1999;  Rantanen,  2004;  Rosa,  2005/2013;  Rosa  &
Scheuerman,  2008/2009).   
During: Drylands 
As I became more immersed in the experience of  Hotel Medea,  I
was aware of the immediate past being forgotten. In this space, I
seemed far removed from the purposefulness and relentlessness of
65
 See Schechner (1985, pp. 117-211). 
66
The  original  staging  of  Harrison’s  trilogy  of  plays  (Nativity,  Passion,
Doomsday)  had  other  features  in  common  with  Hotel  Medea,  such  as  the
promenade staging, transcribing of well-known narrative to a new context,  and
occasional audience participation. 
67
 Since 2010 there has been an unprecedented growth in online streaming
of television series, available for consumption at the rate of the viewer rather than
a  TV  channel  schedule.  The  widespread  practice  of  ‘binge  watching’  might
suggest  that  audiences  are  being  conditioned  to  watch  shorter  shows.  The
significant difference, whoever, is that many of the on demand series are sliced
into  comfortably  consumed  slots  of  forty-five  minutes;  it  is  also  important  to
remember that the viewer is in control by virtue of the available ‘stop’ and ‘pause’
options.
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the busy Edinburgh streets during the festival. In minutes and hours,
it  was not  long since walking  the  streets  in  my journey to  Hotel
Medea, but I also experienced a sense of duration as my memory of
this experience was eroded. 
Jason  entered  with  his  entourage,  followed  by  TV  cameras,  for
which he offered political sound bites while Medea looked forlornly
on. A few moments passed by as we watched Medea and Jason
sleep, before being woken by a phone call. In this moment we saw
Medea uncover her husband’s betrayal by watching a mobile phone
recording (broadcast on the back wall); the images played on a loop
as Medea slumped dejectedly against the wall. As an angry scene
played  out  between  Medea  and  Jason  reached  its  climax,  the
background music achieved a notable intensity along with my sense
of fatigue as I considered a new quality of my duration. The images
become increasingly pixelated as the music increased in tempo and
volume.  There were layers of  music,  video and live  performance
competing with each other in a way that accentuated yet diminished
each component, a blurring of recognizable elements to produce an
unfamiliar effect. Medea began to stand as if in defiance of Jason’s
betrayal, finding her strength. The video image projected on the wall
was of Medea, replacing the pixelated and grainy blur of before. The
virtual video image had subordinated the live figure on stage, the
camera  moved  to  a  close-up  shot  of  a  laptop.  Medea  typed
frantically:
forgive me Jason how stupid of me I forgot that loves comes and
goes.  where  do  i  go  now?  disappear  into  my  own
wasteland??????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??
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The  scene  reached  a  crescendo,  as  a  distraught  Medea  lay
sprawled across her marital bed as we began to be led out of the
room, unable to assist the distressed protagonist. The final image of
this  section  was  the  rapidly  reproducing  question  marks  that
continued to  spread out  in space across the screen.  Despite  the
intensity of this sequence, my eyelids were heavy as I began my
journey into the final part of the performance.  
During: Feast of Dawn 
In the final act of  Hotel Medea, titled  Feast of Dawn, the men and
women  were  separated.  I  was  taken  with  the  other  men  into  a
separate room where we were given instructions of how to infiltrate
‘Club  Exile’,  a  place  exclusively  for  heartbroken  women.  This
moment, playful in nature, asked us to remember ‘codes’ such as
elementary improvised sign language we could use to communicate
covertly, thus indoctrinating us into our own secret club. Given well-
worn wigs, rudimentary and poorly applied make up, we were told to
assume a female alias – all part of our ‘cover’.  This slow process of
preparing and transforming the spectators into participant-spectators
built  a  sense  of  expectation  and  anticipation.  Inside  ‘Club  Exile’,
Medea  was  laid  out  across  a  large  storage  chest,  wearing  her
wedding dress.  Despite being able to check the time I chose not to,
and I was uncertain of the exact number of hours that had gone by
as my quality of duration was further transformed. 
In ‘Club Exile’, women and (wo)men sat cabaret style on benches
and  on  the  edge  of  the  bunk  beds  of  the  previous  scene  with
Medea’s  nurse  maids.  The  Nurse  signalled  the  start  of  Medea’s
performance – ‘Sounds of the Body’, a melancholic yet tongue-in-
cheek piece of performance art. As she held a microphone closely to
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various parts of her body, we heard the internal sounds of a woman
in turmoil.  Despite  the  clarity  of  intentions here,  I  could not  help
considering that we were hearing the internal rhythms and duration
of Medea herself. As I considered this, my own sense of duration
was heightened, as I evaluated my sense of the passage of time.
The women in the audience were invited to discover the sounds of
their own hearts and it seemed that the prevailing mood in the club
was of  melancholia  and contemplation.  This  mournful  and forlorn
atmosphere supported the tangible  sense of  a changed duration,
one  charged  with  a  feeling  of  slowness  or,  at  least,  an  easy
undemanding pace. The cabaret continued with ‘The Dance of the
Poison  Dress’,  performed  by  Medea.  Throughout  the  dance,  the
Nurse Maid’s verbal commentary maintained a sense of slowness
and insistence that we should not be distracted as we might in the
‘other’  socially  accelerated  world.  Suddenly,  the  mood  became
macabre as Medea’s dead brother was resurrected, propelling his
agile body around the room as if possessed by a refractory spirit,
causing him to behave without intention or control.
After: (A)Liveness 
Despite the slowness of  Hotel Medea, the use of technology gave
this  part  of  the  performance  (and  the  earlier  section  showing
Medea’s  betrayal  at  the  end  of  Drylands,  described  above),  a
paradoxical  quality.   In  Feast  of  Dawn there  was  a  prolonged
sequence where Medea was ritualistically stripped, re-dressed and
‘made up’ as a raped and tortured victim of Jason’s anger.  The slow
pace at which this was performed stood in direct opposition to the
use of video to deliver the narrative. From only a few feet away, we
saw Medea; directly in front of her was a video camera feeding live
pictures, projected onto the back wall.   Whilst the video narrative
was delivered at the same pace as the live performance it seemed
strangely  different,  the  video  apparently  faster  and  further
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emphasizing  the  slowness  of  the  live  elements.   As  participant-
spectators, we were presented with the liveness of the event as it
happened before  us,  whilst  also  being  confronted with  the  same
event in its mediated form. 
The fact that we could engage with the live event in a very intimate
way  was  challenged  by  its  simultaneous  mediated  presence.
Because the instantaneity of the mediatized mode of presentation
was,  at  this  moment,  conveying  the  slow  onstage  action,  it  was
between ‘classic’ liveness and broadcast liveness. 
For Philip Auslander, ‘classic’ liveness relies on the “[p]hysical co-
presence  of  performers  and  audience;  temporal  simultaneity  of
production and reception; experience in the moment” (2008, p. 61).
Whilst  this  was true  of  this  particular  scene in  Hotel  Medea,  the
event  itself  became  removed  from  the  immediate  temporal
simultaneity of classic liveness through its use of broadcast liveness.
For  Aronson  (2013),  in  much  mediated  performance,  “while  the
duration  of  a  recorded  projection  will  be  coincident  with  the
performance  time,  the  content  of  the  image  is  not”  (p.  93);  he
concedes that the “most fascinating use of media and the one being
used with ever-increasing frequency is the live video image” (p. 93).
Aronson’s fascination suggests a connection with the methods by
which we most commonly receive information, in such ways that it
can be replayed without variation. The instantly accessible recorded
video  image  gives  validity  to  the  live  performance  image,  its
authority  being  increased  through  presenting  the  live  as  a
mediatized presence.  In  Hotel Medea it  was clear that the video
images  were  not recorded  but  a  representation  of  the  onstage
action. This experience of seeing mediatized representations of the
live  allowed  me  to  “observe  a  space  or  action  from  different
perspectives simultaneously …[thus]… bend[ing] time and space …
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plac[ing] us in the time of Einsteinian relativity” (Aronson, 2013, p.
94).  The act of viewing live action and mediatized images in this
instance thus had the effect of the “rupture of duration” (Aronson,
2013, p. 94), prompting me, as a spectator to interrogate the reality
of  the  two simultaneous images.  The experience of  being  in  the
moment, the physical co-presence of spectators and performers (the
role  combined  to  become  participant-spectators),  and  temporal
simultaneity of production and reception gave this particular instance
a liminal quality, thus rupturing my duration. The immediate past and
the present intermingled, aided by this dual perspective of live and
mediated.  It  was  the  combined  use  of  fast  technology  and  slow
performance that delivered a subjectivity of duration that was unable
to  be  quantitatively  measured,  also  highlighting  the  dichotomy
between a socially accelerated culture and a method of resisting it. 
The live/mediated contrast in Hotel Medea was unlike the mediated
strategies in other contemporary performance, where this is often
done to create scale, thus making the mediatized the main focus of
the  production.  In  works  such  as  in  Robert  Le  Page’s  Lipsynch
(2008),  and New York  based The Builder’s  Association  who use
large video screens, the dominance of mediatized over liveness is
unquestionable. For example, in the latter’s  Supervision (2005) the
actors performed at stage level whilst the audience saw their live
performances primarily via a screen almost filling the entire stage;
the  performers  were  still  visible  but  were  subordinated  to  the
mediatized images.  Hotel Medea most often used combinations of
live/mediated in ways that placed the live and the mediated in an
unharmonious configuration. 
Like many immersive theatre performances, Hotel Medea “revels in
the liveness and consequent live(d)ness of the performance moment
… it is clear that the sensual worlds created exploit the power of live
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performance”  (Machon,  2013,  p.  43).  Despite  the  mediatized
elements in  Hotel Medea making duration seem fissured, as I was
torn between the live and the almost live, I was always drawn back
to the live figures on stage, thus supporting Peggy Phelan’s belief in
the transience of performance, whose “only life is in the present”.
Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise
participate in the circulation of representations  of representations:
once  it  does  so,  it  becomes  something  other  than  performance”
(Phelan  &  Lane,  1998,  p.  146).  Bergsonian  duration  is  only
actualized  when  pure  memory  invades  the  present;  as
‘performances’,  our  memories  are  representations  of
representations,  enriched  by  distance  from  the  original  event.
Although the almost live moments in this part of Hotel Medea were
not  recorded,  the  mediated  images  were  still  representative  of
something that was “non-reproducible; its power and value [lying] in
that  which  is  transient,  intuitive,  experiential”  (Klich  and  Scheer,
2012,  p.  69).  In  our  age  of  superfast  communication  and
consumption of information (most often in the form of images), the
“increasing  insistence of  retention and repetition  within  the visual
field in performance cultures everywhere seems to militate against”
the value of liveness (Klich and Scheer, 2012, p. 69). For me, it was
the ephemerality and transience of the live that was privileged over
the  almost live,  thus  heightening  my  experience  of  Bergsonian
duration. 
After: The concrete and the absolute 
Aronson  (2013)  argues  that  an  audiences’  perception  of  time  is
increasingly  affected  by  “expanding  use  of  projections  and  the
introduction  of  increasingly  sophisticated  video”  (p.  92).  This
moment  in  Feast  of  Dawn was  not  qualitative,  fusional  and
continuous as in duration; nor numerical, homogenous and discrete,
as in clock-time. In this moment, the Hotel Medea company found a
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liquid space between duration and clock-time, capturing Bergson’s
notion of the concrete and the absolute. 
In explaining this distinction between the concrete and the absolute,
Bergson uses the examples of photographs of a town. He asserts
that photographs will only ever capture a particular angle and thus
singular  viewpoints,  presupposed  on  the  specific  interests  of  an
individual.  No  matter  how  many  photographs  are  taken,  the
experience  of  looking  at  them  will  never  be  the  same  as
experiencing  the  town  in  person  (Bergson,  1903/1999).  Thus  a
multitude of photographs would be needed to attempt to simulate
the experience of liveness and, even then, would be inadequate:
During 
In a moment following Medea’s humiliating apology to camera, there
is a brief sequence of apparent tenderness between her and Jason.
As Medea lifts her left arm towards Jason’s face in a smooth and
natural  motion,  the live video image suggests a more stilted and
distorted  movement.  This  distortion  jolted  me  back  to  an  earlier
memory of  the performance,  augmented by a pure memory from
long ago:
As the wedding party  began to  dissipate,  Medea,  Jason and the
fleece were prevented from leaving as the assembled participant-
spectators once again moved into a circle of dancing and chanting.
The repetition of the chanting and the dancing immersed me further
into the piece as it segued smoothly into the intense rhythmic beats
of a club filled with ecstatic dancers, reminiscent of my Edinburgh
past – the quality of my time now being infiltrated by a memory of
my past, as I recalled hedonistic nights in Liverpool pubs and clubs. 
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After
In another example, Bergson (1903/1999) writes:
When you raise your arm, you accomplish a movement of
which you have, from within, a simple perception; but for
me,  watching  it  from  the  outside,  your  arm  passes
through  one point,  then through  another,  and between
these two there will be still other points; so that, if I begin
to count, the operation would go on forever (p. 23). 
Thus, for Bergson, an absolute viewed from an inside perspective
appears simple but from the outside it is infinitely complex. In Hotel
Medea this was exemplified in a moment that allowed simultaneous
viewing of the live and mediated: 
The  live  action  of  Medea’s  arm  lifting  to  touch  Jason’s  face
appeared to me as simple and straightforward, understood as if the
action was my own. The delay I perceived in the mediated image
illustrated the infinite complexity that Bergson suggests occurs when
viewing an action from an external perspective. 
The dual perspectives of live and mediated at various moments in
Hotel Medea added to the complexity of the analysis that Bergson
would say was necessary to understand concepts. It  is,  however,
important  to  note  Bergson’s  (1903/1999)  assertion  that,  “from
intuition one can pass to analysis, but not from analysis to intuition”
(p. 42). It is therefore significant that my surrender to duration was
necessary  in  beginning  to  move  from  an  understanding  of  the
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concrete  to  the  absolute  in  Hotel  Medea.  In  Bergson’s  view  of
philosophy, “[t]here is one reality, at least, which we all seize from
within,  by  intuition  and  not  by  simple  analysis.   It  is  our  own
personality  in  its  flowing  through  time  –  our  self  which  endures”
(1903/1999,  p.  24).  Bergson’s  philosophy  shifts  between  intuition
and analysis and in order to make sense of absolutes, they must
always be rooted in intuition.    
Bergson’s notion of duration was, as Muldoon (2008) suggests, “a
way back to the purity of things” [and a need for the] “recognition of
the intuition of duration” (p. 74).  Muldoon recognizes that Bergson
regards  intuition  in  contrast  to  intelligence  and  that  it  is  to  the
question  of  intuition  that  Bergson  constantly  returns.  As  a
philosophical  method,  Bergson  regarded  intuition  as  being
somewhere between instinct and intelligence; the former being the
realm of animals and the latter of humans. Without intuition, one is
restricted to a mechanistic view of life, and it is through intelligence
that we access intuition (Bergson, 1907/2008; Fell, 2012).68 In Hotel
Medea,  I  recognized  this  intuition  and  experienced  duration,
countering a way of experiencing the world filtered and tamed by the
socio-economic  constructs  of  apparently  daytime  and  nighttime
activities.69 The regularity and precision of a world that insists  on
every second being accounted for has removed our innate sense of
time, demanding that there is a time and time for everything.  Hotel
Medea offered  a  rare  pause  from the  exactitude  and  rapidity  of
contemporary Western living. 
After: Pure perception 
68
 For a fuller discussion and explanation of intuition / intelligence see my
analysis of Einstein in the Beach in Chapter Eight (pp. 176-180).  
69
 I  should  again  emphasize my autoethnographic  approach in  examining
each of these performances. I accept that  Hotel Medea may have presented a
different experience for those who work shifts and are used to staying up all night,
or for people who travel frequently across different time zones.
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My perception of the lifting of Medea’s arm clearly illuminated the
manifestation of duration as the live present and mediated present
stood side by side, augmented by involuntary memory. For Bergson
(1896/1910),  “[p]ure  perception  and  pure  memory  constantly
intermingle” (p.  71), meaning that it  is impossible to separate the
influence of  one from the  other.  Guerlac  (2006)  suggests  that  In
Matter  and  Memory,  Bergson  departs  from  the  usual  opposition
between matter and mind, asserting, “the difference between past
and  present  will  be  more  important  than  the  difference  between
inside  and  outside”  (Guerlac,  2006,  p.  106).  The  important
distinction  made  by  Bergson  is  that  perception  is  different  from
memory, much in the same way that duration is different from time.
This leads him to discuss his idea of pure perception, an  objective
way of  seeing rather  than through the subjectivity  of  memory.  In
Bergson’s (1896/1910) pure perception there is a certain “depth of
duration,  so  that  our  successive  perceptions  are  never  the  real
moments of things, as we have hitherto supposed, but are moments
of our consciousness” (p. 75). In other words, the present moment is
mixed  with  moments  from  the  past  –  “an  endless  number  of
moments of an endless divisible time” (Bergson, 1896/1910, p. 76).
In  Hotel Medea,  the slow and playful  way in which the story was
delivered, coupled with a personal sense of tiredness, meant that
what I witnessed became confused almost instantly with what had
been before; an ‘intermingling’ of pure perception and pure memory.
In a mystical moment, confusion gave way to clarity of duration; I
was no  longer  attempting  to  make  sense  of  time in  an  ordered,
linear way.  The juxtaposition of slowness and instantaneity, intense
activity and quiet reflection in the events of Hotel Medea meant that
time became less distinct than duration. 
The  projected  background  images  of  live  action  in  Hotel  Medea
heightened this tension between intuition and analysis and reminded
me that  “[t]he inner  life  is  … [a]  variety  of  qualities,  continuity  of
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progress,  and  unity  of  direction.   It  cannot  be  represented  by
images” (Bergson, 1903/1999, p. 27). Thus, the individual sense of
duration, of a unidirectional flowing forth was the only way of making
sense of my experience throughout this performance. 
After: Effortlessness
Whilst  intuition  was  an  essential  part  of  experience  and  thus
philosophical enquiry for Bergson, the effort required for this intuition
is equally important. Maslow’s characteristic of effortlessness in self-
actualizers  seems,  at  first  glance,  to  be  at  odds  with  Bergson’s
concentrated effort. Effortlessness as “ease; lack of strain, striving or
difficulty; grace; perfect, beautiful functioning” (Maslow, 2010, p. 78)
cannot be achieved without an equal sense of effort, of working at
effortlessness. Maslow (2010) suggests the list of fourteen Being-
cognition (B-values) are not mutually exclusive but they “overlap or
fuse with each other. Ultimately they are all  facets of Being rather
than  parts of  it”  (p.  78).  Thus,  to  recognize  and  achieve  this
effortlessness  requires  effort;  like  Bergson’s  effort  of  intuition,
diligence is needed to reach this state of mind. 
Several  moments  in  Hotel  Medea facilitated  a  feeling  of
effortlessness  as  I  began  to  lose  a  sense  of  time  in  favour  of
duration,  but  it  was  because of  the  duration  spent  in  the
performance that this was so and, thus, something that had to be
worked at:  
Before: Zero Hour Market
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Of the three parts of this trilogy, the first section, Zero Hour Market,
fulfilled this necessity for diligence before achieving effortlessness.
After being welcomed into the ‘market’, moving sporadically between
the circular stalls that twirled and vibrated with life, the seriousness
of our roles became apparent as we were given instructions and
learnt a few simple dance movements. Travelling around the room,
we became shoppers at the market, wedding guests at Jason and
Medea’s ceremony, and witnesses to the fighting and quarrels that
revealed  Jason  as  the  victor  before  he  ‘claimed’  his  bride.  This
section  may  have  been  physically  challenging  for  many  of  the
participant-spectators, whose circadian rhythms asked for sleep in
vain.  For  me,  I  felt  a  clear  sense  of  the  long  duration  of  the
performance  stretching  out  ahead  of  me.   There  were  mental
challenges to overcome too, as ‘wedding guests’ we were invited to
deliver impromptu poems to Medea and Jason. In retrospect,  the
opening  of  Hotel  Medea,  with  its  journey  from  market  stall  to
wedding celebration to  clubbing experience was enculturating the
participant-spectators into the experience and offering a sense of
wholeness,  a  connection  with  others  through  establishing  order,
unity and integration. The fundamental Maslovian concept of a unity
of  the  self  was  embodied  in  the  challenge  being  offered  to  the
guests at  Hotel Medea,  as we were asked to participate fully and
attentively in the process. As we became part of the world of Hotel
Medea, our perception was both narrowed and expanded. My world
was the environment of Summerhall and thus an artificial world; my
perception of duration was enlarged, as I stayed up throughout the
night. In positing his conception of perception, Bergson argues it is
limited in only noticing what is of personal interest70 (Bergson, 1910).
In  performance  environments,  we  are  offered  a  limited  and
controlled  number  of  elements  to  perceive.  Thus,  the  company
manipulated my perception of duration in a similar way to an artist
who draws our eyes to a particular point in a painting.
70
 See  Chapter  Four  (pp.  48-52)  for  a  full  explanation  of  Bergsonian
perception. 
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During: Feast of Dawn 
Following the disturbingly animated resurrection and ritualistic abuse
of Medea, we were partnered up and invited to participate in a slow,
contemplative  dance.  During  this  awkward  and  somewhat  forced
dance, I mused introspectively about what I had just witnessed. In
the background to our dance, the video screens were still  visible,
playing  out  the  remaining  fragmentary  moments  of  Medea’s
humiliation.  In  the  earlier  scene,  where  she  was  stripped  and
disposed of in a series of ritualistic and premeditated actions, my
sense of duration was stretched as I longed for the torture to cease.
The  extremity  of  the  violence  of  Medea’s  corporeal  and  mental
violation exacerbated the intensity  of  the  desire  for  it  to  end.  As
members  of  the  company,  dressed  as  press  photographers
descended like vultures on Medea’s body to metaphorically feed on
her carcass, I was reminded of the instantaneity of our culture and
that  our  exposure  to  images  such  as  these  has  made  us
desensitized  to  the  quality  and  content  of  experience,  although
highly sensitized to time and a need to do more, faster. As Jason
entered and saw the resurrected figure of Medea’s brother with the
fleece,  we  were  hurriedly  led  away  in  small  groups,  once  again
becoming children in the care of nursemaids. As we were chased
around  the  corridors  of  Summerhall,  I  felt  a  clear  sense  of
playfulness emerging. In a bizarre game of hide and seek the naked
figure of Medea’s brother, resurrected from the dead, pursued us
intently but without a sense of ever really wanting to catch us. This
made the sequence seem comical in some respects, the theatrical
façade  of  the  ‘chase’  being  reminiscent  of  childhood  playground
games. 
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In  Hotel  Medea,  the  reciprocal  externality  of  the clock-measured,
socially accelerated external world was abandoned as playfulness
began to dominate; explored to its fullest extent in the latter stages
of  the  performance.   Individual  durations  became  metaphorically
compartmentalized, as we were led away in small groups by one of
Medea’s  nursemaids.  A  sense  of  playfulness  reemerged  as  an
elaborate game of hide and seek began, subverting my perception
of usual activities at this time of the morning. After being taken into a
small room with several other participant-spectators, we dressed in
pyjamas once again, reiterating our role as Medea’s children. We
named a teddy bear (the first suggestion of ‘James’ was agreed by
all) and we were reassured of our safety, before exchanging mobile
phone  numbers  with  our  nursemaid.  After  being  led  to  another
location we were told to await instructions by mobile phone; when
instructed  we  began  to  run  as  the  demonic  and  crazed  naked
brother  of  Medea  rampaged  around  the  rooms  and  corridors  of
Summerhall as if possessed by an intractable and troubled soul. 
Although this part of the performance was clearly intended to evoke
a sense of the terror of this man arisen from the dead, the reality
was that this was just a game. Perhaps I was thinking as one of
Medea’s children, unaware of the monstrous events of the story.  At
this  point,  various  temporalities  co-existed  –  what  Bergson
(1896/1910)  might  have  recognized  as  “duration  lived  by  our
consciousness … a duration with  its  own determined rhythm”  (p.
272).  This  rhythm,  notes Bergson,  is  opposite  to  the time of  the
physicist;  our  rhythm  “can  store  up  …  as  great  a  number  of
phenomena as we please” (p. 272). This moment exemplified the
simultaneous existence of a group rhythm, my own rhythm, and the
rhythm of the external world. The differences in running pace, our
differing  degrees of  tiredness,  and the  degree to  which we were
immersed  in  the  performance  also  added  to  the  simultaneity  of
opposing  rhythms.  Thus  my  internal,  natural  rhythm  offered  an
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individual and innate sense of consciousness that I recognized as
being  repeatedly  suppressed  by  the  clock-driven  socio-economic
structures  of  contemporary  living.  For  me,  Hotel  Medea was  an
antidote to this,  a way of stepping back and seeing the usual  as
unusual. In other words, it placed time in a subordinate position to
the heterogeneity of duration. 
With each group of ‘children’, a different performance took place,
dictated  to  some  extent  by  the  individuals  involved.   These  co-
existing  pockets  of  temporality  were,  however,  compelled  by  the
structure  of  the piece to  last  no  longer  than each other.   In  this
instance the determinations of our rhythms were, seemingly, weaker
than the march of clock-time.  Because of my awareness of this, my
sense  of  individual  duration  was  heightened.   Was  I  becoming
somewhat  resistant  to  enculturation,  someway  towards  a  peak-
experience?   To  use  Maslow’s  words,  “…  something  extremely
important  and  valuable  had  happened  [making  me]  “transformed
and  strengthened”  (1954,  p.  164).  Whilst  I  was  uncertain  of  the
precise timings of the other groups’ actions, the fact that these were
all  discrete  performances  working  to  the  idiosyncrasies  of  each
participant  meant  that  their  experiences of  time  must  have  been
different.  This process of resisting the enculturation of clock time
was significant; we were in a performance of a determinate length of
time, which contained a series of smaller unique performances of
indeterminate  durations.  These  ‘pockets’  of  performance  were,
however,  governed  by  the  length  of  the  whole  production.71 This
moment highlighted to me that Bergsonian duration exists within the
structures  of  clock-time  and  is  only  something  that  can  occur
because it  stands in  opposition  to  the  measurement  of  seconds,
minutes and hours. Despite Bergson’s assertion that duration cannot
be juxtaposed with anything, it is only possible to recognize duration
71
 I deliberately use the term ‘length’ instead of duration as the latter implies
something distinct from time (i.e. Bergsonian duration). 
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because we are aware of clock-time: duration exists within it,  we
were ‘playing’ at duration within the structures of clock-time.  
After: Playfulness   
The B-Values of playfulness and effortlessness were roused in this
section of the performance as, once again playing the role of one of
Medea’s  children,  I  acquiesced  to  the  requirements  of  my  role.
Maslow’s (1970) view that playfulness is like feeling “cosmic or …
godlike” (p. 106) was not part  of my feelings at this moment, but
there was a mood of camaraderie and solidarity amongst our small
group that resonated with Maslow’s thoughts on playfulness: “It has
a certain quality of triumph in it, sometimes perhaps also of relief. It
is simultaneously mature and childlike” (2010, p. 106).
This dichotomy of simultaneous maturity and childishness shares a
similarity with the dichotomy of the order of clock-time and the free
flowing and thus perceived disorder of duration. In the same way
that Maslow suggests playfulness is able to transcend polarities in
its simultaneities, duration is able to transcend time without being
outside time: they can exist side by side.  The playful nature of this
part of the performance suggested a “transcend[ence] [of] time and
space” (Maslow, 2010, p. 106), lifting me from the effort and energy
expended  during  the  long  night  I  had  endured.  Like  Bergsonian
duration  made  with  unique  moments  and  the  fullness  of  pure
memory  returning  to  the  present,  the  sense  of  playfulness
contributed  to  a  moment  when  my  consciousness  was  altered,
characteristic of a peak-experience. 
After: Wholeness and belongingness 
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It was apparent to me that many of the moments in  Hotel Medea
appeared to support and encourage a sense of belonging amongst
the participant-spectators. It is only natural that in a small group of
spectators in a participatory or immersive performance, elementary
relationships  are  formed,  thus  supporting  an  atmosphere  of
wholeness  and  belongingness.72 Maslow’s  inclusion  of
belongingness  in  his  hierarchy  of  needs  is  significant  because  it
recognizes that our understanding of experience is affected by the
presence of others and our place within a group. Whilst each of the
participant-spectators in Hotel Medea would, I am certain, have had
a  unique  perspective  and  understanding  of  the  performance,  the
sense of being  part  of something meaningful  was significant.  For
me, the significance was about the effect of this unity on my sense
of  duration.  Whilst  the  feeling  of  wholeness  and  integration  with
others suggested orderliness and uniformity, it also, paradoxically,
heightened my awareness of  the apparently  disordered nature of
duration,  temporarily  deleting  the  ‘irrelevance’  of  clock-time.  My
small pocket of temporality was indeed driven by the march of time,
but  within  this  pocket  existed  an  opportunity  to  reflect  on  my
perception of time passing. It was, as Bergson (1896/1910) states,
an  example  of  how  my  perception  was  limited  to  “that  which
interests [me]” (p.  34).
During: Feast of Dawn 
The  final  moments  of  Hotel  Medea,  again  delivered  slowly  and
deliberately,  fully  immersed  its  audience  members  in  the
participatory act of laying flowers and children’s toys over the bodies
of the children. As we entered the space where the celebrations of
Zero Hour Market had taken place, I saw two participant-spectators,
laid out funereally on oblong plinths – their supine bodies committed
72
 As in the Maslovian sense of ‘belongingness’. 
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to  this  act  of  performance.  Other  participant-spectators  began  to
cover them in toys and flowers, something we were also encouraged
to participate in. There was a sense of nearing an end although one
that was not measured by time.  This was an opportunity to reflect
on the night’s events and look forward to fulfillment of our task as
spectators and participants. The recent memories of the night just
gone and the present moment were engulfed by involuntary pure
memories that had returned to the present:
In attempting to recall the story, a moment from 1992 is unlocked
from memory and pours into my consciousness. I  remembered a
dress  rehearsal  for  a  student  production  of  Medea,  where  an
accident led to a broken tooth.
After
The moment of laying toys and flowers resonated with what Bergson
(1896/1910) might have meant when he said that “[p]ractically we
perceive only the past, the pure present being the invisible progress
of the past gnawing into the future”  (p. 194), as I reflected on the
night just passed.  Bergson’s idea of duration is of a continuous flow,
the  “unrelenting  process  of  the  accumulation  of  experience  that
shapes our lives … this Bergsonian ‘swelling’ occurs whether we will
or  not”  (Aronson,  2013,  p.  87).  In  rejecting deterministic  thought,
Bergson recognized that the only certainty in our conception of time
is what has already passed. 
During: Feast at Dawn 
Jason  entered  and  looked  solemnly  at  his  dead  children,  before
breaking down in despair,  the anticipated conclusion to all  Greek
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tragedies. I sensed this moment possessing a meditative quality, a
purity  of  duration that  transcended analytical  thought  in  favour of
intuition. Having reached the tragic conclusion of Hotel Medea, we
were invited to share breakfast with the company – a feast at dawn,
somewhat alluding to the cycle of time that engulfs us on a regular
basis. Assembled at the head of a long table was Medea, blood-
splattered yet intact. There was what seemed like a long moment
before  the  fast  was  broken,  as  Medea  looked  lovingly  and
benevolently at her children. In this silence there was a final moment
of contemplation before we were re-enculturated into our everyday
selves.  As the curtains opened and daylight filled the room, blinking,
I saw evidence of the true passage of time. In one final moment of
deliberate ritual action, Medea invited us to begin eating.  As I sat
eating  the  simple  meal  of  bread  and  fruit  I  contemplated  my
experience and felt a sense of emerging from  and into something
different from usual experience. Maslow (1970) noted two kinds of
reactions to peak-experiences in his subjects: “excitement and high
tension … feel[ing] wild, like jumping up and down [and] relaxation,
peacefulness,  quietness,  the  feeling  of  stillness”  (p.  108).  My
participation in Hotel Medea delivered both of these experiences to
me; of quiet contemplation and hedonistic nights.  The journey to
and through  Hotel Medea had seemed protracted at times and, at
this moment I felt the weight of the night bearing upon my body and
mind.  A  long  journey  home  lay  ahead  of  me  although,  for  that
moment all I thought about was the present being carried into the
future by the past. 
Before, during and after
As  a  theatrical  experience,  Hotel  Medea has  been  described  as
being like “sharing a secret … and a victory” (Field, 2009, para. 6).
The secret, for me, was the unlocking of a different experience of
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time,  the  victory,  of  understanding  Bergson’s  notion  of  duration.
Standing at opposite ends of a hundred years, both Bergson and
Hotel  Medea provided  a  space  for  duration  to  be  explored,
discovered and to offer transformation.  In an instant culture, where
slowness and protraction are often regarded as synonymous with a
lack of progress, and the immediacy of experience equals success,
Hotel Medea successfully juxtaposed slowness with speed to allow
me to consider an alternative to clock-time. 
The transformative nature of this experience was clear to me when I
consider my apparent insight into what Bergson may have meant
when he talked of duration. As I remarked at the beginning of this
chapter,  this  was  an  exploration  of  how  Bergson’s  concept  of
duration  was  understood  through  Hotel  Medea,  and  how  Hotel
Medea was  understood  through  Bergson.  When  I  consider  an
understanding  of  Bergsonian  duration  as  the  mingling  of  pure
memory and unique moments, I am drawn to Maslow’s comments in
his posthumously published The Farther Reaches of Human Nature
(1971). In his notes on innocent cognition, he remarks that:
in  innocence,  i.e.,  to  the  innocent,  everything  moves
toward  becoming  equally  probable  …  if  one  expects
nothing, if one has no anticipations or apprehensions, if in
a  certain  sense there is  no  future  … there  can be no
surprise,  no  disappointment.  One  thing  is  as  likely  as
another to happen. (p. 254)
Maslow, talking here specifically  about  the innocence of  children,
suggests that they are more likely to live in the “here-now [because
there] “is little tendency … to bring the past into the present or into
the future”  (p.  254).   This  childlike sense of  freedom where only
involuntary past  memory  might  invade  the  present,  may  be
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accompanied by innocence or naiveté and is perhaps a move closer
to understanding Bergsonian duration. 
Chapter Seven - Contextualizing Theories 2: Csikszentmihalyi and 
Bergson 
Csikszentmihalyi and optimal experience
Hungarian  psychologist  Mihaly  Csikszentmihalyi’s  exploration  of
genuinely  fulfilling  experiences  of  consciousness  draws  on  data
gathered from a number of people who have described their optimal
experiences or instances of ‘flow’. In a similar fashion to Maslow,
Csikszentmihalyi  has developed a  set  of  principles  around which
optimal experience occurs and uses examples from individuals who
have applied them “to transform boring and meaningless lives into
ones full  of  enjoyment”  (2008,  p.xi).  Like  Maslow’s  work  on self-
actualization and peak-experience, the theory of optimal experience
defies clear categorization, sitting somewhere between psychology
and self-help. Equally similar to Maslow’s work is the way in which
the notion of  flow has become popularized through its  endearing
simplicity. 
Flow,  or  the  ‘phenomenology  of  enjoyment’  has  eight  major
components:
• Tasks that we can complete
• We must be able to concentrate on what we are doing
• The task or activity provides clear goals and
• Immediate feedback
• One must be able to act with deep but effortless involvement
• A sense of control must be allowed
• Concern for the self disappears
• The  sense  of  duration  is  altered  in  that  ‘hours  pass  by  in
minutes,  and  minutes  can  stretch  out  to  seem  like  hours’
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2008, p. 49).
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Csikszentmihalyi offers a clear structure for achieving the state of
flow although,  as with  Maslow,  there  is  no guarantee or  obvious
method for success; instead, case studies are used to illustrate the
argument. As with other theorists in this thesis, it is not my intention
(nor would it be possible) to align all of Csikszentmihalyi’s work on
flow with Bergson’s notion of duration. Rather, I will be considering
how aspects of flow can offer a way of achieving an experience of
Bergsonian  duration,  thus  connecting  the  theories  in  some  way.
Csikszentmihalyi’s work on flow also has many similarities with his
other  research  into  the  aesthetic  experience  (Csikszentmihalyi  &
Robinson, 1990), in which the authors analyzed the experience of
individuals’ encounters with art works in galleries. I deal with this in
Chapter Eight in relation to my analysis of duration and flow in the
Philip Glass/Robert Wilson opera Einstein on the Beach (Barbican,
2012).
The conditions for flow
Rules
I will return to the eight components of flow listed above later in this
section,  when  I  examine  them  in  relation  Bergson’s  work  on
duration. Before doing so I explore other significant conditions for
flow to occur, the first of which is the presence of rules, however
rudimentary they may be. Csikszentmihalyi (2008) writes:
Sometimes the goals and rules governing an activity are
invented, or negotiated on the spot … The goal of such
sessions emerges by trial and error, and is rarely made
explicit;  often it  remains below the participants’  level  of
experience.  Yet  it  is  clear  that  these activities  develop
their own rules and that those who take part have a clear
idea of what constitutes a successful “move,” and of who
is doing well (p. 56). 
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The use of rules appears contrary to the value that Bergson placed
on intuition73  as a way of experiencing the world. Yet, these kind of
rudimentary rules suggested by Csikszentmihalyi are developed and
used  intuitively.  Goals  remaining  below the  participants’  “level  of
experience”  (p.  56)  implies  a  sense  of  being  displaced  from
everyday consciousness, in the same sense that Bergson’s intuition
places one further away from rational thought. It is this cleaving of
intelligence  from  instinct  that  drives  the  creative  force  of  life
(Bergson, 1907/2008; Fell, 2012).  The setting of rules and goals is,
as Csikszentmihalyi suggests, something that sometimes happens
spontaneously.  The conscious setting  of  goals  may become  less
conscious  and  more spontaneous  once  one  recognizes  and
appreciates  how  flow  occurs.  My  consciously  set  goals  are
intrinsically connected to feelings and thus decided upon intuitively.
In performances lasting beyond comfortable levels of consumption,
rules that allow us to ‘get through’ are derived from intuition. 
Entropy and Negentropy 
Optimal experiences provide a sense of enjoyment and freedom and
“one  is  able  to  forget  the  all  unpleasant  aspects  of  life”
(Csikszentmihalyi,  2008,  p.  58),  leaving  no  room  for  irrelevant
information. Similarly, Bergson regarded perception as awareness of
matter  important  only  to  our  own  consciousness.  For
Csikszentmihalyi,  “[t]he  concentration  of  the  flow  experience  –
together with clear goals and immediate feedback – provides order
to  consciousness,  inducing  the  enjoyable  experience  of  psychic
negentropy”  (p.  59).  Csikszentmihalyi  defines  negentropy  as  the
opposite state to “entropy [which] is a state of disorder in the self
system that results in decreased efficiency of that system” (2014, p.
157). In a state of negentropy the “self system is in harmony, and no
73
 A full discussion of Bergsonian intuition / intelligence can be found in 
Chapter Eight in relation to Einstein on the Beach (see pp. 219-21).  
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attention needs to  be allocated to  its  internal  functioning … [t]he
subjective experiences of psychic negentropy are what we call fun,
involvement, enjoyment, serenity; and they are characterized by lack
of  voluntary  self-consciousness”  (2014,  p.  157).   Thus,  as  with
Bergson’s  idea  of  intuition as  something  to  be  worked  at,  the
concentration  necessary  for  immersion  in  a  flow  experience  is
similarly intense. The state of negentropy, with its roots in biology,
draws further  parallels  with  Bergson’s  thought  about  the  creative
evolution of life. 
This experience of psychic negentropy is something one might not
expect when watching  Einstein on the Beach; the demands of the
piece having closer associations with a spectator’s loss of interest,
boredom,  or  zoning  out  –  factors  associated  with  mental  and
physical  entropy. However,  my experience was one more akin to
meditative encounters, a somewhat dreamlike state that despite its
challenges,  provided  me  with  a  rewarding  and  memorable
experience. In fact, when the piece ended I felt that I wanted more
as time seemed to have passed by with ease.  
Our  normal  state  of  consciousness,  suggests  Csikszentmihalyi
(2013) is entropy, which “is more primitive and more powerful than
the urge to create” (p. 109). He writes:
We don’t usually notice how little control  we have over
the mind, because habits channel psychic energy so well
that thoughts seem to follow each other by themselves
without a hitch … But when we are left  alone, with no
demands  on  attention,  the  basic  disorder  of  the  mind
reveals  itself.  With  nothing  to  do,  it  begins  to  follow
random patterns, usually stopping to consider something
painful or disturbing. Unless a person knows how to give
order  to  …  thoughts,  attention  will  be  attracted  to
whatever is most problematic at the moment: it will focus
on some real  or  imaginary pain,  on  recent  grudges or
long-term  frustrations.  Entropy  is  the  normal  state  of
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consciousness  –  a  condition  that  is  neither  useful  nor
enjoyable (p. 119).
The state of entropy described by Csikszentmihalyi is something that
meditative and mindfulness practices seek to address. Patrick Kelly
(2008)  suggests  Csikszentmihalyi  even “refers  to  [the  concept  of
flow] with the Buddhist term ‘one-pointedness of mind,’ or ‘merging
of action and awareness’” (p. 20). Csikszentmihalyi (2008) describes
a  climber  who  experiences  “a  Zen  feeling,  like  meditation  or
concentration … when things become automatic, it’s like an egoless
thing”  (p.  62).  Similarly,  mindfulness  “is  the  chief  factor  in  the
practice  of  satipatthana,  the  best  known  system  of  Buddhist
meditation.  In  descriptions  of  satipatthana  two  terms  constantly
recur:  mindfulness  (sati)  and  clear  comprehension  (sampajañña)”
(Bodhi, 2013, p. 19). The transformation associated with meditation
and  mindfulness  occurs  over  a  long  period  of  time,  through
practicing  and  thus  increased  awareness,  producing  a  kind  of
“gentle but radical transformation” (“Learn Meditation”, 2016). The
flow  experience  differs  in  that  it  can  happen  by  chance,  with
feedback occurring instantly.  The entropic state, which is part of our
normal everyday experience, can be transformed by flow activities
and,  unlike  meditation  does  not  always  necessitate  a  conscious
effort. Csikszentmihalyi (1997) observes that overcoming obstacles
and the amount of stress we experience “depends more on how well
we control attention than on what happens to us” (p. 70). Learning to
recognize  when a  flow experience occurs  is  something  that  may
increase its intensity or enjoyment, much like meditative practices
leading to a greater  mindfulness and ability  to  suspend everyday
existence. 
The paradox of control
A further feature of flow is the paradox of control; despite being in
control,  people  in  Csikszentmihalyi’s  study  commonly  reported
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becoming ‘lost’ in the activity. It is not so much about being in control
but “lacking the sense of worry about losing control that is typical in
many situations of normal life” (Csikszentmihalyi,  2008, p.  59).  In
fact, Csikszentmihalyi suggests that the feeling of control is in the
possibility rather than the actuality. He uses the examples of a chess
player  and a dancer  and points  out  that,  even though they have
reported a feeling of complete control in their flow experiences, they
are  not  protected from control  being  lost  (sustaining  an injury  or
making a poorly considered move).
Flow time
Most pertinent to this thesis is the effect of flow on the feeling of time
during optimal experience:
Often hours seem to pass by in minutes; in general, most
people report that time seems to pass much faster. But
occasionally the reverse occurs: Ballet dancers describe
how a difficult turn that takes less than a second in real
time stretches out for  what  seems like minutes … The
safest generalization to make about this phenomenon is
to say that during the flow experience the sense of time
bears little relation to the passage of time as measured
by the absolute convention of the clock (Csikszentmihalyi,
2008, p. 66).
It  is  this  “freedom  from  the  tyranny  of  time”  (2008,  p.  67)  that
resonates  with  Bergson’s  desire  to  experience  duration  as  pure,
away  from  the  clock-measured,  spatial  view  of  time  and  -  as  I
suggest  –  an  antidote  to  a  socially  accelerated  culture.
Paradoxically,  the  looseness  of  flow  experience,  like  the
ephemerality  of  Bergsonian  duration  requires  some  level  of
structure. As already suggested, the imposition of often-improvised
rules provides an edifice on which to achieve optimal experience, as
does the effort  of  intuition that was so important to Bergson. His
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failure to provide any clear instructions as to how duration might be
experienced  means  that  it  may  happen  under  a  set  of  ‘correct’
conditions. These conditions will  vary from person to person and,
like  flow (or  a  peak-experience),  the  desired  outcome cannot  be
guaranteed.  In  An  Actor  Prepares,  Stanislavski  (1936/1991)
describes an inner creative state in which an actor’s “inner motive
forces combine with the elements to carry out the purposes of the
actor” (p. 262). He suggests that an actor is able to work with a set
of elements on stage to create an effective performance, although
he  warns  that  this  inner  state  can  be  disrupted  by  the  smallest
variation.  A  focused  attempt  at  experiencing  flow  or  Bergsonian
duration might suffer a similar fate. 
Flow and structure
Unlike duration, flow can be achieved much more easily or, at least
be  more  easily  recognized  as  it  often  occurs  when  engaging  in
specific, structured activities that form part of everyday life. In each
of the performances explored (see Chapters Six, Eight, and Ten),
the conditions varied according to a number of factors; most notably
my physical and mental state and, as such, a sense of duration was
not  forced,  much  like  the  participants  who  reported  optimal
experiences.  In  each  case  of  flow,  individuals  were  engaged  in
activities that were intrinsically enjoyable rather than as a means to
an end optimal experience, their construction being a way to achieve
an  ordered  mind;  “[s]uch  flow  activities have  as  their  primary
function the provision of enjoyable experiences. Play, art, pageantry,
ritual,  and sports are some examples” (Csikszentmihalyi,  2008, p.
72). 
The absence of structured narrative, exposition and denouement in
Einstein on the Beach apparently counters Csikszentmihalyi’s claim
about ordered states of mind. Perhaps the remaining structures of
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theatre buildings, seating arrangements, and rituals associated with
live  performance  are  sufficient  means  in  helping  to  achieve  an
enjoyable,  ordered  state  of  mind.  Of  course,  the  (seeming)
repetitions in the music and movements add to the highly structured
nature of the production. 
Investing in flow
One of the other key features of flow is that it requires a certain level
of investment. Csikszentmihalyi (2008) uses the example of gaining
sensory delight from seeing. In  Einstein  there was a great deal of
visual stimuli which I could take meaning from and engage with. In
the  first  Train  scene  I  found  myself  visually  focusing  on  specific
aspects for short amounts of time to ascertain the full extent of what
I  was  seeing.  For  example,  the  young  Einstein  standing  on  a
platform appeared to be making paper airplanes from a cube of light.
On closer observation it became clear that the paper planes were
being produced, ready made from his bag. It was through engaging
with this level of detail in the piece that produced an experience of
flow. I was fully engaged in this tiny detail and, for me, the duration
seemed to pass by feeling both protracted and compressed; in other
words, losing its temporal relationship with the clock. 
The autotelic personality 
Whilst  Csikszentmihalyi  (2008)  asserts  flow  experiences  are
achievable by anyone, he recognizes that individuals with autotelic
personalities – those who engage in activities where “the doing itself
is the reward” – are more open to optimal experience and undergo it
on a regular basis (p. 67). Like Maslow - whose use of case studies
of  particular  self-actualizers  led  him  to  be  accused  of  elitism  -
Csikszentmihalyi suggests that individual potentiality has a role to
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play. In pathological terms, certain individuals may be incapable of
optimal  experience,  such as  schizophrenics  who notice  irrelevant
stimuli,  and  those  with  attentional  disorders,  or  suffering  from
excessive  self-consciousness  may  be  “condemned  to  permanent
exclusion from enjoyment” (2008, p. 84). Conversely, the autotelic
personality  is  more  open  to  optimal  experience.  Csikszentmihalyi
(2008)  surmises,  the “autotelic  self  transforms potentially entropic
experience into flow. Therefore, the rules for developing such a self
are simple” (p. 209), something explained in his flow model. The four
stages of this model: (1) setting goals; (2) becoming immersed in the
activity; (3) paying attention to what is happening; and (4) learning to
enjoy immediate experience (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008) are examined
in relation to Einstein on the Beach in the next chapter. Before this, I
consider  how  the  components  of  flow  listed  earlier  connect  with
Bergson and his philosophy of duration. 
Csikszentmihalyi and Bergson: Flow and duration 
Earlier in this section I outlined the eight major components of flow.
As with the features of Maslow’s B-values, I suggest how some of
these constituent parts resonate and connect with Bergson’s theory
of duration. 
[Flow]  “happens  when  we  confront  tasks  we  have  a
chance of completing” (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008, p. 49)
Csikszentmihalyi cites several examples where complex structures
are  developed  to  make  less  stimulating  encounters  into  optimal
experiences. He suggests everyone has private rituals of behaviour
to “fill in the boring gaps of the day, or to bring experience back on
an even keel when anxiety threatens” (p. 52). Such anxieties might
appear  when  presented  with  unfamiliar  structures  such  as  in
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Einstein on the Beach, a performance with an unclear arrangement
that may prompt its spectators to find ways of ‘completing’ the length
of  performance.  Csikszentmihalyi  also  stresses  that  when  a
mismatch of  ability  occurs in  an activity,  such as a tennis match
between a highly skilled player and novice, flow is unlikely to occur
as  “[e]njoyment  appears  at  the  boundary  between  boredom  and
anxiety,  when  the  challenges  are  just  balanced  between  the
person’s capacity to act” (p. 52). 
The concept of time as space, manifested as clock-measured time
has the ability to control and manipulate. This was exemplified by
Marx when he commented in  Das Kapital that “moments [are] the
element of profit” (1867/2008, p. 153), making reference to the ways
in which factory owners used clocks to regulate the working day.
The ubiquity of  time as a regulator of our activities, from work to
leisure, means being ‘up against’ the clock, as if it was a device to
compete  with.  Thus  the  mastery  of  time  (Gurvitch,  1964)  is
something to pursue and pervades even those social  and leisure
activities that must apparently be completed within allocated sets of
moments. 
The manageability of a task and prospect of its completion are, as
Csikszentmihalyi implies, connected to our mode of perception. In
Matter  and  Memory (1896/1910),  Bergson  puts  forward  his
argument about the way in which perception is a compression of a
vast number of stimuli into a single moment, and that this is the only
way we can perceive the innumerable phenomena we encounter at
every moment. Bergson cites an example from physics where, if we
were  to  attempt  to  separate  the  individual  vibrations  of  light,  we
would spend centuries in the process.  He concludes that:
We must distinguish here between our own duration and
time in general.  In our duration, - the duration which our
consciousness  perceives,  -  a  given  interval  can  only
contain a limited number of phenomena of which we are
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aware.  Do we conceive that this content can increase;
and when we speak of an infinitely divisible time, is it our
own duration that we are thinking of? (p. 273)
If  time  is  regarded  in  the  physical  scientific  sense  described  by
Bergson’s  example,  the  very  notion  of  clock-measured  time
becomes  a  barrier  to  the  completion  of  any  task.  Thus,  the
heterogeneity  of  duration  comes  to  the  fore  in  enabling  optimal
experience through the manageability of tasks and activities. 
Flow and intuition 
In  Creative  Evolution Bergson  (1907/2008)  states,  “by  intuition  I
mean  instinct  that  has  become  disinterested,  self-conscious,
capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely”
(p. 176).  Mullarkey (2000) suggests that Bergson’s discussion of
intuition is not entirely clear and requires some “detective work” to
pin  down  his  meaning  (p.  158).  He  notes  Bergson  moves  from
describing  intuition  as  ‘immediate  consciousness’  to  ‘something
requiring effort’ although by 1911, he has moved towards intuition
“represent[ing] a synthesis of all that is best in instinct and intellect: it
has  inherited  instinct’s  attunement  to  life  along  with  intellect’s
potential for continual evolution” (p. 159). Mullarkey notes, “[i]ntuition
is  probably  a  mixture  of  [mental  reorientation  and  perceptual
awareness]” (p. 161): “[t]he method of intuition … recombin[ing] the
virtues of instinct and intellect only by undergoing the bifurcation that
rendered  them  separate  and  opposed”  (p.  161).  It  is  Bergson’s
resistance to compartmentalizing the mind that accounts for his use
of intuition as philosophical method. 
The effort of flow
Although the flow experience appears to be effortless, it
is far from being so. It often requires strenuous physical
exertion, or highly disciplined mental activity. It does not
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happen  without  the  application  of  skilled  performance.
Any  lapse  in  concentration  will  erase  it  [the  flow
experience]74 (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008, p. 54)
Whilst flow activities are considered by Csikszentmihalyi to evoke an
experience that is “seemingly effortless … where there is no need to
reflect, because the action carries us forward as if by magic” (2008,
p. 54),  there is a definite need to invest in an activity  to  allow a
sense  of  immersion.  Striving  for  a  task  or  activity  to  become
‘seemingly  effortless’  is  paradoxical  because,  as  with  Bergson’s
effort  of  intuition,  “consciousness  works  smoothly,  action  follows
action  seamlessly”  (Csikszentmihalyi,  2008,  p.  54).  In  An
Introduction to Metaphysics Bergson (1903/1999) argues duration is
simultaneously unity and multiplicity, as it is only through “replac[ing]
myself  in duration by an effort  of  intuition, I  immediately perceive
how it is unity, multiplicity, and many other things besides” (p. 31). It
is only through this “effort of intuition … an inner absolute knowledge
of  the  duration  of  the  self  by  the  self  is  possible”  (p.  31).   For
Bergson, undergoing an experience of duration means it becoming
the  synthesis  of  “a  multiplicity of  successive  states  of
consciousness, and … a unity which binds them together”. It is: 
a  mysterious operation  which  takes place in  darkness,
and in regard to which, I repeat, one does not see how it
would admit of shades or of degrees.  In this hypothesis
there  is,  and can only  be,  one single  duration,  that  in
which our consciousness habitually works (p. 46).
Thus, Bergson’s notion of duration is apparently a singular concept
but,  like  flow  it  can  and  does  occur  in  a  number  of  different
situations. The distinction between Bergson and Csikszentmihalyi is
that  the  former  explains  duration  hypothetically,  whilst  the  latter
provides  case  studies  from  empirical  research.  In  this  sense,
74
 As I  suggested earlier  of  Stanislavski’s  inner creative state,  even small
variations can change a whole experience. A lapse in concentration may do this,
as might a moment of self-consciousness emerging. 
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Csikszentmihalyi is able to provide a range of specific examples in
which flow can happen.  
Flow, temporality, and intuition  
“The  reason  it  is  possible  to  achieve  such  complete
involvement in a flow experience is that goals are usually
clear, and feedback immediate” (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008,
p. 54)
“In  normal  everyday  existence,  we  are  the  prey  of
thoughts  and  worries  intruding  unwanted  in
consciousness. [Flow] improves the quality of experience
[and]  exclude[s]  the  interference  of  disorder  in
consciousness” (p. 58). 
Csikszentmihalyi’s  discussion  of  the  temporal  aspects  of  optimal
experience suggests a clear connection to Bergson’s thought.  The
apparent  ‘narrow  window  of  time’  associated  with  certain  flow
activities  is  significant  because  “only  a  very  select  range  of
information can be allowed into awareness” (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008,
p.  58)  and  thus,  there  is  a  heightened  awareness  of  certain
moments,  as  troubling  or  unwanted  thoughts  are  kept  at  bay.
Csikszentmihalyi is probably not referring here to the operations of
short-term memory, which only lasts 15-20 seconds (Fine, 2008), as
the flow activities he describes often involve motor-memory (or habit
memory,  in  Bergsonian  terms),  and  thus  not  a  case  of  recalling
information.  It  is  a  deeper  concentration that  is  beyond everyday
consciousness, the awareness that we are placed outside time and
in duration. 
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In  his  discussion  of  the  nature  of  intuition,  Bergson  (1946/1992)
suggests  that  in  order  to  go  beyond  intelligence  and  reach  an
understanding of the realms of intuition, we must see that:
intellectualized time is space, that intelligence works upon
the phantom of duration, not on duration itself,  that the
elimination of time is the habitual, normal, commonplace
act  of  our  understanding,  that  the  relativity  of  the
knowledge of the mind is a direct result of this fact, and
that hence, to pass from intellection to vision, from the
relative  to  the  absolute,  is  not  a  question  of  getting
outside of time (we are already there); on the contrary;
one must get back into duration and recapture reality in
the very mobility which is its essence (p. 31).
In  flow  experience,  immersion  in  an  activity  results  from
concentration of experience and thus, is a focusing of the individual
consciousness  or  effort  of  intuition.  Time,  as  the  phantom  of
duration, is the compartmentalized measurement by the clock. The
mobility,  which Bergson discusses,  is the flowing forth of  time as
duration experienced through intuition.  Arguing for  a  “much more
instructive  …  tru[e]  intuitive  metaphysics  …  follow[ing]  the
undulations of the real” (p. 31), Bergson asserts that “pure change,
real duration, is a thing spiritual or impregnated with spirituality” (p.
33).  Even though Bergson suggests that  we should search for  a
“simple  and  geometrical  definition  of  intuition  …  a  fundamental
meaning [is] to think intuitively is to think in duration” (p. 34). For
Bergson, the act of using intuition as method is “arduous and cannot
last” (p. 35), thus the small window in which one might experience
flow is intense and mobile. Bergson’s philosophy is, as Fell (2012)
suggests,  “deliberately  inconclusive  …  where  we  find  ostensive
demonstrations rather than final conclusions and rigid definitions …
Bergson  is  reluctant  to  commit  himself  to  definitions,  because  a
definition would dictate what the nature of the phenomenon should
be”  (p.  8).  It  is  this  positioning  of  metaphysics  as  “a  remedial
technique  in  perception,  not  a  form  of  ethereal  contemplation”
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(Mullarkey, 2000, p. 157), that makes Bergson’s concept of duration
difficult to measure beyond subjective experience. 
The loss of control
“When a person becomes so dependent on the ability to
control an enjoyable activity that he cannot pay attention
to anything else, then he loses the ultimate control: the
freedom  to  determine  the  content  of  consciousness”
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2008, p. 62).
Csikszentmihalyi  considers the negative phenomenon of addiction
(sometimes  mistaken  for  flow)  as  making  the  self  “captive  of  a
certain  kind  of  order,  and  is  then  unwilling  to  cope  with  the
ambiguities of  life”  (p.  62).   Despite this loss of self  to addiction,
Csikszentmihalyi notes that the loss of self-consciousness is a very
different phenomenon: “[T]he loss of the sense of self separate from
the world around it is sometimes accompanied by a feeling of union
with the environment” (2008, p. 63).  
Crucially, this does not mean that an individual loses self-awareness
in pursuing their flow activity; “loss of self-consciousness does not
involve a loss of self, and certainly not a loss of consciousness, but
rather, only a loss of consciousness  of the self” (Csikszentmihalyi,
2008,  p.  64).  This  sense of  unity  with  an activity  or  environment
resonates with  the union of mind and body implied by Bergson’s
notion of duration, in which “past, present and future tread one on
another, forming an indivisible continuity” (Bergson, 1920, p. 17). As
with Bergson’s conception of pure perception, which “however rapid
we suppose it to be, occupies a certain depth of duration, so that our
successive perceptions are never the real moments of things … but
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are moments of our consciousness” (Bergson, 1896/1910, p.  75),
multiple aspects of experiences are merged into a single perceived
experience. 
Freedom from the tyranny of time
“The sense of the duration of time is altered; hours pass
by in minutes, and minutes can stretch out to seem like
hours” (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008, p. 49). 
This final component of the flow experience obviously has the most
substantial  resonances  with  any  discussion  of  duration.
Csikszentmihalyi  (2008)  generalizes,  suggesting  that  during  “this
phenomenon [altered time perceptions] … [of] the flow experience
the  sense  of  time bears  little  relation  to  the  passage of  time  as
measured by the absolute conventions of the clock” (p. 66). There
are,  of  course,  exceptions  to  this  rule.  Csikszentmihalyi  cites
examples from surgeons who are able to know the exact time during
an  operation  without  consulting  a  watch,  and  athletes  who  are
extremely time aware during a race. Nevertheless, the element of
being lost in the moment of an experience is reported by many of
those surveyed: “Athletes refer to it as ‘being in the zone,’ religious
mystics  as  being  in  ‘ecstasy,’  artists  and musicians as  ‘aesthetic
rapture’”  (Csikszentmihalyi,  1997,  p.  46).   The  freedom from the
“tyranny of  time”  (p.  67)  is  fundamentally  where Csikszentmihalyi
and Bergson meet and share the greatest commonality. 
Psychologist Claudia Hammond (2012) suggests that flow presents
us with a paradox:
When you are experiencing flow, time does just seem to
disappear. Hours can pass and you don’t notice them, so
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if time going too fast is your main issue then you might
not want to spend your days experiencing flow. On the
other  hand  there  is  evidence  to  suggest  that  flow
increases  well-being,  so  perhaps  once  again  our
perception of the speed of time is less of a problem than
we think. (p. 303)
Hammond is writing from the perspective of trying to understand why
time accelerates as we age and therefore her argument suggesting
that flow can be negative has no bearing on Bergsonian duration. 
The  connections  between  flow  and  Bergsonian  duration  are
explored in  the  next  chapter,  focusing  on how my experience of
Einstein on the Beach offered opportunities for flow to occur. I build
on a number of flow categories, conditions for flow as well as the
stages of flow. In doing so, further aspects of Bergson’s philosophy
are discussed, notably intuition/intelligence and the present moment.
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Checking out of Hotel Medea and back into a socially accelerated 
culture 
The city was beginning to wake as I walked away from Summerhall
shortly after 7am. Leaving the venue, I saw a few people who had
attended the performance together jump into a black cab and head,
presumably, to their home or another hotel. At that moment I had a
desire to do the same but having no hotel  to book into, I  walked
towards Elder Street bus station. Along the way I felt a slight sense
of agitation that my coach did not leave until after 11am; back in the
socially  accelerated  ‘real’  world,  I  felt  the  pressure  to  be  home
sooner, perhaps subconsciously fearing the slipping slope would be
harder to remain on.  
September 24, 2011
19.22
An  email  in  my  inbox  confirmed  my  booking  for  two  tickets  to
Einstein on the Beach (DD1 & DD2, slightly restricted view) for May
12, 2012. 
April 12, 2012
14.57
Another  email  confirmed  my  purchase  of  two  train  tickets  from
Kettering to London Euston.
May 12, 2012
Setting off from my home in Bury, Greater Manchester on Saturday
morning, we drove one hundred and fifty-six miles to Kettering in
Northamptonshire.  As with  my journey to  Edinburgh the previous
August, this was not the most straightforward route but economics
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dictated that the journey to Einstein on the Beach should begin this
way. Parking the car in Kettering, we boarded the train at 14.27 and
arrived in London at 15.29, then made our way to a hotel near the
Barbican Centre. Two hours and one minute after arriving London, I
walked into  the theatre and sat  in  seat  DD1,  the first  Knee Play
already in progress.  
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Chapter Eight: All these are the days my friends - Duration and 
Flow in Einstein on the Beach
May 12, 2012 
Present 
The 2012 revival of  Einstein on the Beach at the Barbican Centre,
London could be described as being of a challenging nature with its
almost five-hour length, seemingly repetitious score and nebulous
narrative  structure.   The  piece,  a  montage  of  scenes  and  stage
pictures  loosely  based  around  Albert  Einstein’s  life,  offers  its
audience  an  experience  that  has  little  association  with  normal
theatrical  conventions  of  carefully  timed  intervals  to  allow  a
comfortable viewing experience – it is a “Beaumarchais spectacle
scored by Wagner” (Brecht, 2007, p. 361). 75 According to Holmberg
(2002), this “mystical farce … rampages through the absurdity of the
human condition … bring[ing]  together  music,  dance, drama, and
visual art in one big bang – the nuclear fission of theatre” (pp. 9-10).
There is little to suggest linearity in this performance, something that
both composer Phillip Glass and director / designer Robert Wilson
cared little for in the original 1976 production: “Wilson collaged his
extraordinary  visions—part  painting  with  human  figures,  part
choreography.  Glass's  sweet,  pulsing,  repetitive  patterns  swelled
and thinned, not so much arrowing toward a goal as wheeling into
the stratosphere” (Jowett,  “They Sing of Voyages, 2001, para. 1).
What  is  extraordinary  about  Einstein  on  the  Beach is  the
mesmerizing  effect  of  the  combined  result  of  Glass’s  minimalist
score and Wilson’s stage pictures, evolving in “tortuous slow motion,
in  which  time  itself  became  solidified  as  spatial  phenomenon”
75
 See  Brecht  (2007,  pp.  317-375)  for  a  complete  narrative  account  of
Einstein on the Beach. 
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(Causey, 2006, p. 89). For a work that was first produced in between
the digital revolution of the late 1970s and early 1980s as well as
“between different eras of avant-garde experimentation” (Bottoms,
2013, p. 100),  Einstein  remains trapped between a pre and post-
digital era but performed in an age of social  acceleration.  Whilst
there  are  many  elements  of  the  production  that  rely  on
contemporary  technologies,76 there  is  a  distinct  juxtaposition
between this and the onstage use of simple pieces of set as well as
the emphasis on the physical control and exertion of the performers.
The corporeal endurance demonstrated by the performers is one of
the  elements  that  make  Einstein  on  the  Beach a  transformative
experience in addition to the remarkable unity of sound and images.
Ultimately,  Einstein offered a kind of  liberation from the capitalist
logics of  value as it  resisted “the artificial  divisions of  clock-time”
(Shalson, 2012, p. 101). 
Present: The memory of flow
My own account of Einstein on the Beach describes one in which I
became  wholly  absorbed  in  the  production,  an  experience  I
subsequently identified as optimal experience or ‘flow’. Arguably, it is
the use of repetition in Einstein that contributes to the occurrence of
flow, an almost trance-like state.  The piece is, however, far more
intricate  than  that,  its  subtleties  and  complexities  only  really
becoming  apparent  retrospectively;  thus  it  is  the  memory  of  the
experience  that  allows  for  the  recognition  of  flow  transpiring.  In
common  with  flow  activities  described  by  Csikszentmihalyi,  my
sense of linear time in  Einstein on the Beach was disrupted as I
became totally engrossed in the presented spectacle. As with the
76
 There  have  been  obvious  advances  in  theatre  technology  since  1976,
which may have made Einstein on the Beach easier to realize in 2012 than thirty-
five  years earlier.  Nevertheless,  the revival  retains the essence of  the original
production. 
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other case studies in this thesis, I am dealing with my memory of the
performance and, in capturing my memories of specific moments I
will inevitably mis-remember, embellish and omit moments that for
other spectators may be of great significance. Whilst I have tried to
describe moments in the performance in as much detail as possible,
I  am  aware  that  some  descriptions  may  be  less  complete  than
others and that  the analyses and reflections resulting from these
descriptions may not address all aspects of a scene. Above all, it is
my intention to offer specific examples from specific moments and
illustrate  their  efficacy  in  my  exploration  of  flow  and  Bergsonian
duration.  Thus,  in  relation  to  exploring  these  notions,  my
examination  of  Einstein  draws  predominantly  upon  ways  of
interpreting the production from a visual perspective in accordance
with Wilson’s own background as an architect. 
Present: Einstein transgresses time
For Steve Bottoms, the experience of  Einstein on the Beach was
dominated by a sense of time being altered and a falling into the
flow of the performance:  
My  own  experience  of  the  piece  was  that  time  felt
curiously  elongated  and  slowed down through  the  first
thirty  to  forty  minutes,  as  my  habituated  urge  to  seek
progression  and development  was inevitably  frustrated.
During scene 2 (trial 1) I was fighting to stay awake, a
factor that further elongated things (have minutes passed
or only seconds since I last nodded out?). But after this
point I fell into the flow, and the next three hours or so
passed  -  wide  awake  -  without  any  particular
consciousness of time. (Bottoms, 2013, p. 99)
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Often  cited  as  a  mesmerizing  experience for  Einstein audiences,
Bottoms’ comments about falling into the flow may or may not refer
to the notion of optimal experience but his words certainly indicate
how his perception of time was tangibly altered. 
Past: Knee Play 1
As I entered the theatre on Saturday May 12, 2012 the first Knee
Play – connecting the scenes together like the anatomical joint - was
already in progress. The stage was set with chairs stage right and
stage left, illuminated in a square of light. Two women, dressed in
white  shirt,  baggy  pants  and  wristwatches  entered  and  stepped
carefully into position behind the two chairs stage left, finally sitting
behind  two  desks.  As  the  audience  continued  to  enter,  the  two
women remained motionless as single notes played on a keyboard.
The two women, sitting upright began to count random numbers77
and spoke fragmented sentences that  were barely  audible  to  the
audience. 
1…8…73…3…the sail boat and…19…could get….4…
12..it is…47…it could…53…get…111…the railroad…
112…9…50…these workers and…1…it could be work 
it…7…is…42…it is…8…16…could…1…Frankie it 
could…13…be…542 …all these are the days my friends 
and these were the days…6..my friends…1…8..it…7…
could...105…some wind..12…4..the sailboat…78
77
 Although many aspects  of  Einstein  on the Beach may appear random,
such as the passages of text, they are actually carefully staged. The libretto in the
programme  notes  from  this  production,  however,  states:  “KNEE  PLAY
CHARACTER 1 (Numbers recited randomly)” (Wilson, 2012, p. 32). 
78
 These fragments of dialogue are drawn from programme notes and other
records of  the performance as well  as from memory.  It  is  not  my intention to
accurately transcribe the spoken text but to give a sense of the performance as it
happened and how it is recalled in my memory. 
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As they continued, members of the company began to assemble in
the orchestra pit.  The performance of the two women had a quality
or sense of something about to begin, yet not quite ready – as if I
was  witnessing  the  final  rehearsals.  This  sense  of  betwixt  and
between was apparent to me because this part of the performance
seemed to stand outside of what an audience might expect. At this
moment  I  had  a  clear  sense  of  time  becoming  jumbled  and
imprecise, as if we were all adjusting our natural timepieces in an
attempt to become synchronized. 
…it could be a balloon…it could be Frankie…these were
the days my friends and these are the days…put these
days of…365…11…8…26…1 into 100 coins of change…
these are m-m-m-m-m-y days….
 As the two women typed onto imaginary keyboards, I was drawn
into  the  piece,  and  questioned  whether  the  performance  was  in
progress or yet to begin. Unlike the middle stage of Gennep’s ritual
process, between separation and reincorporation,79 the liminal stage
appeared to  be  happening out  of  the  usual  order.  This  temporal
subversion  was  one  of  the  ways  in  which  Einstein  disrupted  my
understanding of linear clock-time.    The counting continued, as did
the fragmented dialogue, the women’s facial  expressions fixed as
they leaned forwards slightly towards the audience.  
Present: Early signs of flow – becoming immersed
In retrospect, I had already experienced a sense of flow at this early
stage.  As Csikszentmihalyi suggests, flow can happen when one is
least expecting it:
Occasionally  flow may occur  by  chance,  because of  a
fortunate coincidence of external and internal conditions.
… While such events may happen spontaneously,  it  is
79
 Turner’s use of Gennep’s stages of ritual are discussed in the next two
chapters in reference to Walking (see p. 269).  
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much  more  likely  that  flow  will  result  either  from  a
structured activity, or from an individual’s ability to make
flow occur, or both. (2008, p. 71)
Whilst I was aware of the concept of ‘flow’ prior to watching Einstein,
I did not attend the performance with the intention of setting up the
correct conditions for flow. In this performance, there was potential
for the flow experience to be extended to everyone present, simply
because  a  common  purpose  of  the  audience  was  to  watch  the
production.  Unlike  Csikszentmihalyi’s  example,  it  is  impossible  to
confirm whether flow was a comprehensive experience although my
casual observations suggest that there was some kind of unity of
experience. Certainly, Einstein was a highly structured performance
that was able to exert a degree of control over its audience. As such,
this supports Csikszentmihalyi’s assertion that flow is more likely to
occur in structured situations and often begins with setting goals.
Equally, an individual’s ability to make it happen is also important
and, if  I  had been aware of the potential  for  flow in  Einstein,  the
intensity of experience would have been heightened.  It is, however,
only on reflection that I am aware that flow had occurred and, had
my  awareness  been  greater,  the  flow  may  have  felt  forced  and
therefore not transpired. As with the  Hotel Medea case study (see
Chapter Six), I acknowledge that I had certain expectations prior to
attending  Einstein.   Being  such a  widely  known piece of  work,  I
anticipated  the  possible  effects  of  (apparently)  repetitious  music,
glacially moving stage pictures,  and absence of narrative.  It  was,
however, in the memory of the production that a recognition of flow
and duration occurred and, as such, my prior expectations were less
significant in my analysis. It is also significant that my expectations
of the performance were that of an encounter that would be unlikely
to induce a flow experience. 
19
Listening as flow and paying attention: Analogic and analytic 
Experience seems effortless in flow situations, as if  an activity or
event  blends  seamlessly  with  our  natural  rhythms,  moods  and
disposition;  one  way  in  which  flow  occurs  is  through  playing  or
listening  to  music.  Csikszentmihalyi,  who suggests  music  can be
used  as  a  way  of  warding  off  psychic  entropy,  recognizes  the
importance of music when he writes:
Music,  which  is  organized  auditory  information,  helps
organize  the  mind  that  attends  to  it,  and  therefore
reduces psychic entropy, or the disorder we experience
when random information interferes with goals. Listening
to  music  wards  off  boredom  and  anxiety,  and  when
seriously  attended  to,  it  can  induce  flow  experiences.
(2008, p. 109)
Csikszentmihalyi  believes  that  music  can  be  listened  to  in  two
distinct ways – analogic and analytic: 
Whilst the analytic method moves away from sensory or
narrative  elements  and  concentrates  on  structure,
analogic  analysis  of  music  is  more  concerned  with
developing the ‘skill to evoke feelings and images based
on the patterns of sound’. (2008, p. 111)
The analytic method requires the listener to attend to the structure of
the  music  and,  as  such,  is  a  conscious  process  of  trying  to
understand a piece of music.  In this sense,  a listener may try  to
assess the individual components of a piece of music, rather like
attempting to analyze a piece of theatre according to taxonomies
such  as  Pavis’s  questionnaire  (1985).  Being  unfamiliar  with  the
structure of music beyond a basic level, my attempt to understand
the music in  Einstein  using this analytical perspective would have
revealed few insights.  Similarly,  the theatregoer concerned with a
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general  rather  than  critical  appreciation  of  a  play  does  not
consciously unpack the dramaturgical elements of a performance,
despite  the  performance  being  a  complex  blend  of  ideas.80 This
analytic  level  of  skill  in  listening  to  music  is,  according  to
Csikszentmihalyi (2008), the way for a listener to access “an active
experience  that  provides  instant  feedback  (p.  111).  For  Roland
Barthes  (1977),  “musical  activity  is  no  longer  manual,  muscular,
kneadingly  physical,  but  merely  liquid,  effusive,  ‘lubrificating’”  (p.
150).  This  lubrification  of  music,  wherein  we  often  have  music
around us (in the supermarket or lift, for example) creates, according
to  Barthes,  the  effect  of  deadening  our  response  to  music  in
everyday life. The analogic approach to listening to music proposed
by  Csikszentmihalyi  may  be  lubrificated  but  in  Einstein, this
lubrification made the experience hypnotic and compelling. 
 
It is my argument, however, that the opposing method of listening to
music  –  the  analogic  approach  –  is  the  means  by  which  a  flow
experience  is  achieved  in  Einstein  on  the  Beach.   My  analogic
listening drew me into the performance with an awareness of the
hypnotic and lulling effect of the music. For Csikszentmihalyi,  this
level of listening is between the ultimate experience of flow and the
most basic level of listening, it is a sensory experience. A sensory
response to  music  is  something  that  is  innate to  us  as humans,
relatable to any cultural background. Even in the womb we develop
a sensory  response to  music  (Gilboa,  2014;  Martens,  2013)  and
appreciate the “qualities of sound that induce the pleasant physical
reactions  that  are  genetically  wired  into  our  nervous  systems”
(Csikszentmihalyi,  2008,  p.  110).  In  Einstein, I  was  positioned
somewhere between the two lower order listening modes of sensory
and  analogic.  Whilst  I  was  unaware  of  the  complex  musical
80
 As Counsell  (2001) suggests in  his  discussion of  the Law of  the Text:
meaning is “culturally derived, drawn once again from the pool of existing social
meanings”  (p.  14).  Thus  a  truly  objective  analysis  of  any  performance  is
impossible. 
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structures and rhythms of Glass’s score, I was fully conscious of the
effects of this sensory experience. 
Durkheim’s writing on collective effervescence draws on examples
of the Warramunga people’s rituals in Australia. In a description of a
ritual lasting several days, Durkheim observes that “[m]en jumped,
kicked, reared, and let out wild screams” (Durkheim, 1995, p. 220)
and that, “as a result of collective effervescence, they believe that
they have been swept up into a world entirely different from the one
they have before their  eyes” (p.  228).  This total  absorption in an
experience is the result of a collective lived experience and thus live
music  might  be  considered  as  more  powerful  than  its  recorded
counterpart.  Csikszentmihalyi  rejects  this  argument  as  invalid,
arguing that optimal experience can develop from listening to and
appreciating  recorded  music.  What  Csikszentmihalyi  omits  to
mention, however, is the visual elements of live performance, and
particularly of  opera. Increasingly,  live music concerts rely on the
designer  to  create a backdrop that  is  of  equal  importance to  the
overall effectiveness of a concert.81 In Einstein, Wilson’s design and
glacially  changing  images  combined  with  the  music  to  create  a
feeling  of  flow,  in  a  work  where  time  was  theatrical  as  Wilson
“tortuously [drew] time out to a virtual stand still” (Causey, 2006, p.
172). 
We  often  experience  flow  when  listening  to  music  due  to  the
regularity  of  its  rhythms,  beats  and  motifs  but  whilst  Einstein
certainly uses motifs, the rhythms actually subvert musical norms.
In  Mark Obenhaus’s 1985 film  The Changing Image of  Opera,  a
singer in the 1984 Einstein company commented, “we are raised in
81
 In  a  recent  BBC report  –  ‘Exhibition  shines  spotlight  on  British  stage
design’, theatre designer Tupac Martir commented “When you go to a concert and
take a picture in the middle of a show, what are you taking a picture of? Are you
taking a picture of the music or the stage?” (Muffett, T., 2015).   
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4/4 but Glass’s music subverts this”.  Einstein works in groups of five
and seven, which performers naturally try to turn into eight. Despite
appreciating the music in the sensory and analogic modes, when
watching Einstein, I became enculturated into these unusual musical
patterns very early on.  
Past: Knee Play 1
The  opening  Knee  Play,  already  happening  as  I  entered  the
auditorium began with single notes played for several minutes at a
time.  As the assembled singers began the repetitious and trance-
like ‘1,2,3,4’,  the two performers sitting on the apron of the stage
repeated barely audible phrases such as ‘Would it get some wind for
the sailboat’,  ‘It  could get the railroad for these workers’,  and ‘All
these are the days my friends and these are the days’.  The chorus
members held small circular pieces of glass or transparent plastic
and slowly raised their arms as if carrying out the action of driving a
car.  The dialogue muttered by the two woman talked of the bus
driver whilst the stage lights were gradually dimmed, imperceptibly
yet in an instant. 
Present 
Although this is of course impossible, my perception of this moment
was just as described. Whilst my attention was apparently so fixed
on aural elements, the visual components of the scene escaped my
perception.  In  a  similar  sense  that  a  sudden  realization  of  time
having  been  condensed  is  often  described  after  an  enjoyable
experience or of a very protracted length of time occurring in a brief
uncomfortable  experience  (Flaherty,  1999;  2011),  I  felt  a  loss  or
disruption of linear clock-time. 
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Past 
Behind the women, an image of Einstein as a young boy appeared –
there was a sailboat in the background of the picture.
…it could get the railroad for these workers….
Blackout.
Present: From paying attention to immersion 
At  this  point,  there  is  little  in  the  performance  that  settles  the
spectator or invites them into something that makes sense, either
visually or in its narrative. The Knee Plays, of which this is the first of
five in the opera, are intended as a structure to connect the scenes.
According to Glass, they are “prelude, interludes and postlude [seen
as]  the  seeds  which  flower  and  take  form in  the  larger  scenes”
(Glass & Wilson, 2012, p. 131). Stefan Brecht (2007) sees this as
ineffective;  it  “does not  enrich  the  perceived structure:  the knees
only  produced  a  secondary  rhythm  of  alternation.  (Nor  are  they
joints: they do not link what they separate)” (p. 367). This lack of
connectivity  between  the  scenes  and  themes  in  Einstein  on  the
Beach might suggest an experience of flow would be difficult; there
is, however, a paradoxical quality to the production that produced
something  transformative.  In  common  with  transformative
experiences such as rituals, little emphasis is placed on the actual
meaning  of  words  and  sounds;82 instead  Christopher  Knowles’
libretto offers neither explanation nor exposition. Turner’s writing on
the classification of rituals describes his attempt to accurately reflect
82
 In the BBC TV series Tribe, Bruce Parry participated in the initiation rites of
the Sanema people of Venezuela. Parry drank a natural hallucinogenic substance
and attempted to get into a trance. The Sanuma people commented that, once in
a trance, the words and sounds would come naturally,  as if from other worldly
spirits (20:08). Thus, the actual meaning of the sounds and words were deemed
less important than the actual act of being in trance. 
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on his witnessing of Ndembu girls’ puberty rites, where he notes that
“it is one thing to observe people performing the stylized gestures
and  singing  the  cryptic  songs  of  ritual  performances  and  quite
another to reach an adequate understanding of what the movements
and words mean to  them” (Turner, 1969, p. 7). Unlike indigenous
rituals, the apparent complexity and nebulous nature of the visual
and textual  elements in  Einstein  needed no prior enculturation or
cultural knowledge for them to make sense. This may in fact partially
account for the international success of  Einstein on the Beach and
many of Wilson’s other stage works. 
Present: Einstein in a trance
There is a trance-like quality to many elements of the performance,
something that recurs at various points throughout the opera. Whilst
the music is not intended to induce trance in a similar way as might
some  indigenous  rituals,  Glass’s  music  has  been  influenced  by
Eastern practices that have a closer affinity with the sensory effects
of music than Western practices. Having studied with the sitar player
Ravi Shankar, Glass realized that he was more interested in rhythm
rather than melody and notes (Glass & Jones, 1988). He explains
the  significant  differences  between  classical  Indian  music  and
traditional Western classical music:
First, there is the “raga” system governing the order and
intonation (tuning) of the notes in a scale. This is a highly
elaborate system in which the particular raga … is related
to emotional states as well as times of the day.… What
came to  me as  a revelation  was the  use of  rhythm in
developing  an  overall  structure  in  music.…  I  would
explain  the  difference  between  the  use  of  rhythm  in
Western  and  Indian  music  in  the  following  way:  In
Western music we divide time – as if you were to take a
length of time and slice it in the way you slice a loaf of
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bread. In Indian music (and all non-Western music with
which I’m familiar), you take small units, or “beats,” and
string  them  together  to  make  up  larger  time  values.
(Glass & Jones, 1988, p. 17) 
For Glass, the problem arose from his attempts at notating the music
on a conventional Western stave. He found that by placing bar lines
on the paper, he produced unwanted accents. Removing these bar
lines enabled Glass to realize that this produced a “steady stream of
rhythmic  pulses”  (Glass  &  Jones,  1988,  p.  18).  The  rhythms
produced in Glass’s music have an improvisatory quality that makes
it seem repetitious when in fact, there is very little repetition.  Being a
non-musician, in  Einstein on the Beach my appreciation of this fell
somewhere between the sensory and analogic ways of listening. It
was the relentless rhythmic pulses of Glass’s score that infiltrated
my natural rhythm and subverted my linear experience of clock-time.
The effect of Glass’s music is what Schechner (1985) describes as
an  “accumulation-repetition  [that]  lifts  performers,  and  often
spectators too, into ecstatic trance … the spectator’s mind tunes in
to subtle variations that would not be detectable in a structure where
attention is directed to narrative or melodic development” (p. 11). 
It was not just the music that evoked a trance-like quality. The visual
aspects of the performance also had a quality that enthralled me,
much like Maya Deren’s experimental  ‘trance films’  of  the 1940s.
Like much of Wilson’s other work (Deafman Glance, 1970; The Life
and Times of Joseph Stalin, 1973; A Letter to Queen Victoria, 1974),
some of  Deren’s  films were made without  sound although,  when
watching  them  there  is  a  compelling  rhythmicity  that  draws  the
viewer in, a task that a soundtrack is often charged with. In Meshes
of  the  Afternoon  (1943;  2012  video  by  CutCollage),  the  central
protagonist (played by Deren) moves around her environment as if
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in a dream, as we become “attuned to her unconscious mind and
caught in a web of dream events that spill over into reality” (Museum
of Modern Art, 2004, para. 1). In Ritual in Transfigured Time (1946;
2009 video by Ivo Bol), the repetitive actions of Deren  and Anaïs
Nin,  initially  framed  in  a  doorway  reminiscent  of  Wilson’s  stage
designs, are compelling to watch even in grainy black and white.
Throughout the film there are contrasts between real time action and
slowed down moments; a male dancer makes angular yet flowing
movements that evoke memories of Lucinda Childs’83 dancers in the
Field scenes (see Figure 11). In contrast, the dancers’ movements in
Deren’s film show moments of stillness – the image of the dancer
locked in a pose and presented alongside statues in a garden. The
poise and stillness with which the male dancer holds his pose while
standing on a plinth fascinates me in a similar way as the precise
movements  executed  by  Wilson’s  performers.  Deren’s  graceful
dancer,  who  is  momentarily  frozen  as  only  film  or  a  state  of
dreaming can achieve,  evokes the oneiric  quality  experienced by
both performer and spectator in simultaneous flow during  Einstein
on the Beach. 
83
 Childs is responsible for the choreography in  Einstein, following Andy De
Groat original choreography. Childs also appeared in the first production. 
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Figure 10: Still from Ritual in Transfigured Time (1946)
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Figure 11: Field 1 (Barbican, 2012. Photo credit: Lucie Jansch) 
Flow, Bergson and the dancer
In  Time  and  Free  Will (1889),  Bergson  discusses  grace  in  the
dancer as an aesthetic feeling:
If  jerky movements are wanting in grace, the reason is
that each of them is self-sufficient and does not announce
those which  are  to  follow.  If  curves are  more  graceful
than broken lines, the reason is that, while a curved line
changes  its  direction  at  every  moment,  every  new
direction  is  indicated  in  the  preceding  one.  Thus  the
perception  of  ease  in  motion  passes  over  into  the
pleasure of mastering the flow of time and of holding the
future in the present. (1889/1913, p. 12) 
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Bergson also suggests that, once the dancer is moving to music, we
believe we are in control of him or her, in a kind of communication
between dancer and spectator – there is “a virtual and even nascent
sympathy  [that  is]  the  essence  of  higher  grace”  (Bergson,
1889/1913, p. 13). This aesthetic feeling of grace may be analogous
to a feeling of flow in that there is an apparent sense of control and
mastery over the task at hand. 
Learning  to  enjoy  immediate  experience  of  the  present:
(Re)ma(r)king clock-time 
Less than  thirty  minutes  into  the  performance,  my  experience  of
Einstein  on  the  Beach seemed  incompatible  with  a  sense  of
conventional, clock-measured time.  Despite its preoccupation with
time and clocks, Einstein had the effect of making me lose a linear
sense of time. As Holmberg (2002) observes, the ‘characters’ are
“obsessed,  comically,  by their  wristwatches …[although]… interior
time, time as consciousness – Bergson called it duration – cannot
be measured by clocks and calendars” (p. 11). Clocks were present
in a number of scenes; as well as each ensemble member wearing
a wristwatch, there are also other references to time in the form of
trains,  the  constant  repetition  of  numbers,  and  more  subliminal
references to the regularity of measured time - most notably with the
uniformity of the ensemble, all costumed in Einstein’s famous baggy
pants and braces.  There was also something about the precision
with  which  the  performers  moved;  angular  and  meticulous  in
execution, they were as fixed and precise as the movements of a
clock.  Einstein did, however, offer the juxtaposition of a number of
different viewpoints, allowing the experience of time to be explored
from multiple angles.  At various points in the opera, slow moving
images and stage pictures were juxtaposed with rapid, amplified and
high-energy music.  This had the effect of disturbing my spectatorial
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experience,  as  image  and  sound  clashed  in  a  jagged  alliance.
Similarly,  the juxtaposition of moments of stillness such as in the
opening Knee Play, with the frenetic action of the Spaceship scene
in the final scenes provided discontinuity for me as spectator. This
element  of  discontinuity  should,  on  the  face  of  it,  make  a  flow
experience less possible as there is a component of disruption; this
was, however, not so in Einstein. 
Present: (Dis)Ordered temporal states 
Csikszentmihalyi (2008) observes that flow activities such as “[p]lay,
art, pageantry, ritual, and sports, … [b]ecause of the way they are
constructed,  they  help  participants  and  spectators  achieve  an
ordered state of mind that is highly enjoyable” (p. 72). Did Einstein
help  to  achieve an ordered state  of  mind? Games and sports  in
particular  enable  participants  to  experience  enjoyment  and  flow
because of the clarity of rules and clear construction. The rules that
are  common denominators  in  the  above  activities  are  apparently
absent  from  Einstein  and thus should not have facilitated optimal
experience.  Similarly,  in the well-made play, the clear exposition
and denouement offer audiences a ‘complete’  experience as they
see  that  a  logical  or  acceptable  conclusion  has  been  reached.
However,  in  Einstein  the  general  lack  of  clear  narrative  and
extended  scenes  contradicted  this  sense  of  logic  and  order.  Of
course, there was a clear structure to the piece (Train / Trial / Field,
punctuated  by  the  Knee  plays,  dancer’s  movements),  but  the
content and subject matter was largely open to interpretation. I am
not  suggesting  that  Einstein  was  somehow improvised  or  left  to
chance but that its highly structured form is less apparent than in
many other operas, particularly those following a well-known story.
Einstein can certainly be regarded as scientifically structured and is
viewed  as  such  by  Brecht  (2007)  who  explains  the  opera  using
Glass’s  own  diagrammatic  representations  (see  Brecht,  2007,  p.
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317, p. 320, p. 331, and p. 337). Brecht’s language also alludes to
the scientific nature of the production; in describing a dancer in the
first Train scene, he regards her movements as “not dancing, not
taking  off,  she is  a  pendulum,  and all  her  energy goes into  that
maintenance” (p. 321). The nebulous nature of Einstein raises more
questions than it answers. Who is ‘on trial’? What does the repetition
of numbers represent? Are Knowles’ words largely incidental? Is it
important that we cannot clearly hear some of the text during the
opening Knee Play? All of these elements should, if we are to follow
Csikszentmihalyi’s argument, operate against optimal experience. I
believe  it  was,  however,  the  quality  of  my  investment  in  the
performance that empowered the flow experience. As a researcher,
I did not view Einstein in a conscious attempt to experience flow, but
I was certainly engaged in watching the performance from a critical
and analytical perspective. It may be that these critical and analytical
perspectives gave me a set of ‘rules’ that facilitated flow; watching
the performance from this view allowed me find order in disorder, to
find coherence in incoherence.   
Csikszentmihalyi (2008) uses the example of gaining sensory delight
from seeing and, as “seeing is immediately accessible” and does not
require the “cultivating of necessary skills” (p. 108); I  was able to
instantly appreciate the visual stimuli of Wilson’s design thus making
meaning.84 In the first Train scene I found myself visually focusing on
specific aspects for short amounts of time to ascertain the full extent
of  what  I  was  seeing.  I  was  fully  absorbed  in  tiny  details  and
constantly noticing new elements; for me, time seemed to pass by in
such a  way that  it  felt  both  protracted and  compressed.  Claudia
Hammond  (2012)  describes  this  phenomenon  as  the  ‘holiday
84
 See also John Berger’s Ways of Seeing for a discussion of how messages
and meanings are conveyed by works of art. 
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paradox’. She cites the common feeling of time on holiday passing
by very quickly but, on return home, it seems as if we have been
away  for  a  long  time.  The  explanation  for  this  is  that,  whilst  on
holiday  we  are  often  involved  in  many  new  experiences  and
consequently,  a  lot  has  been  compressed  into  a  relatively  short
period of time. Thus it appears that time has passed by very quickly
but  that  time  has  been  filled.  Bergson’s  notion  of  the  novelty  of
duration, that of each moment being distinct and new, has obvious
parallels with Hammond’s holiday paradox in that she suggests a
strategy for producing an effect of the novelty of duration. The view
of time in our minds, seen either “prospectively and retrospectively
[usually makes] these two perspectives match up, but it is in all the
circumstances where  we remark on the strangeness of  time that
they  don’t”  (Hammond,  2012,  p.  198).  Holidays  may  be  like
performances stretching beyond smooth consumption, creating an
opportunity to step outside of clock-time and into duration. However,
experience  on  holidays  is  often  compartmentalized  whereas  in
performance, the collective audience has a significant impact. 
Present: (Dis)Ordered time 
The experience of time is something that  Wilson has explored in
other works such as Deafman Glance (1971), a silent opera in which
the  actions  were  executed  over  four  hours.  For  the  Wilsonian
performer, time can become distorted as much as for the spectator.
Sheryl Sutton, who appeared in  Deafman Glance and  Einstein on
the Beach describes her experience of the former as one in which
she developed: 
an  inner  clock  that  was  sensitive  to  each  segment  …
What the audience is experiencing, though, is a kind of
stopping  of  their  inner  clocks.  They  lose  that  whole
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judgement as to what is slow and fast. When something
is fascinating you can watch it for five minutes and think
only a minute and a half have elapsed (Shyer, 1989, p.
6). 
In respect of the experience of time, Holmberg observed:
Wilson’s slow motion dramatizes time, not as a discrete
unit  ticked  off  by  a  chronometer,  but  as  a  flowing
succession  of  states,  melting  invisibly,  indivisibly  into
each  other  –  time  as  consciousness.  Since
consciousness fuses past, present, and future, this is also
the cyclical time of myth and ritual, of eternal return. Of
the past  found again,  of  Proust’s  privileged moment:  a
moment inside and outside time. (Holmberg, 2002, p. 11)
It  is  the  slow  pace  of  much  of  Wilson’s  work  that,  according  to
collaborator Robert Brustein, offers an: 
antidote  to  the  frenetic  pace  of  everyday  life  …  the
spectator  was  inevitably  drawn  into  its  rhythms  and
reached a point  where the heart rate slowed, the brain
began to operate at a slower frequency and the viewer’s
own  thoughts  and  interior  visions  mingled  with  the
spectacle on stage (as cited in Shyer, 1989, p. xvi).
Whilst the slowness in Wilson’s work generally, and conspicuously in
Einstein, has become his trademark, he disputes any assertion that
it is in slow motion but is actually in real time. The time it takes the
sun to set or clouds to change gives a spectator time “to reflect, to
meditate about other things than those happening on the stage. I
give you time and space in which to think” (Wilson as cited in Shyer,
1989,  p.  xvi).  Thus  the  time  and  space  in  Einstein  offers  the
possibility  of  transformation  for  the  spectator  by  bracketing  the
everyday experience of  social  acceleration.  For Alain Badiou,  the
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“complete  temporal  precariousness of  theatre  … is  disquieting  to
playwrights and directors alike” (2008, p. 193) and, in opposition to
directors  who  emphasize  the  impermanence  of  theatre  which
“unfolds in a flash”85 (p. 193), Wilson’s work tries to last indefinitely:
“[n]either  the  eclipse  nor  the  contemplative  consistency  of  pure
duration  saves  theatre  from  its  extended  finitude,  from  its  long
shortness” (p.  193).   It  is  only since the advent  of  the theatre of
slowness, which according to Hans-Thies Lehmann (1999/2009) is
Wilson’s  ‘invention’  that  “we can speak of  a  proper  aesthetics  of
duration” (p. 156). Through his use of slowness, Wilson creates a
space for reflection in a similar way that flow activities allow for other
aspects of  life  to  be temporarily  bracketed and a complete focus
given  to  a  specific  activity  (Csikszentmihalyi,  2008).  In  Wilson’s
work, the transformation occurs in the hybridity of the experience,
where the mingling of individual thought and stage spectacle has a
physically  calming  effect.  As  Brustein  (as  cited  in  Shyer,  1989)
suggests above, the slowing of heart rate and lower brain frequency
operations  happens  because  of  the  combined  visual  and  aural
elements of the performance. 
As I watched Einstein I was aware of an adjustment to my physical
state although I cannot say for certain whether my heart rate actually
slowed down or  my  brain  was  operating  at  a  lower  frequency.  I
perceived  that  I  was  in  a  state  of  altered  consciousness  that
disrupted  my  relationship  with  clock-time  and  provoked  me  into
thinking about the quality of duration – duration as something clearly
distinct from a quantitative measurement. 
This rupture of temporality added to my flow experience of Einstein
on the Beach.  Csikszentmihalyi observed of flow experiences that
85
 Badiou is quoting French Symbolist poet Mallarme here. 
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“most  people  report  that  time  seems  to  pass  much  faster”
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2008, p. 66) although he also recognizes that this
is not always the case, bearing little relevance to “the passage of
time as measured by the absolute convention of the clock” (p. 66).
My sense of duration in  Einstein was paradoxical, as the collection
of  slow  moving  stage  pictures  and  apparently  repetitious  music
offered  little  in  regards  to  the  kind  of  thrilling  experiences  often
associated with the compression of time. It did, however, have the
quality of a painting or photograph that revealed seemingly unending
layers of detail. There is an effort required for this to happen when
viewing a painting or photograph, and this is much the same for a
spectator of Einstein. Conversely, musical or conventional narrative
theatre offers immediate gratification for the passive spectator; the
spectator  in  Einstein,  however,  is  more  active  because  there  is
apparently less to see. The openness of the Christopher Knowles’
text and his use of non sequitur often render the meaning of his
words  difficult  to  comprehend,  thus  adding  to  the  apparent
incoherence and lack of structure in a highly structured opera. The
words, however, do “acquire a kind of comforting familiarity through
their  insistent  repetition”  (Bottoms,  2013,  p.  99)  and  it  is  this
repetition that begins to give the words meaning. The meanings that
are  formed are  part  of  the  mingling  of  spectatorial  thoughts  and
stage  pictures  thus  producing  a  state  of  flow,  as  apparently
disparate elements come together neatly and immediate experience
is foregrounded.  
Past: Train 1 
A single chair sat stage right, close to a shell. A silhouetted dancer,
holding  a  pipe  moved  forwards  and  backwards  frenetically  in  a
diagonal pattern. She counted time, although “not in time with the
music,  which  is  so  spaced out  that  it  can’t  be  counted”  (Brecht,
2007,  p.  316).  She walked “monomaniacally  back and forth  on a
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diagonal … [h]er hyperkinetic arm movements d[id] not illustrate the
throbbing, hypnotic pulse of Glass’s pounding music, but she [wa]s
equally  compelling,  equally  intense.  Her  legwork  [wa]s  an  object
lesson in controlled rhythm” (Holmberg, 2002, p. 13).  The dancer
appeared absorbed in  the movements and counting time as if  in
flow, although the counting of time against the rhythm of the music
must  surely  have countered the  necessary  conditions  for  optimal
experience. 
Figure 12: Train 1 (Barbican, 2012. Photo credit: Lucie Jansch)
Present
Sally Banes’ 1987 exposition of postmodern dance describes this
moment from the original production of Einstein - the Lucinda Childs’
diagonal dance in Train 1:
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At a distance, the dance looks like a typical Childs solo.
She advances and retreats schematically along different
diagonal  lines  barely  distinguishable  from  each  other,
making  high  pointing  arm  gestures  in  rhythmic
counterpoint to the springy pacing. Yet if one sat close
enough to see the gestural detail, one realized that unlike
her own solos, the Einstein dance expresses a character,
many characters … the character constantly changes as
images  evoked  by  posture  and  arm  gestures  flicker
across  her  body,  images  of  sternness,  mirth,  urgency,
inebriation, pedantry. (Banes, 1987, pp. 139-140) 
From my seat in the auditorium, I could not see the many characters
that Banes describes in Childs’ original version of this moment but I
did sense that the dancer86 seemed totally absorbed in her actions,
perhaps in flow or at least acting intuitively.  
Present: Intuition, intelligence and duration  
Reflecting on this scene now, I consider the role of intuition for the
dancer  as  well  as  for  the  spectator.  Was  my  understanding  or
appreciation of this moment and Einstein on the Beach as a whole
seized  through  intuition  or  intelligence?  Fell  (2012)  suggests,
“Bergson thinks that  if  the creative force of life  were unlimited,  it
might have developed intelligence and instinct in the same species,
but  as  it  is  limited  and  must  choose  a  direction,  instinct  and
intelligence became separated” (p. 71). For Bergson, who believed
that real duration could only be grasped through intuition (a way of
entering  into things),  the role of intelligence is to access  intuition.
Fell  notes  that  Bergson  believed,  “without  the  push  from  the
intelligence,  instinct  could  never  become  intuition,  and  without
intuition, intelligence can only restrict itself to a mechanistic view of
86
 Childs’ role in the scene was performed by Caitlin Scranton in the 2012
production.  
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life” (p. 75). Intuition – in Bergson’s view, a reduced faculty of instinct
– “seems far preferable to intellect, since in it life and consciousness
remain  within  themselves”  (Bergson,  1907/2008,  p.  182).  He
concedes, however, “[o]n the side of intuition, consciousness found
itself  so restricted by its envelope that intuition had to shrink into
instinct”  (p.  182).  The  role  of  intelligence,  once  freed  is  to  “turn
inwards on itself, and awaken the potentialities of intuition which still
slumber within it” (Bergson, 1907/ 2008, p. 182). Thus, it is through
intelligence that we access intuition. For Bergson, “both intelligence
and  instinct  [from  which  intuition  is  derived]  involve  knowledge,
reflected  upon  and  conscious  in  the  former,  and  acted  and
unconscious  in  the  latter”  (Fell,  2012,  p.  72).  Thus  my  current
autoethnographic  reflection  of  the  performance  uses  intelligence
(language, evocative writing) in an attempt to convey what was a
sensory embodied and intuitively understood experience; “intuition
may enable us to grasp what it is that intelligence fails to give us,
and indicate the means of supplementing it” (Bergson, 1907/2008, p.
177).  Ultimately,  instinct,  intuition  and intelligence are inadequate
each in isolation: “There are things that intelligence alone is able to
seek,  but  which,  by itself,  it  will  never  find.  These things instinct
alone could find; but it will never seek them” (Bergson, 1907/2008,
p. 151). 
In  privileging  intuition  over  intelligence,  Bergson  recognizes  that
dreams  provide  the  means  of  feeling  rather  than  measuring
duration;  pure  duration  is  a  qualitative  experience  that  remains
separate  from  symbolical  representation.  However,  Bergson
(1889/1913)  notes  that  homogeneous duration  and conscious life
are two multiplicities which, melt “into one another and form … an
organic whole” (p. 128).87 In regaining a fundamental self, we would
have to experience the “confused, ever changing, and inexpressible
87
 See Chapter Five (p. 81) for a discussion of two multiplicities forming an
organic whole.  
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self  [above the] clear and precise, but impersonal  self”  (Bergson,
1903/1999,  p.  129).  In  other  words,  recognition  of  duration
acknowledges the self as an ever-changing but unclear self.   It is
this privileging of intuition above intelligence that  is present in flow
experience, of acting with a sense of ease and a ”lack of anxiety
about losing control that is typical in many situations in normal life”
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2014, p. 231).  
Past: Vertical, horizontal, diagonal 
A boy, who I assumed is a young Einstein, stood illuminated on a
tower,  reminding me of  a  crane arm,  stage  right.  As  low smoke
spread across the stage, a man in a red top, holding what appeared
to be a stick of chalk, entered stage left and, facing upstage, he star
jumped. This stage picture began to build into a typical Wilsonian
image using vertical, horizontal and diagonal lines.   
Present: Earlier (than some), later (than others)
The use of vertical,  horizontal  and diagonal (see Figure 12) lines
that appear in this scene act as spatial symbols of linear time which,
for me, appeared to correlate with Bergson’s notion of real duration
as  a  single,  flowing  time.   Bergson’s  view  of  duration  as  an
uninterrupted flow of time is scrutinized by Fell (2012), who suggests
that:
 
[I]nstead of the idea that there must be one and the same
time,  whatever  its  nature,  we  get  an  idea  of  three
hypostases of time: 
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1. Time as duration of individual phenomena (time as a
quality). 
2. Time as temporal relations. 
3. Universal time. (p. 125)
In  developing  Bergson’s  ideas,  Fell  (2012)  argues  that  “just
acknowledging  the  inner  duration  of  things”  (p.  126)  takes  no
account of temporal relations. Bergson’s thought objects to the idea
of  earlier  and  later  as  these  take  place  “in  simultaneity,  thus
presenting  time  as  a  static,  non-progressive  system,  where
everything  is  set  for  once  and  for  all”  (Fell,  2012,  p.  126).  To
maintain the dynamic quality of Bergsonian duration, Fell suggests
that:
Instead of  saying  that  terms  are earlier  and later  than
other  terms,  we  could  say  that  terms  happen or  take
place earlier  than  some  and  later  than  others.   For,
regardless of the possible Bergsonian criticism that any
comparison  of  terms  presupposes  their  simultaneous
alignment  which  defies  the  successive  nature  of
temporality, events do happen earlier than some and later
than others. (p. 126) 
Because  ‘earlier’  and  ‘later’  are  never  still,  the  dynamic  quality
remains.  Furthermore,  Fell  departs  from  Bergson’s  thought
substantially  when  noting  that  “individualized  duration  …  means
existence  within  rigid  boundaries”  (p.  127)  such  as  the  body  in
space,  and  thus  “spatial  features  not  only  mark  the  temporal
boundaries of an individual duration, they take part in the evolution
of  duration  throughout  its  continuous  existence”  (p.  127).88 Fell’s
argument is acceptable if we regard the mind’s contents as existing
in  a  physically  embodied  sense,  although  she  earlier  suggests,
88
 See Chapter  Six  (pp.  80-82)  for  a discussion of  Bergson’s  rejection of
spatialized time. 
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“Bergson  proposes  the  hypothesis  that  memories,  just  like
perceptions,  are  neither  the  function  of  the  brain  nor  are  they
contained inside it” (p. 46). Thus when Bergson asserts in Time and
Free Will that real duration must be something different from time
spatialized and represented in numbers, he is privileging the flow of
psychological  duration  that  exists  without physical  boundaries.
Although, in Time and Free Will Fell sees that Bergson argues for an
“inextensive and spiritual” duration (Fell, 2012, p. 49), she also notes
that  because  the  existence  of  duration  in  reality  “presupposes
growth, the addition of new content, and the material for new content
which comes from the physical world”, duration cannot simply be a
spiritual  concept  (p.  49).  Later,  in  Matter  and  Memory Bergson
discusses the role of the body in the formation of duration, stating
that it is at the centre of action: “Thus it indeed represents the actual
state  of  my  becoming,  that  part  of  my  duration  which  is  in  the
process of growth” (Bergson, 1910, p. 178).89 
Past
As the relentless music continued, the boy lifted a small,  glowing
paper cube from his bag and held it aloft. As the man and woman
wrote in the air, a paper plane glided down from the young Einstein
above. The tower, on which he stood, rose vertically, as did the strip
of white light that descended from the top of the stage whilst a train
began to appear horizontally from stage left. 
(Ideal) present 
The  linearity  and  therefore  spatiality  of  time  exemplified  in  the
various lines began to be eroded as a multiplicity of elements came
89
 A discussion of consciousness of the body in the present is resumed later
in this chapter (pp. 240-242), in relation to the first dance (Field) sequence. 
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together as if in an instant. The discontinuity of linear time and thus
past, present and future is what made my temporal experience in
Einstein on the Beach closer to duration than to clock-time - of being
in  the  present  moment.  For  Bergson  (1896/1910),  the  present
moment is defined thus:
The essence of time is that it goes by; time already gone
by is the past, and we call the present the instant in which
it  goes  by.  But  there  can  be  no  question  here  of  a
mathematical instant. No doubt there is an ideal present –
a pure conception,  the indivisible  limit  which separates
past from future. (p. 176)
This ‘ideal present’, a psychical state, recognizes that the present,
“must  be  both  a  perception  of  the  immediate  past  and  a
determination  of  the  immediate  future”  (Bergson,  1896/1910,  p.
177).  It  is  here  Bergson  admits  that  duration  in  the  form of  the
present moment “consists in the consciousness that I have in my
body” and is thus sensori-motor (p. 177).  My temporal experience
during  Einstein  was one that existed in the ‘ideal present’ whereby
the apparent sameness of the stage pictures and repetitious music
facilitated a focus on the present with a perception of the past and
determination of the future. In this ‘ideal present’, my awareness of
the present moment was heightened through an ambiguous grasp of
the  past  and  future.   Thus  the  most  tangible  moment  was  the
present, of being engaged in a moment much like in reports of flow
and/or the aesthetic experience. This is not to say that the past and
future were superfluous to the ideal present. In a complete grasp or
congruence of the moment - like a work of art in Csikszentmihalyi’s
and Robinson’s (1990) study of  the aesthetic  experience -  “there
would be nothing that was not already known and the object would
hold no interest” (p. 134). Thus the intangibility of past and future
elucidated my clarity of the present.  
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Past: Train 1
The lights dimmed for a moment and I saw another cube of light, as
the man in red was motionless until he looked stage left and star
jumped.  Looking at  the audience,  his  arms rose up and down in
exclamation. A woman in white shirt and baggy pants entered stage
left and moved across the stage making angular shapes. It was as if
she was a platform guard, beckoning the train along its journey. A
screen  descended  centre  stage  displaying  an  image  of  a  train
passing  through  snow occupied  countryside.  As  the  train  moved
further  in,  the stage picture slowly built  as the music and voices
seemed to accelerate. As the picture was removed, layers of sound
continued to become more complex and intense. Three other chorus
members entered and walked in a synchronized, angular fashion.
The train driver, who was now visible - an Abraham Lincolnesque
figure with beard and pipe - sat at the engine controls. The music
changed, as if about to reach a climax and the vertical strip of light
descended  once  more.  Three  of  the  chorus  figures  kneeled  and
leaned forwards as the train appeared in full view. The first dancer
continued to move as blackness enveloped all but the boy Einstein
and the man in red. 
Present: Space, time and the aesthetic experience 
A concern with  space,  time and timing is  evident  throughout  this
whole  sequence,  marked  by  the  angular  movements  of  the
performers,  use  of  diagonal,  horizontal  and  vertical  lines,  and
carefully  timed  exposition  of  the  scenic  elements.  In  this  scene
Wilson “achieves unity  through repetition,  variation,  and reversal”
(Holmberg,  2002,  p.  14);  tiny,  almost  imperceptible  changes
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combine to create the paradoxical quality of stasis and movement.
Holmberg  (2002)  also  suggests  Wilson’s  use of  language  in  this
scene  is  fragmented,  it  “starts  and  stops.  Sometimes  it
communicates, sometimes it sneezes” (p. 14). Thus there is another
paradox in  Einstein on the Beach;  non-linearity,  absence of clear
exposition,  and  ambiguous,  fragmented  language  combined  to
produce  an  effect  of  unity.  This  dramatization  of  the  “glory  and
lunacy of trying to talk to each other” (Holmberg, 2002, p. 14) was, I
suggest,  a  comment  on  the  tension  between  clock-time  and
duration. One purpose of clock-time is to create a unified whole of
experience  through  artificial  compartmentalization,  whilst  duration
results from a melting of these compartments into a heterogeneous
whole.   The elements of Wilson’s design and language contributed
to a structure in which I was given an opportunity to explore and
challenge clock-measured time. During this first extended sequence
I became drawn into the performance, slowly eroding my sense of
clock-time as I subconsciously drew together apparently fragmented
elements  of  the  performance  into  a  heterogeneous  whole.  Apart
from  the  onstage  action,  the  wider  environment  of  the  Barbican
auditorium complemented my overall experience of Einstein on the
Beach.  The environment was significant and, as in the other case
studies in this thesis, space and place had important bearings on my
total  perception.  As  an  aide  to  facilitating  aesthetic  experiences,
Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson (1990) suggest, “the environment in
which it  occurs is  perhaps the most  basic  condition for  aesthetic
experience”  (p.  141).  Curiously,  my  dominant  memory  of  the
Barbican is of the social spaces around its 1980s concrete structure,
which I remember as being part of my pre-performance experience.
Inside the auditorium, I recall seeing other audience members come
and  go  which,  unlike  most  other  performances,  did  not  seem
incongruous and therefore distracting.  
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A knee play of my own: The past connects with the present 
On June 20, 2015 I visited the Barbican once again. As in May 2012
I had come to see a Robert Wilson production, although this time it
was Wilson himself in a production of Samuel Beckett’s Krapp’s Last
Tape. As I sat in my seat in D row stalls slightly stage right, I looked
up towards the gallery seat I had occupied just over three years ago
when watching Einstein on the Beach, I was struck by how small the
stage looked now, despite the high walls and sense of large scale so
dominant in a Wilson set design.  For a moment in the performance I
imagined seeing  Einstein  from the  perspective  of  this  seat  and I
drifted  off  into  my  thoughts.  I  remember  mentally  jolting  back  to
Wilson’s portrayal of a dying man and being brought from the past to
the  present  in  a  powerful  moment.  The  combined  effect  of  the
warmth of the auditorium, low level lighting, and slow, meticulous on
stage  action  triggered  a  sensori-motor  response  that  brought
involuntary  memories  to  the  present;  pure  memory  produced the
quality of duration. This, for me, was both an example of a peak-
experience  and flow. I  was consumed by the memory of  Einstein
whilst  simultaneously being in  the flow of Krapp,  as well  as also
being cognizant of a peak-experience and, by association, moments
from Hotel Medea.   
Past: Train 1 
As the scene continued, the stage picture evolved with many of the
scenographic  elements  disappearing  and  reappearing  almost
imperceptibly. It was only when the man in red grinned manically at
the audience that I noticed the train had disappeared. 
He spoke: 
…this  love  could  some  one…into  love…it  could  be
someone who has been somewhere like them…
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Facing upstage, his words were almost inaudible.
…it could be something that is likened to….it  could be
some…where
One  of  the  women  from  the  opening  Knee  Play  entered  with  a
newspaper and moved slowly from stage left to right,  reading the
New York Times. As the young Einstein’s paper planes continued to
fly from above, the woman with the newspaper turned towards the
train  and  then  stage  right.  Another  woman entered  and,  walking
downstage, picked up the shell. Looking upwards, she placed the
shell to her ear. The man in red faced upstage and moved to the
apron  stage  left.  In  juxtaposition  to  the  stillness  of  the  woman
listening  to  the  shell,  the  movements  of  the  dancers  became
increasingly frantic and chaotic. The music reached a climax as a
rapid succession of numbers was heard. 
….1234…1234….1234….1234….
The woman with the newspaper jumped as the tower began to lean
forwards, causing the boy to bend his knees, disrupting his vertical
stance. As the vertical strip of light penetrated the funnel of the train
there was a brief blackout. I could make out the shape of the scene
as it  dismantled, accompanied by a single note on the keyboard.
The  train  reversed  as  the  tower  returned  to  its  vertical  position,
leaving the stage devoid of anyone but the woman listening to the
shell. 
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Present: Against negentropy90 
It was during this first scene that I was enculturated into the rhythms
of Einstein on the Beach and a sense of flow was established, as I
was drawn into paying close attention to the stage picture. When
watching  Einstein  I  was  aware  -  more  so  than  during  other
performance experiences - of being in a space where, although I
was free to come and go at will, watching this extended performance
of  slowly  evolving  sounds  and  stage  pictures  seemed  like  a
substantial task. As such, there was a challenge presented to me as
spectator,  where  I  was  confronted  with  a  performance  duration
beyond comfortable consumption. The freedom allowed to enter and
exit  at  will  gave  permission  to  consume  the  product  more
comfortably  but  presented  a  further  challenge  or  goal,  as  the
promise of fulfilment was allied with the potential discomfort of being
present for the entire duration. Seated in the circle stage right, I was
at the edges of the auditorium whilst simultaneously being absorbed
in the centre of the action; an exit only a few feet away offered the
possibility of an easily accomplished departure.  
This goal setting is something that Csikszentmihalyi recognizes as
being part of the flow experience in that “concentration … together
with clear goals and immediate feedback … induc[es] the enjoyable
experience of psychic negentropy” (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008, p. 59).
This  occurrence  of  negentropy  is  something  that  one  might  not
expect when watching  Einstein  as the demands of the piece have
more in common with factors associated with mental and physical
entropy.  My  experience  of  the  piece,  however,  was  closer  to  a
meditative  encounter,  an  almost  dreamlike  state  that,  despite  its
challenges, proved rewarding and memorable. In actuality, by the
end of the piece I felt that I wanted more – the duration being more
than comfortably consumed. 
90
 See  Chapter  Seven  (pp.  169-171)  for  a  definition  and  discussion  of
negentropy. 
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Present: The aesthetic experience   
The specific  durational  parameters  set  by  Einstein  on  the  Beach
constituted  the  very  essence  of  my  experience  of  psychic
negentropy.  In  a  study  following  on  from  his  research  on  flow,
Csikszentmihalyi  (with  Robinson,  1990)  asked  participants  to
describe  their  aesthetic  experiences  when  viewing  gallery  art.
Unbound  by  time,  the  gallery  visitors  in  Csikszentmihalyi’s  study
were neither obliged nor  constrained by specific  amounts of  time
that  must  be  devoted  to  the  art  works.  Nevertheless,  the  study
suggests that  one condition of the aesthetic experience was “the
amount of  time available for viewing and being with works of art.
Aesthetic experience, whilst spontaneous in certain instances, often
requires a period of maturation” (Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson,1990,
p. 144). Thus the efficacy of the aesthetic experience was judged as
being directly related to the length of time devoted to appreciation of
the art works. 
Like flow, the aesthetic experience describes the quality of a specific
practice -  the distinction between the former and latter  being the
nature of the activity. Flow occurs in activities as diverse as sport,
reading, work, and gardening whereas the aesthetic91 experience, as
the term suggests, is about the quality of encounters with the arts
and,  for  the  authors,  “aesthetic  and  the  flow  experiences  are  in
reality  indistinguishable  from  one  another”  (Csikszentmihalyi  &
Robinson, 1990, p. 9). The activity of reading may be more passive
than the other active activities listed above, but it may still present a
challenge that sees the mind “stretched to its limits in a voluntary
effort  to  accomplish  something  difficult  and  worthwhile”
91
 I understand the term ‘aesthetic’ as being concerned with an appreciation
of beauty rather than a set of principles that might underpin a particular artist’s
work. 
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(Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson, 1990, p. 3).   As with reports of flow,
Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson (1990) admit that the nature of the
research  into  the  aesthetic  experience  is  wholly  qualitative  and
subjective:
Like any written report, this one is made up of words. The
words represent perceptions, feelings, ideas – in short,
experiences  –  that  people  reported  having.  These
experiences,  in  turn,  are  what  we  feel  to  be  the
foundations of interpretative psychology. They are basic
protocol statements of what people believe is happening
to  them,  even  though  words  are  necessarily  imperfect
representations  of  states  of  consciousness.
(Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson, 1990, p. xv) 
The  authors  are  explicit  in  their  mode  of  research  leading  to
conclusions that are not reached by standard research procedures
usually employed in the humanities and, some may argue, are not
robust and thus valid. The subjective nature of the research and the
respondents’ accounts of aesthetic experience in the form of words
are inadequate in fully explaining something that is embodied. 
Csikszentmihalyi  and  Robinson  (1990)  define  the  aesthetic
experience as being similar to flow: 
[P]hilosophers  describing  the  aesthetic  experience  and
psychologists describing flow are talking about essentially
the same state of mind. This in turn means that human
beings enjoy experiences that  are relatively more clear
and focused than everyday life … When this heightened
state  of  consciousness  occurs  in  response  to  music,
painting, and so on, we call it an aesthetic experience. In
other  contexts,  such  as  sports,  hobbies,  challenging
work,  and  social  interactions,  the  heightened  state  of
consciousness is called a flow experience. (pp. 8-9) 
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The authors also indicate that “Western philosophy has neglected
the emotional, intuitive, and, to a lesser extent the volitional aspects
of consciousness” (pp. 5-6). It is this intuitive response that occupies
a  privileged  position  in  my  analysis,  in  support  of  Bergson’s
favouring of intuition above intellect as a philosophical method. 
Past: Trial 1  
As the vertical strip of white light sliced the stage into halves, the
courtroom scene began to appear; layers of music began to build
and the judge’s seats appeared. I noticed the man in red, who was
still present, write in the air as if dictated to by the motifs of sound
from the flutes.  A silhouetted stage crew arrived,  seemingly from
nowhere then exited the stage left and right. There was a blackout
just as the jury’s bench and stenographer’s seats were set up.
A horizontal strip of white light emerged with two small spheres of
light below. As the stage was gradually illuminated, members of the
public gallery began to arrive. They carried small paper bags as they
walked  to  their  seats  using  sharply  defined  movements.  The
members of the jury entered stage right, carrying the same small
brown paper bags. In unison, they placed the bags on the floor and
began singing. 
Two women entered from stage right  and took their  positions as
stenographers.  One  of  the  women  from  the  opening  Knee  Play
entered stage left  and moved towards centre stage.  Turning 360
degrees she then continued stage right. At the centre of the stage
picture  sat  a  large  clock  face,  devoid  of  hands.  The  central
positioning of this clock was significant to me in the present moment
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and,  on reflection,  this  significance may be attributed to  Wilson’s
training and background in architecture.
Present: Ideal, real, centre, margin 
In three-dimensional visual composition,92 there are four areas that
are considered most important (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006): Ideal,
Real,  Centre,  and  Margin.  In  architecture  this  can  be  easily
illustrated with  the example of  a church,  where the centre of  the
building’s facade is often reserved for religious icons. This central
position is also the realm of the Ideal with its “significant emblems,
the cross, or the clock, the gable stone on Amsterdam canal houses,
the frieze high up on the Greek temple”  (Kress & van Leeuwen,
2006, p. 256) and, in the courtroom of Einstein the handless clock,
(from the design of a Persian bowl, according to Holmberg, 2002), is
significant  in  representing  an  ideal  of  timeless  time.  The  Real,
embodied in the form of the judges, court  attendants,  and jury is
subordinated in scale. 
In contrast to the rapid appearance of the train scene, the courtroom
picture built  slowly as we saw the stagehands prepare the scene
92
 I use Taylor’s (1957) definition of composition in the visual arts as “how
part related to part and to the whole: composition not as an arbitrary scheme of
organization  but  as  a  dominant  contributor  to  the  expressive  content  of  the
painting”  (p.  55).  Taylor’s  text  is  regarded  as  important  in  contributing  to
understanding ways in which students of art learn to understand the visual arts. As
such, Taylor’s volume remains in print, thus demonstrating its significance to art
education. Wilson’s composition of his stage pictures illustrates Taylor’s view that
composition is a dominant contributor to a viewer’s understanding.  I acknowledge
that different views of composition have emerged since Taylor’s work,  such as
Arthur Danto’s suggestion there is no particular way a work art has to look and
thus  no  distinguishing  visible  features  or  rules  of  composition.  Whilst  Taylor
provides a clear definition of composition, Danto’s (1997) post-historical stance
poses a philosophical question: “what makes the difference between a work of art
and something not a work of art when there is no interesting perceptual difference
between them”?  (p. 35). Danto’s view was formed after seeing Warhol’s  Brillo
Boxes (1964),  in  which  the  artist  used  everyday  objects  stacked  as  if  in  a
storeroom. For Danto,  this represented “the end of  art  … the end of a certain
narrative  which  has unfolded  in  art  history  over  the  centuries,  and which has
reached its end in a certain freedom from conflicts of the kind inescapable in the
Age of Manifestos” (1997, p. 37).  
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before the performers began to enter. In the previous scene, Wilson
had allowed a slowly evolving stage picture to  take shape in my
perception as if viewing the picture in a gallery, gradually perceiving
the details as I studied the images before me. Like a viewer in a
gallery, I was given time to visually explore and scrutinize the artist’s
finished product.  Conversely,  in  the courtroom scene (see Figure
13) I  was given the living artist’s view as he layered the picture,
providing  me  with  the  privilege  of  a  seat  in  his  studio  where  I
watched each brushstroke and dab as the pieces of set and light
built a picture. Once again, Wilson played with my sense of duration
as I patiently observed the scene unfolding. In this instance, I was
shown the tools with which the scene was constructed,  and then
asked to  watch as it  developed.  In  contrast  to  the previous train
scene, the courtroom offered some sense of a linear narrative, albeit
fragmented and nebulous; as such, the logical construction of this
scene seemed less about an intuitive response than was necessary
in the preceding train sequence. This was, perhaps, because I had
viewed the construction of the scene and therefore felt  a greater
sense of control. Unlike viewing a completed painting in a gallery
where  “a  great  amount  of  knowledge  about  the  world  is
encapsulated  in  the  transaction”  (Csikszentmihalyi  &  Robinson,
1990, p. 12), I was able to see the layers being added. This strongly
visual  methodology  is  typical  of  Wilson’s  approach  to  making
theatre: his “drawings were the genesis of  Einstein on the Beach;
the rest of the production – music, text, staging – was built around
them” (Holmberg, 2002, p. 86). 
Having trained as an architect and artist, Wilson 
borrows from painting – portrait, still life and landscape –
in a particularly pronounced way. Thus, in  Einstein, they
provide him with structurally inscribed perspectives: the
knee plays are the close-up portraits; the train and trial
scenes provide the middle-range perspective of still life;
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the dance sections and the spaceship’s interior provide
the long view of landscapes. (Shevtsova, 2007, p. 112)
In Wilson’s stage work immediately prior to Einstein, his “geometric
aesthetic - minimalist in sympathy – sharpen[ed] … Wilson privileges
architecture, line, design” (Holmberg, 2002, p. 9).  Einstein on the
Beach was an architectural experience, viewing a scene as it was
constructed – much in the same way we travel through a building,
noticing  new  details  in  space  and  time.  According  to  Joshua  C.
Taylor (1957), in architecture we “analyze the experience rather than
simply the geometric structure” (p. 86). Wilson’s scene construction
allowed  me  to  explore  the  stage  architecture,  affecting  my
experience of space and time. The size of a building is significant
and,
because we pass through it, allowing its forms, as they
evolve one after the other, to mold and shape our actual
environment,  a  work  of  architecture  wields  a  peculiar
power over our sensibilities. We could describe the effect
simply  as  an  experience  of  space  acted  on  by  time.
(Taylor, 1957, p. 84) 
Whilst Taylor’s assertion refers to the act of physically traversing a
building, the sheer scale of the scenic elements in Einstein gave me
a sense of  moving through each scene because of  the apparent
stasis. The effect architecture has on our sensibilities depends on
the amount of  time spent in a building. The time Wilson gives to
spectators  in  the  first  Trial  scene  allows  the  space  of  the  stage
design to have an effect because it  is acted on by time. It  is the
moulding and shaping that  happens in front  of  the spectator that
produces a similar effect to a journey through a building, where new
details are noticed as we travel. A sense of control was enabled for
me  as  I  visually  negotiated  this  scene  thus  facilitating  my  flow
experience. 
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Figure 13: Trial 1 (Barbican, 2012. Photo credit: Lucie Jansch). 
Present: Interior / exterior screen 
Maria Shevtsova (2007) suggests Einstein on the Beach, like many
of Wilson’s other theatre productions, engaged the spectator on two
different levels: interior and exterior screen. The interior screen is an
“individual’s  way  of  processing  within  his/her  sphere  of
understanding, which is also deeply subliminal” (Shevtsova, 2007, p.
114), and the exterior screen the “production’s semiotic system” (p.
114).  The interior screen (or interior reflection) is “stimulated by the
exterior or ‘sensory surface’ … of the production” (Shevtsova, 2007,
p. 56). Shevtsova (2007) suggests that whilst spectators can engage
in the exterior screen of any work, Einstein displays so much that “it
can override the ‘interior screen’ and compel attention to itself  as
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‘pure form’, a form that spectators do not need to fill with personal
meanings  to  take  pleasure  from it”  (p.  114).  The  efficacy  of  the
exterior screen in Einstein was powerful and had potential to efface
your interior screen and “send … you on a high, or into a trance, or
to sleep” (p. 114). Shevtsova, however, concedes that it may also
“send you out of the theatre bored out of your brain” (p. 114). For
me, the detail given by the exterior screen made my experience of
Einstein one  in  which  my  sense  of  the  interior  screen  –  on  a
subliminal level -  was heightened. Thus, it was the exterior screen
that  facilitated  an  experience  of  flow  resulting  from  my  interior
reflection.    
Shevtsova (2007) also argues that the interior screen can only be
“sustained by the ‘special’ time of the theatre” (p. 56):
Whether deemed slow or not, Wilson’s time determines
the  quality  of  scenes,  the  graceful  transition  between
scenes, and the length of the productions, some of which
…  are  unusually  long.  Although  Wilson  occasionally
speeds  up  time,  just  a  little,  he  never  lets  go  the
sensation of savoured time that suffuses his productions
and is communicated to audiences. (p. 57)
The ‘savoured time’ of Einstein, although seemingly drawn out, was
more like natural time; Wilson created the illusion of time passing
slowly because he placed naturally experienced time in a theatrical
context. As with the experience of moving through a building and
appreciating  the  architecture,  being  moulded  and  shaped  as  we
pass through, it is the fact that natural time was given to me as a
spectator to appreciate the savoured time. 
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Past: Trial 1 
Moving past the jury, the woman from the first Knee Play (who is
now the clerk to the court) stood upstage right. As the two judges –
a man and a boy separated in age by at least sixty years – entered,
the two stenographers stood centre stage before them. The woman,
who in the previous scene had been dancing frantically, took to the
upstage left  seat  and grinned.  The older  judge banged down his
gavel four times:
This court of common pleas is now in session.
He emptied sand from a vial onto the bench in front of him. 
This court of common pleas is now in session.
After he spoke, the boy poured a beaker of sand onto the bench. 
This court of common pleas is now in session.
The older judge poured water into a jar.
This court of common pleas is now in session. 
Looking at the audience, the judges pulled faces full of air. 
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This court of common pleas is now in session.
The older judge lifted a small indiscernible object and the boy placed
his hand on it.  As the music changed, a man wearing a suit and
holding a briefcase stood centre stage looking towards stage right. 
Present: The paradox of control
The level of detail in this scene adhered to the meticulousness of
Wilson’s approach and, as I had seen the stage picture develop and
build,  this  gave  me  a  sense  of  being  in  control.  Whilst  one
component of any flow experience is that individuals feel in control, it
is  paradoxical  that  people  commonly  report  becoming  lost  in  an
activity. The control was given to me in Einstein through allowing the
unfolding  stage  picture  to  build  slowly,  thereby  exposing  the
mechanics of the performance. Performances with static set designs
or those revealed to the audience as a ‘whole’ may, at first glance,
offer  a  more  ‘complete’  experience.  The  façade  of  these  sets,
however, removes the feeling of control, as the spectator cannot see
their  construction.  This  sense  of  control  that  Wilson  provides  in
exposing the mechanics of a performance may counter the potential
loss of control in not providing a clear narrative. Whilst the spectator
is placed in the uneasy position of a performance lasting beyond
comfortable consumption, they lack the “sense of worry about losing
control  that  is  typical  in  many  situations  of  normal  life”
(Csikszentmihalyi,  2008,  p.  59).  This  feeling  of  control  is  in  the
possibility  rather  than the actuality,  with  those  feeling a sense of
control may potentially lose some of this control. For the spectator in
Einstein,  this  risk  is  not  physical  or  even psychological,  a  wrong
‘move’ will not result in the loss of a game. The only risk (if it can be
23
regarded as such) in this instance is a loss of time awareness in the
performance. 
Past: Trial 1
If  you see any of those baggy pants….Mr Bojangles…
please,  it  was  trees…..it…it…it…is  like  that…Mr
Bojangles…
Sitting downstage right was a grey haired and moustached Einstein,
wild hair  flailing as he played a violin.  The stenographers tapped
away at their imaginary keyboards, members of the jury knitted, the
judges conferred, and the lawyer’s monologue continued.
Mr Bojangles…Mr Bojangles…
The judges made notes as the man with the briefcase stood almost
motionless upstage right. 
Mr Bojangles…if you see any of those baggy pants…
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The man with the briefcase swung his arms and case towards stage
left. There was stillness as Einstein continued to play his violin. A
woman on stage left faced upstage and read incessantly from left to
right  and  right  to  left.  The  image  of  a  handless  clock  appeared
above the judges. 
Present: Clock watching 
The inclusion of clocks and watches in  Einstein on the Beach was
not a coincidence. Rather than being a biographical presentation of
Einstein’s  life,  the  opera  took  a  thematic  approach  in  its  use  of
references to  the scientist’s  public  and private  personas.  As with
The Life and Times of Sigmund Freud (1969) and A Letter to Queen
Victoria (1974),  Wilson’s  approach  did  not  entail  an  accurate
depiction of a life but a montage of loosely connected stage pictures.
In  Einstein,  the  performers  wore  wristwatches  and  various  clock
faces appeared, most notably in the final Spaceship scene where
the clock hands flew rapidly  around the clock face,  suggesting a
complete loss of clock measured time. 
Past: Trial 1
No! No! No!
The  music  seemed  to  increase  in  pace  and  intensity.  The
downstage  stenographer  leant  back  and  was  greeted  with  an
expression  of  shock  from  her  colleague.  As  she  leant  forwards
again, the iterating No! increased in frequency, volume and speed.
The actions of the jury appeared idiosyncratic and intense as the
two  judges  made  notes,  rapidly  and  dexterously  moving  pencils
through their fingers. 
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If  you see any of these baggy pants Mr Bojangles…so
this is about the things on the table…if you answer the
telephone…please it was… 
The briskly continuing monologue stood apart from the stillness that
was now on stage.  As the jury continued to make hurried notes,
Einstein played his violin. A change in music saw the stenographers
stand  and  shake  as  the  Mr  Bojangles  speaker  checked  her
wristwatch. As the music increased in tempo there was stasis and
occasional movement as my personal experience of time continued
to be misshapen into a heterogeneous duration, facilitated by the
opportunity to appreciate each element of the scene in detail.  
Present: Heterogeneous duration 
The heterogeneity of duration is important in Bergson’s philosophy
of  time;  for  moments  to  be  different  they  must  relate  to  another
moment but  not  be identified as existing in  isolation (Fell,  2012).
Moore (1996)  notes Bergson’s  heterogeneity  involves “complexity
rather  than  multiplicity”  (p.  64)  in  accounting  for  the  identity  and
quality of individual moments. Borrowing from Bergson’s example of
notes in a tune, Fell (2012) states that although “entwined with each
other, [the notes] produce a different effect on the listener and in this
they remain distinct from each other” (p. 89). Fell also observes that
the components of tea (liquid, heat and sweetness) can all produce
different effects although they cannot appear separately but,  “it  is
their  effects  in  the  first  place  that  make  us  distinguish  them  as
individual  qualities”  (p.  89).  Thus  duration  as  a  qualitative  non-
numerical multiplicity:
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must be the interrelatedness of all qualities involved in its
construction. For if there are distinct qualities, they must
produce  distinct  relations  with  each  other,  or  else  the
difference between the qualities  would  fade away,  and
the  heterogeneity,  the  multiplicity  of  qualities,  would
collapse into homogeneity, and become just one quality.
(Fell, 2012, p. 88) 
Past: Trial 1
The man with the briefcase moved downstage centre and stood on
his right leg, suitcase propelled forwards. This began a new stage
picture  as  other  members  of  the  company,  looking  in  different
directions,  supplemented  this  tableaux  vivant.93 The  brown paper
bags were opened to reveal in each one a plastic cup and biscuit,
both drink and food were consumed slowly. A woman read rapidly
as  crumbs  scattered  on  the  floor.  The  music  stopped  as  the
performers returned the cups to the bags. There was silence as they
all looked at their wristwatches, then rubbed their foreheads “as if
troubled by a dark, secret thought” (Holmberg, 2002, p. 15). 
Present: Effortless effort
Despite  my  experience  of  duration  in  Einstein  being  one  of
heterogeneity  -  whereby  the  spatial  and  therefore  quantitative
(scientific)  division  of  time  disappeared  -  the  plot,  according  to
Quadri, Bertoni and Stearns (1997) concentrates on “the relationship
between the actor  and the stage, [appearing]  almost  scientifically
determined … in the contrast of gesture and rhythm” (1998, p. 22). It
is certainly scientifically determined in the sense that there was a
precision  in  individual  movements,  giving  me  a  heightened
93
 I use this term, not to suggest that the picture was still, but that it had a
quality of stillness, with tiny physical fluctuations such as one might expect in a
tableaux vivant. 
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awareness of their corporeal presence. There is an irony that the
scientifically  determined  construction  of  Einstein  should  work  in
opposition to the scientific precision of clock-time, thus eroding the
mastery  of  time  so  important  to  the  functions  of  late  capitalist
societies. This notion of social times  persisting “in a discontinuous
succession and change in a continuity of heterogeneous moments”
(Gurvitch, 1964, p.  15) suggests the dynamic quality attributed to
duration by Bergson.94    
Throughout Einstein, my experience of an increased awareness and
immersion  in  the  physical  presence  of  the  performers  led  me to
consider the stages of Csikszentmihalyi’s flow model.95 By becoming
immersed  in  the  activity  (stage  two),  paying  attention  to  what  is
happening  (stage  three),  and  learning  to  enjoy  immediate
experience  (stage  four)  a  spectator  is  able  to  move  towards  a
fulfilling  experience  thus,  I  argue,  establishing  the  conditions  for
Bergsonian duration which, as with flow, requires a degree of effort:
A relaxed, laissez-faire attitude is not a sufficient defence
[against chaos] … to be able to transform random events
into flow, one must develop skills that stretch capacities,
that  make  one  become  more  than  what  one  is.  Flow
drives  individuals  to  creativity  and  outstanding
achievement.  (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008, p. 213)
This  effort  may  have  been  recognized  in  the  first  stage  of  goal
setting, although the goals may be developed intuitively. Similarly,
the sense of intuition that enables duration to be experienced and
understood  as  the  flow  of  inner  life  happens  through  effort.  For
Bergson (1903/1999), it was only through an effort of intuition that “I
immediately  perceive  …[that]…  this  sense,  an  inner,  absolute
94
 See Chapter Three (pp. 40-41) for a fuller discussion of Gurvitch and the
‘mastery’ of time. 
95
 Csikszentmihalyi identifies the first stage as ‘goal setting’. 
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knowledge of the self by the self is possible” (p. 31). I found the first
trial scene required a sense of effort although, paradoxically, there
was  an  effortlessness  accompanying  it.  It  was  almost  like  the
description  by  Csikszentmihalyi  and  Robinson  (1990)  of  the  art
viewer’s  “initial  perceptual  hook  followed  by  a  more  detached,
intellectual appreciation that returns the viewer to the work with a
deeper understanding” (p. 118). 
Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson summarize the model of interaction
in the aesthetic experience in diagrammatic form:
Figure 14: Representation of the model of interaction in aesthetic experience  
(adapted from Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson, 1990, p. 134)
The diagram demonstrates that the artwork, the artist and the viewer
will never align fully in “complete congruence, [and] there would be
nothing that was not already known and the object would hold no
interest” (p. 134). For the aesthetic interaction to be most effective it
“always maintains some element of itself beyond the viewer’s range
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of skills [and] is clearly the kind of work that will retain the ability to
change, at least experientially, through time” (p. 136). There is this
same  quality  in  Wilson’s  work.  The  ability  to  engage  with  tiny
imperceptible  changes experientially  makes viewing  Einstein  very
much  like  viewing  a  painting  that,  when  viewed  (and  for  me,
remembered) on a number of occasions, more detail is perceived. 
In the model of aesthetic interactions, the viewer’s effort is required
to  invest  more  deeply  in  their  appreciation  of  the  artwork  under
inspection,  attentional  focus  being  a  key  feature  of  the  aesthetic
experience.  The  respondents  in  Csikszentmihalyi  and  Robinson’s
(1990) study spoke of “another kind of attentional  focus that  was
intermittent in nature, in which they felt drawn to an object over and
over  again”  (p.  120).  In  Einstein I  was  challenged  to  invest  in
aesthetic  interactions,  an  effort  that  produced  effortlessness.
Challenge, as “one of the primary structural qualities of the aesthetic
experience” (Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson, 1990, p. 128) is also
evident in flow. In the latter, skill and challenge present the subject
with a means to have an optimal experience. Thus the presented
challenge and effort of intuiting a discovery of real duration leading
to a flow experience was offered in Einstein. 
Past: Field 1
A magnolia stage that is bare except for the dancers. Dressed in
khaki trousers and white t-shirts, the dancers moved on and off the
stage,  performing  repetitive  patterns  of  movement:  “postmodern
choreography,  running,  jogging,  leaping,  spinning.  The  spinning
leaves  the  dominant  impression:  a  mystical  trance”  (Holmberg,
2002, p. 15). The relentless music, with its layers of voices, was in
fact  just  two women.  The flowing yet angular movements of the
dancers continued for what seemed like an age yet also passed by
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quickly.  The  patterns  gradually  changed  as  the  dance  continued
and, part way through, a small white spaceship began to descend
from stage left, moved towards stage right and exited as the dance
sequence drew to a close.96 
Blackout. 
Present: The feeling of control 
Holmberg (2002) notes much of Wilson’s work involves ballet and
movement, that “[a]nyone who cannot read movement will go astray
in  Wilsonland”  (p.  135).  Sheryl  Sutton,  who  worked  with  Wilson
many  times,  most  notably  on  Deafman  Glance and  the  original
production of  Einstein  reported, “[w]e didn’t miss words. We didn’t
need them. We shared a physical vocabulary … [w]e got to know
each other through movement” (as cited in Holmberg, 2002, p. 134).
In  Wilson  and  his  collaborators’  work  movement  is  of  primary
importance and is free from the constraints of language:
Western theatre, by letting language ride roughshod over
all, has castrated movement into an afterthought – like so
many commas, semi-colons, and apostrophes scribbled
atop  a  sentence  to  clarify  verbal  meaning.  Not  so  in
Wilson,  and  the  way  he  works  explains  the  primal
importance he accords movement.  (Holmberg, 2002, p.
135)
96
 An alternative description of this first ballet can be found in Stefan Brecht’s
(2007) analysis of the first production of Einstein on the Beach:
[I]n  addition  to  a  moderate  amount  of  intermittent  turning
about  oneself  in  place,  the  dancing  consists  of  running,  a  steady
shower of runs, with turns and bends, and, especially, leaps, arms
and legs out,  interspersed with just standing or bouncing lightly in
place. (p. 340). 
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Thus  there  was  a  freedom  given  to  me  as  a  spectator  in
understanding these movement sequences in Einstein. Whilst it may
be true that one has to be able to ‘read’ movement, the complexity
and  depth  with  which  one  reads  it  is  of  significance.  Unlike
‘traditional’  ballet,  where each movement has a specific meaning,
the contemporary ballets of Einstein allowed me to make sense of it
with  my  own vocabulary,  thus  being  free  to  explore  beyond  any
specific choreographic language. The apparent freedom given to the
spectator by the choreographer relinquishing fixed meaning placed
me as a spectator in control  or,  at  least,  not  in danger  of  losing
control. 
During Einstein, this feeling of control was apparent, as a feeling in
controlling my ability to sustain my enjoyment. Of course, this may
have changed in accordance to my response to specific moments.
For example, the Field scenes, which occur twice in the production,
are  a  display  of  repetitive  dance  moves,  lasting  around  twenty
minutes. At the start of the first dance piece I was rationalizing my
decision to take a break (as attendees at this event are famously
encouraged  to  do),  as  I  anticipated  this  section  being  the  least
engaging. After a couple of minutes, I found that I was being drawn
in and, whilst it was challenging to watch the action and listen to the
music, I was enthralled and captivated by the sheer skill, relentless
energy  and  mesmerizing  spectacle  presented  by  the  dancers.  In
contrast to the rest of the production, both of the dance sequences
occurred on an ‘empty’97 stage except  for  the  spaceship  passing
slowly by. Whilst other scenes were slow in unfolding and provided a
number of different elements to watch, the bare stage left me little
choice but to engage with the dancers and their bodies in space.
97
 I  acknowledge  that  the  notion  of  an  ‘empty’  stage  is  debatable.  For
example, Henri Lefebvre argues space can act as an authoritarian force and, as
such,  cannot  be  truly  empty:  “Every  space  is  already  in  place  before  the
appearance in it of actors … The subject experiences space as an obstacle … as
implacably hard as a concrete wall” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 57). 
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The original choreography for  Einstein, created by Andy De Groat
depended,  according  to  Richard  Kostelanetz  (1994)  on  “spinning
whereas  …[it]…  is  mostly  circular  spinning”  in  Lucinda  Child’s
choreography (p. 43). Childs’ choreography differs from De Groat’s
in  that  she  “emphasizes  strong,  clean  lines  and  is  mathematical
rather than mystical” (Holmberg, 2002, p. 15). This moment of flow
was a further example of it also being a peak-experience. As I was
drawn into watching the choreography, I felt – as in moments during
Medea -   a sense of something important occurring. My knowledge
and earlier reflection on Medea did, however, produce a somewhat
different  effect;  I  considered  the  after-effects  of  peak-experience
whilst still in the moment. Notably, I experienced a sense of “greater
creativity,  spontaneity,  expressiveness,  idiosyncrasy … as a  very
desirable happening” that I would seek to repeat (Maslow, 1971, p.
102). 
Present: Just clicks
In this scene, my experience of flow derived from the scopophilic
experience of seeing the way the dancers themselves appeared to
be in flow. It may be mere conjecture to suggest that this  was the
experience of the dancers, but there is research to suggest that the
act  of  dancing  causes  “a  moment  where  everything  ‘just  clicks’”
(Hefferon & Ollis, 2006, p. 148). In a study of professional dancers,
Hefferon & Ollis’s  results  determined that  there were “three main
higher  order  themes  consistent  with  Csikszentmihalyi‘s  [work  on
flow]: the autotelic98 experience, challenge vs. skill and absorption in
the  task”  (p.  141).  Using  Interpretive  Phenomenological  Analysis
(IPA),  the  researchers  interviewed  a  number  of  dancers,  who
described their experiences. Although I am discussing flow from the
perspective  of  a  spectator,  the  results  of  this  research  are
98
 See Chapter Seven (pp.174-5) for an explanation of autotelic. 
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nevertheless  illuminating.  The  complexity  of  a  dance  was
considered significant  by  many of  the  respondents,  that  when “a
piece  had  become  too  familiar  and  repetitive  or  else  was
insignificant to the company as a whole, they were not able to reach
their original flow state” (p. 149). Whilst Childs’ apparently repetitious
choreography might make its execution more straightforward, it  is
the  repetition  that  makes  it  challenging  for  the  dancer.  As  with
Glass’s complex use of solfège, Childs’ choreography is intense and
insists  on  total  investment  from the  dancer.  Like  Wilson’s  strictly
timed  movements  of  both  performer  and  set,  it  may  be  the
“architectural,  geometric  structures  of  Childs's  own  dances  [that]
allows her a feeling of liberty” (Sulcas, 2001, para. 3). The dancers
in  Hefferon  &  Ollis’s  study  reported  the  similar  feeling  of  liberty,
manifested  in  a  loss  of  consciousness.  Within  this  loss  of
consciousness was a distortion of time: 
[For]  [d]ancers  …  experiencing  flow,  time  seemed  to
either slow down, increase or not exist at all. In addition
to time distortion, complete concentration, intense focus
and elimination of all thought occurred. The dancers were
so focused on the task at hand that there was no room
left for any task irrelevant stimuli or thoughts. (2006, p.
150)
Bergson suggests in  Matter and Memory,  that the “body is at the
centre of action, the place where the impressions received choose
intelligently  the path  they will  follow to  transform themselves into
movements accomplished” (1896/1910, p. 178). I suggest this “state
of becoming … duration which is in the process of growth” (Bergson,
1896/1910, p. 178), may have been the experience of being in the
present  for  the  dancers  in  Einstein.  For  the  dancer,  the  intense
concentration required to execute the movements illuminates their
awareness of the “consciousness that I have of my body” (Bergson,
1896/1910, p. 177). 
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The dancers in this study described a kind of total absorption in the
act of dancing, with music being an important element of this sense
of immersion. Many of the dancers reported that it was important to
make a connection with the music. The seemingly repetitious nature
of Glass’s score, with its subtle changes, would make the counting
of beats problematic and so the dancer who is able to let the music
inhabit them is more likely to be in flow. One dancer in the study
confirms this:
If I am doing something really fast and it requires a huge
amount  of  concentration,  I  wouldn’t  get  into  flow.  I  am
thinking  about  the  counts,  isolation,  achieving  the
position, right place at the right time. If  you have more
space and time in the movement and music, I find that
there is more of a chance to get into flow. (Hefferon &
Ollis, 2006, p. 152) 
This complexity enabling flow produced empathy with the dancers in
my  spectatorial  experience  of  Einstein.  Presented  with  a
performance  of  such  density  and  intricacy,  surrender  to  flow
becomes easier than having to consciously invest in a performance,
as one might when watching, for example, a ‘traditional’ production
of  Shakespeare’s  Hamlet,  Chekhov’s  Three  Sisters,  or  Tony
Harrison’s The Mysteries.99 
Past: Train 2
A simple melody began playing on a keyboard. A single chair was lit
downstage  right.  As  the  lights  began  to  reveal  a  blue  tinged
panorama, I could see a shell on stage. Two figures standing inside
a caboose became visible as they began to lip-synch to the singers
99
 I have chosen these examples because they are both Shakespeare’s and
Chekhov’s longest plays; Harrison’s mystery cycle was performed over one entire
day at the National Theatre. 
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in the orchestra pit below. This repetition of a train (this time from a
different angle) was an allusion to Einstein’s famous illustration of
relativity using the example of a moving train and a bystander.  The
woman, dressed in a  white  dress and white hat  evocative of  the
Victorian era,  was something I  saw as a reference to the age in
which Einstein was born. The man was in evening wear – a bow tie
and starched white shirt. A crescent moon appeared stage right as
the rhythm built and changed. They did not look at each other as
they sang. The man stepped outside of the carriage and looked out
at the audience. As he ran his white-gloved hands along the rail I
noticed a single bulb was lit inside the carriage. The woman joined
him on  the  balcony,  raising  her  left  hand  before  lowering  it  and
looking away. The man reached into his jacket with his right hand
and pulled out a pocket watch. He looked at the watch and then
returned it to his jacket pocket. As the woman looked at the man I
noticed that there were clouds in the sky. The man reached into his
jacket pocket with his right hand, removed his watch and checked
the time. He looked up as if suddenly startled by something. The
woman looked away. The singing continued.
1 2 3 4 5 6-1 2 3 4 5 6-1 2 3 4 5 6-1 2 3 4 5 6
Their hands rose until  they were almost touching before lowering
once again. The singing continued. 
1 2 3 4 5 6-1 2 3 4 5 6-1 2 3 4 5 6-1 2 3 4 5 6
As they sang, the woman moved her hand and body towards the
man.  They  separated  as  the  moon  gradually  enlarged.  As  the
singing ceased, the man reached for his pocket watch and held it in
front of him. He replaced the watch in his pocket with the moon in
full view. Moving his right hand towards the woman, he looked away
and then towards her. They looked at each other in an instant and
moved towards each other. The woman stepped inside the carriage
and  stood  in  profile  towards  stage  left.  The  man  re-entered  the
carriage  and  stood  in  profile  towards  stage  right.  As  they  both
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looked outwards towards the audience, the moon began to return to
a crescent shape. The woman raised a gun with her left hand and
pointed it towards the man. He looked at her as the moon faded out.
Raising  his  hands  in  surrender,  he  looked  outwards  with  an
expression of horror. 
Present: The quality of dreams 
This  scene  is  described  by  Brecht  (2007)  as  “an  exquisite
confection,  superbly  staged  in  the  B’way  style  …  a  Romantic
phantasy”  (p.  342)  yet,  shortly  afterwards,  as  “crap”  (p.  343)  in
reference to the image. For Brecht, the scene is held together by the
song: “the song conveys a feeling, - a perfect night, - the song …
complemented by the image … would it would last forever” (p. 343).
Like other train scenes, this scene made a clear visual reference to
Einstein’s theory of relativity and the heralding of the atomic age that
arrived  in  the  mid-20th century.  The  antiquated  setting  of  the
caboose and its Victorian occupants was an image that changed
little for the length of the scene, suggesting to me that Wilson and
Glass were playing with notions of relativity.
Cunningham (as cited in Kostelanetz & Fleming, 1999) elucidates
further about why this scene exemplifies Einstein’s illustration of the
theory of relativity:
[T]ime  in  the  carriage,  were  it  actually  moving,  would
appear  to  be  passing  at  an  imperceptibly  slower  rate
relative to the viewer’s time, with even this rate getting
slower  as  the  train  accelerates  away  from the  viewer.
This … is used by Wilson and Glass as the basis for this
scene; they emphasize it by having the characters on the
train move extremely slowly and finally cease to move at
all. (p. 158) 
24
I was drawn into the scene and because it appeared to be moving
slowly,  the  experience  of  duration  had  a  dream-like  quality.  The
rhythm  and  patterns  of  the  music,  with  its  use  of  numbers  and
solfège, supplemented this oneiric effect. In examining the original
1976 production, Craig Owens (1977) concurs that there are oneiric
elements of Einstein: 
Because of the frequent arbitrariness of the selection of
the images, no detail being too insignificant for inclusion,
as  well  as  the  freedom  with  which  associations  were
made  –  organization  was  neither  chronological  nor
thematic  –  Wilson’s  work  has  been  compared  with
dreams. (p. 24) 
The music in this scene had a lulling effect on my body as, like the
experience of travelling on a train, the clicking of the track and the
motion of the carriage imbued sleep. It was, however, not a sleeping
state that I found myself in, but a waking dream. Bergson asserted
that  “[i]n  the dream we often become  indifferent to  logic,  but  not
incapable of logic” (Bergson, 1920, p. 122). Whilst he was writing
about dreaming in a state of sleep, this notion of making logic from
dream like  experiences  resonates  with  my  understanding  of  this
scene in  Einstein.  For Bergson, dreaming is “the state into which
you naturally fall when you let yourself go, when you no longer care
to concentrate yourself on a single point, when you cease to will”
(1920, p. 126). Similarly, this instant was one in which I was able to
surrender to the moment and, although there was still concentration
(on multiple points), it was effortless, generating a flow experience. 
Csikszentmihalyi  (2008)  suggests  that  activities  producing  a  flow
experience require concentration, whereby an individual focuses on
the  task  in  hand  and  “leaves no  room in  the  mind for  irrelevant
information” (p. 58), providing “order to consciousness, inducing the
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enjoyable  experience of  psychic  negentropy”  (p.  59).  The  oneiric
experience evoked by  Einstein, in which my perception of duration
was altered, was a product of being fully immersed in the moment,
of being capable of finding logic in our experience whilst not actually
needing to  understand  in  any  logical  way.  This  capability  of
understanding something whilst being indifferent to it, corresponds
with  our  relationship  with  clock-measured  time  (as  logical)  and
duration  (not  illogical,  and  incapable  of  being  explained  through
logic). The desire to understand clearly, indisputably and in a logical
way has always been outside the remit of Wilson’s theatre work, as
is the need to give one’s complete attention to the entire length of a
performance. In a BBC interview with Glass at the time of the 2012
revival of Einstein, he commented, “we've taught our audiences bad
viewing  habits.  Short  attention  spans  and  stories  that  are  very
recognisable. However, I think that's going to change now” (Sillito,
2012).  In  Einstein,  I  suggest  that  the  lack  of  plot  or  characters
actually made it very accessible as a piece of theatre and, as Glass
comments, “if you fall asleep, when you wake up it'll still be going
on” (Sillito, 2012). 
Past
The music changed and a woman entered stage left and picked up a
shell. Placing it to her ear, she listened. Stillness. A single chair sat
stage right. The woman looked upward, then turned suddenly to the
shell, looking at it longingly. The stage picture faded to black as she
returned to her first position. 
Present: Structure 
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Moments such as these, like the Knee Plays, were used as a way of
punctuating the  action and provided a  segue into  the  next  stage
picture.  Despite  the  clearly  identifiable  structural  elements  of
Einstein,  the piece remains resolutely non-linear. For Owens, it is
the  circulatory  nature  of  the  train-trial-field-train-trial-field
construction  that  “emphasizes  the  arbitrariness  of  Einstein’s
temporal  structure  …[and]…  [t]he  circularity  activated  by  that
formula [that]  effectively checks any linear development”  (Owens,
1977, p. 29). In some ways,  Einstein is configured mathematically,
using the same three images but “approached from a different angle
… [taking  on]  the  form of  a  portrait,  a  still  life,  or  a  landscape”
(Quadri, Bertoni, & Stearns, 1998, p. 21).
This emphasis on the cyclical  further emphasizes the defiance of
temporal  logic  in  Einstein.  Whilst  the  piece  followed  this  logical
structure, there was no attempt to show time moving forwards in any
linear (logical) way. Instead, the piece challenged the logic of clock-
measured time and evoked a sense of duration that proffered an
absolute reality “as revealed by metaphysical intuition [in] the ever-
rolling stream of  time”  (Goudge,  1999,  p.  12).  The experience of
compressed time in Einstein is  commonly  reported  as  audiences
feel the almost five-hour performance has passed by very quickly,
something  Susan  Broadhurst  (2012)  echoes  in  her  study  of
temporality in Einstein:  “In contrast to the real Einstein’s conjecture
of what would be experienced when travelling at near light-speed,
our subjective sense of duration has apparently accelerated while
‘objective’ time has continued normally” (p. 36).
Past: Trial 2
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The courtroom scene reappeared with the two judges seated behind
the bench. As the stenographers appeared they mimicked the action
of  a  tiger  or  cat.   Four  performers  entered from stage right  and
assumed a seated position. As members of the jury entered stage
left, a woman in white entered stage right and sat on a chair placed
on  a  raised  platform  followed  by  a  man  who  joined  her  after
mimicking the action of a tiger or cat. The woman in white looked at
ease as the clerk appeared, providing no clues as to whether she
was on trial  or was, in fact, a witness. The performers who were
sitting  stage  left  exited  along  with  the  younger  judge.  The  clerk
moved slowly to stage left as the woman in white stepped down from
her  seat.  The  same  horizontal  light  from  the  previous  scenes
descended as the woman in white stood face to face with the clerk.
As  she  smiled,  the  tempo  of  the  music  increased  whilst  the
courtroom setting was slowly erased. The woman in white moved
towards the jury and stenographers on stage right; she leant back
on a large rostrum, lay down and faced towards the audience. 
On  stage  left,  two  prisoners  entered  in  striped  uniforms  as  the
woman in white began a lengthy and repetitive monologue. 
I was in this prematurely air-conditioned supermarket…I
was reminded of the fact  that I  had been avoiding the
beach…
Present: Dissecting time 
This  monologue,  written  by  Childs,  is  reminiscent  of  the  use  of
dialogue in her earlier dance work. In the 1960s “she incorporated
monologues in the dances …[but]… did not try to make coherent
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illustration  of  the  subject  matter  but,  rather,  created  a  scattered
context of words, movements, and objects” (Banes, 1987, p. 134).
The repetition of this monologue (thirty-five times in total) acts as “a
mantra, it puts the spectator into a trance” (Holmberg, 2002, p. 55).
Holmberg  suggests  that  the  next  scene  –  a  “postmodern  ballet
structured around hypnotic spinning catches us unawares” (p. 55)
and  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  trial  scene.  This  moment  was
significant in its reference to a beach, the single such allusion to the
title of the opera. The division of the stage into courtroom / prison
suggested  an  attempt  to  change  the  experience  of  duration  by
disrupting  what  was  an  already  familiar  stage  picture.100 The
dissection of the stage into two halves implies that even the cyclical
nature of  time in  Einstein can be dislocated,  as the recognizable
train-trial-field  format  was  challenged.  The  train  scenes  were
disrupted  in  a  similar  fashion,  presenting  the  train  from different
perspectives. 
 The prisoners carried out an “angular seated dance … perhaps a
dance  of  interminable  waiting  …[or]… a  dance  of  suspense  and
desperation’” punctuated by occasional glances at the audience with
an expression of horror (Brecht, 2007, p. 348). This “slow, angular
movement  sequence  [was]  not  related  to  the  music”  (Holmberg,
2002, p. 54), but was another example of Wilson’s ability to bring
incongruous elements together into a harmonious stage picture.  
Past: Field 2
The dancers reappeared and began a series of seemingly repetitive
patterns of movement. Einstein, who sat downstage right playing the
violin, led the relentless and powerful music emanating from the pit.
A strip of white light ran horizontally across the cyclorama. The lights
100
 The first Trial scene was built very slowly and therefore remained in my
memory as a strong image. 
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faded and the dancers moved in silhouette. The dancers turned in
circles that developed into leaps and jumps. Illuminated once again,
I observed that they responded to the sporadic changes in tempo. A
large  white  circular  spaceship  appeared  upstage  right  and
descended,  moving  slowly  towards  stage  right  where  it  exited.
Blackout. 
Present: A unity of duration 
Broadhurst (2012) suggests that this sequence draws comparisons
with cinematic slow motion whilst also being more complex in that
with musical “phrases of twenty to twenty-eight rapid notes, some
dancers gyrate ‘in time’, while others’ formalistic slow motion takes
each of these phrases as a single beat” (p. 38). She regards this as
being like action replays in sport broadcasts, and even seeing it as a
“further defamiliarization device, making the stage action not present
to us, but as if it is already recollected by us, an item or memory or
dream” (p.38). Building on earlier moments that induced a state of
dreaming in me, this oneiric quality was used throughout Einstein to
alter  my  perception  of  duration.  Equally,  the  lack  of  clear  linear
progression was substituted by spiral or helical time,101 where “we
are  going  round  and  round,  but  travelling  somewhere  new”
(Broadhurst, 2012, p. 39). The sense of the unfamiliar suggested by
the music, scenic elements and bodies in performance created my
sense of duration “as a multiplicity of moments bound to each other
by  a  unity  which  goes  through  them  like  a  thread”  (Bergson,
1903/1999, p. 47). In other words, the sense of clock-constructed
time  was  replaced  with  a  homogeneous  unity  of  discrete  and
undecipherable moments, distinct from the socially accelerated view
of time. 
101
 See Chapter Six (pp. 111-112) for a discussion of time viewed as a helix. 
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Past: Building 
I  was aware of intensive and relentless keyboard music as a tall
building,  resembling  brick  appeared against  a  blue  backdrop.   A
woman (who I understood to be representative of the eponymous
scientist)  sat  in  an  upper  window whilst  a  saxophone  played.  A
single chair was lit downstage right. The woman in the window wrote
in  the  air,  as  if  making  calculations,  juxtaposed  with  occasional
stillness. A woman entered stage right, rapidly turning her head from
left  to  right  and  right  to  left,  as  she  read  a  black-covered  book.
Moving towards the apron of the stage, she stopped and continued
her incessant devouring of the printed word. A large man entered,
stopped centre stage and froze in a piercing expression of joy. A boy
with a skateboard, previously seen as a judge, entered with others
as the picture built into a gently shifting tableaux vivant. There was a
gradual collective look downstage and then a turn upwards to the
window of  the building where the woman still  sat.  As the picture
returned to its original image we were plunged into blackness. 
Present: Finding submodalities 
Although it has been suggested that the silhouette of the building in
this scene is the same as the previous image of the train, there is
not an obvious association because, as Brecht (2007) suggests, “the
mood of the two scenes is so utterly different” (p. 354). The slowly
building stage picture in  this  scene provided me with  a sense of
structure, as I had an expectation that the scene would continue to
build in a logical way.102 There was a cyclical sense of time in this
scene,  as  the  image  reached  a  crescendo  and  diminished  in
apparently equal measures before returning to its original image of a
102
 Despite all of my assertions about the illogical structures on which Einstein
is built and my experience of it as inducing flow and duration, the deeply ingrained
expectation of logic returned to my thoughts at various moments. 
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lone  scientist  performing  calculations.  This  circularity  of  time,
however, implies repetition, something which Bergson saw as only
being possible in the abstract, whereas real duration is something
that “gnaws on things, and leaves on them the mark of its tooth”
(Bergson, 1907/2008, p. 46). Despite the recognizable structure of
this scene, my experience of duration was one that defied temporal
organization because:
we live …[and]… life transcends intellect. The feeling we
have of our evolution and of the evolution of all things in
pure  duration  is  there,  forming  around  the  intellectual
concept properly so-called an indistinct fringe that fades
off into darkness. (Bergson, 1907/2008, p. 46) 
Thus the sense of time we use to quantify intellectual concepts is
diminished through thinking in terms of duration. 
This building scene is the clearest examples in Einstein of a slowly
developing stage picture.  As a whole this  particular  stage picture
seemed to remain in a state of stillness for much longer than other
scenes,  thus  allowing  for  an  increased  opportunity  for  me  to
appreciate  its  subtleties  and  in  my  memory  of  the  scene,  its
submodalities. In Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP), an individual
may remember an experience focusing on the senses experienced:
visual, auditory and kinesthetic modalities. In the field of NLP, the
submodalities are defined as the “fine distinctions we make within
each  representational  system,  the  qualities  of  internal
representations and the  smallest  building blocks of  our  thoughts”
(O’Connor,  2001,  p.  281).  Within  these  modalities,  NLP  trainers
suggest submodalities are found and reflect the differences in what
different  people  find  attractive.  In  exploring  submodalities,  the
“image of what’s most important or compelling is often leaning out
toward them” (Andreas & Faulkner, 2008, p. 71). In an explanation
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of  NLP  in  action,  Andreas  and  Faulkner  (2008)  report  that
respondents found some of the experiences ‘very attractive’, were
brighter, in colour, in front, and used sounds or words. In contrast,
the ‘don’t  care’  responses were often darker,  in  black and white,
situated to the side, and were silent.  For me, it  was the smallest
details in my memory of the building scene that drew my interest. I
recall  that  I  was unaware of the colours although I  was certainly
conscious of the scene being brightly lit; in contrast to the Train and
Trial scenes, this image was illuminated to a greater extent.  The
central positioning of the building itself was a significant part of the
stage picture, as was the comparative variety of the saxophone solo
played throughout the scene – notably different in mood from the
apparent repetition of the music in other scenes. Nevertheless, the
smallest details of the scene stood out for me; the book held in the
performer’s hand, the piercing facial expression of joy on the large
man’s face, even the individual bricks that made up the building’s
façade were significant details. This attention to the submodalities in
the stage picture contributed to my sense of flow both in the moment
and in subsequent recognition of it, found in the smallest details of
an experience. 
I  suggest that the rewarding scopophilic experience, which comes
from  noticing  the  smallest  details  in  this  scene,  is  echoed  in
Csikszentmihalyi’s assertions about the joys of seeing. Arguing that
most people only seem to use their eyes “to keep from stepping on
the cat, or to find the car keys” (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008, p. 107), he
suggests that there are visual skills we can use to have enjoyable
experiences.  Csikszentmihalyi cites examples from individuals who
describe seeing favourite paintings and the pleasure gained from
looking, even giving the sense of shock “a body feels when diving
into a pool of cold water” (p. 107). He also suggests that mundane
sights, such as views from the window on a train journey to work can
provide pleasurable visual experiences. Crucially, the ability to take
pleasure from visual experiences has the same foundations as all
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flow activities; being in control (or the perception of being in control)
enables us to be “transformed by the same sense of exhilaration”
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2008, p. 108).
This joy of seeing and being in control during such experiences may
also  strengthen  an  individual’s  sense  of  being,  as  they  become
increasingly  aware  of  the  efficacy  of  B-Values.  The  feelings  of
aliveness, uniqueness and effortlessness attributed to moments in
Hotel  Medea were  also  felt  during  Einstein;  as  I  experienced  B-
Values as “facets of Being rather than parts of it” (Maslow, 2010, p.
78). Experiencing flow during Einstein reinforced my understanding
of  B-Values  explored  during  my  reflection  on  Hotel  Medea;  that
transient moments of peak-experience may be sought to an extent,
as I learned to recognize my self-actualization. 
Past: Spaceship 
When the stage was illuminated I saw the interior of a spaceship
(see Figure 15),  its horizontal,  vertical  and diagonal veins of light
spread across the back wall. Stage left, a boy (who I saw as the boy
Einstein) in a glass elevator rose vertically as the clock hands above
him spun round disregarding time. As the boy banged his fists on
the front of the glass elevator, the scene burst into a cacophony of
music  and  voices,  courtesy  of  onstage  musicians  and  offstage
voices. Downstage right were two small spaceships – flying saucers
from the pages of a 1950s comic. A second glass elevator moved
across  the  stage  as  the  silhouetted  figures  made  rapid  and
relentless  calculations,  moving  the  opera  inexorably  towards  its
conclusion.  Einstein,  sat  downstage  right,  played  his  violin  as
fragments of dialogue infused the music.
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…get some wind for the sailboat…
A woman stood centre stage and looked through a telescope as if
looking for a way out of the discord of sounds and images. Lights
were being waved around downstage right by a blacked out figure,
as  if  directing  air  traffic  or  beckoning  in  the  nuclear  age.  The
performance  reached  towards  its  climax  showing  Einstein  as  a
“latter-day Doctor Faustus, whose will  to know leads him and the
rest of us to the abyss … end[ing] not with a whimper, but with a big
nuclear bang” (Holmberg, 2002, p. 11).  
Figure 15: Spaceship Interior (Barbican, 2012. Photo credit: Lucie Jansch)
A single small rocket flew diagonally across a blackened stage from
stage right to left. As we were returned to the spaceship, the figure
directing air traffic was more visible as the lights became brighter. A
man dressed in black flew diagonally upwards through the air from
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stage  left  as  the  two  women  from  the  first  Knee  Play  crawled
towards  the  audience  downstage  right.  They  leant  forwards,
prostrated  as  if  grateful  to  have survived  a  nuclear  blast,  before
beginning to look up and move to a bench that had been brought on
stage right. Sitting down, they began to repeat the opening dialogue
as the bus appeared slowly from stage left, driven by the judge. The
bus – a replacement for the train and an indication that we were now
firmly in the 20th century – occupied the same stage left position as
the  earlier  train.  The  dialogue  spoken  by  the  bus  driver  was
“couched  in  a  level  of  diction  too  elevated  for  its  banality  …
bring[ing] Einstein on the Beach to a close, not with a whimper, not
with  a  bang,  but  with  a joke  on language and its  relationship  to
reality” (Holmberg, 2002, pp. 17-8).
These were the days my friends…
Blackout. 
Present
Stefan  Brecht’s  detailed  description  of  Einstein,  based  on  the
original 1976 production, provides an analysis that is as scientific as
the work of its eponymous hero.  Despite Brecht’s analysis offering a
different  understanding  of  Einstein  to  my  own  interpretation,  his
evaluation of the production is absolutely clear about the ambiguity
of Wilson’s images and Glass’s music in that “one sees pictures that
refuse to become stories” (2007, p. 370). This is much like Susan
Bennett’s  point  that  performance  is  distinct  from  conventional
theatre.  She  suggests  that  “performance  does  not  rely  upon
narrative  and  representation,  and  more  importantly,  it  refuses
meaning” (Bennett, 2005, p. 74).  Brecht (2007) also suggests:
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[I]n  watching  [Einstein]  the  elements  of  the  setting
emerge only as formal and incidental elements. They are
not perceived as subject matter, nor in their own nature,
nor do their relations to one another or, especially, to the
play’s persons, informs one’s experience of the play …
[o]ne  watches  appearances  and  enjoys  them
aesthetically.  The  play’s  content  remains  contingent  in
interpretation. (pp. 374-5) 
In  this  respect,  Einstein  provides a rich context  where “one sees
pictures that refuse to become stories” (Brecht, 2007, p. 370) -  a
context  in  which  to  explore  flow and a sense of  duration  that  is
distinct from clock-time. Brecht (2007) suggests Einstein  is a move
away from “duration to measured time … [coming] in sub-divided
pieces  [and]  is  marked  by  cuts  instead  of  by  beginnings  and
terminations” (p. 360). It seems paradoxical then, in a piece that is
regarded as much more temporally constructed than his previous
work,  that  Wilson  should  offer  his  audiences  an  experience  that
distorts conventional temporal understanding. For me, the concept
of  duration  was  reified  through  being  challenged  to  consume  a
seemingly impenetrable combination of performance circumstances.
Present: These are the days my friends
In his discussion of the intensity of performance, Richard Schechner
cites his early work with The Performance Group that relied on the
collective nature and energy of audiences, particularly in exploring
the  shared  spaces  of  his  environmental  theatre.  According  to
Schechner (1985), all performances produce the potential for flow;
citing  Wilson  he  notes,  “the  excruciatingly  slow  movements,
extruded over a period of hours,  of  …  Einstein  on the Beach …
develop[s] patterns of accumulating, if not accelerating intensities”
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(p. 11). This acceleration that Schechner suggests is true if Einstein
contravenes my experience of the performance as something unified
and  flowing.  However,  Schechner  also  argues  that
Csikszentmihalyi’s notion of flow results from live performance and
“affect[s]  people  individually  [but  does  not]  generate  collective
energies”  (p.  11).  This  observation  about  the  nature of  individual
versus collective energy and experience is pertinent to my preceding
detailed analysis of  Einstein; the idiosyncratic and highly subjective
nature of  flow was crucial  to  my exploration.   Thus,  Schechner’s
‘accelerated’  experience  of  Einstein  exemplifies  an  alternative
understanding of the production.103 The notion of collective energies
described  by  Schechner  is  explored  in  Chapter  Ten,  where  I
demonstrate  how  communitas  developed  during  Wilson’s  slowed
down participatory Walking. 
Crucially,  the  relationship  between  my flow  experience  and  my
encounter  with  a  heterogeneous  duration  is  what  made  this
particular performance of Einstein a conduit for transformation. It is a
transformation wherein a change of lens was made possible, a lens
through  which  to  view  an  alternative  to  a  socially  accelerated
culture. Heathfield (2009) argues durational performance - that is,
performance in which a “sense passage [where] corporeal attention
is drawn to (a) time reforming” – has the ability to open up to “other
phenomena or  inchoate orders”  (p.  22);  it  was these inchoate or
nascent orders that were exemplified as flow and duration for me at
the Barbican in May 2012. Ultimately, they are orders or ways of
thinking that  underpin the potential  for  transformation  against  the
milieu  of  a  synthetic  clock-time  culture  that  supports  social
acceleration. As Lara Shalson (2012) writes:
That resisting the artificial divisions of clock-time might be
103
 Although Schechner is also writing about a different production of Einstein
on the Beach, Glass and Wilson’s revivals have not deviated significantly since
1976. 
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connected to letting ourselves live; that art might be the
vehicle  through  which  we  learn  to  do  this:  these  are
persuasive arguments for the value of durational art … In
resisting the homogenizing and rationalizing structures of
the clock, durational performance puts us in touch with
qualitatively multiple, affectively rich, diverse and layered
experiences  that  exceed  capitalist  logics  of  value.  (p.
101) 
These  are  the  capitalist  logics  of  value  underpinning  a  socially
accelerated  culture,  logics  that  were  liberated  by  the  ‘layered
experiences’  in Einstein  and  its  resulting  transformation  through
flow,  as  well  as  building  on  my  understanding  of  duration
exemplified almost a year earlier in Hotel Medea. 
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Chapter Nine: Contextualizing Theories 3 – Turner & Bergson 
The field of performance studies owes a great deal to anthropologist
Victor Turner. In his own work and in his collaborations with Richard
Schechner, Turner has drawn on ritual dimensions and processes to
illustrate  and  explore  how  ritual  is  part  of  performance  and
performance is part of ritual. Whilst I am primarily concerned with the
notion  of  communitas  (Turner,  1969;  1982;  1988)  and  its
development  through  duration  (the  case  study  in  Chapter  Ten
examines  this  in  relation  to  Robert  Wilson’s  Walking),  I  initially
outline the development of communitas in its wider context. 
Turner was interested in ritual as a dynamic force and drew upon
the earlier work of Arnold Van Gennep who, in his 1909 book The
Rites  of  Passage identified  the  fact  that  ritual  occurred  in  three
distinct phases:
The  first  phase  (of  separation)  comprises  symbolic
behaviour signifying the detachment of the individual or
group  either  from  an  earlier  fixed  point  in  the  social
structure, from a set of cultural conditions (a “state”), or
from  both.  During  the  intervening  “liminal”  period,  the
characteristics of the ritual subject (the “passenger”) are
ambiguous: he passes through a cultural realm that has
few or none of the attributes of the past or coming state.
In the third phase (reaggragation or reincorporation), the
passage is consummated (Turner, 1969, p. 94). 
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This liminal state of “betwixt and between” (Turner, 1969, p. 95) is
much more tangible in the neophytes of societies that maintain a
deeper  connection  with  ritual.  In  developing  Van Gennep’s  work,
Turner makes a distinction between liminal and liminoid in relation to
their social functions, arguing liminal phenomena are bound up with
calendrical  rhythms that are part  of  a collective process. Liminoid
phenomena,  conversely,  often  arise  from individual  activities  that
have collective effects, also often associated with leisure activities
and are not cyclical. White (2013) argues, “[t]o describe all staged
performance  as  liminoid  makes  some  sense,  as  it  helps  to
understand the special  character of a stage, somewhere that has
been  marked  off  from  normal  space  and  time,  and  where
extraordinary  things  happen”  (p.  140).  Similarly,  Marvin  Carlson
(2004)  states,  performance  “is  a  specific  event  with  its  liminoid
nature foregrounded, almost  invariably  clearly separated from the
rest of life” (p. 216).   As a kind of sanitized, westernized version of
liminality,  the  liminoid  encounter  is  certainly  closer  to  my  own
experience in Walking than the indigenous rituals of the Ndembu or
performance of  Ramlila  (see Turner,  1969 and Schechner,  1985)
discussed by Turner and Schechner. 
For Turner (1969), the significance of this liminal stage of the ritual
process is that “[s]ecular distinctions of rank and status disappear or
are homogenized” (p. 95). It is this levelling of status that, I suggest,
draws parallels with the concept of duration, implying a removal of
something  structured  and  ordered.  In  his  analysis  of  hierarchical
societal  structures,  Turner  favours  “the  Latin  term  ‘communitas’
[rather  than]  ‘community,’  to  distinguish  this  modality  of  social
relationship  from  an  area  of  ‘common  living’”  (p.  96).  He
distinguishes  between  three  different  types  of  communitas:
“existential or  spontaneous communitas  …  normative  communitas,
… ideological communitas” (p. 132).  
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The significance of the first category of communitas is its emergence
without  structure.  Although  Turner  (1969)  recognizes  that  all
spontaneous communitas will eventually develop into some kind of
structure, it is, like the emergence of a sense of duration, impossible
to  anticipate.  Equally,  the  notion  of  communitas  itself  is  highly
subjective. How is it apparent when it occurs? What tangible signs
are revealed? These questions can similarly be applied to duration
which, like spontaneous communitas, becomes part of the socially
accelerated structure it is trying to resist. 
Turner (1969) asserts, “there is no specific social form that is held to
express spontaneous communitas. Rather is it expected best to rise
in  the  intervals  between  incumbencies  of  social  positions  and
statuses”  (p.  138).  Communitas  goes  beyond  the  kind  of
relationships developed between work colleagues or regular social
activities;  it  is  to  examples  from the  beat  generation  that  Turner
looks  to  exemplify  this  claim,  who  “seek  …  a  transformative
experience that goes to the root of each person’s being and finds in
that root something profoundly communal and shared’ (p. 138). As
such, spontaneous communitas is “the end of human endeavour” (p.
139).  In  parallel  with  duration,  the  experience  of  communitas  is
fleeting  and  lacks  permanency,  something  I  will  explore  in  more
detail when I make connections with Bergson later in this chapter.
Turner (1982) sees liminoid phenomena as “freer than the liminal, a
matter  of  choice,  not  obligation … One  works at  the liminal,  one
plays with the liminoid” (p. 55). This clear distinction between the
role of the liminal and that of the liminoid suggests that the former
occurs  in  highly  organized  events  and  the  latter  in  less  formal
activities.  Whilst  both liminal  and liminoid activities are conducted
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within the confines of the “industrialization reorganization of time”104
(Counsell and Wolf, 2001, p. 203), the possibilities of emancipation
from this strictly measured industrialized time transpire in liminoid
encounters. 
Communitas, the liminoid, and Bergsonian duration 
Turner’s  distinctions  between  liminal  and  liminoid  phenomena  is
where I will begin to draw parallels with Bergson’s notion of duration.
As  with  the  other  theories,  some  of  the  ideas  connect  more
substantially than others and, as such, this is reflected in the focus
of  my  writing.  The  comparisons  between  liminal  and  liminoid
encounters can be summarized as follows:
Liminal Liminoid
Predominated in tribal
and  early  agrarian
societies
Flourish  in  societies
with organic solidarity 
Collective,  concerned
with  calendrical,
biological,  social-
structural  rhythms  or
with  crises  in  social
processes
May be collective, but
not cyclical 
Centrally  integrated
into  total  social
process  representing
negativity  and
subjunctivity
Develops  apart  from
economic and political
processes 
Reflect  on  collective
experience, over time
Tends  to  be  more
idiosyncratic  and
generated by  specific
named  individuals
and particular groups 
104
 I believe this refers to the way in which duration has been reconfigured as
time for economic purposes.
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Ultimately
eufunctional105
Exposes  injustices,
inefficiencies  and
immoralities  of
mainstream  and
economic  political
structures 
   Figure 16: Liminal and Liminoid. (Adapted from Turner, 1982, pp. 53-55) 
“Liminoid phenomena flourish in societies with ‘organic solidarity’”
(Turner, 1982, p. 53)
Whilst  the  organic  solidarity  of  an  organized  industrial  society
positions  individuals  as  working  towards  a  common  goal  (i.e.
contributing towards the greater good of a society), the individuation
permitted by this gives precedence to the singular, heterogeneous
experience  of  duration  suggested  by  Bergson.  It  may  seem
somewhat  counter-intuitive  to  suggest  that  highly  organized
industrial societies, which rely on strict adherence to clock-measured
time  support  an  experience  of  duration.  It  is,  however,  the
comparative  freedom and  choice  that  is  a  by-product  of  organic
solidarity  that  allows for  a  liminoid  encounter  with  duration  to  be
experienced. 
“Liminoid  phenomena  may be  collective  …  not  cyclical,  but
continuously generated, though in the times and places apart from
work settings assigned to “leisure” activities” (Turner, 1982, p. 54). 
Turner’s  suggestion that  liminoid phenomena are segregated into
distinct  times  and  settings,  most  often  associated  with  leisure
activities is pertinent to this thesis, as the selected performances are
105
 Helpful functions of a social activity that contribute to the continuation of
another social activity. 
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regarded  as  cultural  leisure  activities  and  therefore  beyond  the
settings of work and productivity. It is, however, Turner’s assertion
that  liminoid  phenomena  are  “not  cyclical,  but  continuously
generated”  that  resonates  with  Bergson’s  notion  of  “duration
considered as the flowing forth of time” distinct from homogenous
space and clock-measured time (Guerlac, 2006, p. 65). In Bergson’s
own  language,  duration  is  similarly  continuously  generated,  “[i]ts
essence being to flow, not one of its parts is still there when another
comes along” (Bergson, 1946/1992, p. 12). For Bergson, the “free
act takes place in time which is flowing and not in time which has
already  flown”  (Bergson,  1889/1913,  p.  221)  and,  as  Muldoon
states, “the free flow of time, as experienced interiorly, is the key to
human freedom” (2008, p. 73).  The cyclical nature of the seasons
similarly  suggests  a  flowing  forth  akin  to  Bergsonian  duration.  A
distinction,  however,  between  seasonal  rituals  and  liminoid
encounters  is  that  the  former  repeats  and  produces  familiar
experiences like the quantitative measurement of time, whereas the
latter  constantly  generates  new  and  unique  experiences.  Thus
liminoid encounters are qualitative and, like duration, “excludes all
idea of juxtaposition, reciprocal externality, and extension” (Bergson,
1903/1999, p. 26).  
“Liminoid phenomena develop apart from the central economic and
political processes … in the interfaces and interstices of central and
servicing  institutions  –  they  are  plural,  fragmentary,  and
experimental in character” (Turner, 1982, p. 54)
Similarly,  duration  can  be  regarded  as  ‘plural,  fragmentary,  and
experimental’,  being  distinct  from  the  “total  social  process”  that
Turner  suggests  of  liminoid  phenomena  (1982,  p.  54).  To
experience duration,  Bergson proposes one must  step outside of
everyday experience, privileging intuition above intelligence but, as
Bergson never explained how duration might be achieved, it is only
possible to conjecture about what this experience actually is and the
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conditions for realizing it. Turner’s suggestion that the liminoid is to
be found in the ‘interfaces and interstices of servicing institutions’
could equally be applied to an argument for recognizing duration.
Correspondingly,  duration  -  like  liminoid  phenomena  –  develops
away  from the  formal  economic  and  political  processes  cited  by
Turner.  A  driver  for  economic  forces  is  clock-time,  which  in  turn
drives  political  forces  and,  consequently,  economic  forces  ad
infinitum. Thus, I suggest the alternatives to liminal experience and
clock-time can be located in  liminoid  encounters  and Bergsonian
duration, experiences that develop from the temporary removal from
productivity-measured  activities.  Turner  suggests  liminoid
phenomena  occur  in  activities  such  as  sport,  art  exhibitions  and
theatre  performance,  whereas  there  is  often  a  “moral  pressure”
associated  with  the  liminal  (p.  55).  Liminoid  encounters  are
frequently commoditized and, if considered from a purely economic
perspective and value, there is an expectation that a more fulfilling,
satisfying experience should be gained. Despite its commoditization
and  thus  association  with  number,  I  suggest  my  experience  of
Bergsonian duration in Walking was part of the liminoid phenomena
categorized by Turner, notwithstanding it being closer to the spiritual
nature implied by liminal encounters.  In fact, the spiritual nature of
Bergson’s writing on duration would at first glance seem to fit most
naturally into the realms of liminal experience, as “pure change, real
duration,  is  a  thing  spiritual  or  impregnated  with  spirituality”
(Bergson, 1946/1992, p. 33). However, the association of the liminal
with structure and law precludes an alternative experience of time in
the form of duration, which is to be found in the liminoid. Of course,
these  are  not  hermetically  sealed  categories  and  I  am  not
suggesting there are not elements of duration to be found in the
liminal; it is a case of the anti-structure of duration being built into
the structure of time. Thus, duration occurs because it is different in
structure (it  is  structureless)  from time and is  only recognized as
something  distinct  from time  as  a  structured  concept  because  it
exists within time’s structure. 
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“Liminoid phenomena tend to be more idiosyncratic,  quirky,  to be
generated by specific names individuals and in particular groups …
[they] are thought of at first as ludic offerings” (Turner, 1982, p. 54).
 
In direct contrast to the collective nature of liminal phenomena, the
idiosyncrasies that arise in the liminoid have much in common with
the heterogeneous nature of duration, which proffers an individual
experience where each moment is qualitatively different. The lack of
clear structure in duration suggests something of a playful or ludic
nature; play being a way of subverting rules and structures. Roger
Caillois (1961/2001) suggests that whilst it is the function of games
to use rules as a way of creating structure, humans have an intrinsic
desire  to  circumvent  or  break  those  rules.  The  idiosyncrasies
apparent  in  liminoid  phenomena  may  provide  an  alternative
structure in which to break the rules of clock-measured time and
experience  Bergsonian  duration.  Thus  it  may  also  be  that  the
structural clarity of rules can facilitate an experience of duration in
the  predominant  structure  of  space-measured  time  in  a  socially
accelerated culture. The anti-structure of duration must arise from
within  a  structure  in  order  to  recognize  that  it  is  outside  of  that
structure. 
“Liminoid phenomena … expos[e] the injustices, inefficiencies, and
immoralities of the mainstream economic and political structures and
organizations” (Turner, 1982, pp. 54-5).
The subversion of a mainstream (liminal) structure as prevalent as
clock-measured time places duration within the realms of liminoid
phenomena. Thus, there is a tangible connection between Turner’s
discussion of liminoid phenomena and Bergson’s notion of duration.
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The opposing notion of the eufunctional nature of liminal experience,
whereby the greater good of a society is privileged above all else,
draws parallels with the precedence given to time over duration; the
former  being  more  easily  quantified  and  controlled  than  the
individuality and heterogeneity of the latter. The greater good of a
society is, of course, not always equal to quantification and control; it
is, however, the quantitative rather than qualitative that is privileged
in a socially accelerated culture.   
Communitas and flow
Turner’s reference (in From Ritual to Theatre) to Csikszentmihalyi’s
flow and communitas, the liminal and liminoid are also pertinent to
this thesis. Turner (1982) regards communitas as having “something
of  a  ‘flow’  quality,  but  it  may  arise,  and  often  does  arrive
spontaneously and unanticipated – it does not need rules to trigger it
off” (p. 58). The key distinction between flow and communitas is that
the  former  can  be  experienced  alone  whereas  the  latter  is  a
collective  phenomenon;  the  final  performance  discussed  in  this
thesis is the only one in which I consider collective transformation.106
Although Turner regards flow as being in the domain of structure, he
also  sees  flow  as  “one  of  the  ways  in  which  ‘structure’  may  be
transformed or ‘liquefied’ … into communitas again” (p. 58). Turner
recognizes that the post-industrial experience of flow is to be found
in games,  sport  and leisure activities,  due to  ritual  giving way to
“individualism  and  rationalism”  (p.  58).  The  ritual-like,  liminal
encounters once experienced in pre-industrial societies have been
replaced by more accessible liminoid encounters that can produce a
feeling  of  communitas.  Unlike  the  liminoid  however,  which  often
arises from rules and structures, “[c]ommunitas is something else,
106
 Whilst there is some discussion of collective experience in Hotel Medea, I
discuss  the  experience  of  this  performance  primarily  in  terms  of  individual
transformation. 
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for  it  does  not  have  to  be  induced  by  rules  –  it  can  happen
anywhere, often in despite of rules” (Turner,  1982, p.59).  Turner
concludes the connections he identified between communitas and
flow with a discussion of the content of experience. He suggests that
content  is  where “the analysis  of  symbols begins … [s]urely,  the
processes of communitas and flow are imbued with the meanings of
the symbols they either generate or are channelled by” (p. 59). In my
readings of Einstein and Walking it is my interpretation and analysis
of  symbols  (Wilson’s  design  and  ‘rules’,  Glass’s  score)  that
contributed to the depth and nature of my experience and reflection. 
Communitas and structure  
In  contrasting  liminality  with  status  system,  Turner  observes  a
number of binary oppositions; most notable for me is the distinction
between communitas and structure. Communitas, as Turner (1969)
suggests,  appears  in  three  forms:  spontaneous,  normative,  and
ideological,  the  first  of  these  categories  being  most  relevant  to
duration as it  “can never be adequately expressed in a structural
form”  (p.  137).  The  mystical  nature  attributed  to  spontaneous
communitas  in  pre-industrial  societies resonates with  the spiritual
qualities associated with duration. Bergson’s conception of duration
has  strong  resonances  with  Eastern  philosophies  such  as
Buddhism, where the practice of respiration-mindfulness (Anapana-
sati)  enhances  the  unity  of  mind  and  body  through  meditation
(Foley, 2013). 
Aside  from  the  spiritual  qualities  that  can  be  attributed  to  both
communitas and duration,  it  is  the ephemerality  and unstructured
nature  of  both  experiences  where  the  closest  parallels  can  be
drawn. The “unceasing creation [of duration and] the uninterrupted
up-surge  of  novelty”  (Bergson,  1946/1992,  p.  18)  defies  clear
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organization in the same way that “[s]pontaneous communitas can
never be adequately expressed in a structural form” (Turner, 1969,
p.  137);  it  is  “a  phase,  a  moment,  not  a  permanent  condition”
(p.140). Thus, the notions of communitas and duration, like peak-
experience and flow, cannot be directly sought; each experience is
individual, unique and heterogeneous. Although this thesis suggests
that certain performance experiences can directly seek out duration,
the variability of such an approach should be noted. 
In summarizing the relationship between Turner and Bergson, I note
the  direct  reference  the  former  makes to  the  latter,  with  regards
distinguishing between the different types of communitas.107 Turner
writes,  “[t]o  some  extent,  communitas  is  to  solidarity  as  Henri
Bergson’s ‘open morality’ is to his ‘closed morality’ ”(1969, p. 132).
The  notion  of  open  morality  views  religion  as  dynamic  and
changeable, unlike closed morality which Turner might argue is what
happens  to  spontaneous  communitas  when  it  “undergo[es]  what
most people see as a ‘decline and fall’ into structure and law” (p.
132). Bergson’s open morality, according to A. R. Lacey (2009) is:
based on feeling or (higher) emotion rather than reason,
is  supra-intellectual  rather  than  infra-intellectual,  is
universal  rather  than  partial  in  its  sympathies,  follows
individual  examples rather  than rules,  and leads to  joy
rather than mere pleasure (p. 207). 
The  qualities  Lacey  attributes  to  open  morality  suggest  any
connections made between individuals in its process are a challenge
to established forms; similarly, spontaneous communitas confronts
established beliefs with an alternative experience. 
107
 See p. 285    
27
Knee Play: From Einstein on the Beach to Walking on the beach
In the back pages of the  Einstein on the Beach programme were
several advertisements for forthcoming productions in London and
further afield. Immediately following an advertisement for Chekhov’s
longest play, Three Sisters and Elevator Repair Service’s eight hour
long Gatz,108 I spotted Wilson’s Walking – a collaboration with Dutch
visual artists Theun Mosk and Boukje Schweigman.109
108
 Gatz used every single word from F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby. 
109
 Walking  was originally  produced for  the  Oeral  Festival  in  2008  on  the
island of Terschelling, Netherlands. 
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Figure  17: Page advertising  Walking. (From  Einstein on the Beach programme,
2012, p. 60) 
The ‘unique artistic experience’ promised by Walking was a journey
through North Norfolk’s flat landscape; across open fields, through
undulating  woodlands,  rolling  sand  dunes,  and a  stroll  along the
beach with views across the North Sea. It  is this experience of a
slowed  down,  contemplative  walk,  where  I  became  a  “Wilsonian
movement artist” (Owen, 2013, p. 572) that forms the basis of this
next chapter; my autoethnographic reflection uses both Bergson (in
terms of duration) and Turner to examine how a state of communitas
developed.
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Chapter Ten: Walking, Communitas, Ritual, and Transformation 
August 31, 2012
Around Holkham – 3 miles (4.83km) – 4hrs 30min
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Figure 18: Map outline of Holkham area (from Google maps (n.d.)).
ASCENT / GRADIENT: Largely flat with occasional peaks  
LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY: Requires some effort of intuition 
PATHS: Mostly on good tracks – the way will reveal itself when the
time comes
LANDSCAPE: Mostly open and exposed with some shelter in the
woods
SUGGESTED MAP: Follow the walker ahead
A slow, contemplative walk – a transformative experience. 
(1) From the car park walk to the box office where you will be asked
to surrender your time. From here, you will be taken by minibus to
the start of your walk. Please listen carefully to any instructions
regarding the pace of your walk. 
(2) Begin at a steady pace across the field. You will soon arrive at a
building; please enter and wait for the exit to be revealed. As you
enter the next space you will need hear a rumbling bass sound;
please follow the instructions from your  angels and stand in a
circle. 
(3) As  you  exit,  please  continue  your  walk  at  the  same  pace  as
before. Admire the open landscape as you contemplate the path
ahead.  You  will  encounter  a  number  of  installations  along the
way; please take time to explore them as you wish. 
(4) About half  way through,  pause for  a  rest  –  apples,  water  and
seating are provided for your comfort. 
(5) Continue your  walk into  the woods,  taking  time to  explore the
twisted branches.
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(6) As the  sea  and  beach  come into  view you  will  see a  conical
shaped building; walk towards this and pass through, pausing for
a moment to listen to the sounds within. 
(7) On arrival at the beach, there is an opportunity to relax as you
take in views of the sea and sky. 
(8) Walk along the beach and look for an angel who will guide you
towards the return transport. 
Post-liminoid
In 2012, Avant-Garde American director Robert Wilson staged two major works in the UK. London’s
Barbican played host to a revival of his seminal opera  Einstein on the Beach, a visually and aurally
multi-layered performance lasting almost five hours.  In common with other durational works, Einstein
offered the possibility of transformation, something usually absent from “Euro-American theater [which]
is  one  of  transportation  without  transformation”  (Schechner,  2002,  p.  131).  Having  witnessed  this
performance, I was drawn to Wilson’s second offering to the UK in the same year.   Walking, a site
specific, participatory walk along the North Norfolk coast also offered the possibility of transformation
and what Bergson might have described as “pure, unadulterated inner continuity” (1946/1992, p. 14).
In  other  words,  the  piece  offered  the  chance  of  experiencing  real  duration.  Upon  arrival,  the
participants were asked to ‘surrender their time’, leaving watches and phones behind and to engage
with the landscape, punctuated with a series of installations and to experience the passage of time
without precise markers. Guided by ‘angels’ dressed in yellow ponchos, the participants embarked on
a  slow,  meditative  walk  alongside  occasional  encounters  with  installations  and  soundscapes.  Of
course, the effects of a piece like Walking can be as varied and diverse as the participants attracted to
it.  Wilson’s reputation and the nature of his work is such that audiences are more likely to expect a
certain kind of experience and this may well have a bearing on any transformative effects.  Whilst I
approached this performance from the perspective of an informed spectator / participant with a specific
agenda, I believe this had no significant bearing on the possibilities of transformation; my awareness
was heightened by perhaps being more informed than other spectators, who may therefore have been
less aware of the transformative potential of Walking.  Approaching Walking from an autoethnographic
perspective, this chapter  examines how transformation occurred; in doing so, I draw on  Bergson’s
notion of duration, and observations of ritual experience and theory from Schechner and Turner. I also
explore how Walking was a liminoid encounter that offered the possibility of transformation through the
emergence of spontaneous communitas, despite the participants being in a solitary, meditative state.
Phases of Separatio Liminal Reincorporation
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ritual n (Liminoid)  
PRODUCES A 
CHANGE IN MENTAL
OR PHYSICAL 
STATE 
(TRANSFORMATION)
Indication
s of 
change 
Emotional
and/or 
cognitive 
change 
Emerging 
(spontaneous)
Communitas
(Confirmed) 
communitas 
State of 
participan
t 
Separate

Separate No longer 
separate 
   Figure 19: Process of change for participant in Walking. 
The table above illustrates the process from separation to liminal to
reincorporation  that  I  experienced in  Walking.  These stages,  first
explained  by  Van  Gennep  in  1909  (discussed  in  the  previous
chapter in relation to Turner’s work, see p. 269) were used later by
Turner to explore aspects of ritual. My table suggests these stages
of  ritual  were  present  in  Wilson’s  work  and  ultimately  led  to  a
transformative experience. 
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Post-liminoid
Turner does not suggest that communitas is a single tier framework
and makes clear distinctions between three types of communitas:
spontaneous,  normative,  and  ideological.  Writing  in  1969,  Turner
discusses communitas in the context of  a society where rebellion
against ‘normal’ structure was becoming part of the culture:
[E]xistential or spontaneous communitas – approximately
what the hippies today would call “a happening,” … (2)
normative communitas, where … the necessity for social
control  [results  in]  existential  communitas  [being]
organized  into  a  perduring  social  system;  and  (3)
ideological communitas, which is a label one can apply to
a  variety  of  utopian  models  of  societies  based  on
existential communitas (p. 132). 
In  Walking the concepts of normative and ideological communitas
seemed  absent  whereas  spontaneous  communitas  was  most
certainly present. The suggestion that ideological communitas is a
result  of experiences of existential  or spontaneous communitas is
wholly  possible,  although  one  can  imagine  this  being  developed
over a protracted period and numerous encounters of spontaneous
communitas.  Communitas  may  not  represent  the  “erasure  of
structural norms from the consciousness of those participating in it
…[because  of]…  its  own  readiness  to  convert  into  normative
structure  [which]  indicates  its  vulnerability  to  the  structural
environment”  (Turner,  1982, p.  47).  Thus, whilst  participation in a
communitas experience is an opportunity to stand outside structure,
it naturally falls into structure and its associated values. Communitas
creates  sets  of  ideas  that  are  transmogrified  into  cultural  and
political  values,  it  generates  “metaphors  and symbols  which later
fractionate into sets and arrays of cultural values” (Turner, 1982, p.
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50). Communitas occurs in an “active opposition to social culture”
(p.51), and is less exclusive than social structure: 
Communitas tends to be inclusive – some might call  it
‘generous’ – social structure tends to be exclusive, even
snobbish,  relishing  the  distinction  between  …
higher/lower  …  The  drive  for  inclusivity  makes  for
proselytization.  One  wants  to  make  the  Others,  We.
(Turner, 1982, p. 51) 
The  egalitarian  nature  of  Walking  was  apparent  in  many  ways,
despite criticisms that such events are only accessible to people with
a certain amount of cultural capital (Harvie, 2013). In walking at the
same pace, stripped of our measurements of time, and following the
same route, we were equals. I made no judgments about the other
participants  in  terms  of  their  appearance,  age,  gender  or
engagement with the performance. We all appeared to be generous
in accepting the stutters in each other’s walking, the stops and starts
and maintaining an equal distance between us. 
Post-liminoid: Locating the field
Walking has formed an integral part of the creative process for many artists. Henry Thoreau’s 1851
lecture discussed the act of walking in relation to the natural environment, whilst Richard Long has
used walking to create land art pieces such as A Line Made by Walking (1967), England (1968), A Line
in Japan (1979), and Silence Circle Big Bend Texas (1990). In performance, the last twenty years has
seen a proliferation of walking performance such as in the work of Lone Twin, (Walk With Me Walk
With Me Will  Somebody Please Walk With Me,  2008),  Wrights  & Sites,110 (The Quay Thing,  1998;
Subverting the City: A Mis-Guide to Milton Keynes, 2005; Possible Forests, 2007) and plan b (Walks
on Water, 2007; A Day in the Life, 2010, and Crossing Paths, 2012).  In Hsieh’s Outdoor Piece (1981-
82),  the  artist  spent  a  year  walking  the  streets  of  Manhattan  in  a  self-imposed  ‘houselessness’.
Wilson’s Walking can be located in this area of performance; what follows is a brief survey of walking
related performance practices as a way of positioning Wilson’s work in this field.
110
 Since 1997,  Stephen Hodge,  Simon Persighetti,  Phil  Smith,  and Cathy
Turner have created site-specific work using mythogeography in the form of mis-
guided tours, using “the latent qualities of a standard mainstream guided tour, but
rather than clarifying, implying and reducing, the mis-guided tour always maintains
the multiplicity of stories and meanings in any one site” (Smith, 2012, p. 162). 
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The act  of  walking as art  or  performance has a long tradition,  a
simple  process  that  has  associations  with  many  writers  from
Rousseau to Wordsworth; for instance, Charles Dickens who would
cover  great  distances  most  days,  walked  around  London  as  a
“melancholy  pleasure”  (Solnit,  2002,  p.  185).  Danish  philosopher
Søren Kierkegaard walked the streets of his native Copenhagen as
an aid to thinking, comparing “his urban tours to rural  botanizing:
human beings were the specimens he gathered” (Solnit,  2002, p.
23). The association of walking with contemporary performance is
exemplified  in  Abramović  and  Ulay’s  final  collaboration  –  The
Lovers: The Great Wall  Walk (1988) - in which the artists walked
from opposite ends of the Great Wall of China. More recently, He
Yunchang’s The Rock Touring Around Great Britain (2006), in which
he covered over 2000 miles in 110 days, placed the act of walking
as central to the artwork.  The efficacy of walking as art is illustrated
by  Hamish  Fulton’s  work.  Fulton  has  done  a  number  of  walking
performances  including  Slowalk (Tate  Modern,  2011),  Walking
Backwards  for  Ten  Kilometres (2002),  Water  Paths  River  Tides
(2002),  and  Road Kill (2003).  Fulton’s  Slowalk (2012)  –  a  mass
participation event that directed participants to walk extremely slowly
across  a  distance  of  ten  feet  over  two  hours  -   harnessed  a
“congregational power” by the “force of walking” (Collier, 2012, p. 1).
Mike Collier, a founding member of W.A.L.K (Walking, Art, Landskip,
and Knowledge), a research centre into ‘art walking’ at the University
of  Sunderland discusses the meditative qualities of  Fulton’s most
recent  Slowalk (Newcastle, March 31, 2012). Half an hour into the
walk,  Collier  felt  as if  he had hardly  moved,  yet  “because of  the
extension of time, because of the dwindling into the distance of all
other tasks, I was awed” (p. 1). The expectations of a “meditative
conga” (p. 2) and the idea that “by the time it was over, if we had
entered into the spirit, we would have discovered some idea about
ourselves, whatever it  was” (p.  2) is,  perhaps, the most common
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hope amongst the participants of such meditative practices. Collier
conjectures  that  the  idea  of  Slowalk may  have  been  more
fundamental:  “we  do  not  simply  pass  through  the  artwork;  the
constitution of the self is not suspended while engaged with making
art:  the  self  is  precipitated  by  the  quality  of  the  relation  to  the
experience of making” (p.  2). Thus the simple act of walking - in this
case of an extremely slowed down walk – caused a fundamental
reaction in the individual as they ‘made’ the art work. This sense of
transformation  was  similarly  brought  about  in  Wilson’s  Walking,
although  Collier  concludes  that  Slowalk did  not  make  the
participants “habituated” and, the people remaining after the event
were simply “savouring the act” (p.  3). Although this suggests a less
obvious  or  tangible  transformation,  Collier’s  inference  is  of  a
collective sense of achievement, satisfaction or even spontaneous
communitas coming into play, but not yet fully recognized. Watching
video documentation of Fulton’s  Slowalk certainly gives a sense of
the participants being ‘released’ at the sound of the closing gong111
and there is a palpable awareness of moving gently from one state
to another. 
The paradox of walking is that its simplicity belies a complexity in the
transformative potential  it  offers.  In a Calle-esque112 gesture, Dee
Heddon invited forty people to take her on forty walks for her fortieth
birthday:
In  discussing  the  relative  merits  of  walking  alone  and  with  a
companion,  Heddon  (2012)  cites  19th century  essayist  William
Hazlitt, noting that his “chief objection to walking with others is that it
111
 Fulton’s  Slowalk  performances customarily begin and end with the single
strike of a metal gong. 
112
 My reference here is to artist Sophie Calle, whose work often stems from
simple instructions and rules. 
28
provides the occasion for – and an expectation of – talking”  (p. 68).
Moving along as part  of  a  line of  continuous walkers in  Wilson’s
Walking,  offered  the  juxtaposition  of  being  able  to  reflect  quietly
whilst having a clear sense of company.  Heddon notes, “[f]raming
walking as a means for reflection and contemplation (of sights, ideas
and memories), Hazlitt  presumes such occupations and pleasures
debased  or  interrupted  by  the  presence  of  others.  Conversing
contaminates traversing” (p. 68). This suggestion that walking can
be ‘contaminated’ by conversation is something that resonates with
my  experience  of  Walking.  Throughout  the  four-and-a-half-hour
process,  I  did  not  feel  any  necessity  to  talk  to  others  but  more
significantly, I would have actively avoided conversation should the
opportunity to talk had arisen. Certainly, in one of the few moments
where  conversation  might  have  been  ‘permitted’,  I  chose  not  to
speak to anyone and, observing other participants, there were many
others who did  the same.  Whether  I  would have wished this  to
continue is debatable. As Heddon suggests, “[t]he pleasure of being
alone is dependent on the knowledge that it is a temporary state, a
practised dialectic of separation / conjoining” (p. 68). The pleasure
(or  transformation)  that  may  occur  from  solitude  may  only  be
possible when presented within specific  parameters. This is true of
many  artists  working  durationally  such  as  Abramović  and  Ulay’s
Nightsea Crossing (1981-87), which allowed the artists to function
“as  champions  of  the  rich  communication  of  silence”  (McEvilley,
2008, p. 281). 
Heddon (2012) exemplifies this notion of change or transformation in
her citing of Werner Herzog’s “performance of commitment” (p. 69) -
his walk from Munich to Paris, and Abramović and Ulay’s Great Wall
Walk. In Herzog’s walk between Munich and Lotte Eisner’s hospital
bed in Paris he hoped that, by the act of walking itself, healing would
take place. For Abramović and Ulay, their walk symbolized the end
of  both  their  artistic  and  personal  relationship.  In  both  cases,  a
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sense of something being changed permanently was at the forefront
of the walker’s actions. 
Heddon  (2012)  also  comments  on  the  “materiality  of  the  walk”
playing a part in “prompting certain forms of companionship” (p. 71).
It is this materiality, the topographical changes in the landscape that
makes certain  types of  walking  occur,  as undulating and winding
paths  are  navigated.  In  a  reflection  of  site-specific  performance,
Heddon cites theatre director Dorinda Hulton who suggests, “place
proffers  dramaturgical  structure”  (p.  71).  In  Wilson’s  Walking the
place  did  indeed  offer  a  structure  to  the  performance,  the
topography  of  the  area  acting  as  a  natural  collaborator.  For
example,  the  flat  Norfolk  landscape  created  a  sense  of  a  wide,
seemingly never-ending open space stretching out before me. 
The ritual of walking 
Despite its simplicity, Walking had the elements of a transformative
experience  through  its  rudiments  of  ritual.  Catherine  Bell  (1997)
characterizes  ritual  in  Western  society  as  “a  matter  of  special
activities  inherently  different  from daily  routine  action  and closely
linked to the sacralities of tradition and organized religion” (p.138).
Bell  asserts  that  ritual  is  more  often  associated  with  times  and
places outside of daily life, which is unsurprising considering how
the notion of ritual has attained a specialness and is thus usually
found in highly structured activities with an element of theatre. Erika
Fischer-Lichte’s (2005) discussion of the origins of ritual in theatre
begins with Nietzsche’s controversial suggestion that Greek theatre
originated in the chorus, thus striving to “annul individualization” (p.
19).   Using  the  Dionysian  perspective,  Fischer-Lichte  (2005)
suggests,  “the  Aristotelian  concept  of  theatre  which  focuses  on
mimesis, at the heart of Nietzsche’s concept of the performative act
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of transformation … is only possible because theatre originated in
the  Dionysian  ritual  of  dismemberment”  (p.  39).  This  notion  of
dismemberment,  of  being  transformed,  whether  physically,
cognitively, or emotionally is at the heart of the ritual experience; in
Dionysian ritual the dismemberment would be literal but in Walking it
was a metaphorical kind of dismemberment. 
Fischer-Lichte  (after  Max  Hermann)  notes  the  most  important
theatrical aspect of a performance is “‘the shared lived experience of
real  bodies  and  real  spaces’’’  (2005,  p.  26).   From  my  own
experience  I  suggest  that  shared  experience  is  something  often
absent from a contemporary experience of the theatre audience, as
although  we  are  witnessing  the  same  performance  in  the  same
space,  I  commonly  experience  a  feeling  of  being
‘compartmentalized’ in my seat even though I am aware of others’
reactions. I also suggest ritual and liminoid113 encounters commonly
rely on sharing of knowledge and insights.  Walking was such an
encounter,  whereby  a  focus  on  embodied  experience  and  being
integrated into the landscape was shared with  others.  Hermann’s
term - “psychic contagion” (Fischer-Lichte, 2005, p. 26) - suggests
the  shared  experience is  not  confined  to  the  physical  sharing  of
experience, but a shared mental state of mind:
The metaphor of contagion once more emphasizes that in
a performance, aesthetic experience does not refer to a
‘work’,  but  springs from what  is  emerging between the
participants,  from  their  bodies.  It  seems  that  the
emergence of what happens is more important than what
happens,  and  in  any  case  more  relevant  than  any
meanings that  may  be attributed to  it.  That something
happens  and  that  what happens  affects  everybody
113
 Turner notes, “[o]ptation pervades the liminoid phenomenon, obligation the
liminal. One is all play and choice, an entertainment, the other is a matter of deep
seriousness, even dread, it is demanding, compulsory” (1982, p. 43). 
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participating in the performance, even if in different ways
and  to  a  different  degree.  In  the  course  of  the
performance, energy is exchanged, forces are unleashed,
activities triggered (2005, pp. 26-7).
Thus it  is  what  emerges between the people involved that is the
essential aspect of performance. Fischer-Lichte deems the specific
particulars of a performance as less important than the  act of the
performance. Communitas emerged in a similar act of contagion in
Walking, as  the  participants  themselves  made  the  aesthetic
experience,  their  bodies  interacting  with  the  landscape  and  with
each  other  (although  without  direct  contact),  leading  to  a
transformation;  the  specific  nature  of  which  occurred  “in  different
ways and to a different degree” (Fischer-Lichte, 2005, p. 27). The
exchanged energy and unleashed forces of contagion are transitory
and,  like  spontaneous  communitas,  are  “moment[s],  not  a
permanent  condition”  (Turner,  1969,  p.140).  I  argue  that  my
experience  was  one  of  a  state  of  communitas  although  I
acknowledge this was probably not a universal phenomenon.114 The
exchange of energy cited by Fischer-Lichte is a crucial  aspect  of
many  performances,  although  its  discussion  is  often  limited  to
participatory,  immersive,  or  live  art  performance.  Most  recently,
Abramović has frequently declared energy exchange as important:
“you have to empty the body to the point where you can be really
connected with the fields of energy around you” (as cited in Goy,
1990, p. 47). In a discussion of her 2014 performance 512 hours,
Abramović commented, “[i]n 1989 … I said that the art of the 21st
century would be art where there is nothing between the artist and
the visitor, … an exchange of energy, and that is how it has turned
out here” (Cooke, 2014). Although it is explicit in more recent works
114
 It was not my intention to gather any data from interviews or questionnaires
but  from my  casual  observations  of  the  other  participants  I  believe  that  their
experiences would have been varied.  My recognition of a state of communitas
was evident in my feeling of having been part of something  outside of structure
that was fleeting yet significant enough to challenge that structure. 
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(The Artist is Present, 2012;  512 Hours,  2014), Abramović’s early
work also relied on this reciprocity. Rhythm 0 (1974) demanded both
the presence and the participation of the spectators in a very direct
sense,  as  did  The  House  with  the  Ocean  View (2002)  in  which
Abramović  made  direct  eye  contact  with  the  spectators  during
gallery opening times.  Performed at the Sean Kelly  Gallery,  New
York, Abramović stayed on a raised platform for twelve days. The
platform was accessible only by ladders with knives as rungs thus
creating a physical barrier between artist and spectator. Relation in
Time (1977)  saw  Abramović  and  Ulay  sitting  motionless  without
spectators, their hair tied together for seventeen hours. For the final
hour,  spectators  were  permitted  to  watch,  perhaps  in  an  act  of
solidarity  with  the  artists.  The  notion  of  energy  exchange  is  not
limited to performance art; Stanislavski (1936/1991) discussed it in
relation  to  concentration  of  attention.  In  noting  how  we  should
interact  with  objects  he  states,  “mutual  interaction  establishes  a
stronger contact with the object of your attention” (p. 76), although
he also recognized that attention sometimes must be drawn away
from the object or audience. More notably, Michael Chekhov’s work
on atmospheres discussed the role of the audience as being united
with  actors  (Chekhov,  2002,  p.  61).  Equally,  the  presence  and
participation  of  a  church  congregation  functions  as  a  means  of
energy exchange, particularly evident in Evangelical churches where
formal  structure is  often neglected in  favour  of  a focus on “good
music that young people love and … engage with … [although] a lot
of the time they don't know what they believe” (Brown, 2013).
Fischer-Lichte (2005) further discusses the concept of performance
in  relation  to  notions  of  performativity  and  notes  leading
philosophers on the subject, John L. Austin and Judith Butler who:
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agree  that  performative  acts  /  performances  do  not
express something that pre-exists, something given, but
that  they bring forth  something  that  does not  yet  exist
elsewhere  but  comes  into  being  only  by  way  of  the
performative  act  /  the  performance that  occurs.  In  this
sense, they are self-referential  - i.e. they mean what they
bring forth – and, in this way, constitute reality (p. 27).
The  primary  meaning  of  this  passage  may  be  concerned  with
representing  reality  rather  than mimesis  but  this  gives  rise  to  an
implication of a sense of becoming, of a transformation arising from
something  unplanned.  Whilst  Live  Art  performances  such  as
Walking are never generally unplanned, the shape of a performance
is frequently unknown until it happens, as there are “some additional
conditions that must be fulfilled” (Fischer-Lichte, 2005, p. 27).  As
with  Hermann’s  discussion  of  the  ‘essence’  of  theatre,  the  real
communication and connection between performer and audience is
not from “the words of the text originating in the mind of an individual
creator [but]  to the bodies of the actors and to the community of
actors and spectators brought about by the performance” (Fischer-
Lichte,  2005,  p.  28).  In  a  reference  to  a  production  of  Electra,
Hermann  comments  that  “theatre  appeared  to  be  capable  of
transforming individuals into members of a community, albeit only
temporarily,  by  focusing on the bodily  co-presence of  actors  and
spectators, on the physical acts of the actors and their capacity to
‘infect’ the spectators as well as on the ‘contagion’ occurring among
the  spectators”  (Fischer-Lichte,  2005,  p.  30).  Although  Fischer-
Lichte and Hermann are discussing theatre in which spectators are
largely  passive,  it  remains  the  same  principle  in  that  there  was
contagion  amongst  the  participants  in  Walking;  I  felt  a  sense  of
community and, as I suggest later, of communitas. As I was required
to follow the person directly ahead, my awareness of their  bodily
presence was magnified, much more so than my awareness of other
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spectators  in  a  conventional  theatre  performance.  In  this  sense,
there was a contagion that spread across time and transformed my
sense of time. Whilst Electra and Walking are very different types of
performance, the former being closer to traditional theatre without
the participatory elements of the latter, I suggest that Fischer-Lichte
and I are using the term ‘contagion’ in the same way. In the example
of Electra, Fischer-Lichte refers to Gertrud Eysoldt’s “violence to her
own body …[drawing]… the attention of  the spectators to  her  …
bodily  being-in-the-world”  (2005,  p.  27).  In  Walking,  bodily
experience was similarly magnified, as I  was aware of my body’s
participation in the action of the performance. Thus contagion and
infection spread through the participants in  Walking without direct
bodily  contact,  much as the psychic contagion spread in  Electra.
There is,  however,  a  significant  contrast  between the violence of
Electra and the tranquility of Walking. 
Ritual and transformation 
Schechner (1994) identifies some of the components of  ritual  as:
symbolic time, audience participation and belief, collective creativity,
and results,  which were  all  present in  Wilson’s  piece.  Schechner
also  categorizes  time as  either  event  time,  set  time,  or  symbolic
time. The first of these – event time -  is typical of games such as
baseball or hopscotch where all steps must be completed regardless
of  the  clock-time.  Set  time is  where  “an  arbitrary  time pattern  is
imposed on events” (Schechner, 1994, p. 7) such as in football or in
games that require tasks to be completed in a specific time frame.
The final category of symbolic time is often associated with religion,
and is when “the span of the activity represents another (longer or
shorter) span of clock-time” (Schechner, 1994, p.7). Ritual activities
often rely on a sense of faith or, at least, some investment in the
process.  Walking may have had its share of cynical  spectators115
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present  but  I  suggest  that  it  is  the individual  belief  that  gave the
performance  efficacy  for  the  individually  believing  person.  The
notion of transformation was also an important aspect of Walking; I
had a “stake in seeing that the performance succeed[ed]”, at least in
terms of what I defined as success (Schechner, 1985, p. 131).
In Walking I was both spectator and participant and, while I did not
have any prior connection with the other participants, I was invested
in  the  experience  as  I  felt  part  of a  collective,  aware  of  the
significance of communal  experience in being transformed. There
were several mechanisms used in Walking that facilitated this sense
of collective activity. Firstly, there was the verbal instruction to walk
at a measured distance behind the person in front.  Although this
was never rigidly enforced, each participant appeared to regulate his
or her distance in a palpable sense of working together. Despite the
clear instructions given to participants, I did not feel that I was being
controlled  or  coerced as  such but  gently  guided.  For  others,  the
experience  was  “dictatorial  …  Wilson  spoils  the  ramble  with  his
restrictions” (Bassett, 2012, para. 6).  The second mechanism was
found in moments where the participants faced each other, such as
inside the first installation, described later in this chapter (see pp.
314-5). Finally, a silence was maintained throughout the length of
the performance and, even when comments passed between some
participants in the middle ‘rest’ section, these were executed with a
whispered reverence.    These and other  components  of  Walking
made  it  an  efficacious  rather  than  an  entertainment  experience,
distinctions  made  by  Schechner  in  discussing  the  purpose  of
performance.
 Susannah Clapp of The Observer offered a cynical appraisal of  Walking,
suggesting most of the performance “could have [been] got on a day out. Without
paying”  (Clapp,  2012,  para.  5).  Kate  Bassett’s  review  in  The  Independent
described  Walking as “an exercise in irritation, simultaneously dictatorial and, to
put it bluntly, half-arsed” (Bassett, 2012, para. 6).  
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EFFICACY
Ritual                  
ENTERTAINMENT
Theater
Results fun
link  to  an  absent
Other
only for those here
symbolic time emphasis now
performer possessed,
in trance
performer  knows
what s/he’s doing
audience participates audience watches
criticism discouraged criticism flourishes 
collective creativity individual creativity 
Figure 20: Efficacy / Entertainment braid (From Schechner, 2002, p. 120). 
The efficacy list suggests a serious experience, clearly focused on a
transformative  outcome  for  both  spectators  and  participants;  in
Walking,  we  were  both.  Walking certainly  fits  neatly  into  this
category although the element of ‘fun’ that belongs to entertainment
was also present and evident in the number of recreational walkers
in attendance. As Schechner (2002) suggests, “[n]o performance is
pure  efficacy  or  pure  entertainment”  (p.  120)  and,  in  citing  an
example  of  a  Broadway  musical  being  more  than  entertainment
because  it  encompasses  the  multiplicity  of  elements  beyond  the
show itself, he illustrates that one cannot neatly separate ritual and
theatre into the broad categories of efficacy and entertainment; they
“are not so much opposed to each other; rather they form the poles
of  a  continuum”  (Schechner,  2002,  p.120).   Given  Schechner’s
assertion  that  most  performances  lie  somewhere  along  the
continuum,  Walking was no exception.  The current trend towards
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immersive and participatory practice (Machon, 2013; White, 2013)
means that many pieces of contemporary performance do not follow
the traditions of passive spectatorship. The first case study in this
thesis,  Hotel  Medea demonstrated  the  importance  of  audience
participation;  I  suggest,  in fact,  that we were neither spectator or
participant  but  a  participant-spectator,116 this  role  placing  an
emphasis on the haptic rather than the optic. Unlike Medea, in which
there were moments of passivity,  Walking relied on the walkers to
make the performance and brought the haptic even further to the
fore;  I  was  participant  rather  than  spectator  for  most  of  the
performance, the optic elements were often about my engagement
with  landscape rather  than action  or  performers.  One of  the  key
features of Wilson’s Walking was the unique role of the landscape,
which acted as a natural mise en scène for the piece. Heddon (after
Lorimer and Wylie) suggests, when walking “the landscape [there] is
a multiplicity of narratives and perceptions, and you can both lose
and find yourself among this multitude” (2012, p. 69), surmising that
both “landscape and self are in flux, engaged in a process of co-
production” (p. 69). 
Thus it was this total reliance on the spectator to inhabit the role of
performer  that  places  Walking further  towards  the  ritual  end  of
Schechner’s  continuum.   The  moments  of  passive  spectatorship
were rare and, arguably, entirely absent. Even when I was clearly
viewing others,  such as in the first  installation standing around a
circular  pit,  I  was aware  of  my performer ‘status’  as gazes were
exchanged. In Medea, I was immersed, even to the point of having
an option to be ‘invisible’, as I participated as much or as little as I
felt comfortable.117 Walking did not offer this protection and thus the
116
 See Chapter Six (pp. 90-92) for the various terms for audience members in
immersive and participatory performance. 
117
 In Chapter Six (p. 119) I made reference to an observation of a man who
was not participating in dancing on in the performance. There was no attempt to
physically coerce or encourage him to take part in any of the performers despite
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increased participation  increased the  possibility  of  transformation.
The kind of participation in Walking was distinct from Medea; in the
latter I was an incidental participant – at times, a supernumerary. In
the former my participation was essential and, even though I could
maintain  solitude  in  public,  my  focused  presence  was  required
throughout. 
The whole structure of  Walking was heavily dependent on guiding
the audience through the process,  thus heightening the sense of
collective creativity  as each performance was uniquely structured
around the idiosyncrasies of the participants. For Schechner (2002),
the “attention paid to the procedures of making theater was … an
attempt to ritualize performance, to make theater yield efficacious
acts”  (p.  121).  In  a  brief  illustration  of  theatre  from  1500-2000,
Schechner shows how efficacy and entertainment have converged
and diverged, with the early 20th century’s entertainment found in
commercial  theatre  and  theme  parks,  whereas  efficacious
performance  is  found  in  paratheatre,  political  and  experimental
theatre. In instances where “efficacy dominates, performances are
universalistic,  allegorical,  ritualized,  tied  to  an  established  order”
(Schechner  2002,  p.  123)  and  therefore  tend  to  have  greater
durability than entertainment performances. 
The yielding of efficacious acts in ritual-like performance increases
the  prospect  of  transformation  occurring,  ritual  being  “a
transformative performance  revealing  major  classifications,
categories, and contradictions of cultural processes” (Turner, 1988,
p. 157).  Walking offered a contradiction to the everyday process of
walking in using an extremely slowed down practice of an activity
usually  associated  with  getting  from  A  to  B  to  get  C  done  as
his  obvious reticence;  if  many other  spectators had taken a similarly  reluctant
stance, the performance may have been put in jeopardy.  
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expediently as possible. Whilst there has been a marked increase in
traffic populating city centre locations, the pedestrian still dominates
the streets in the United Kingdom. Certainly, in major centres such
as London, Birmingham, and Manchester the most common form of
‘transport’  is  walking,  with  many cities encouraging travel  by foot
(Moss, 2015).118
The prevalence of ritual and its associated behaviours in our cultural
processes does not, suggests Turner (1988), make it “a bastion of
social conservatism; its symbols do not merely condense cherished
sociocultural values” (p. 158), 
Rather,  through  its  liminal  processes,  it  holds  the
generating  source  of  culture  and  structure.  Hence,  by
definition, ritual is associated with social transitions while
ceremony is  linked with  social  states.  Performances of
ritual  are  distinctive  phases  in  the  social  process,
whereby  groups  and  individuals  adjust  to  internal
changes and adapt to their external environment. (Turner,
1988, p. 158) 
This dynamic quality of change was an important part of  Walking
and generated a new structure amongst the gathered participants.
The  process  of  slow  and  focused  walking  over  several  hours
facilitated a change in my internal sense of duration, as I became
enculturated  into  a  spontaneously  formed  community.  The
distinction  between  ritual  and  ceremony  is  important  here;  as  a
performance containing ritual,  Walking was concerned with social
transitions rather than an affirmation of social statuses that could be
118
 In an investigation published in The Guardian, Moss draws on a survey of
a number of cities across the world and their adoption of schemes to reduce cars
on the road. He concludes that as we become more networked with our use of
technology, we become less reliant on cars and more self-sufficient. 
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fulfilled by ceremony.   To reenact  Walking would be a ceremony
whereas the relative unpredictability and thus idiosyncratic nature of
each performance clearly made it  an act  of  ritual.  It  is  ritual  that
generates these cherished sociocultural values that are represented
in society through ceremony. In Walking, the performance generated
something new rather than reaffirmed something already known; the
outcome was a change of state, not reaffirmation. 
Post-liminoid: From liminal to liminoid 
The  distinctions  made  between  liminal  and  liminoid  (tabulated  in
Chapter Nine, p. 263) demonstrates that the five qualities of liminoid
encounters  are  arguably  applicable  to  Walking.  Whilst  it  may  be
unrealistic  to  refer  to  the  collective  participants  in  Walking as  a
‘society’, they might be considered as a society in microcosm. The
sense that the process of communitas had ‘organic solidarity’ has
some evidence in that some, but clearly not all participants held a
shared  belief  that  was  developed  and  cemented  throughout  the
experience.   Whilst  the  piece  was  very  much  about  a  collective
experience (even allowing for the solitary nature of each individual
walk), there was an absence of anything cyclical. Even the route of
the walk did not suggest a process of returning to the start; similarly,
there  was no sense that  this  would  happen again  in  exactly  the
same way with the  same group of individuals (see my point above
about  new rather  than affirmation of  existing states).  The idea of
being removed from ‘economic and political processes’ was, for me,
a significant aspect of my participation in Walking. The exclusion of
the  dominance  of  the  clock-measured,  socially  accelerated,
economic  and  social  structures  of  the  external  world  was  the
presiding  factor  in  allowing transformation  to  occur,  and to  some
extent exposed the “inefficiencies and immoralities of  mainstream
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economic and political structures” (Turner in Counsell & Wolf, 2001,
p. 208), a notion I return to below. 
I recognize that Turner (1969) uses the term ‘communitas’ instead of
‘community’ to distinguish this modality of social relationship from an
area of “common living” (p. 96), which would suggest that economic,
political and social factors are intrinsic parts of this. However, in the
framing  of  Walking in  its  landscape  and  as  a  performance,  the
participants began with a greater equality than in normative society
or community, as we were all  equally at the behest of the angels
who  guided  us  through  each  stage.  Once  my  time  had  been
capitulated at the box office, then taken to a new location by minibus
we had become more equal. Finally, the idiosyncrasies that arose
from participation in Walking are rather difficult to identify. However,
the  twin  nature  of  collectivity  and  solitude  in  Walking,  and  the
random gathering of  individuals meant  that  the whole experience
was distinctive for all, despite collective beliefs. Of course, as with all
ritual-like behaviour there was a certain amount of presupposition
that  ‘something’  will  ‘happen’  as  a  result  of  the  process  –  the
possible before the real.119 Participants may have been looking for a
particular experience – possibly meditative or spiritual, or simply to
engage with a performance in an intimate way. Equally, participation
in Walking may have evoked a sense of conforming to the rules of
the  situation.   As  with  ‘conventional’  theatre  audiences,  the
acceptance of rules and prescribed behaviours is ingrained into our
social psyches; communitas, however, “does not have to be induced
by rules – it can happen anywhere, often in despite of rules” (Turner,
1982, p. 59).
119
 See discussion later in this chapter on Bergson’s ‘possible’ and ‘real’ (pp.
317-323),  in  which  he argues that  the possible  only  becomes real  because  it
passes into reality but  that we believe it  to have always been possible due to
retroaction. 
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One rule  that  Walking attempted to  emancipate itself  from is  the
means by which clock-time is used as a measure of productivity.
Turner (1982) observed that liminoid phenomena “first begin clearly
to develop in Western Europe in nascent capitalist societies, with the
beginnings  of  industrialization  and  mechanization,  the
transformation of labor into a commodity, and the appearance of real
social classes” (p. 53). Thus, the liminoid is a way of freeing oneself
from  the  strictures  and  structures  of  organized  society,  often
associated with leisure time and non-serious behaviour,  for “[o]ne
works at the liminal, one  plays with the liminoid” (Turner, 1982, p.
55). In Western late-capitalist culture it is significant that common
opinion sees a polarization between the church and the state, with
sacred  and  secular  behaviour  regarded  very  differently  by  many
people (Jones, 2014). This is certainly true of the United States of
America -  the world’s largest late-capitalist country, which has a wall
of  separation  between  church  and  state.  Jones  (2014)  suggests
there  is  a  similar  call  for  this  kind  of  separation  in  the  UK.  This
separation is often informal as the Church of England, for example,
is constitutionally linked with the state via the monarch but their role
is symbolic rather than having any real authority. The liminoid setting
is  one  that  allows  free  access  and  inclusivity  to  thrive;  sacred
institutions  and  ceremonies  often  preclude  participation  on  the
grounds  of  gender,  race,  class,  and  belief120 but,  as  Bell  (1997)
notes, rites of passage have an “effect on the cultural understanding
of  human life”  (p.  135),  and,  as  such,  are  essential.  The  liminal
setting of the sacred makes becoming part of it a rite de passage,
something  that  happens  to  the  liminoid  when  “clubs  become
exclusivist … tend[ing] to generate rites of passage, with the liminal
a condition of entrance into the liminoid realm” (Turner, 1982, p. 55).
Thus, we may enter the liminoid via the liminal – an anti-structure
within structure. 
120
 I am referring to ceremonies in some religions where males and females
have different roles, sometimes giving a dominant role to the former.  Even in the
Church of England it is not possible to take communion without being confirmed,
thus excluding some members of a congregation. 
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Turner (1982) makes a number of distinctions between liminal and
liminoid  –  the  most  significant  being  that  “optation  pervades  the
liminoid, obligation the liminal” (p. 43). In observing the distinction
made  between  liminal  and  liminoid  and  their  relation  to  social
functions, Turner argues that liminal phenomena are bound up with
calendrical  rhythms that are part  of  a collective process. Liminoid
phenomena,  conversely,  often  arise  from individual  activities  that
have collective effects.  In his introduction to  The Anthropology of
Performance,  Schechner  notes  Turner’s  explanation  of  the
distinctions  and  connections  between  liminal  and  liminoid
demonstrate that “traditional, modern, and postmodern performative
genres interconnect” (in Turner, 1988, p. 8). 
Figure 21: Schechner’s diagrammatic illustration of the evolution of cultural genres and 
performance: from ‘Liminal’ to ‘Liminoid’ (From Turner, 1988, p. 9). 
The  liminal  occurs  in  what  Turner  (1988)  describes  as
“technologically  ‘simpler’  societies”  (p.  9)  and  can  be  closely
matched  to  the  stages  of  ritual  constructed  by  Van  Gennep
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(1909/2011). In the liminoid, the three-stage structure of separation,
liminal,  and  reaggragation  is  still  important  but  there  are
innumerable  situations  in  which  the  liminoid  can  occur.  Using
examples  from  theatre,  Turner  sees  the  middle  liminal  (liminoid)
phase as comprising:
1. Communication of “sacred,” “archaic,” “mythical,” texts
as  quasi-sacra  (Noh,  Kutiyattam,  Kathakali,  gospel
drama)
2. Ludic  recombination:  experimental  theater,
surrealism,  comedy,  clowning  (develops  rules  and
structure of subversion), misemono (grotesque spectacle)
3. a. Authority of director
 b. “Chorus line” communitas (1988, p. 9) 
Thus, it is the liminoid that is more commonly experienced in our
society. Turner sees the liminoid as being the results of “[t]echnical
innovations … the products of ideas, … (the ‘oid’ here derives from
Greek-edios, a form, a shape; and means ‘like, resembling’; liminoid
resembles without  being identical  with ‘liminal’)”  (Turner,  1982,  p.
32). Turner also sees the liminoid as occurring in “neutral spaces or
privileged areas … set aside from the mainstream of productive or
political  events.  Universities,  institutes, colleges etc.,  are ‘liminoid’
settings  for  all  kinds  of  freewheeling,  experimental  cognitive
behavior as well as forms of symbolic action” (1982, p. 33).121 The
similarly  privileged  space  of  Walking offered  the  possibility  of
transformation and change. In Turner’s examples, it is notable there
is less at stake for the participants than in tribal ritual behaviours; the
ability to be experimental and ‘freewheeling’ constructs actions with
deeper  and  more  personal  meanings  -  through  play  and
experimentation we can arrive at transformation. 
121
 Victor and Edith Turner conducted experiments with anthropology students
at  the  University  of  Virginia  and  drama  students  at  New  York  University  to
construct and enact social and ritual dramas (Turner & Turner, 1982). 
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Walking  was, arguably, a ludic recombination as it took the simple
act  of  walking  and  placed  it  within  a  structure  exposing  the
participants to an experience made unique by being at the mercy of
a number of elements; elements that may be more easily controlled
in a traditional theatre space. Despite strong traces of the artists’
authority remaining in the work, the gaze of the participants could
barely be controlled, particularly as the performance was subject to
the change in weather, temperature, and sounds of the landscape.
For example, inside the first installation I recall looking overhead to
see a plane crossing the sky, a reminder of the outside, accelerated
world. Although Walking was not ludic in the same way as Turner’s
examples from the surreal or grotesque, there was an element of
forms being combined and recombined, something I suggest may
have happened with each new group of participants. The form of the
walk, being slow and meditative was played with by the participants,
as individual rhythms ebbed and flowed in attempting to maintain a
steady pace. Furthermore, a sense of the sacred and archaic was
apparent in moments of quasi-solemnity. As we stood around the
circular  pit  or  waited  to  enter  the  conical  building,  the  sense  of
making  our  own  myths  was  palpable  as  we  interpreted  the
encounters with installations in different ways.122 
In drawing on the work of Van Gennep, Turner (1969) explains that
ritual is comprised of three states: separation, the ‘liminal’  period,
and  reincorporation  (p.  94).123 Walking followed  this  pattern;  the
choice  of  landscape  separated  the  participants  from  an  external
social  structure  -  whilst  also  surrendering  mobile  phones  and
watches - symbolic and functional objects of a social structure. The
122
 The first association I had with the conical shaped building by the beach
was to Maslow’s concept of self-actualization although it occurred to me later that
it was a reversal of the circular pit in the first installation. 
123
 See Chapter Nine (p. 260) for the full quotation in which Turner expands on
these phases. 
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removal of the participants from a starting place (the car park) to
another starting place (a dirt track adjacent to a field) was a further
separation from a set of cultural conditions. In the liminoid stage that
stretched for  the majority  of  the walk,  my sense of  duration was
altered and temporarily realigned with a far more innate sense of
being.   As  with  other  liminoid  encounters  such  as  the  theatrical
examples cited by Turner, the transformation may be only temporary
before reincorporation into normative experience. It was not only my
involvement in the experience that generated a transformation but
the conscious and subconscious contributions of others, even if only
through their presence. 
Turner (1969) likens the liminal state to a feeling of ambiguity, that of
betwixt and between, assimilating liminality to “death, to being in the
womb, to invisibility, to darkness … the wilderness, and to an eclipse
of the sun and moon” (p. 95). He suggests that “[s]ecular distinctions
of  rank  and  status  disappear  or  are  homogenized”  (p.  95);  the
“lowliness and sacredness … homogeneity  and comradeship”  (p.
96) that occurs during liminality suggests that there are expectations
of a quasi-religious encounter. 
Pre-liminoid: Holkham, August 31, 2012
Having arrived at the car park at around 1.45pm on Friday August
31,  2012,  I  was  asked  to  wait  and  surrender  my  time,  leaving
watches and mobile phones behind. The flat landscape of the North
Norfolk coast, so far, seemed absent of markers of time. Before this
last day of the summer expired, the area was busy with dog walkers,
families, couples and lone walkers plugged into their iPods or simply
absorbing the natural sounds as they travelled leisurely towards the
beach via woodland paths. In this piece, time was surely intended to
be symbolic; we had the opportunity to experience “timeless time –
the  eternal  present”  (Schechner,  2002,  p.  80).  For  Schechner,
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symbolic time is “when the span of the activity represents another
(longer or shorter) span of clock-time. Or where time is considered
differently, as in Christian notions of “the end of time,” the Aborigine
“dreamtime,” or Zen’s goal of the “ever present”’ (Schechner,1994,
p. 7).  In some contrast to Bergson’s duration, that which “excludes
all  idea  of  juxtaposition,  reciprocal  externality,  and  extension”
(1903/1999, p. 26), the symbolic time of ritual was marked, albeit
delicately in the landscape and the actions of the participants. 
Liminoid
After  ‘checking  in’  I  was  told  to  take  a  seat  and  wait  to  be
transported to the starting point of the walk. In an arbitrary way that
ignored order  of  arrival  or  even the  booked performance time,  a
member of the Walking volunteer team, known as ‘angels’ selected
individuals to board each minibus as it arrived. After a short drive we
arrived  at  a  dirt  track  next  to  a  field  where  we  were  randomly
selected to begin the walk. At this point, I felt a sense of removal
from one ‘culture’ and being on the threshold of another. As we were
slowly enculturated into  the piece,  there was a distinct  feeling of
separation  from  ourselves,  from  others,  and  from  homogenous
clock-measured time as we began our journey. Despite the fact that
some of  the participants were still  engaged in friendly  and eager
conversation,  the  prevailing  tone  was  one  of  anticipation  and
preparation  to  become  part  of  an  experience  predicated  on
collective  creativity  and  belief.  Billed  as  being  concerned  with
heightening  “senses  and  thrillingly  [altering]  your  perceptions  of
space and time” (“Robert Wilson Walking”, 2012), Walking conjured
ambitious participant expectations, at least for me.  
As the third performance examined during my research journey, I
arrived at Walking with greater expectations than Medea or Einstein.
This was not, however, because I was willing a specific experience
30
but that I had arrived naturally at Walking and it seemed to offer an
opportunity  to  test  my  hypothesis  in  another  context.  Thus,  my
expectations – although important – do not invalidate my analysis in
any way. The advertised aspects of Walking  as ‘altering space and
time’ became less significant in my experience as I considered the
phenomenon of communitas, a concept that seemed contrary to the
act of silent walking.  
An angel dressed in a yellow poncho spoke to me quietly and softly,
directing me to walk across the field, following white stones on the
ground. There was no indication of the required pace so I set off
slowly  and  deliberately,  anticipating  and  willing  a  meditative
experience.   I  do  not  know  whether  this  was  the  desire  or
experience  of  other  participants,  but  my  observations  of  others
suggest  strongly  there  was  a  collective  belief.  Like  an  audience
seated in a venue, the initial collective belief may have been borne
from a polite sensibility to the piece (or even to the landscape), but
Walking required  a  physical  and  cognitive  investment  that  -  it
seemed to me - would be difficult to fake. It may be that a sense of
communitas was beginning to emerge; as equal participants in the
process, boundaries and identities had already been gently eroded.
As  liminal  entities,  we  had  started  to  become  bound  by  our
“submissiveness and silence” (Turner, 1969, p. 103). Whilst it may
seem implausible  that  such  simple  actions  can  have  a  powerful
impact, the whole environment had a potent effect on me.  At this
stage,  having  surrendered  timepieces  and  mobile  phones,  how
much  further  might  the  erosion  of  boundaries  be  pushed?
Schechner suggests it is “surrender to the flow of action [that] is the
ritual  process”  (1985,  p.  124);  submissiveness  was  certainly  a
significant part  of  this moment and of my participation throughout
Walking.  Much  of  the  loss  of  awareness  that  accompanies  flow
activities (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008; 2013) also relies on devoting full
attention  to  specific  moments,  surrendering  the  whole  of  one’s
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attentiveness, as one must in ritual. In initiation rites, change often
occurs, its “very purpose is to transform people from one status or
social identity to another” (Schechner, 1985, p. 127). The role of the
initiation rite is to mark a change but also, is “itself the means by
which  persons  achieve  their  new  selves:  no  performance,  no
change” (Schechner, 1985, p. 127). Thus, it was my participation in
Walking as a performance and initiation that offered the potential for
transformation and change in identity, or at least part of my identity.
Walking exemplified  the  coexistence  of  transportation  and
transformation  that  Schechner  suggests  is  present  in  all
performance,  whether  theatre  or  ritual.  Although  transportation  is
often associated with the former and transformation with the latter,
Schechner  (1985)  argues,  spectators  at  a  transformation
performance  -  having  a  stake  in  the  outcome  for  those  being
transformed - are also implicated in the process of transformation,
often  through  audience  participation.   As  both  a  spectator  and
participant in  Walking I was transported and transformed, whereas
the ‘angels’ (arguably the only performers) were simply transported. 
Post-liminoid
In  The Ritual Process (1969) Turner cites a wide range of binary
opposites  associated  with  status  in  liminality;  he  asserts  these
binaries represent the difference between liminality and the status
system.   Many  of  these  can  be  applied  to  Walking,  including:
equality / inequality; anonymity / systems of nomenclature; absence
of property / property; absence of status / status; silence / speech;
simplicity / complexity; heteronomy / degrees of autonomy; and most
significantly; communitas / structure (Turner, 1969). The list contains
twenty-six terms associated with liminality alongside their opposite
terms  in  status,  although  Turner  acknowledges  that  many  more
could be included. For the participants in Walking, the awareness of
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external  status  may  not  have  been  entirely  eradicated  and  their
casual  and  inadvertent  observation  of  others  might  have  had  a
bearing  on  any  sense  of  communitas  or  equality.  For  me,  the
experience was not  a rite  of  passage or  to  gain a new status in
society;  it  was  a  choice  that  made  it  a  liminoid  encounter  of
spontaneous communitas that led to transformation. 
The liminal state reduces or eradicates status, placing participants on equal terms. The equality and
sense of communitas evoked by liminality seems, on the surface, to be an appealing outcome although
Turner (1969) recognized that to “those concerned with the maintenance of ‘structure’, all sustained
manifestations of  communitas  must appear  as dangerous and anarchical,  and have to be hedged
around  with  prescriptions,  prohibitions,  and  conditions”  (p.  109).  This  is  a  radical  reading  of
communitas and one that does not fit with my observations of participants in Walking; the absence of
‘angels’  or  other  markers  of  authority  might  have  presented  an  opportunity  for  widespread  ludic
behaviour. I am not suggesting that any fundamental structure was being challenged other than my
perception of temporality  and that this was an opportunity  to attempt  to stand outside the external
structures in which we exist. A political reading of  Walking might suggest otherwise and, in a subtle
way, the piece could be regarded as subverting issues of equality  in a wider social  sense.  In the
processional  work  of  Welfare  State  international  (WSI)  (1968-2006),  Baz  Kershaw argues  that  by
permanently settling in Ulverston, Cumbria, the company’s work “shifted from producing an artwork to
enhancing the process of living in a particular community through the production of artwork” (Coult &
Kershaw, 1995, p. 207). In this respect, WSI were able to relate more directly to the concerns of the
immediate community; these local concerns were “intimately locked into the great global issues of our
times – economic,  ecological,  [and]  political”  (p.  207).  Thus  an apparently  ‘local’  artwork  had far-
reaching  implications  –  Walking had  a  similar  potential,  its  resulting  communitas  questioning  an
external structure. I cannot say for certain whether  Walking enhanced the ‘process of living’ in the
same way that Kershaw suggests of WSI’s processional work; their community was fixed and long
established  whereas  ours  was  transient  and  newly  formed.  Walking may,  however,  have  quietly
subverted the values of some participants. 
Fleeting solidarities
Communitas may be a phenomenon that frequently occurs in performance, particularly in the move
from optic  to  haptic.  In  a  brief  survey  of  the  use of  time in  Live  Art,  Beth  Hoffman  (2012)  cites
durational work as a way of cultivating “fleeting solidarities … that develops communitas [and] works
on a level that goes beyond thought and into the effective and visceral” (p. 49). Hoffman suggests
communitas arises from durational performances such as Lone Twin’s Ghost Dance (2006) - a daylong
performance where “they present themselves publically in a profoundly vulnerable manner, inspiring
spontaneous  and  surprising  demonstrations  of  support  and  empathy”  (p.  50).  Throughout  the
performance,  spectators  would  join  in  with  the  two  blindfolded  performers  as  they  continued  the
repetitive line dancing steps. Although this was a common occurrence in many of the performances of
Ghost  Dance,  performers  Gregg  Whelan  and  Gary  Winters  regarded  this  as  an  unexpected  but
welcome phenomena: “The unexpected experience of communitas breathed life into a situation that
30
the (blind) piece did not know it sought. A ‘competitive’ test of physical endurance became a collective
feat of mutual support” (Hoffman, 2012, p. 50). 
Liminoid
After this first short walk I arrived at an installation which, despite its
rather plain exterior, suggested a gateway or portal to another time
and  place.  Perhaps  it  was  incongruous  in  the  landscape,  this
installation seeming more suited to a gallery. Outside another angel
instructed me to step inside saying, ‘the way out will  reveal itself
when the time comes’. As I entered a pitch-black room, I noticed a
small  chink  of  light  penetrating  the  space.  Whether  this  was
deliberate or not, I am unsure; unlike most experiences of being in
complete  darkness,  this  actually  had  a  calming  effect.  The  time
spent  inside  this  room seemed short,  the  darkness an enjoyable
environment  to  inhabit.  I  read  the  black  box  as  a  metaphor  for
clearing the mind, a kind of ‘palette cleanser’ before the walk began.
As the door opened on the other side of the dark room an angel led
me into a large installation. Square in shape, the high walls were
covered by a brown material akin to straw or reeds, swaying in the
wind.  Sand  covered  the  floor  around  a  central  circular  pit  that
seemed  to  burrow  deep  underground.  Seven  people,  including
myself, stood around the circle in a contemplative manner. Whilst
my eyes absorbed the visual textures of the place - the grains of
sand, moving gently and almost imperceptibly in the calm breeze -
my ears connected with the low humming sound that surrounded the
participants, mixing serendipitously with the external sounds of birds
singing and planes overhead. 
Post-liminoid
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It  was at this moment that the first sense of communitas became
apparent. Turner suggests (after Martin Buber) that community is a
dynamic process, in which there is a sense of flow – “community is
where community happens” (in Turner, 1969, p. 127); it is a sense of
being, not doing (Turner, 1982). Perceiving the other participants,
this sensation of a dynamic in progress became increasingly evident
to me. By directly juxtaposing my phenomenological experience with
a memory of the cultural processes I had been separated from, I
became aware of the potentiality of communitas and that it involves
“the whole man in relation to other whole men, [communitas often
being] in the subjunctive mood” (Turner, 1969, p. 127). Turner does
not explain exactly what he means by his use of ‘subjunctive’ here
but he may be referring to the existential and thus doubtful nature of
communitas; in other words, communitas often being experienced
as fleeting and subjective.  Louise Owen (2013), whose analysis of
Walking focuses on landscape, comments, “the staged appearance
of fellow walkers in this space took on a monumental, even mythic,
aspect  as  time  elapsed  –  an  effect  amusingly  undercut  by  the
situation’s ritualistic seriousness” (p. 570). Despite being amused by
the tone of this moment, Owen’s allusion to the appearance of her
fellow participants suggests that their presence was of significance.  
Liminoid
Exiting through the other side of this installation, the walk began.
Walking for a moment with a poncho-clad angel, I learnt the pace
and set off on my own. Crossing a bridge over a stream I became
aware of  it  being  arid  and overgrown with  weeds and brambles.
Coincidental as it might be, I could not help thinking about it being a
metaphor  for  the  absence  of  seeing  the  flow  of  time  in  this
experiential,  interactive piece. Instead, I  sensed time flowing by –
corporeally,  intellectually and intuitively.  For Bergson (1946/1992),
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“intuition is what attains the spirit, duration, pure change” (p. 33). He
felt  that  intuition  was  an  effort,  something  to  be  worked  at;  in
Walking I  invested in the process to be able to access the ‘pure
change’.   The  arid  and  lifeless  trace  of  a  river  represented
metaphorically  the  symbolic  nature  of  time,  whilst  also  drawing
attention to the way in which symbols such as numbers replace lived
duration.124 
Post-liminoid: Re-actualizing events
Schechner’s  (1994)  symbolic  time  is  exemplified  in  “rituals  that
reactualize  events  or  abolish  time”  (p.  7),  a  description  that
characterized  Walking.  This  reactualization  of  events  is  a
phenomenon described  by  Claire  Chambers-Blackstock  (2008)  in
her analysis of the dancing congregation in an Episcopal church in
California. She surmises that:
On the surface, a visitor to St Gregory’s would witness a
transformation:  the  congregation  transforms  from  a
collection of individuals into one dancing body, and then
after  this  liminal  time  of  ‘communitas’,  they  transform
back  into  individuals  and  go  their  separate  ways.  But
underneath and alongside this ritual transformation is an
affirmation  of  what  is  already  embraced,  known  and
understood as a way of life (p. 108). 
Thus, the ritual actions of the congregation are a way of accessing
their  already  held  beliefs;  reactualizing  events  through  symbolic
liturgical  actions.  In  the  event  described  above,  symbolic  time  is
represented in  the actions of the congregation embodying beliefs
124
 See Chapter Five (pp. 80-81) for an explanation of Bergson’s rejection of
time as number and therefore as space. 
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that  transcend  time  in  the  reactualization  of  events  through  set
actions.  These  actions  also  take  place  in  event  time,  “when  the
activity has a set sequence and all the steps of that sequence must
be completed no matter how long (or short) the elapsed clock-time”
(Schechner, 1994, p. 6). In Walking, the participants - although not
sharing a common belief - were brought together to enact the simple
action  of  walking.  Despite  no  shared  belief,  my  participation  in
Walking was an act of individual ritual action, much like walking a
labyrinth - a “practice of integrat[ing] the body with the mind and the
mind  with  the  spirit”  (“The  Story  Behind  the  Rediscovery  of  the
Labyrinth”, 2015, para. 5) - a “symbolic journey or a map of the route
to salvation” (Solnit, 2002, p.70), like many liturgical acts. 
The  ritual  behaviours  of  congregations  described  by  Chambers-
Blackstock (2008) “are not dead repetitions but continuous erasings
and superimposings” (p. 107). Thus, they are actions that through
their repetition become part of the lives of congregations; actions
imprinting on everyday lives and remade at each ritual. Similarly, the
quotidian  act  of  walking,  framed  in  Wilson’s  piece  as  altering
“perceptions of space and time” (“Robert  Wilson Walking”,  2012),
becomes  a liturgical act: the simple action of walking becomes an
act of ritual. Chambers-Blackstock’’ (2008) suggestion that liturgy as
“literally  mean[ing]  the  work  of  the  people,  [and]  is  by  nature
theological” (p.  103), concurs with the notion of everyday life and
quotidian activities ‘erasing’ and ‘superimposing’ ritual processes. 
Physical experience is often missing from many liturgical acts where
individuals  are  almost  passive,  making  them  disembodied  and
removed  from  innate  human  needs.  As  Chambers-Blackstock
suggests:
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Rituals  can reveal  present  realities,  not  only  ones that
can  be  recaptured  and  restored,  or  wished  for  and
created.  Together,  the  subjunctive  and  indicative  can
reveal  a present truth that argues for not only a future
reality but a radical understanding of the now (p. 107). 
The combination of  the subjunctive and indicative here seems to
refer to the creation of something new each time they are reenacted.
Thus, the ritual action of Walking provided a way of reevaluating and
redefining the present moment, thereby creating the sense of real
duration. 
Liminoid
Throughout this first part of the walk, stones marked the way so I
should be aware of the route if I lost sight of the person ahead. I was
also told to maintain an equal distance between the walker ahead
and  myself  -  a  method  of  temporal  measurement,  highlighting
intrinsic  and intuitive methods of  measuring duration.  Despite the
free flow of individual experience in  Walking, a sense of structure
remained;  I  was part  of  something that  had a clear  structure but
paradoxically  gave  the  freedom  of  something  unstructured.  The
emerging communitas provided a dialectic as an essential  part of
the ritual process:
[T]he immediacy of communitas gives way to the mediacy
of structure, while, in rites de passage, men are released
from structure into communitas only to return to structure
revitalized by  their  experience  of  communitas.  What  is
certain is that no society can function adequately without
this dialectic (Turner, 1969, p. 129). 
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The dialectic is that spontaneous communitas eventually becomes
part of a structure despite its origins in anti-structure, whereas rituals
begin  within structure and are supplemented by an experience of
communitas occurring within  the anti-structure of  a  ritual.  In  both
cases,  the  result  is  the  same:  communitas  ultimately  becomes
structure  and participants in  rites de  passage  return to  structure.
Thus, Turner (1969) sees a link between the structures of society
and communitas  and a  “relationship between concrete,  historical,
idiosyncratic individuals” (p. 131).   My experience of  Walking was
one in which I went from structure to lack of structure and then back
to structure, yet a sense of ‘structureless’ structure remained in the
middle liminal stage.    
Liminoid
As  I  walked  along  the  pathway,  guided  by  the  stones  I  noticed
occasional divergences. For me, Walking explored a psychology of
measuring,  appreciating  and  valuing  time  and  understanding
duration.  Its  contemplative  nature  was  exemplified  further  as  I
walked along a stream that flowed into a river and then into a sea –
seconds  into  minutes  and  then  into  hours.   First  of  all,  I  was
reminded of Heraclitus’s claim that one can never step into the same
river twice, then of Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/2007) analogy of time as
being “similar to a river” [flowing] from the past towards the present
and the future” (p. 477). 
I thought about temporality and about how we judge the passing of
time in different ways. Regardless of how we measure duration, it is
heading in only one direction; in this case measured with my chosen
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path,  directed towards a  goal  of  transformation.  Once again,  the
notion of communitas returned to me as I imagined the occasional
divergences  leading  towards  a  collective  convergence  or
communitas. 
As in  Einstein, certain moments seemed to exemplify more than a
single concept. As I walked along the path, I felt a sense of being
guided but also of being in control, common in experiences of flow. I
was also conscious of the B-Values explored during Medea and, as I
continued  on  my  research  journey,  these  values  became  more
significant  as  I  realized  their  potential  in  understanding  flow and
now, communitas.   
A Pilgrim(Ages): The road to identity 
Anthropologist Catherine Bell (1997) notes:
Setting off on a journey has always evoked aspects of an
initiatory  ritual  transition  to  a new identity,  and in  both
fictional and historical versions the pilgrim is apt to find it
hard  to  fit  back  into  the  old  life  afterward.  Religious
pilgrimage has continued to thrive amid the transportation
developments of the 20th century, whilst its more secular
counterpart, tourism, is apt to invoke very similar images
of transformation and renewal, whether the destination is
Paris, Gettysburg, or Disneyland. (p. 102)
Bell’s  description  of  the  pilgrimage  suggests  a  transformation  of
identity and of a fundamental shift in relating back to a previous way
of life. The difficulties in fitting back into an old way of life that Bell
suggests is one factor that might have distinguished Walking from a
pilgrimage.  However,  her  suggestion  that  tourism  is  the  modern
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secular  counterpart  to  a  pilgrimage might  place  Walking into  this
category. Staged as part of the Norwich & Norfolk Festival,  more
widely  as  part  of  the  cultural  Olympiad,  and  being  situated  in  a
popular tourist location placed Walking more comfortably on a tourist
itinerary  than  a  venue  for  Avant-Garde  performance.  I  suggest
Walking was not a pilgrimage in the traditional sense and was not
intended to be, although it certainly had some of the same qualities.
Walking was distinct from a pilgrimage in its unpredictable nature,
allowing spontaneous communitas to occur, something that Yoram
Bilu  (1988)  suggests  does  not  ordinarily  occur  in  pilgrimages,
despite Turner’s assertions that pilgrimage generates communitas.   
Bilu (1988) examines Turner’s notion of communitas in relation to
pilgrimage,  beginning  with  his  argument  that  it  is  “a  form  of
normative  communitas”  (p.  303).  Although  Walking cannot  be
categorically defined as pilgrimage, the ritual and liturgical elements
of the piece imbued it with similar qualities and, as “[p]ilgrimage is
premised on the idea that the sacred is not entirely immaterial, but
that there is a geography of spiritual power” (Solnit, 2002, p. 50),
Walking was a  route  towards a spiritual  experience.   In  Turner’s
theory  of  communitas,  individuals  are  levelled  as  part  of  the
experience and stripped of status. It is a suggestion that something
might  happen because of  a  slow, meditative  walk that  offers the
possibility  of  transformation.  Bilu  suggests  there  is  an  aspect  of
pilgrimage - that of brother/sisterhood - which can reduce the status
between participants although it is not ubiquitous to the extent that it
erodes all boundaries. In communitas however, there is the power to
change structures, something illustrated by Turner in his discussion
of the Tallensi people of Ghana. In their culture, hierarchies exist
that favour the passing of property and status from father to son,
mother’s brother, or sister’s son. This patrilineal order is associated
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with structure whereas the “uterine tie is associated with  spiritual
characteristics, mutual interests and concerns, and collaterality … it
represents … the dimension of kinship, the notion of communitas”
(Turner, 1969, p. 114). Thus, I  use Turner’s point to suggest that
recognized structure found in pilgrimages is less likely to produce
communitas, but can flourish in a freer walking experience. 
In some respects, the notion of pilgrimage is much freer in form than
the  ritual  components  of  Walking.  The  pilgrim  uses  his  or  her
journey as a way of opening up to others along the way; it has “a
form though not the structure of a routinized ritual … it is not a race
to a goal line” (Grimes, 2001, p. 249).  The improvisatory nature of
pilgrimages  was  a  feature  absent  from  Walking;  although  some
pilgrimages have set routes, these are not accompanied by specific
instructions. The pilgrimage has a personal connection, a goal that
is part of or even an expectation of individuals in a culture whereas
my participation in Walking enabled me to stand outside of a culture
regulated by clock-time.  Despite each participant surrendering their
time at the beginning of Walking, there was no expectation that we
were  all  searching  for  the  same  results,  as  it  might  be  with
participation in a pilgrimage. 
The  notions  of  “equality  and  congeniality”  (Bilu,  1988,  p.  303)
evident in pilgrimages may have been manifest in Walking to some
extent although, as Bilu suggests, there is not the complete erasure
of boundaries present in acts of communitas.  It was because of the
separation from other participants, that the universality of experience
found in pilgrimages was limited in Walking. Pilgrimages have fewer
physical boundaries; pilgrims may walk hand in hand or talk along
the way, encouraging each other in a common goal or belief.  It was
because of the boundaries remaining in our separation as walkers
that  communitas  occurred  and  not  because  we  were  sharing  a
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common  objective  as  might  be  the  case  in  a  pilgrimage.  A
pilgrimage invades “ordinary reality  … to the extent  irreconcilable
with  Turner’s  structure-communitas  dichotomy,  as  the  boundaries
between groups and contingents are not dissolved, and participants
are still segmentalized into structurally defined unequal roles” (Bilu,
1988,  p.  303).  Bilu  further  suggests  that  it  is  difficult  to  apply
communitas to pilgrimages, as the notion of the former is “all  the
more  vague  as  the  ‘existential-normative’  distinction  renders  it
distantly and broadly applicable” (p. 304).  
Liminoid
Walking through the woods, I thought of trees as being a metaphor
for life, time and growth; the roots, leaves and branches connecting
each part to the next. In clock-measured time, we join seconds to
minutes and minutes to hours, placing and organizing events in a
temporal  context.  In  Bergson’s duration,  however,  there is  a  flow
that, despite its lack of visible connections, moves from one point to
another  with  seamless  progress  –  an  “unadulterated  inner
continuity” (Bergson, 1946/1992, p. 14).  It is through the experience
of continuity in Walking that the possibility of transformation became
a genuine prospect. As Bergson suggested, “[l]et us say then, that in
duration,  considered  as  a  creative  evolution,  there  is  perpetual
creation  of  possibility  and not  only  of  reality”  (1946/1992,  p.  21).
Bergson’s notion of duration as one of becoming, of  being in the
moment is analogous to the liminal state of betwixt and between.
The moment we attempt to describe has already passed by the time
its description is articulated; the liminal state is only at the forefront
of  the  mind  when  safe  passage  has  been  made  through  to
reincorporation. 
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Some of the trees had expired, either through a natural ending or
have been reduced to an untimely stump. As withered stumps of
time they seemed to represent moments gone by that cannot be
reclaimed,  like  an  experience  of  spontaneous  communitas.  In
common  with  transformative  experiences,  the  occurrence  of
spontaneous communitas may be difficult to articulate or quantify, so
we to turn to ideological communitas as a way of rationalizing “its
transmogrification … into structure and law” (Turner, 1969, p. 132). 
Moving  towards  something  unfamiliar  in  the  distant  landscape  I
began to accelerate. It  was almost as if  I  was racing towards an
event or marked occasion, as we do in real life. We look forward to
the  special  occasions  that  punctuate  our  lives  and  seldom
appreciate the time in-between that are made up by the seemingly
inconsequential hours.  It is with ritual and ceremony that we mark
our lives and, consequently, the passing of time. In the absence of
deep  ritual  in  a  Westernized  societal  structure,  we  seek  out
ceremony as a way of marking and recording our rites of passage.
Turner, however, made a distinction between ceremony and ritual in
that  “ceremony  indicates,  ritual  transforms”  (1982,  p.  80).  The
deficiency of ritual suggests a scarcity of liminal experience, and so
it is to the liminoid that we turn. 
I  passed  through  a  wooden  installation  constructed  of  a  narrow
walkway with a high fence either side. As I moved through I thought
about the compartmentalization of time, of being shielded from the
reality of clock-time, time that is distinct from duration. 
So far, the terrain had been largely grass and woodland, so it was
notable that we now moved onto the sand dunes. The softness of
the sand contrasted with the harder woodland floor and, as I walked,
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the sand moved lightly underfoot, tiny grains cascaded beneath my
feet like time falling through an hourglass. 
About halfway through the walk we were given bottled water and an
apple. Invited to sit in woodland clearing, I took my place on a soft
square grey seat perched on an uneven bank. This was a time for
quiet reflection, listening to the natural sounds mixed in with a soft,
warbling  choral  music  drifting  through  the  air  –  “a  recording  of
crickets slowed down by Tom Waits” (Barkham, 2012, para. 6). As I
sat and slowly ate an apple, I was lost in time; it is not that I was
simply unaware of time but that I was unconcerned with its passage.
Having surrendered my time in exchange for a distinct experience, I
wondered at how I might measure its value. How much is my time
worth? What reward will investment of my time in this walk bring?
This moment was the very personification of the liminoid phase I
was experiencing. I was in the literal middle of the walk as well as
the metaphorical middle of a transformative experience. I was aware
of  the  ephemerality  of  the  experience  but  unaware  of  the  true
passage  of  time.  Like  spontaneous  communitas,  it  was  not  a
“permanent  condition”  (Turner,  1969,  p.  140)  but  there  was
something “’magical’” about it … the feeling of endless power” (p.
139).  The  experience  of  duration  in  Walking was  transitory,
impermanent and ephemeral but, like all transformative experiences,
a  trace  remained  that  was  static,  permanent  and  lasting.  Unlike
Schechner’s  theory  of  transportation,  where  the  participant  or
spectator  returns  to  his  or  her  former  state  unchanged,
transformation leaves an ineffaceable imprint on the human psyche.
Distinct from walking as a recreational activity, Wilson’s performance
utilized the simple  act  of  walking  and framed it  as  such that  we
became  more  aware  of  each  step.  Our  surroundings  and  their
imprints  remain  in  us  like  the  “heavier  and  still  heavier  load”  of
memories  that  Bergson  sees  us  carrying  as  we  grow  older
(1903/1999, p. 40).  
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The pace was re-established as I continued my walk into the woods,
an  angel  leading  me  for  a  few  steps.  The  walker  ahead  of  me
seemed  to  race  into  the  future  as  I  attempted  to  maintain  a
deliberately slow pace. I wondered if this route was chosen for the
multitude of broken trees; they seemed to be falling into each other,
unable to remain supported by the solidness of the earth; their roots
no longer able to connect to the ground, melting and melding into
their nearest neighbour.  I  smiled as I  imagined the trees being a
reference  to  the  distortion  of  time  on  this  walk,  and  I  began  to
wonder whether the sense of transformation was being experienced,
imagined or even pre-imagined. I was reminded of Bergson’s effort
of intuition and not simply, as Muldoon (2008) suggests, “some sort
of alerted state of consciousness or semi-dream state” (p. 75); I was,
perhaps,  moving  consciously  towards  a  pre-determined  state  of
being.  Did  I  want the  experience  to  have  some  kind  of
transformative effect?  Our beliefs and goals are influenced by what
we believe to  be  possible  and the  potential  for  this  possibility  to
become reality. 
Post-liminoid: The possible and the real
Can transformation only be possible if one believes it is achievable?
Once  the  state  of  transformation  has  been  achieved,  one  might
believe that this has always been possible because of the way in
which our memories view the past in the present. Although, in order
to recognize change or transformation one must be aware, firstly of
their state  before and after a transformation in order to recognize
that such a process has taken place. 
In  his  introduction  to  The  Creative  Mind,  Bergson  (1946/1992)
suggests some people “will  always believe an event could not be
accomplished if it had not been possible of accomplishment: so that
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before being real  it  must  have been possible”  (p.  21).  Using  the
example of a musician composing a symphony, he argues that we
waver between ‘possibility’ as two different things. If the possibility of
a symphony is real because there is “no insurmountable barrier to its
realization” (p. 21), then “we imagine that everything which occurs
could have been foreseen by any sufficiently  informed mind,  and
that, in the form of an idea, it was thus pre-existent to its realization”
(p. 21). Bergson sees this as an absurd idea but in the case of life in
the  universe,  there  “still  persists  that  even  if  it  has  not  been
conceived before being produced,  it  could have been,  and in this
sense from all eternity it has existed as possible, in some real or
virtual intelligence” (p. 22). Our logic “cannot help throwing present
realties, reduced to possibilities or virtualities, back into the past, so
that what is compounded now must, in its eyes, always have been
so”  (p.  26).  Bergson  argues  this  is  an  illusion  because  of  a
retroactive effect:
Things  and  events  happen  at  certain  moments;  the
judgment which determines the occurrence of the thing or
the event can only come after them; it therefore has its
date. But this date at once fades away, in virtue of the
principle  deep-rooted  in  our  intellect,  that  all  truth  is
eternal.  It  matters  not  that  it  had  never  yet  been
formulated:  it  existed  by  right  before  existing  in  fact.
(1946/1992, p. 22)
Bergson  (1889/1910)  asserts  that  we  project  the  past  onto  the
present  in  a  way  that  deceives  us  into  believing  events  or
accomplishments have always existed, even before being realized.
In his earlier writing he suggests, “[p]ractically we perceive only the
past,  the  pure  present  being  the  invisible  progress  of  the  past
gnawing into the future.” (p. 194); as such, the “past is contracted
into the present” (Bergson, 1946/1992, p. 27).  The retroactive logic
that we use, Bergson (1946/1992) believes, should not be rejected
but “we must extend it, make it more supple, adapt it to a duration in
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which novelty is constantly springing forth and evolution is creative”
(p. 26).                                              
The relation between the possible and the real was something that
Bergson (1946/1992) believed “can be a preparation for the art of
living” (p. 106).  His 1920 lecture The Possible and the Real outlined
that the possible is only real once it is held in reality. Thus, the idea
of possibility is only so once it has been realized, an illusory effect of
retroaction. A key premise of ritual is that we believe in the possible
before  it  is  real,  but  it  is  only  through  the  ‘becoming’  or
transformation that we really achieve that possibility; retroactively we
will always have believed in its possibility even if it had previously
remained unaccomplished. The act of faith that is often associated
with ritual – we believe in the potential outcome otherwise we would
not participate – would be questioned if the possible did not become
the  real.  The  prospect  of  talking  part  in  Walking offered  the
possibility  of  transformation,  of  an  altered  state  of  being.  This
potentiality of change, of ‘thrillingly altering perceptions of space and
time’, was suggested in promotional literature for the performance
and so,  whilst  the  possibility  of  changing my perceptions at  pre-
performance stage was not real, I believed it was possible because
it  became real:  thus  I  always  believed  it  was  real.  The  potential
efficacy of the performance may have been accentuated for me, as I
was certainly aware of the broad nature of  Walking,  classified as
performance (or even ritual) rather than theatre. 
The novelty ”constantly springing forth [where] evolution is creative”
(Bergson,  1946/1992,  p.  26)  is  explored  further  in  Bergson’s
assertion that however much one might be able to imagine an event,
the reality is different from the possibility and, as with many of his
other philosophical ideas, he returns to the role of duration: 
32
I  should  compare  them [the  repetitions  of  evolutionary
process] to the swinging of the pendulum of a clock: the
swingings of the pendulum are coupled to the continuous
unwinding of a spring linking them together and whose
unwinding  they  mark;  the  repetitions  of  the  inorganic
world constitute rhythm in the life of conscious beings and
measure their duration. Thus the living being essentially
has  duration;  it  has  duration  precisely  because  it  is
continuously elaborating what is new and because there
is no elaboration without searching, no searching without
groping.  Time125 is  this  very hesitation, or it  is  nothing.
(1946/1992, pp. 92-3) 
Bergson regards the idea of  novelty,  of  a constant becoming, as
being an essential part of our existence and the creative force of life.
The term ‘groping’  to  describe  a  living  being’s  duration  suggests
searching for an  unknown something. Bergson’s assertion that the
living  being  has  duration  because of  this  groping  for  novelty  is
important  in  experiencing    each  moment  of  our  existence  as  a
becoming,  rather  than  being  diminished  by  the  homogeneity  of
clock-time. In extracting the “stability and regularity there is in the
flow  of  reality”  (Bergson,  1946/1992,  p.  95),  we  find  a  way  of
knowing as  our  intelligence arranges and rearranges experience.
Bergson (1946/1992) sees this reality as: 
[G]lobal  and  undivided  growth,  progressive  invention,
duration;  it  resembles  a  gradually  expanding  rubber
balloon assuming at each moment unexpected forms. But
our intelligence imagines its origin and evolution as an
arrangement  and  rearrangement  of  parts  which
supposedly  merely  shift  from one  place  to  another;  in
theory  therefore,  it  should  be able  to  foresee any one
state of the whole: by positing a definite number of stable
elements  one  has,  predetermined,  all  their  possible
combinations.” (pp. 95-6) 
125
 Bergson does not always distinguish between time and duration although I
have made important distinctions between these two terms (see p. 6). 
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Our  duration,  then,  is  limited  by  the  ways  in  which  perceive  our
growth; by attempting to spatialize parts of our beings in order for
them  to  be  rearranged  restricts  our  growth  and  therefore  our
understanding and experience of duration.   
Post-liminoid: (Dis)Order
In addressing reality as an ever-expanding growth, Bergson sees
that emptiness would then appear to be an impossibility as there is
as much in emptiness as in fullness. Arguing that nothingness is
merely a substitution of something with something else, he states:
[T]his so-called representation of absolute emptiness is,
in reality, that of universal fullness in a mind which leaps
indefinitely  from  part  to  part,  with  the  fixed  resolution
never  to  consider  anything  but  the  emptiness  of  its
dissatisfaction  instead  of  the  fullness  of  things.
(1946/1992, p. 98) 
In other words, emptiness is merely a space to be filled and “implies
as much matter  as  the idea of  All”  (Bergson,  1946/1992,  p.  98).
Bergson  applies  a  similar  justification  in  discussing  order  and
disorder: 
there is  less in the idea of the empty than in the idea of
the  full,  less in  the  concept  of  disorder  than in  that  of
order. In reality, there is more intellectual content in the
ideas of disorder and nothingness when they represent
something than in those of order any existence, because
they  imply  several  orders,  several  existences  and,  in
addition, a play of wit which unconsciously juggles with
them. (p. 99) 
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There is as much to be found in disorder as in order although the
latter is often privileged above the former but, as Bergson suggests,
“[d]isorder is simply the order we are not looking for”  (p. 98). His
assertion of our view of empty being less than the idea of the full is
extended into a discussion regarding the possible and real: “there is
especially the idea that the possible is  less than the real, and that,
for this reason, the possibility of things precedes their existence” (p.
99). We only realize the real once we think back to the possibility of
the real – the imagined act.
That  one  can  put  reality  into  the  past  and  thus  work
backwards in time is something I have never claimed. But
that  one can put  the  possible  there,  or  rather  that  the
possible may put itself there, or rather that the possible
may put itself there at any moment, is not to be doubted.
As  reality  is  created  as  something  unforeseeable  and
new,  its  image  is  reflected  behind it  into  the  indefinite
past; thus it finds that it has from all time been possible,
but  it  is  at  this  precise  moment  that  it  begins  to  have
always  been  possible,  and  that  is  why  I  said  that  its
possibility,  which does not precede its reality,  will  have
preceded it once the reality has appeared. The possible
is therefore the mirage of the present in the past; and as
we know the future will finally constitute a present and the
mirage  effect  is  continually  being  produced,  we  are
convinced  that  the  image  of  tomorrow  is  already
contained in our actual present, which will be the past of
tomorrow,  although  we  did  not  manage  to  grasp  it.126
(Bergson, 1946/1992, p.101) 
Thus the present reality reflects the possible like a mirage back into
the past; the “possible does exist, if not for the future, then at least
as a past for the present. It is in terms of a future made possible by
the present that possibility is an illusion that Bergson consistently
condemns”  (Mullarkey,  2000,  p.  173).  As  it  is  not  possible  to
126
 There is a parallel here with Benjamin’s ‘angel of history’. See discussion in
Chapter Five (p. 83). 
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determine the future,  possibility  can only  be projected backwards
from the present. Similarly, Gunter (2007) notes, the possible is “an
optical  illusion,  a  retrospective mirage that  we have inadvertently
projected onto the prior past” (p. 35). Our belief in the transformative
potential of an event may not have existed before the event and it is
the actualization of the event that makes us perceive it as possible
in the past. Thus, it is “the real which makes itself possible, and not
the possible which becomes real” (Bergson, 1946/1992, p. 104) and
“can be a preparation for the art of living” (p. 106). Bergson returns
to examples from the arts to suggest it absurd we should think a
work of art  impossible before it  is  real  and suggests it  is  equally
absurd to suppose, “in the work of nature that the future is outlined
in advance, that possibility existed before reality” (p. 103). Thus, if
we can apply this principle to art we should be able to do the same
to  life  itself  as,  “[b]ackwards  over  the  course  of  time  a  constant
remodeling of the past by the present, of the cause by the effect, is
being carried  out”  (p.  104).  Duration as a “flow of  unforeseeable
novelty”  (p.  105)  is  a  powerful  concept  for  Bergson;  it  has  the
potential to be the force of creation (i.e. life itself). He asserts it will
give us “greater strength … [as] participating creators of ourselves,
in the great work of creation” (p. 105) and, through this acceptance
of unforeseeable novelty where the real makes the possible, we are
able to experience duration. 
Liminoid
This reality of an unforeseeable novelty was exemplified in the final
stages of Walking. I could take my time and enjoy the experience of
moving slowly towards an unknown finishing point. Walking at about
1mph seemed at odds with the rapidity of the external world. I took
my time simply to walk very slowly, an activity that appeared to offer
little  tangible  reward  or  output,  whilst  imagining  the  socially-
accelerated world racing by. In that world, the compartmentalization
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of clock-time suppresses the novelty of duration; the possibility of
the future is seen as minutes and hours and laid before us as if it
were already real. As Bergson proves, this is not the case as the
possible  is  only  real  once  it  has  become reality;  thus  the  future
expressed as clock-time is an illusion as the possible exists only as
a past for the present. 
For the first time in the walk I caught a glimpse of the sea through
the sand dunes. In the distance there appeared to be a cone shaped
construction rising out of the sand. Having walked alone for a while,
the appearance of other participants made me realize the role and
potential of solitude, but also the presence of others in the sharing of
an experience.  
I  once  more  became  part  of  a  train  of  walkers,  equidistant  and
moving somnambulistically.  Intermittently, the train of people slowed
down  or  halted,  as  the  distance  between  each  walker  was  re-
established. Occasionally, it was necessary for our natural rhythms
to be realigned with that of other participants, the landscape and the
sea. 
The line of walkers came to a stop. Ahead of me, I saw six people,
several people behind. The conical building loomed ever larger in
my view; the sea in the background, the sky began to fill with clouds
– all of these elements gave a clear sense of time having passed.
There was a stillness in the air that seemed to last longer than the
ten or  fifteen seconds I  estimated to  have passed.  We began to
move again. 
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As we stopped, I noticed a man who gestured to those behind him to
stop and then to  start  moving again.  Was he so unaware of  the
natural  standstill  that  occurred? Was he someone who feels  lost
without a watch? There was a mastery of time to be gained during
this walk but this could only happen once the artificial mastery of the
clock had been relinquished. 
For the third time we stopped as we approached the conical shaped
building. By now, the transformative possibilities of this piece were
becoming  increasingly  apparent.   There  was  a  clear  sense  of
emerging  from the  other  side  of  this  liminoid  experience,  and  of
being reincorporated into normative experience. This building was,
according to journalist Patrick Barkham (2012), representative of the
“the mysterious temple of the mind” (para. 8). This was intended to
offer a contrast to the first installation where we stood around the
circular pit, that “Wilson likens to a human being … the bottomless
conical shape with an amplified groan playing … is heavy, like feet;
the walking part of the body” (Barkham, 2012, para. 8). This conical
building was a peak rising out of the ground, a mirror image of the
first  installation,  penetrating  deep  underground  and  perhaps
narrowing as it diminished. 
My  mind  returned  to  the  white  sticks  that  marked  our  way  and
punctuated our progress. Other walkers appeared to have placed
pinecones, twigs and pebbles around and on top of the sticks in a
kind  of  palimpsest,  thus  marking  the  thoughts  of  preceding
participants.  
When I reached the conical building an angel invited me inside. As I
entered through a low circular doorway, I looked upwards to gauge a
sense of its height. With a simple gesture, the angel requested that I
32
wait inside. As I stood listening to serene music, I felt a sense of an
ending being near.
I exited through a larger, oblong doorway. A symbolic transformation
had occurred in a pyramid evocative of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs
(or an upside down cone of memory) – I had reached a peak.
I use the term ‘peak’ to imply an end as well as reaching a summit or
highest  point.  The  ‘peak’  not  only  refers  to  Maslow’s  peak-
experience and a transformation but the peak of this performance,
the  peak  of  my  ‘field’  work,  and  the  literal  peak  of  the  conical
building. This moment, for me, truly exemplified the combination of
peak-experience, flow, and communitas as well as moving closer to
a  sense  of  understanding  Bergsonian  duration.  This  point  in  my
journey  from  Hotel  Medea to  Walking,  illustrated  both  the
ephemerality and tangibility of the concepts explored across all three
case studies. Whilst each concept was tackled in isolation, reflecting
on them at  this  moment  in  Norfolk  brought  shards of  involuntary
memory  from  Edinburgh  and  London.  Writing  now  about  this
moment,  I  reflect  that  these  memories  were  a  kind  of  peak-
experience,  something  that  “cannot  be  bought  … guaranteed  …
even be sought” (Maslow, 1971, p. 46). In the process of seeking to
understand  duration  through  the  lenses  of  Maslow,
Csikszentmihalyi, and Turner, each theorist has illuminated the other
in an unexpected but serendipitous way.  
On the other side of the pyramid was a beach. An angel, dressed in
a yellow poncho led me to an upright wooden bed, a moment that
for theatre critic Kate Bassett (2012), felt “like a transcendent, poetic
death”  (para.  9)  and for  fellow critic  Susannah Clapp,  was when
spectators were “turned both into human sacrifices and scanners of
the skies” (2012, para. 5).  I stood and looked out to sea as I was
32
slowly lifted via a pulley system into a horizontal position. A view of
the sea was superseded by a view of the sky, although the smell of
the salt stayed with me. This seemed to be the end or at least, it felt
like the end. 
Returning  to  vertical  normality,  it  appeared  that  the  formation  of
walkers  had  dissolved;  the  measured  pace  was  no  longer  being
enforced. Despite the dissolution, I maintained the former pace, as it
seemed  somehow  appropriate.  In  this  manner,  the  stage  of
reincorporation in the ritual process was continued. 
Despite the significance attached to the liminal phase of betwixt and
between,  we  remained  separated,  although  separation  is  the
opposite  of  communitas,  until  we  were  reincorporated  into  our
former  culture  with  new  conditions.  Crucially,  the  reincorporation
phase exemplified the changes I had undergone. It was only through
emerging  from  the  other  side  that  I  was  able  to  recognize  the
results. 
At the end of the performance, I was invited to return to the starting
point by foot or minibus. As I headed towards the latter I started to
consider and evaluate how much time had passed as well as the
possibility  of  transformation.  As  I  proceeded  along  the  beach
towards the minibus,  an angel  greeted me.  ‘Do you know where
you’re heading’? he said, looking up from his book. ‘Towards the
minibus’ I replied. ‘OK – just walk along the beach for ten minutes
and you’ll  be  there’  he  said,  and looked down at  his  book once
more. I smiled as I continued walking as it occurred to me that I had
no idea how long ten minutes felt at that moment. Such temporal
irony could only be incidental. 
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Post-liminoid
Arriving back at the car park, I checked the time as I switched on my
BlackBerry. At 5.50pm the whole experience had lasted around four
and half hours. At this final point, there was little external sense of a
transformation having occurred. To the remaining dog walkers and
tourists,  the  scattering  participants  of  Walking were  coincidental
entities  of  the  landscape.  This  thought  directed  me  towards
considering  the  subjectivity  of  the  whole  experience  and  of  the
experience  of  duration.  The  spontaneous  communitas  that  had
occurred,  like  Turner  suggests,  had  disappeared  in  a  cloud  of
transience. The trace it leaves behind in its wake, however, has a far
more permanent legacy: it supports a structural realignment of the
phenomenal self and, in Bergson’s philosophy of duration, a novelty
of  experience  that  contributes  to  an  ever-growing  identity.  The
experience had provided an alternative encounter with duration even
though I fell too easily back into the socially accelerated world. As
Turner  (1969)  suggests,  “it  is  the  fate  of  all  spontaneous
communitas  in  history  to  undergo  what  most  people  see  as  a
“‘decline and fall’ into structure and law” (p. 132). I had returned to a
clock-time  driven  culture  but  my  experience  of  spontaneous
communitas in  Walking gave a new perspective on the ‘structure
and  law’  of  clock-time,  much  as  ritual  experience  enhances
everyday  life  and  offers  opportunity  for  reflection.  The  ritual-like
liminoid experience of Walking had generated communitas in which
Bergsonian duration was achieved through an effort of intuition and
recognition  of  unforeseeable  novelty,  leading  to  an  ultimately
transformative experience. 
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Conclusion – (Re)Ma(r)king Time?
Making time, marking time, remarking (on) time, remaking time. At
the  beginning  of  this  thesis  I  suggested  my  use  of  parentheses
implied  time  is  a  quantitatively  constructed  concept  marked  by
clocks  and  calendars.  I  also  proposed  that  because  time  is  a
construct, a qualitative alternative of duration can be experienced.
This  duration,  described  by  Bergson  (1903/1999)  as  that which
“excludes  all  idea  of  juxtaposition,  reciprocal  externality,  and
extension”  (p.  26)  enables  a  view  and  experience  of  the  world
beyond  that  of  the  socially  accelerated  culture  which  holds  the
measure of a productive life to be “an increase in quantity per unit of
time”  (Rosa, 2005/2013, p. 65). This socially accelerated culture is
now  so  prevalent  in  late  capitalist  society  (currently  defined  as
Neoliberal)  that  individuals are  left  with  few opportunities  to  slow
down  and  feel  less  time-pressured;  thus  they  never  manage  “to
reconcile  the  time  of  life  with  the  time  of  the  world”  (Rosa,
2005/2013,  p.  185).  This  feeling  of  being  time-pressed  is  further
exacerbated by the pressures of a network society, in which we are
constantly connected. Such networks are often lauded as a means
of taking control of time but, as Rosa (2005/2013), Hassan (2007;
2009; 2012) and others argue, this is not always the case. 
Bergson’s philosophy of duration is central to this thesis, posited as
an alternative to clock-time. Although the majority of performance is
quantified  for  smooth  consumption,  durational  performance  may
provide respite from our socially accelerated culture in which clock-
time  dominates. Heathfield  (2009)  has  suggested  that  durational
performance draws our “corporeal attention” to a “sense passage” in
which  time  is  reformed,  generating  “inchoate  orders  or  other
phenomena” (p. 22).127 Such transformations have been outlined in
127
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my autoethnographic readings of performances that have drawn on
the theories of  Maslow, Csikszentmihalyi,  and Turner  to  illustrate
how Bergson’s intangible concept of duration can be understood in
an embodied sense. The ‘other phenomena or inchoate orders’ of
peak-experience, flow, and communitas have emerged as a result of
combining  them with  an  exploration  of  Bergsonian duration,  thus
offering an antidote to the stresses of fast capitalism which “meshes
poorly” with the rhythms of human existence (Rosa & Scheuerman,
2008/2009, p. 25). In this sense, using performance as a means of
challenging a socially accelerated culture may offer a possibility and
opportunity  to  decelerate.   The  experience  of  the  “premodern
peasant, who does not live in a linear, progressive time with an open
future but in a cyclical time with reiterated rhythms … and thus dies
‘old and sated with life’” (Rosa, 2005/2013, p. 184) is not an ideal
that can ever be reclaimed. It seems that the network time that is
fast replacing clock-time further removes these reiterated rhythms.
However,  experiencing an alternative to  clock-time in  the form of
duration may be something that can be sought through performance
lasting  beyond  comfortable  consumption.  As  I  stated  in  Chapter
One, I  have not attempted to offer a ‘prescription’ for achieving a
sense of duration, nor do I suggest that transformation (in whatever
form) will be an inevitable or even desired consequence for  every
audience member at a performance. Rather, this thesis is an attempt
to describe an embodiment of Bergsonian duration and illustrate my
endeavors in exploring this concept. 
It may be contentious to suggest there is value in seeking respite
from a socially accelerated clock-measured culture. Nevertheless, in
attending performance lasting beyond comfortable consumption, the
‘time-pressed’  individual  can pause and attach significance to  an
event itself rather than the time in which it happens or how long it
takes to complete it. As Rosa (2005/2013) states, “[s]elective social
 See opening paragraphs of Chapter Two (pp. 23-4). I suggest that these
‘inchoate’ orders are manifest in peak-experience, flow, and communitas. 
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deceleration for the purpose of hindering an erosion of institutions
necessary for the continued existence of society may be, from both
a cultural and structural perspective, a functional requirement of the
contemporary acceleration society” (p. 89). Experiencing Bergsonian
duration may be necessary to support a society that functions on the
continued dominance of clock-time. Paradoxically, to accelerate we
must also decelerate. Heidegger’s assertion that acceleration hides
an abandonment of being offers a stern warning to those who praise
the  ubiquity  of  speed  and  efficiency.  Whether  one  subscribes  to
Heidegger’s thought or not, it is certainly true that speed regulated
and driven by the clock and the network induces stress and feelings
of being harried.  
The  potential  efficacy  of  duration  illustrated  in  accounts  of  each
performance has been exemplified in a number of ways. Uniting the
case studies in this thesis is the suggestion that an experience and
subsequent understanding of Bergsonian duration has produced a
transformation.  Given  the  difficulty  of  measuring  or  quantifying
transformation  there  is  a  sense  in  which  the  concepts  of  peak-
experience, flow and communitas have been utilized in an effort to
make the intangible tangible.  Nevertheless, the central argument of
this  thesis  -  that  our  connection  with  ‘real’  time  in  the  form  of
duration may offer an efficacious alternative to clock-time - is clearly
evident in two ways. Firstly, it may produce a transformation for the
spectator and secondly, it offers a pause from social acceleration.
This pause from smooth consumption and therefore clock-time is not
a permanent alternative. It can, however, produce a transformation
that endures and thus allows social acceleration to endure. 
 
In  Chapter  Six,  my  analysis  of  Hotel  Medea explored  Bergson’s
notion of pure memory invading the present and therefore making
each moment  unique;  a  sense of  duration  occurred because the
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invading  memory  exemplified  the  heterogeneity  of  duration.  The
transformation resulting from this experience was illustrated using
Maslow’s  concept  of  self-actualization,  manifested  as  peak-
experience.  For  me,  the  peak-experience  was  in  gaining  an
understanding of Bergsonian duration and a sense of the “here-now”
(Maslow, 1971, p. 254) that is lost through strictly adhering to the
conventions of the clock and the pressures of a networked society.
My  experience  of  Hotel  Medea was  significant  in  shaping  the
structure of this thesis. The role of involuntary memory was apparent
at  various  other  moments  during  my research  journey  and,  as  I
suggest  in  both  the  Einstein and Walking chapters,  peak-
experiences  and  instances  of  flow  occurred  at  various  moments
beyond the first case study.    
In  Chapter  Eight  Csikszentmihalyi’s  notion  of  flow,  in  which
individuals learn to enjoy immediate experience, was illustrated by
my autoethnographic account of a performance often regarded as
visually  and  aurally  challenging.  By  apparently  adopting the
conventions of western theatre space and a concomitant sense of
smooth consumption,  Einstein  actually  illuminated and highlighted
the experience of duration. As with my use of peak-experience to
assess transformation in Hotel Medea, examining Einstein as a flow
experience  further  enhanced  my  understanding  of  Bergsonian
duration. Like peak-experience, the concept of flow is not amenable
to  measurement  and  so  Bergson’s  privileging  of  intuition  over
intellect was a useful notion in making sense of my experience of
duration during  Einstein. In  Einstein, a transformation transpired in
me  because  my flow  experience  and  my encounter  with  a
heterogeneous duration was elucidated, thus  reforming time. This
analysis of Einstein ended with a suggestion by Shalson (2012) that
resisting clock-time “might be connected to letting ourselves live …
put[ting]  us  in  touch  with  qualitatively  multiple,  affectively  rich,
diverse  and  layered  experiences  that  exceed  capitalist  logics  of
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value”  (p.  101).  Shalson’s  words  echo  my  assertion  that
performance  lasting  beyond  comfortable  consumption  can
potentially have an efficacious and transformative effect on our daily
lives; the pairing of Bergsonian duration and flow offers a strategy
for doing so. 
As  I  progressed  from  Hotel  Medea to  Einstein  on  the  Beach,  I
recognized the occurrence of peak-experiences and a sense of how
Maslow’s  B-Values  offer  possibilities  for  viewing  the  socially
accelerated world from a different perspective. Crucially, it was my
examination of Maslow  with Bergson that strengthened a notion of
how  it  is  possible  to  step  aside  from  the  speed  of  a  socially
accelerated and networked society;  Maslow’s notion of  the peak-
experience made Bergsonian duration tangible and vice versa. In
Hotel  Medea,  there  were  moments  that,  on  reflection,  were
instances of communitas. The club-like atmosphere of Jason and
Medea’s wedding seemed to exemplify a sense of belongingness
although this was not apparent to me at the time, as I began my
exploration  of  Bergson.  It  was  only  later,  during  Walking,  that  I
began  to  see  the  interconnectedness  of  peak-experience,  flow,
communitas and duration as a melting pot of complementary ideas.
Chapter Ten used Turner’s notion of communitas to illustrate how
the anti-structure of duration can emerge and be re-absorbed into
the structure of social acceleration and smooth consumption. It may
even  be  that  this  temporary  “flow  of  unforeseeable  novelty”
(Bergson, 1946/1992, p. 105) and these moments of “unadulterated
inner  continuity”  (Bergson,  1946/1992,  p.14)  become increasingly
accessible as we practice our encounters with them.  The peak of
my  research  journey  towards  understanding  Bergsonian  duration
arrived during Walking.  The journey time from Edinburgh to Norfolk
was, in calendrical terms, only twelve months apart. In reflecting on
that journey now, after a further forty-eight months of writing, I see
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that performance lasting beyond smooth consumption not only offers
an opportunity to examine and understand Bergson’s duration, but
also  that  it  creates  a  portal  through  which  everyday  accelerated
experience can be escaped, much in the same way that meditation
might temporarily suspend our networked lives. In this sense, the
performances discussed in this thesis not only offered a portal to an
alternative experience of time (and an understanding of duration),
but  demonstrated  how  decompressing  our  usual  experience  of
performance can be liberating. Performance, like every other aspect
of  socially  accelerated  life,  has  been  the  victim  of  shortened
attention  spans  and  a  desire  for  instantaneity.  Decompressing
performance might also be a positive move forwards for theatre, as
well as for the well-being of time-pressed individuals, as the value of
learning from durational performance becomes more elevated. Thus
the thesis demonstrates the role of performance in offering a pause
from  constant  acceleration  and  its  associated  stresses  through
reexamining our relationship with time.  
The potential value of Bergsonian duration is important in a socially
accelerated  culture  and  networked  society  for,  when  being
constantly driven forward there is little time to reflect.  Bergsonian
duration  offers  us  a  vehicle  for  the  management  of  social
acceleration, for clearer reflection and an associated sense of well-
being.  Hsieh,  an  artist  whose  work  certainly  extends  beyond
comfortable consumption,  suggests the passage of  “[t]ime makes
some  memories  unstable;  meanwhile  it  embeds  the  profound
memories in one’s body, and makes them even more solid” (as cited
in  Heathfield  &  Jones,  2012,  p.  461).  In  making  these  profound
memories solid,  a transformative experience is  required;  one that
may be found in duration, with performance being a medium through
which to explore this possibility. 
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